



THE
FREEDOM OF THE WILL

AS A BASIS OF

HUMAN RESPONSIBILITY AND A DIVINE GOVERNMENT

ELUCIDATED AND MAINTAINED IN ITS ISSUE
WITH THE NECESSITARIAN THEORIES

OF

HOBBS, EDWARDS, THE PRINCETON ESSAYISTS, AND OTHER
LEADING ADVOCATES.

BY D. D. WHEDON, D.D.

Ὅτι οὐδέ τις ἦν τοῖς σπουδαίοις ἔπαινος ἀρετῆς, οὐδέ τις θεοφιλία, οὐδὲ τῶν ἐν ἀσκήσει πόνων καρπὸς ἐπάξιος, ἀνάγκης καὶ εἰμαρμένης τὴν αἰτίαν πάντων ἀναδεδεγμένης.—*Eusebius, Prep. Evang.*, lib. 6.

Qui introducunt causarum seriem sempiternam, ii mentem hominis voluntate libera spoliata necessitate fati devinciunt.—*Cicero de Fato*.

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P R E F A C E.

ANY substantial contribution to the most difficult of all psychological and moral problems, the reconciliation of the sense of Responsibility with our intellectual conclusions regarding the nature of Choice, must be a service to a true psychology, a consistent theology, and a rational piety. It can hardly be expected that any single mind will at the present time so solve this problem, even with all the aids his predecessors in the discussion afford, as to leave nothing to his successors to elucidate. Yet the present writer would not offer this treatise to the public did he not believe that even to so ancient a debate he had furnished some new thoughts, and brought the difficulty nearer to a solution.

Upon such a subject it is a matter of course that, agreeing or disagreeing, a writer would have something to say of President Edwards. Disagreeing with him fundamentally, the present writer has taken an unequivocal but respectful issue with that great thinker. Whether he has not demonstrated forever the existence of a number of undeniable fallacies in the "Inquiry" on the Will, fallacies that vitiate its most important conclusions, it is for the reader to judge.

The method of Edwards was first to institute a psychological and logical investigation of the operations of the volitional faculty demonstrating its necessity in action, and then to bring the moral intuitions into accordance with the intellectual con-

clusions. His apparent success in the first part was signal, but not half so signal as his failure in the second. That an Edwards should have so failed by that route is a justification of a despair of any possible success. We have in a measure reversed the method. We have first assumed the prior validity of the intuitions, and then sought by their guidance to ascertain how our psychology and logic may be brought into harmony with their dicta. It is for others to decide how satisfactory the reconciliation.

In acuteness the intellect of Edwards has scarcely been surpassed. No cause, perhaps, ever had a keener advocate. *Advocate*, we say; for the intellect of Edwards was not, we venture to suggest, like that of Bacon, *judicial*, but *forensic*. He was not the Chancellor in the high court of thought, but the Attorney. He was born to his case; he accepted it as of course; his mind was shaped by and to it; and if his philosophy and theology are not triumphant, it is not, we repeat, for the want of about the acutest advocate that ever framed a special plea.

If there is a class of thinkers who are perfectly satisfied with the Edwardean method of reconciliation, or who see not the discord to be reconciled, or who find a moral advantage in holding both sides of the contradiction, this work can scarcely be considered as written for them. It is rather dedicated to the acceptance of those who feel the discord, and seek a more satisfactory harmony; of those who recognize the discord as absolute, and reject the doctrine of responsibility; but especially of those who, called to the sacred office of explaining and impressing the law of accountability upon the conscience, appreciate the necessity of making it acceptable to the reason.

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THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL.

PART FIRST.

THE ISSUE STATED.

CHAPTER I.

WILL ISOLATED AND DEFINED.

IN the following treatise we assume as correct the ordinary generic classification of the operations of the human mind into Intellections, Sensibil-^{Faculties threefold.} ities, and Volitions. The Intellect is that by which all things, material or immaterial, external or internal, moral or unethial, are cognized by the soul. The Sensibility is the capability of the mind of experiencing the feelings, namely, the emotions by which the mind is excited, or the desires by which it becomes appetent of objects. The Will is the volitional power by which alone the soul consciously becomes the intentional author of external action—external, that is, to the Will itself—whether of mind or body.

All the operations of the first two of these faculties, namely, Intellect and Sensibility, are universally felt, and acknowledged to be necessary and^{Necessity in two first.} absolutely caused. Present the object before the perceptive power, (the power being voluntarily or necessarily fixed,) and the object *must* be perceived as it presents itself. As when we place the object before a fixed mir-

ror, the mirror forthwith presents the correspondent image, so when we place the object before the fixed intelligence, the intelligence forthwith presents the perception. We may withdraw either the object or the mind; but when the two are brought into the proper juxtaposition the perception *necessarily* exists, just as it does exist. The Carthaginian, with his eyelids severed, could not but see the blazing orb of the sun to which his naked balls were forcibly exposed. Neither the sensorium nor the mind can vary or reject the sensation produced by the presentation. There are the absolute absence and non-existence of any alternative or contrary power either in the intellective or sensitive nature. No physical causation is more absolute than that which exists between the object and its mental results.

It is when penetrating more deeply we arrive at the Will—the mysterious seat of the volitional and responsible power—that the difficulty and controversy arise. The necessitarian affirms that between the motive and volition there exists the same absolute causation as between the object and the perception; a causation equivalent, therefore, in absoluteness and necessity, with any instance of physical causation. As when you place an externality before the mind the idea arises, as when you place an object before a mirror the image necessarily arises, so when you present before the Will the motive, the volition as necessarily springs forth. Contrary power, varying power, alternative power, *freedom*, are wholly non-existent and even inconceivable. Now no causation, however physical or mechanical, can be more absolute than where the power of a diverse result is inconceivable.

The freedomist, on the other hand, maintains that in Will—alone of all existences—there is an alternative power. Every species of existence has its own one and singular property. Matter alone has solidity; mind alone has intelligence; cause alone has ef-

Necessity
claimed in
the third.

Denied by
freedomists.

ficiency, and Will alone of causes has an alternative or pluri-efficient power. It is the existence or non-existence of this power in Will which constitutes the dispute between the necessitarian and the freedomist.

From what has been said above we might define WILL to be that faculty of the mind in whose exercises there is not felt the element of necessity. Definition of Will. But this is a definition in which all parties might not agree.

The definition of Edwards, that Will is "the power to choose," is on his own principle manifestly defective. It has the objection which Edwards By Edwards. brings against another definition, namely, that it needs definition as much as the term to be defined. *Choose* is a word as obscure as *Will*. In fact, if the definition be true, then to *choose* is to *will*; and the definition is no more than saying that the *Will is the power to will*, which is about the same as defining a thing by itself.

Nearer to an exact definition, yet not exact, is that of Coleridge, that "Will is that which originates action or state of being." It may, however, By Coleridge. be truly said that all cause originates action or state of being, and some further limitation seems therefore necessary. We define Will to be *that power of the soul by which it intentionally originates an act or state of being*. Or more precisely, *Will is the power of the soul by which it is the conscious author of an intentional act*. By present writer. And this definition furnishes a complete demonstration that the Will is a clearly different faculty from any other in the mind; for it is always distinguished and characterized by the *intention*, and also, as we shall hereafter note, by *motive*. Volition, indeed, might be defined as that act of the mind which it performs with intention. Peculiar distinction of Will.

Edwards and the older necessitarians held volition to be the same as desire, or at least to be included generically under it. This assumption False identification of Will and desire. would settle the question of necessity, inasmuch as it

is by all conceded that desires are in nature *necessary*; while, on the other hand, modern concession of the difference of the two is no surrender of the necessity of *Will*.

How indiscriminately the various terms belonging to the different faculties were used by elder necessitarians may appear from the following words of Edwards: "Whatever names we call the act of the Will by—choosing, refusing, approving, disapproving, liking, disliking, embracing, rejecting, determining, directing, commanding, forbidding, inclining, or being averse, a being pleased or displeased with—all may be reduced to this of choosing." Now, of the above terms, in order to a greater precision, we may say, 1. Approving, disapproving, coming to a conclusion and deciding, belong more properly to the intellective or moral faculty; 2. Liking, disliking, inclining, being averse, being pleased with or displeased with, to the sensitive nature; 3. Choosing, refusing, rejecting, determining, sometimes deciding, to the Will; 4. Embracing, directing, commanding, and forbidding, to external acts.

DESIRE, be it ever so intense, never becomes volition, but by a distinct *movement* known to consciousness; and no action can follow until volition arises. Desire is uneasy and stimulant; Will is decisive, and brings all the mind to acquiescence. Yet volition, like desire, is appetency and preference; it is a conscious free act of fixing a settlement upon its object, to which it brings the unity of the man.

Will may be distinguished from desire by the following points: 1. Volition is consciously distinct from desire. *in nature* from even the culminating desire. It is felt to be an *ACT*—a decisive *movement*—a putting forth of energy. It is a conscious projection, from interior power, of action upon its object. Desire is the flowing forth of appetency for an object; volition is the putting forth of action upon it. 2. Volition and desire *differ in their objects*. Desire is an appetency for some perceived

agreeable quality or agreeable thing in its object. The object of the volition is the post-volitional voluntary act which it effectuates. 3. We can conceive a being *full of coexisting and contending desires and emotions*, but *without any power of volition*, and so hemmed forever into a circle of passivities. 4. To volition, and not to any other mental operation, belong, as before said, *intention and motive*. This peculiarity alone would be sufficient to distinguish volition as a unique operation and Will as a special faculty. 5. There is no mental faculty which our consciousness so identifies with the *self* as the Will. When the Will governs the appetites or passions, we naturally say that the Man governs them; when they *govern* the Will, we say the man is governed by them. 6. The Will is alone that power by which *man becomes properly an AGENT* in the world. It is the bridge over which he *passes* in his *active power* to produce effects, according to design, on objects around him. No matter how intense or powerful may be his other feelings or faculties, he could never execute any projects, shape any objects, or *make any history* which he could call intentionally his own, without the faculty of Will. 7. Upon Will alone primarily rests from above the *weight of moral obligation*. And surely if, of all possible events, volition alone can be the primary object of obligation, it *ceases to be an arrogant or wonderful claim that in volition alone should exist the element of freedom*. The necessitarian allows that in one respect at any rate the event *volition is absolutely UNIQUE*; it is *sole and singular* among things; the freedomist, consequently, only claims for that unique superstructure, *responsibility*, an equivalently unique basis, *freedom*. 8. It is a fact that, while among all thinkers there is a perfect unanimity in attributing necessity to all the other mental operations, there is, to say the least, a very extensive and perpetuated denial of necessity in the volition. *The necessitarian is bound to account for both this una-*

nimity and this dissent. Here, then, is a distinction permanent and extensive between desire and volition. The desire is a mental operation to which all thinkers with perfect unanimity ascribe necessity; the volitions are a mental operation in which all deniers of necessity affirm with an equal unanimity that freedom resides.

INCLINATION belongs to the feelings, and not so properly either to the intellect or the Will. From his perception of an object a man feels *inclined* to choose it. It is the *feelings* that *incline*, and the Will remains quiescent until the initiation of the choice. "A mere inclination to a thing," says Dr. South, "is not properly a willing of that thing."

The DISPOSITIONS are the *feelings* viewed in relation to any particular object or volition. A man is said to be disposed to an object or act when his feelings are favorable to it; indisposed when they are the reverse.

A CHOICE is always a *volition*, but of a particular kind. It is, namely, a volition by which the agent appropriates to himself *one* of a class of objects or causes of action on account of some perceived comparative preferability in it. I choose, that is, appropriate to myself, one of a lot of apples, because I see it comparatively most eligible or preferable. I choose one of two roads at a fork because I see it comparably the preferable. I choose from among professions that which seems comparatively most eligible. I *choose* God, not I *will* God. I choose virtue, not I *will* virtue. Choice, then, is an appropriative comparative volition; usually, however, including also the external act. By it I *will* one of several things to be mine. To say that I will as I choose, is simply to say that one volition is as another volition. Definitions which make a choice not to be a volition are incorrect. In this treatise choice and volition are used interchangeably.

To PLEASE, as an intransitive, expresses a volition, and usually signifies to *will authoritatively*. So a deity or an autocrat *pleases* that a thing be thus or so, or he does

as he *pleases*. That is, he does as he authoritatively wills, chooses, or determines.

To PURPOSE is to will, to determine, predetermine, or resolve that something shall be willed or done at a future time. I now will or purpose to go to the city to-morrow. A purpose wills or predetermines now that perhaps an immense number of volitions shall take place. A volition thus comprehensive of many volitions, to which they more or less conform, may be called a Standard Purpose. This comprehensive purpose resolves the mind into a state of permanent determination. A man may act in view of one great life *purpose*.

The PREFERENCE is a recognition by the *intellect* that a given object or course is, on some account, or upon the whole, rather to be chosen than, or held in some way superior to, another with which it is compared. When a man on some account intellectually *prefers* an object he generally has a feeling of *inclination* to choose it. Nevertheless there may be coexistent with this *preference* an opposing *inclination* on some other account, in favor of which the Will may decide. Opposite dispositions and desires may, and often do, coexist in the same mind. Different affections, operations, and forces may exist within the soul, and, at the same instant, fluctuate and struggle for mastery.* This agitation might last forever had man, as previously said, no faculty of Will. He would be like the troubled sea, that cannot rest. It is by volition that the faculties are brought to unity and settlement.

Nevertheless to the Will also belongs a preferential state. When a volition has resolved the Will into a settled purpose that at the proper time it will give a particular volition, or adopt a certain cause or object, then so long the Will permanently *prefers* that volition course or object to a diverse.

The term INDIFFERENCE was often used by the old writers on the freedom of the Will in a technical sense. In ordinary language it now refers to the feelings as

* See p. 373.

being wholly without inclination for or against an object. But as in the feelings there may be no inclination, so in the Will there may be no volition; and until the Will chooses or differentiates, there is an indifference, non-differentiation, or quiescence. Whatever may be the co-existing and struggling or fluctuating inclinations and preferences, the Will does not differentiate or cease to be indifferent until it volitionates, chooses, or wills.

Consequent upon the interior *volitional* act performed by the Will is the external *voluntary* act performed by the body, obeying and executing the imperative volition. Yet it is not the body and the limbs alone which obediently execute the determinations of the interior Self through the Will. The mind also in its operations, intellectual and emotional, is more or less under the Will's control. To trace how complete this partial volitional control over body or mind is, is not our present purpose.

The **INTENTION** of an act, volitional or voluntary, objectively, is the result had in view to be produced by the act. This result may be immediate, or more or less remote. Of the same act, the intentions may be stated with a great variety. Thus an archer draws his bow. His intention is the discharge of an arrow. That is, such is the immediate result imaged and *intended* in his mind. But, more remotely, his purpose is that the arrow pierce the body of a stag. Still further remote, there are other and other successive intentions; and it is difficult to ascertain, often, the ultimate intention of an act or volition. For the intention, near, remote, and ultimate, whether accomplished or not, the agent is responsible. For all the legitimately calculable consequences, the agent is responsible. How far even for any consequences of a deliberately wicked act an agent may be responsible is debatable; since he who breaks law is fairly warned by his own reason that he indorses disorder, and so makes any disastrous consequence legitimate and responsible.

Distinction
between the
volitional
and volun-
tary.

Suppose, however, that, without any culpable want of care, the arrow of the archer, missing its aim, is so deflected by some object as to hit and slay his prince. At once it is seen no responsibility for the result accrues. He is irresponsible just because this result was not *intended*; that is, framed in his conception as that which he, as a volitional agent, exerted his power to bring into existence. Though partially an effect by him caused, that result comes upon him as unconceivedly as a lightning flash darting across his path. For the conception unsanctioned by the volition, and for the result unconceived and *unintended*, yet accomplished, there is equally no responsibility.

As the intellect, the emotions, and desires conditionally precede the volition, so we may call these the *prevolitional* conditions. The act of body or mind which follows as a consequent of the volition obeying its power and executing its requirements may therefore be called *post-volitional*; so that the position of the act of Will is with great precision identified. The *willing* act is adjectively called *volitional*; the consequent act of body or mind is called *voluntary*. When an athlete strikes a blow, his *willing* the blow is a *volitional*, and the physical motion of the arm which obeys and executes his volition is a *voluntary* act. So that we have the *prevolitional*, the *volitional*, and *post-volitional* or *voluntary* operations as the sum total of all human affections and activities.

The occasional confounding of the terms volitional and voluntary, and the transfer of the latter from the post-volitional act to the volition itself, is the source of some error and some unintentional sophisms. Thus Dr. Pond, in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, says: "If we originate our own voluntary exercises we must do it voluntarily or involuntarily. If we do it involuntarily, there is nothing gained certainly on the score of freedom. There can be no freedom or voluntariness

Unintentional act.

Order of operations.

Confusion of volitional with voluntary.

in an involuntary act of origination more than there is in the beating of the heart. But if we originate our own voluntary exercises voluntarily, this is the same as saying that we originate one voluntary exercise by another, which runs into the same absurdity as before."

Solution of
the fallacy.

To this we may for the present reply, that as the terms voluntary and involuntary are predicable only of the external actions in reference to the Will, the volitions are neither voluntary nor involuntary, but volitional. They are not intrinsically, as free, the product of a previous volition; nor in that does their freedom consist. What their freedom does imply appears in the proper place by our definition.

The younger Edwards, in his remark on his father's "Improvements in Theology," has the expression, "such volitions being, by the very signification of the term itself, voluntary." A voluntary volition is impossible. So on the same page he uses the term *spontaneity*, not, evidently, as Webster defines it, to signify *voluntariness*, but as the abstract of volition, *volitionality*.

Agent wills,
not the
faculty.

When we say that the Will wills, we really mean that the entire soul, or self, wills. It is the man who wills, and his Will is simply his power or being able to will. And the free Will is really the man free in willing. So it is the man, the soul, the self, that perceives, feels, and thinks. The faculties are not so many divisions of the soul itself, but rather so many classes of the soul's operations, and the soul viewed as capable of being the subject of them. And as in volition the whole soul is the Will, and in thinking the whole soul is the intellect, so it follows that the Will is intelligent, and the intelligence is volitional. When, therefore, we speak of Will, we speak not of a separate, blind, unintelligent agent, but of the whole intelligent soul engaged in and capable of volitional actions. It is in no way a separate substance or agent.

CHAPTER II.

FREEDOM OF THE WILL DEFINED.

FREEDOM is *exemption*. Either it is exemption from some impediment to the performance of some act, which is a freedom *to* the act; or it is an exemption from a limitation, confinement, or compulsion to perform the act; and this is a freedom in direction *from* the act.

To non-volitional objects there belong only the first of these two freedoms. All mechan- ^{Mechanical freedom.} isms are free only *to* the sole mode of act or state in which they are, or are about to be. The clock that strikes is free not *from* but only *to* the stroke. The river that flows is free only *to* the current, but not *from*. The lake that *stands* is free only *to* that *stand*, and not, at the same time, *from* the stand. But to volitional agents we do not with propriety ascribe freedom in the performance or occupancy of an act or state unless the exemptions exist both *to* and *from* the act or state. We hardly say of a man bound fast to the floor that he is free in lying there, or free *to* lie there. ^{Voluntary freedom.} If he is unbound, and still voluntarily remains lying, we say then that he does so *freely*. There is an exemption both *from* impediment and *from* limitation; that is, there is freedom both *to* and *from* the act. He performs *either way* freely: *freely*, because exempt from obstacle both ways, and free *to* or *from* both.

What is thus true of the freedom of a volitional agent in external action is, by parity, true of the same agent in volitional action. An agent ^{Volitional freedom.} exempt only from impediment, and so free only *to* the act, has not the proper freedom of a volitional agent, but of a machine. As the clock-hammer in the given case is free only *to* the stroke, so the agent in the given case is

free *to* the given volition, and not also in direction *from* it. He has only the freedom of a mechanical object, not the freedom of a volitional agent.

Freedom and
power.

Freedom is not identical with power. The freedom and the power are different, and either may be antecedent condition to the other. Either the freedom is an antecedent and a requisite condition to the existence or possible exertion of the power; or, reversely, the power is antecedent condition of which the freedom is the consequent. Thus, when the freedom is an exemption or deliverance from some restriction laid upon the capabilities of body or mind, then there comes, as a consequent, a new *power* of action or exertion. But when the freedom is exemption from *internal* or *intrinsic* restriction, impotence, or want of faculty, then the added power or faculty is antecedent, and the freedom of action or exertion is the consequent. Thus in the former case a removal of a fetter from the arm is a freedom which gives power for striking; or the removal of an opiate from the mind gives power for thought. In the latter case the bestowment of efficient wings upon the bird gives power and so freedom for or *to* flight; the bestowment of vigor upon the intellect gives freedom *to* thought.

In the case of Will the freedom is not identical with the power, but is a consequence of its existence. The confinement *to* a solely possible volition or direction is supposed to be *intrinsic* in the agent; and the bestowment of a power, or faculty, or removal of incapacity, for contrary volition, so that a volition either *to* or *from* the given direction is possible, creates that much a freedom. Hence the freedom is not identical with the additional contrary power, but is based and consequent upon it. I am free to will either way, *because* I have power or faculty either way. This distinction, though metaphysically accurate and important, seldom needs in our discussion to be noted. As each implies the other, and both are alike in debate, they may be usually treated as identical.

In the case of Will, the whole debate is as to the existence of this freedom *from*. In all their conceptions and definitions of freedom of Will, necessitarians never get beyond that sole freedom to the act or state which belongs to mechanics and to mathematics. It is a liberty *from*, as well as *to* which all freedomism asserts for the responsible agent. The question then arises, Freedom from what?

The question in regard to Will, we may answer, is awakened by the moral sense. Free will demanded by the moral sense. When a man is morally obligated or divinely commanded to will otherwise than he does, the question immediately arises, Can he will otherwise than he does will? Is he free *from*, as well as *to*, this act? Or is he limited by necessity in the given circumstances to will *just this ONE way*. Suppose that *one way* to be contrary to the command of Almighty God, or to his own best reason, or to the obligations of eternal right, or to his endless well-being, still between that way and his Will is there a sure tie securing that the disastrous volition shall be put forth? Is there any fate, predestination, antecedent causation, or law of invariable sequence, by which, all other directions being excluded, the Will is, like a mechanism, limited to one sole way? The moment these questions are asked the *great debate* between necessity and freedom commences.

These questions suggest the definition of the freedom which the moral sense requires. Bishop Bramhall defines it "an immunity from inevitability and determination to one." Definitions of freedom of will. We should define it as the power or *immunity to put forth in the same circumstances either of several volitions*. Or supposing a given volition to be in the agent's contemplation, it is the unrestricted power of putting forth in the same unchanged circumstances a different volition INSTEAD. Hence, it is often at the present day called *the power of contrary choice*.

Mechanical freedom then to any action is exemption from all impediment or preventive of positive action, and

so is freedom solely to the act. Voluntary freedom is exemption from impediment to the being or doing as we will, and is freedom *to* or *from* a certain post-volitional act. Volitional freedom, in regard to a given volition, is immunity to put forth it or other volition, and is freedom *to* or *from* it. Power solely to a thing being, Alternativity. in the given case, and with the given motives, without *alteriety* or *alternative*, we call an *inalternative power*, in opposition to a power which, being at once either *to* or *from*, we call *alternative power*, or *alternativity*. We extend the term to any number of different alternatives. The *alternativity* is as extensive as the *disjunctive* proposition which should enumerate them. Thus, *this, or that, or the other, or still another, is the possible object of alternative choice.**

Against the exceptions and evasions of this definition by necessitarians, the phrase "in the same Different act "in same circumstances." circumstances" is an important limitation. Necessitarians ambiguously grant that the will has a *power* of choosing a different from a given way, provided the circumstances are changed,† just as a compass needle

* For the introduction of a few new terms we think it scarce necessary to apologize. Our reason for such introduction is not certainly a mere fondness for novelty, but a purpose to secure easiness and clearness of expression. Where these ends are to be attained, discussions in mental science ought not to be excluded from the privilege, so plentifully used in physics, of framing convenient additions to its terminology. And no department of mind is so poorly equipped with a nomenclature as the Will. The very ambiguity of that primal word itself is a glaring instance. It is a proof of this eminent poverty and a shame to our English language that such a sentence as the following is possible: *The will will will a will.* For the verb *will* we have in English no word separate in form from the noun *Will*; since the term *choose* varies in meaning from the verb *will*. We must say the *Will wills*, or the Will chooses. And the proper participle of the verb *to will*, namely *will-ing*, has sunk into an adjective.

† "That which is contended for is not merely that the will may put forth a choice, the contrary of what actually occurs, supposing such a change to occur in its circumstances as would induce it, (which all admit,) but that in precisely the case in which it exercises a given choice, it is fully adequate to a contrary election." (Princeton Essays, p. 254.)

has a power of pointing a different from a given way, namely, provided the circumstances be different from the given way. But the compass needle has not the power *in the same given and unchanged conditions* of pointing alternatively *either one of two or more* different ways. It cannot point *one of several* ways with the full power *at the initial instant* of pointing other way *instead*. It has solely the *general* power or *faculty* of pointing as attendant circumstances or antecedents shall cause it to point. Logically, however, the phrase is unnecessary; for the act under changed circumstances would not be the same act. No one is so unwise as to deny that the Will can act differently in different cases.

The word "instead" is important in one of the above formulas of definition. The proposition that the Will puts forth one volition with full power ^{Different volition instead.} to another volition, may either captiously or innocently be understood to imply the power to put forth two opposite volitions at the same time.*

This Freedom of volition must be within the Will, and not without the Will. It must be intravolitional and not extravolitional. A freedom of ^{Intravolitional.} the Will, consisting of unimpeded power of diverse volition, cannot lie out of the Will, namely, in the intellect, nor emotions, nor nervous system, nor corporeal frame.

Our definition, therefore, excludes the favorite distinction made by necessitarians, (which will be fully considered hereafter,) between "moral" and "natural" ability; that is, an ability in the Will and an ability outside the Will. Thus to a similar defini- ^{Natural ability for substitute volition.}

* "The question is not whether the will, in one and the same act of choice, may or may not choose two contrary objects. This is too absurd to be maintained." (Princeton Essays, p. 251.)

"Contrary choice is willing as he does and otherwise—choosing as he does and does not." (Professor Lawrence, Bibliotheca Sacra, April, 1863.) This misstatement is the more noticeable from its being made in full view of the definition, furnished by the present writer, containing the terms which excluded it.

tion of free Will given by Dr. West, namely, that the agent can *will otherwise* than a given way, the younger Edwards makes the following irrelevant exception: "If by *power* and *can* he means *natural* power, I agree that in any given case we have a power to act or decline the proposed action. A man possesses liberty when he possesses a *natural or physical power* to do an action, and is under no natural inability with respect to that action." By this "natural or physical power," Edwards means power outside the Will externally to execute or fulfill its volitions. A man possesses liberty indeed in such a case, but not liberty in the Will, or of the Will, but liberty of the muscular power. A physical *strength* or energy sufficient, Sufficient strength is not adequate power. within a man's system, *even to a given volition*, is not in itself adequate power in the existing circumstances in the Will to such a volition. An ox may possess sufficiency of physical *strength* even in his volitional *energies* to will a moral volition, but that does not constitute the adequate *power*.

Of the definitions of Freedom of Will given by necessitarians, we may mention three. The Three necessitarian definitions of Freedom. FIRST is that of Edwards, which is indeed a definition of a Freedom, but not of a Freedom in the Will; the SECOND is that of Hobbes, which is truly located in the Will, but is not a Freedom, certainly not a Freedom within the present argument; the THIRD is a blending of the two, or rather a running of the former into the latter, subjecting it to all the objections belonging to the latter. The definition of Freedom by Edwards is "the power of doing as we please." That by Hobbes is "exemption from impediment extrinsic to the nature of the subject." The blending of the two is "the power of willing as we will."

I. The definition of Edwards is in the following words:

By Edwards. "The plain and obvious meaning of the words freedom and liberty, in common speech, is *power, opportunity, or advantage that any one has to do as he pleases*. Or, in other words, his being free from

hinderance or impediment in the way of doing or conducting, *in any respect*, as he will." Of this definition of liberty he boasts in words of great pomp and defiance, as expressing the only liberty conceivable; "therefore no Arminian, Pelagian, or Epicurean can rise higher in his conceptions of liberty than the notion of it which I have explained, which notion is apparently perfectly consistent with the whole of that necessity of men's actions which I suppose takes place. And I scruple not to say it is beyond all their wits to invent a higher notion or form a higher imagination of liberty, let them talk of *sovereignty of the will, self-determining power, self-motion, self-direction, arbitrary decision, liberty ad utrumvis, power of choosing differently in given cases*, etc., etc., as long as they will. It is apparent that these men, in their strenuous affirmation and dispute about these things, aim at they know not what, fighting for something they have no conception of, substituting a number of confused unmeaning words instead of things and instead of thought. They may be challenged clearly to explain what they would have: they never can answer the challenge."*

Of this definition we may remark that it is to be excluded from the discussion as being, so far as freedom in the Will is concerned, not a poor

Is no definition.

* We may here passingly remark: 1. That "the power of choosing differently in given cases" is just the "power of contrary choice," (and under the term choice Edwards includes volition,) which is maintained by some at the present day who hold Edwards as a standard. But it is plain that Edwards here repudiates it in his highest strain, denouncing it as the very theory which his treatise had demonstrated to be false, unmeaning, contradictory, and unthinkable. 2. Edwards defines for us a freedom which is no freedom, and by his very declaration that this is the highest (in his view) conceivable, he excludes all others, specifically excluding power of contrary choice. There is no freedom but a no-freedom. This is just as if a materialist should define spirit to be matter, declare that no higher notion of spirit is "conceivable," and then claim to be a spiritualist, a believer in the highest possible spirit! So that this very passage (which is habitually quoted to prove that Edwards maintains the highest freedom of will) really sweeps all free-will from existence.

definition, but *no definition at all*. And when Edwards boasts that this is the only conceivable freedom, he emphatically denies all freedom to the Will. It is a freedom not to will, but to *do*; that is, perform or execute what we have *previously willed*. It is a freedom belonging to external action, located out of and subsequent to volition; a freedom of the post-volitional operations. It takes not existence until the Will is done and is out of the question. It is corporeal and *voluntary* freedom, not *volitional* freedom. The Will is not its subject. But a freedom of Will which belongs not to the Will and is no quality of Will, is a contradiction.

This power of "doing as we will," which Edwards proclaims thus magniloquently to be the only This freedom is pure necessity. conceivable sort of freedom, is also excluded as not meeting the demands of the moral sense. It consists in a subjection absolutely perfect, first, of the external or post-volitional act to the volition. Then the volition is, with as absolute a perfectness, subjected to the causative strongest motive. And the strongest motive is brought upon the mind by a chain of antecedent necessary causes. Thus this freedom consists in bringing act, volition, and motive into existence as so many fixed links in the endless chain of fixed necessitations. The freedom at last consists in fixing both the being and action of the agent under necessitative causation, as absolutely as the fossil petrification is fixed in its solid rock. "What does your free-will consist in," says Voltaire, as quoted by Fletcher, "but a power to do willingly what absolute necessity makes you choose?"

The fact that the Will is drawn or secretly attracted, so that its volition goes forth eagerly and of itself, as the soul does of itself by its own spontaneous power go after happiness, renders the necessity none the less absolute. Around the faculties of the soul a circumvallating line of causation is still thereby none the less absolutely drawn because it is del-

Fascination does not imply freedom.

icately drawn and finely shaded. The resisting power at the spring of the Will may be as completely annihilated by a seduction or a fascination as by a rude impulsion. Causation securing effect, which Edwards maintains must rule at every infinitesimal point to secure us from atheism, as truly secures this so called *free* forthgoing of the soul as the steam power secures the movement of the car. No fine word-painting will change this necessity to freedom.

II. Mr. Hobbes endeavors to give his definition of liberty a scientific form. "Liberty is the *absence of all impediments* to action that are *not contained in the nature and intrinsical quality of the agent*." Hobbes's definition. As, for example, the water is said to descend freely, or to descend by the channel of the river, because there is no impediment that way; but not across, because the banks are impediments. And though the water cannot ascend, yet men never say it wants the liberty to ascend, but the faculty or power, because the impediment is in the nature of the water and intrinsical."

From this definition it results that if the impediment or necessitation excluding the contrary volition be simply intrinsic and not extrinsic, the Will is still free. Natural or internal necessity is thereby compatible with freedom.

On the definition we make the following points:

1. Liberty is truly defined by Hobbes to be "an absence of impediment to action," as we have defined it to be *an exemption from limitation*. But when he confines it to exemption from impediment which is "not contained in the nature and intrinsic quality of the agent," that is, to external impediment, he makes a fictitious qualification. *A being* There may be freedom from intrinsic impediment. *may be as truly said to be free from an intrinsic and natural impediment or circumscription or limitation as from an extrinsic*. A being is often said to be free from the intrinsic accident of disease; a man par-

doned is held free from intrinsic guilt. Our Saviour, even as man, was free from intrinsic depravity. A learned man is free from his own *natural* ignorance and prejudices. A being may be said also to be free from any *supposable* disadvantage, real or imaginary, intrinsic or extrinsic. Spirit is free from the pressure of gravitation. Angels are free from original sin. And, what is decisive as to volitional freedom, a being may possess or be free from impediment, impotence, or want of faculty in his own nature which disables him from performing the proper conditions belonging to his responsible position or to his own wellbeing. For, in this sense, alternative *Will* may be truly and properly called *free*; *free* from that *necessity* or *unipotence*, that limitation to one solely possible effectuation, to which all other cause is limited, and which would disable the agent from performing the probationary conditions belonging to his responsible wellbeing. The limitation assigned, therefore, by Hobbes's definition of liberty, to an immunity from an extrinsic impediment, falls to the ground, and the word is used within its true limits as an antithesis to real or supposable intrinsic limitation or impediment.

Negatively, also, beings may be truly said to be *not free* from intrinsic and natural negative impediments or affirmative limitations to particular modes of action. Matter is *not free* from gravitation or the laws of motion. Mind is *not free* from finite circumscription. Necessary cause is *not free* from a unification to a single and solely possible effect. Perception is *not free* from a conformity to the exact appearance of the object perceived. And so the necessitated Will is *not free* FROM an absolute and fixed obedience to the sole strongest motive force. It has no alternative but to obey, and is therefore inalterative.

If action, volitional or otherwise, be required of an agent, he ought to be free to such action; but he cannot be free to it unless he possesses the power for it.

He is not free to the exertion of power which he does not possess. He has not the power which, as already said, is the basis and condition of the freedom. If he be responsibly required, then he is not free from such want of power, impotence, or impediment to the discharge of his requirements as a responsible being.

2. Though an inanimate object when exempted from supposable impediments be always called free, Freedom to and from the act. not so a living agent. He must possess not only power (and exemption from prevention) *to* the act, but power reversely *from* the act. Water may descend the channel freely, or stand in the spring freely; but a man in a prison, however willing and unimpeded his stay, does not stay *freely*, for he can do no otherwise than stay. A stone cast from the pinnacle of the temple in its descent falls freely; but a man who has leaped from the same point, however willingly he thence tends to the earth, does not tend freely, for he can do no otherwise. A man may be impelled to walk through the narrow paths of a labyrinth walled on either side; he may be pleased with the operation; in so walking he may do as he is pleased, and in that sense *as he pleases*; but he does not do it *freely*, for it is the only thing he can do. To the freedom of a living agent, therefore, the twofold power is requisite; the power *to* the act and the power *from* the act. Confinement, limitation to a unit, circumscription, necessitation, excluding power for alteriety, is fatal to the liberty of the agent in the external and voluntary act, and by parity in the internal volitional act. To act as we are pleased, to act willingly and to act freely, are not always one and the same thing.

Mr. Hobbes's definition is, therefore, doubly incorrect as applied to an agent's Will. It has a false exclusion or internal impediment; it is a power solely *to* and not *from* the particular act, and so is wholly inapplicable to a volitional agent, and therefore is no *freedom* debated in this discussion. And moreover failing to meet the

demands of the moral sense, it is in every respect excluded.

Under the same refutation we bring Professor Haven's definition of freedom: "Any faculty of mind or organ of body is free when its own specific and proper action is not hindered." The will of a necessitated agent, we reply, may be unhindered in "its own specific and proper action," and yet not be responsibly "free." He may want that *power* upon which such freedom is based; the power over and above his necessitated "specific and proper action;" the power, namely, of performing the conditions of his responsible being, in obedience to a requirement contrary to the stronger motive force. He is not *free* to perform his moral obligations as a responsible agent.

III. To the Edwardean definition of freedom of Will as the *power of doing as we will*, our objection is above stated, that it is not located in the Will. To this objection it is replied, and by Edwards himself, by running the Edwardean into the Hobbesian: "to will is in fact to *do* something; it is to put forth a *volition*; and so the freedom of the Will by this definition fairly is the "power to *will as we will*." And thence it is deduced that the choosing at all is choosing freely; freedom and volition being identical.* We thereto admit, as of Hobbes's definition, that this freedom is indeed located in the Will, but deny that it is a volitional or more than a mechanical freedom. For,

1. As we have already shown, the assumption at its base, that freedom is "the power of doing as we please" or will, is entirely untrue. A man may do as he pleases, and yet not be free, both because his antecedent *please* is necessitated, and because he is limited and circumscribed to the course with which he is pleased. Power both pro and contra, power to the thing and from the thing, is requisite for the liberty of a free agent.

* See p. 206.

Power, then, to the given volition, and from the volition, and to a reverse volition, must exist, or the agent is not free in the volition. It is an error to call an agent volitionally free unless he has power for either one of two or more volitions. The above pompous challenge of Edwards is, therefore, we think, fairly met and invalidated. But,

2. According to necessitarianism all actions, motions, or states of being are equally fixed, and so ^{Makes all events} equally free. Impediments, intrinsic or extrin- ^{equally free.} sic, are only modifications of that action which finally and really results; that is, they are causes by which the final action is really shaped. The real action, as so shaped, then, takes place without prevention or impediment; that is, takes place *freely*. So, in the final and absolute, all action is by this equally free. To speak of a free action, then, distinctively, is absurd. There is no such distinction to mark by the word. A *free* action is simply an *action*. The prefix *free* would, then, be inert and void. It would be used in a senseless sense. And a word without meaning, and adding no idea, is not a word, but a mere sound.

The voidness of the term appears by this further consideration. The power to *will as we will*, is ^{Renders the term free-} simply the mechanical power for a thing to *do* ^{dom void.} as it *does*; to *be* as it *bees*. Now there is nothing whatever which has not that notable power and freedom. A mental perception, a sensation, or a clock-stroke, is as free as a volition. A bar of iron, a block of wood, a cube of granite, has that quality. The rail-car is free to run solely as it runs, the prison walls to stand as they stand, the marble monument to lie as it lies. All the physical machinery of the universe has the liberty to be solely as it is, to operate as it operates. The figures of geometry are all equally free. The square is free to be quadrangular, the circle to be round, the globe to be globular. And this freedom of the Will, which is boasted by

Edwards as the loftiest conceivable, is just the freedom by which *whatever is, is and must be*.

Or if the phrase to *will as we will* means, as it is sometimes made to mean, to put forth a volition which is under necessitation to be what it is from a previous volition, responsible freedom is excluded. That previous volition is under necessitation of a previous volition, and so we are in each volition necessitated by an infinite series of anterior necessitating and necessitated volitions. The same necessitative result follows if we suppose the volition is *as* some fixed antecedent, whether such antecedent be a "choice," an "inclination," a "wish," or a "please." If such antecedent be a necessitated result of antecedent circumstances or inalternative causation of any kind, freedom does not exist. For if each and every antecedent in the series, however long the series be, is fixed by its predecessor and fixes its successor, the whole train is necessitated, and the putting forth of the last volition, the one in question, is anteriorly fixed. And a volition whose putting forth is anteriorly fixed to a unitary result is not free. The agent possesses not the power to will otherwise in the case; the power *from* and obligation to will otherwise are impossible.

Professor Haven teaches that circumstances decide and fix the *inclination*, the *inclinations* fix the *choice*, and the choice fixes the volition; and then the freedom of the Will consists in the absoluteness of the subjection of the volition to the fixation by the choice. The more absolute the limitation, the more absolute the freedom. Circumstances, inclination, choice, and volition, are four nine-pins in a row; No. 1 knocks down No. 2, No. 2 knocks down No. 3, and No. 3 knocks down No. 4. The freedom of No. 4 in its falling consists in the absoluteness of its being knocked by No. 3 as that is by its row of predecessors. Professor H. holds that it is no matter how the agent comes by his

Makes an endless chain of necessitations.

A chain of necessitations is fatalism.

inclination; the only question is, Is he at liberty to be controlled by it necessitatedly, as the nine-pin is by its predecessor? Certainly such reasoners ought to see that to subject the Will to a previous necessitative causation which is itself necessitated, is the annihilation of alternativity. It forecloses the power *from*. The lengthening of the series is but an infantile attempt at relief by pushing the necessitation a little back, and so out of view; they might just as wisely declare first as last, that the Will is in its simple acts fixed and circumscribed to a solely possible volition.

And that is the freedom of a mechanism. Just as a clock-hammer possesses in its given antecedents no power for a different stroke instead, so the agent has no power for a different volition instead. The agent can in the given case give none but a one solely possible volition, just as the clock-hammer can give none but a one solely possible stroke. This is true of every volition that ever takes place, just as it is true of every clock stroke that ever takes place. It is true of the entire series of volitions of every single agent, as it is true of the entire series of the strokes of every single clock. Just as, should a clock have an eternal existence, each stroke would be a solely possible stroke, so, should an agent have an eternal existence, each volition would be a solely possible volition. As the clock could not, in a single one instance of the infinite, help giving the given stroke, so the agent could not in a single instance avoid giving the given volition. If the volitions were all wicked, still, the agent gives the solely possible. No sinful volition that ever takes place could in the given antecedents have been withheld. No sin ever committed could have been helped or avoided. Sin and damnation are as inevitable to the sinner as the clock-stroke is to the clock.

A clock-hammer can give a different stroke, if it inclines or is moved to. That is, it can strike differently sequently upon different antecedents. Just so, necessitarians admit

that the agent can will otherwise IF—the antecedents are otherwise. That is, he can will differently *in different cases*; which nobody was ever so unwise as to deny. Thus to our making a man's Arminianism or Calvinism depend on his answer to Fletcher's question, "Is the Will at liberty to choose otherwise than it does, or is it not?" Professor Lawrence, in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, replies, "A man is at perfect liberty to choose otherwise than he does, *if he wishes* to." A clock-hammer is perfectly at liberty, we reply, to strike otherwise if it is *inclined* to. But Professor L. teaches, with all other necessitarians, that this anterior "*wish*" of the agent is just as absolutely necessitated and controlled by antecedent causes, as this *inclination* of the clock-hammer is controlled by its antecedent mechanical causes. Each lies as a link in the chain of necessary causations. So that the volition, *in the given CASE*, is as solely possible as the clock-stroke in the given case; and we have just the mechanical freedom *to* and not *from*. And that excludes all responsibility, and makes a just retributive divine government impossible.

Freedom is as much contradicted by a law of Invariability, that is, a law by which all Will invariably does obey the strongest motive, even though able to do otherwise, as by a law of Causation. If the invariability be formulated as an anterior fact, strictly absolute and universal, pervading all actual and possible cases, then by the law of contradiction the counter exception becomes impossible. Thus it is claimed by some thinkers that though *the Will possesses power for choice* against strongest motives, yet that choice *will never be used*. If that *never* is an invariability, as truly in itself universal as the law of causation, the usance of the power of counter choice is impossible. It is incompatible with an absolute universal contradictory fact, and *cannot* take place; and that the reverse of which cannot be, is a *necessity*. A power which

Law of Invariability excludes freedom.

cannot be used, a power which is not in power of the agent for act, is no adequate power in the agent at all. It exists in words only, and can be no satisfactory basis of responsibility.

Indeed, this case of a Will under law of Invariability to obey strongest motive, with a so-called counter power never to be used, is a case under law of causation. Invariability involves causation. The law of invariability existing, the anterior strongest motive is the cause why the act is one way rather than another. The Law of Invariability *must* ever be made true. Obeying the Law of Invariability, the Will must obey the strongest motive. Just so far as the absoluteness of the Invariability is assumed, just so far there is causative necessitation, and the counter power has no actual existence.

When, finally, a man is required by the Moral Law to will otherwise than he does will, the question must, we say, be answered, Has he the power or freedom to will otherwise? False definitions excluded. It does not suffice for the demands of our moral nature to tell us that he has a freedom post-volitionally to *do* what he wills; nor that he can will otherwise if antecedent circumstances are otherwise; nor that he is free from all impediment external to himself; nor that he has power to will according to the strongest motive; nor that he has power to will as he does will; nor that freedom and volition are the same thing. For all these get not beyond the freedom of a mechanism *to* a thing without the freedom of an agent *from* as well as *to*. The simple question is, Is he so limited in power in *the given case* to the one solely possible choice or volition as not to be free to volitionate otherwise instead, or does he possess a power of disjunctive volition, so that he is *free* to choose either one of several ways? Choosing thus our own The real ISSUE. *ISSUE*, as is our right, we affirm under requirement of the moral sense, as against necessity which denies, that there does exist in the agent a freedom of just this kind.

The terms opposed to this *liberty* of "doing or willing as we will," Edwards thus specifies: "One is *constraint*; the same is otherwise called *force*, *compulsion*, *Compulsion or coercion.* and *coaction*, which is a person's being necessitated to do a thing *contrary to his Will*. The other is *restraint*, which is his being hindered, and *not having power to do according to his Will*."

From these definitions it follows that the highest motive, however absolutely it may *cause* the volition to be what it is, can never be said to *compel* it to be what it is. For compulsion is always exerted upon something exterior to the Will, but in opposition to the Will. The Will is never itself compelled by motive force, for the motive in securing the existence of the volition precludes the idea of any opposition of the Will. The case resembles creation, in which the created object takes its entire existence from its Creator, and thereby receives its whole vitality in perfect subjection and submission to the creative power. The words *compel*, *constrain*, *restrain*, thus presupposing an opposition of the Will, would properly be limited to designate a force upon our extra-volitional parts or powers. Thus we may *compel* a person corporeally to yield, to love or hate us, to believe or know a thing; but we cannot, by any motive, be said to compel one to choose a thing.

This sharp distinction, however, when peremptorily asserted, incurs the same confusion (as we shall *Compulsion of Will.* elsewhere notice*) between the most *common* meaning of a word and the most *proper*. A less common meaning of a term is often as truly, if not the more proper meaning. Men may oftenest have occasion to use terms in their least proper sense. Men have more need to talk of doings than of willings; of what they can do if they will than of what they can will; of what compels them to do in spite of their Wills than of what *compels*

* See pp. 55, 254.

their Wills to choose. Hence, though the word *compel* most frequently, if not the most properly, applies to force upon body against Will, yet phrases like "*cloud-compelling Jove*," "*by dying love compelled*," show that the word is most expressively and correctly used in application to force upon inanimate objects or motive force upon the Will. Such words, indeed, imply opposition. But that opposition may be either the *vis inertiae* of matter *compelled* to give way, or the counter force of motive *compelled* to be overcome, or that resistance to change which is always presupposed when we speak of a cause exerting *power* to effectuate an event of body or mind which otherwise by the law of continuity would not take existence.

However, to designate the bringing a volition into existence by causation of motive, it may be well to use other terms. For this purpose we accept the words to *cause*, to *fix*, to *necessitate*, to *secure*; by all of which words we mean to express causation, or creation of the consequent volition in the absolute sense, *excluding in the given case the adequate power in the agent for the volition to be otherwise, or not to be at all.*

Necessitation
secures Will.

"The fates lead the willing, but drag the unwilling," *Fata ducunt volentem, nolentem trahunt.* But a deeper fate allows no *nolentem*. It *pre-forms* and *in-forms*, and so secures the volition and precludes the *nolition*, as to rule the man, not against, but through the Will, by ruling the Will. It secures the act by securing the volition. That volition is as truly secured as if created in the mind by Omnipotence, for even Omnipotence could do no more than secure the existence of the act precluding the power of any alterity. It does not matter whether the external act be secured through the volition by an immediate omnipotent agent, or by a sufficient fixing finite cause; for the latter totally excludes all counter power, and the former cannot ex-

Necessitation
more fatal
than compulsion.

clude it more than totally. Nor can any effect take a greater amount of causality, even from infinite power, than is just sufficient to its own production. Our cup can take but a cup full, even from the ocean.* To force the agent against his Will is a powerful securement of his act; but to cause his act, precluding the very power of a counter volition, is a still deeper necessitation.

In regard to the ethical relations of free volition three things are to be noted:

1. Though the question of volitional freedom is awakened by the moral intuitions, and receives its clearest elucidation from instances of moral alternative, yet the freedom of the Will itself is not to be held as confined to the ethical sphere. The Will is as truly free in the secular and non-ethical alternatives of life as in the moral.

2. The freedom of the Will forms the terminal point as we ascend in our inquiry from effect to cause in search of the location of responsibility. The volitional sins of a necessitated agent are what he cannot help. He could not volitionate otherwise. The securative originative causation must be traced further back than himself, and so the responsibility. But the alternative agent who sins, with full power otherwise, has brought an unnecessitated, unnecessary evil into the world. He need not do it. He is its first necessitating unnecessitated cause. Nothing back of him has caused or made it necessary, and so nothing back of him is responsible. He has taken into himself all the anterior causations and influences, and by his own transmuting and originating power has created out of them a new and evil existence in the world. Every free agent is thus an original creator even out of nothing. But for him and such as he there would be no guilt in the world.

* In relation to a different subject, Dr. Whichcote, of Cambridge, says: "The ocean can *but* fill the vessel, which a much less quantity of water can do." See "Moral and Religious Aphorisms, 1703," p. 46.

And just so far as the volition is the *necessitated* result, however intrinsically evil, of anterior or surrounding circumstances, just so far the individual stands morally excused.

3. A moral and responsible volitional act can be performed only by an existent free volitional agent; and once done, by the very necessity of existence, it can never become *not done*. It thence forever becomes historically the inseparable fact and attribute solely of that agent, and the fact of its performance can never be literally transferred to any other being or personality. In the personality exclusively of that agent the moral sense sees an axiomatically inhering responsibility, guilt, merit, or demerit. Consequent and correlative to that merit or demerit, the moral sense affixes an ethical desert of reward or penalty. And as the fact of the agent's act is intransferable from one agent to another, so the merit, demerit, reward, or penalty, is ethically intransferable. Punishment and guilt, therefore, are no more transferable than personal identity. When an innocent being is said to suffer the punishment of a guilty being the language is conceptual, and not barely literal and true. The innocent being is still innocent, and he endures what to the guilty agent would be *punishment*, but to himself is only consequent though substitutional *suffering*.

Act and responsibility intransferable.



CHAPTER III.

VOLITION NOT ALWAYS PRECEDED BY EMOTION.

MR. LOCKE held the doctrine that *uneasiness* is the necessary antecedent to every volition. "Good and evil, present and absent, it is true, work upon the mind; but that which immediately determines the Will from time to time to every voluntary action is the uneasiness of *desire*, fixed on some absent good,

Volitions result of uneasiness?

either negative, as indolence to one in pain, or positive, as enjoyment of pleasure. That it is the uneasiness that determines the Will to successive voluntary actions, whereof the greatest part of our lives is made up, and by which we are conducted through different courses to different ends, I shall endeavor to show, both from experience and the reason of the thing."

Again: "For good though appearing and allowed ever so great, yet till it has raised desires in our minds, and thereby made us uneasy in its want, it reaches not our will; we are not within the sphere of its activity."

If this be indeed true, action is born of misery. All energetically active beings must be unhappy, and the more energetic the action the intenser must be the stimulant by which they are urged and chased.

Not true.

Post equitem sedet atra cura.

A perfectly happy being must be a perfectly stagnant being. God and holy angels must either be as tranquil as the sleeping deity of Epicurus, or as unhappy as the evil omnipotence of Manes.

Sir James Mackintosh, Upham, and others, maintain that the volition must ever be preceded by an emotion of *desire*. "We can easily imagine," says Mackintosh, "a percipient and thinking being without a capacity of receiving pain or pleasure. Such a being might perceive what we do; if we could conceive him to reason, he might reason justly; and if he were to judge at all, there seems no reason why he should not judge truly. But what could induce such a being to *will* or to *act*? It seems evident that his existence could only be a state of passive contemplation. Reason, as reason, can never be a motive to action."

Thatemotion
always pre-
cedes voli-
tion,

On the contrary, it is the clear decision of consciousness that the reasonableness or the intellective perception of advantage to one's self or another, or the perception of accordance with a previous

Not true, for,

purpose, or the intuitive perception of right, may so come in immediate contact with Will as to be the motive of volition.

1. The reasonable, we submit to every man's consciousness, is not choosable simply because it is desirable, but also because it is *reasonable*. The ^{1. The reasonable is a motive.} reasonable, as reasonable, is a reason or motive for action. The reasonable is not only desirable, but it is eligible, choosable. I may choose a thing simply and solely because it is reasonable, and not because it is desirable. I may choose the reasonable in preference to the desirable. I may be in a state of purpose to choose not the pleasant, not the desirable, but the reasonable.

2. If emotion is an antecedent condition to volition, we might suppose, according to the usual reasoning of necessitarians, that the stronger the ^{2. Intensest emotion falls of volition.} emotion the surer the volition. If a less emotive object prevailed by so much as the emotion was less, by that much there was choice without emotion. By that much the Will acted from emotionless intellection. Now it is certainly very common for men to choose a distant interest apparently without emotion, and appreciated by but the driest calculation in preference to a matter of present emotive enjoyment. By the usual modes of necessitarian reasoning this is proof positive of the greater motive power of cold intellection over emotion.

3. But an intellectually perceived advantage to another is an ample motive for energetic volition. An ^{3. Intellectual motive prevails.} emotionless old man may plant trees whose shade he never expects to enjoy, coolly and simply for the advantage of posterity. A man may perform an act for the benefit of the antipodes whom he has never seen, because he perceives it to be a choosable thing that they should be benefited just as coolly and clearly as he recognizes that a circle is not a triangle.

4. A being may will purely because he knows and sees it to be right. Right, as right, simply cognized, is

motive upon Will without any intervening condition. The perception of obligation may be obeyed as a perception. It has a claim which can be measured and accepted as motive force. There is weight and power for action in it as a matter of moral calculation.

5. The doctrine that the Will chooses only in behalf of agreeable emotion, forms a fair basis for the selfish system of morals. Upon that basis it may justly be said that whatever benefaction we confer upon others we confer purely and solely for the emotive gratification it affords to ourselves.

6. Dry purpose produces volition. 6. But a large share of the great sum total of human volitions is put forth purely from a perceived accordance with a general anterior purpose. I have a *purpose* to write through the words and letters of a line or page; every letter is the product of a volition; but so far as I can see, the whole train of volitions is a perfectly emotionless one, each volition obeying the general purpose; the mind, indeed, being in a permanent state of willingness. So far as I can see, the whole process is transacted between the intellect in a certain state of quiet purpose and the particular volition. A book-keeper in casting up a long row of figures exerts at least one volition at each figure as soon as his eye has perception of its shape and identifies its meaning. Between this identification and the volition he is conscious of no emotion intervening. The whole is a dry emotionless process. Besides, our volitions are as infinitesimal, we might say, as the ultimate atoms of matter, and as infinite in number. In writing this page there is a volition for every turn of the pen in every letter, so that the pulsations of Will, like the pulsations of sound, fuse into a flow. If, therefore, emotion precedes volition, emotion is fused into a simply animate and living state of mind, and the doctrine is lost in the fusion.

7. Are the men of most energetic and powerful action

the men of the most excitable desires? They are, indeed, men of the strongest purpose, of the most unflinching determination; but the energy of their volitions is surely not to be measured by the turbulence of the emotions by which they are preceded. The question, be it marked, does not concern the strength of the constitutional appetencies of the man, but the intensity or ebullition of the immediate emotion; and so viewed, it may be held as a general rule that the men of strongest volitions are men of the least perturbable emotion. As there is a *dry light, lumen siccum*, of the intellect, so there is a dry force to the volition.

7. Men of strong emotions not men of strong volitions.

From all this we conclude that pure intellection, without any intervening emotion, does come as motive-force in immediate contact upon the springs of volition.

CHAPTER IV.

FREEDOM OF WILL CAUSATIONALLY PRESENTED.

FREEDOM of the Will, as distinguished from necessity, is usually defined to be that power by which it may put forth either of several volitions, or, in causal terms, *that property of the volitional cause by which it produces either of several possible effects*. It is an *either-causal power*.

Causal definition.

But to a full development of these definitions an exposition is requisite of the terms CAUSE, POWER, NECESSITY, and CERTAINTY.

A CAUSE is a subject by whose existence another subject comes into existence, or may, without contradiction of any truth, be conceived to so come into existence.

Definitions.

POWER is that element in a *cause* by which the effect comes into existence, or may, without involving contradiction, be supposed to come into existence.

If POWER is a clear, valid, cognizable *idea* of a true reality, then its absence or non-existence is an equally valid cognition. We have, therefore, the following precise and cognizable definition of *necessity* and its cognates.

• NECESSITY in a thing is the non-existence therein of adequate power for the thing to be otherwise than it is. NECESSITY of particular existence is the non-existence of adequate power to exist otherwise than the one sole given way. NECESSITY of a CAUSATION or an ACTION is the absence of power of non-causation or non-action, and of all other causation or action than the one sole given mode.

That is usually said to be *necessary* the opposite or alteriety of which cannot be conceived. It would, perhaps, be more accurate to say that that is necessary which we do positively and compulsorily conceive cannot be the different or the opposite of what it is. This conceiving of the impossibility of the diverse arises not so much from *the law of our minds* as from the nature of the necessary subject itself. If it can be said to arise from the law of our minds, it is from that law by which our minds see things as they are; the law that our perceptive intuitions must be controlled by the object intuited. We see this *impossibility of opposite*, because it is a reality before our view.

All necessity is ONE—the *impossibility of a different*. This may exist in different classes of objects; and thus a classification may arise which may be useful in itself, but must not be mistaken for a classification of varieties of the necessity itself. The impossibility of an opposite may exist in matter, in chemical affinity, in magnetism; but that does not give rise to an essentially different material necessity, chemical necessity,

magnetic necessity. There may be the necessity of a clock stroke and of a volition; but these are not two kinds of necessity, but the same necessity in two kinds of operation.

The necessity may exist in different sorts of connection between two things, yet the necessity is not different, being still the *impossibility of* ^{And connections.} *the diverse*. So, between 2×2 and 4 there is a necessary connection; and between the pressure upon a clock-hammer and its stroke there is a necessary connection. These *connections* are very different connections; but their *necessity* is the same, namely, the *impossibility of the opposite*.

We have as yet seen no satisfactorily complete and exhaustive classification of those entities, truths, ^{Classification of necessities.} qualities, connections, etc., which, as we necessarily see, *cannot but be*. Sufficiently complete for our purpose may be a division into entities and relations, and those entities and relations may be either primordial or derived.

I. By *Entities* we mean whatever is cognized by the intuition as a simple and single reality. And ^{Into entities.} among the primordial of these, are the *self-existent, time, space*; and we are inclined to add in mathematics *the point* and *the line*. These are *primordial* in the sense of being unoriginated and eternal. Among the derived or originated entities, which have a beginning and yet become necessary, are all *facts* or *events*, which, being once *done*, remain *facts* and *done* forever. There is no possibility that they can become *never having been done*, and so they are under a *necessity of existence*.

II. Among the *Relations* which are primordially and eternally necessary, are the relations of *geometry*, of *number*, of *right* and *wrong*. These ^{And relations.} are primordial, because uncreated; and indeed all creation must take place in accordance with their presupposed existence, and be subject to their application and

laws. The special application of these relations in the created objects is not primordial, but has beginning.

The popular distinction of *moral* and *natural* necessity is a distinction not in the necessity itself, but in the class of subjects to which it belongs.* No necessities natural and moral. There is no intrinsic moral necessity other than mere moral obligation. I am *obligated* by the law of right, but not *necessitated*. The right act is what *ought* to be, not what *must* be. There is no *impossibility of the opposite* of Right, for there is plenty of Wrong. On the other hand there is no necessity which is not *natural*, that is, existing in *the nature of things*. The connection of causal necessity existing between a motive and a volition necessarily consequent, is as natural as the connection of causal necessity existing between the pressure upon the clock-hammer and the stroke. A man may be *naturally* necessitated to will what is *morally* right; but that would be not a *moral* but a *natural* necessity. It is the object of the volition which is here *moral*; its necessity is *natural*.

The fallacies of necessitarianism, in regard to *power*, are numerous, deceptive, and pregnant with absurd consequences. Thus: Five necessitarian fallacies.

1. Necessitarians confound power *for some OTHER thing* with power *to a GIVEN thing*. A power to see the planet Herschell is no power to talk with its inhabitants. A power of muscle to strike, or of brains to think, is no power whatever of the soul to *will*. So the power to *do as we will* is no freedom or power in the Will to *will otherwise than a sole way*, nor even a freedom or power to will at all.

2. Necessitarians confound A power with THE power to or *from* a thing. A power is often only a part, and an insufficient part, too, of *the* power. The power to do a thing is the complete and *adequate* power, which is requisite to responsibility. Where an act requires for its

* See p. 314.

fulfillment several concurrent or constituent powers, each one of these may be deceptively so affirmed as to signify *THE* adequate and responsible power. A fluent elocutionist has *a* power to deliver an extemporaneous oration, and yet not *the* power, for he has not the intellectual capacity to think it. So power of *Will* and power of *post-volitional motion* are both concurrently requisite in order to the complete performance of a one voluntary act. If a writer, therefore, should say, because a man has *a* power, intellectual or corporeal, for the act, that the man has *the power* to perform the act, he might deceive his readers. He has *a* power; he has *powers*; he has faculties; but he has not *the* power; that is, he has not the complete *adequate* power unless there is also "*ability*" or *power in his Will* for the requisite volition.

We shall usually in this treatise use the prefix adjective *adequate* in order to guard against this ambiguity.

3. Necessitarians confound the power, that is, *the adequate POWER*, for a thing with adequate *STRENGTH*. An ox has adequate strength to execute a minuet as truly as an opera dancer, but he has not the power. So the living body of a man has ample strength to perform all that his Will shall dictate; but it has not, therefore, *the power* to do so *without the volition*, any more than a dead body. So there may be physical strength in an agent, and even in his Will, to put forth a different choice in the place of the one he does put forth; but neither he nor his Will has, therefore, *the power*.

4. Necessitarians confound *a faculty for any kind act* with *the adequate power for a specific exercise or performance*. A *faculty* for language is not necessarily the adequate power to speak French; the faculty of sight is not adequate power to see stars by daylight. The faculty of thought, of emotion, of Will, does not necessarily imply an adequate responsible power to repent, to serve God, to be perfectly holy.

5. Necessitarians confound the *power* for a thing with

the CONDITIONS of the power. Legs are a *condition* to the full power of walking, but not the *power* itself. So a will or an inclination is a condition to the power of corporeal action; but a will, a choice, or an inclination, is no more *the* power itself of action than legs are *the* power of walking. Yet, strange to say, important parts of the necessitarian system of theology are founded on this confounding of volition, or, as they call it, *inclination* with *power*.

Professor Haven, for instance, in his Mental Philosophy, Confounding in discussing the question *whether we can do inclination with power.* *what we have no disposition, or choice, or will to do*, (p. 551,) decides that the answer depends upon whether or not we consider *disposition, choice, or Will* to be identical with power. If the two are identical, then want of choice, he thinks, is want of power; if not, then want of choice, etc., is no want of power, and my body is able to act without choosing to act. On all this we remark that the identification of choice and power is absurd; that the definition by which the identity is either denied or affirmed is quite as absurd, and that the inference he draws, namely, that if the two be not identical, then we can corporeally act without choice to act, is as absurd as either, both as an inference and as a supposable fact. For,

1. Disposition, inclination, choice, or Will, is not power, Condition of any more than it is space or substance, though power not power itself. it be *the condition of power*. Disposition may intrinsically *have* power or intensity; its presence may occasion, or be the condition of, power; but to identify it as *power itself* is as irrational as to identify substance with space, or concrete with quality.

2. The definitions intended by Professor Haven, either to include or exclude this identification, are both absurd, and about equally absurd. Power he first proposes to define, as denoting "all that is requisite to the actual doing of a thing." Then my legs are power of walking;

for they are requisite to the actual doing of the thing. Then I am myself the power of walking; for a walker, an agent, is necessary to the walking. In fine, this definition includes as power the agent, the instrument, and all the conditions, both to the doing and to the power of doing a thing. As instruments, so inclination or choice is not the power, but the *condition requisite to the power* of doing a thing. So far as inclination or choice is not power, Professor H. infers that a man has *power* to act without choice. What a man can do with choice he *can* do without choice. By that same reasoning I can prove that a penniless pauper can pay the national debt of England. For money is not power; and so what a man can do with money he can do without money. If with money he could pay the national debt, then he can do it without money!

But a narrow definition, he tells us, limits power "to denote all that is requisite to the doing the False definition. thing, provided we please or choose to do it." Then, again, my legs are the power of walking, and my eyes the power of seeing, and my nose the power of smelling. That these and all other organs, and all choices and volitions, are conditions to the power of acting, is perfectly plain; we should not have the power without them; but they are not the power itself. The power exists, consequently, upon them.

3. But Professor H. argues, If choice is power, then I *have not* the power to act without the choice; but if choice be not power, then I *have* the Absurd consequences. power to act without choice. But how, Professor, if the choice should prove to be not the *power itself*, but, what is plainly the fact, the *condition requisite to the power*? Plainly, if the condition requisite to the power is wanting to the agent the act cannot be done, for want both of condition and power; that is, the choice is not power, yet the corporiety has no power to act without the choice to act. We should like to see any necessitarian gentle-

man, who says "*choice is not power, and so I have power to get up and walk across the floor without any choice or volition whatever,*" perform the feat. If pure corporiety has this power of action without volition, a dead body may leap from the dissector's table and march off without even intending it.

In every voluntary external action two factors must ever unite, each possessing a constituent power,* namely, the *Will*, and the extra-volitional, which, though it includes mind, we will embrace under the term *corporiety*. To say that either of these *are* power, instead of saying that they *possess* power, is a confusion of terms.

Co-operation
of factors.

Both factors must combine, and the powers of both factors must be ready to co-operate, in order to the existence of the one complete adequate power for the entire composite act. It is then false to say that the corporiety has the adequate power to the act in the absence of the Will in its full power of action. No less false is it to say that the Will with its full power can perform the composite act without the corporiety in its adapted power.

False denial
of "ability"
in Will.

And hereby we may expose the fallacy of those necessitarians, with Edwards at their head,† who tell us that men do in ordinary language say and hold that *if an act or object be physically or corporally in their power, so that the act is doable provided they have the will, then the act or object is completely in their power*; so that ability has no reference to Will, and power or ability is not, in strict propriety of speech, requirable or predicable of Will. A single rational reflection ought to tell those thinkers that the *thing* properly

Source of the
falsity.

called power, and ordinarily styled *ability*, is as truly needed, and exists in the Will to enact a volition as in the corporiety to obey the volition and enact the voluntary motion. When men speak as if all the power required to the composite voluntary move-

* See p. 253.

† See the language of Edwards, p. 249.

ment is merely in the corporiety, the *power correspondent in the Will is tacitly assumed as understood, and as of course*. My power to will being implied silently, then a thing or act is in my power if it be corporeally so, and then nothing is needed but the will or volition; I *can* then do it if I will. But, on the other side, I may tacitly assume the corporeal power, and from that standpoint I may say that all that is wanting to the full performance is *the ability or power to will*. And from such language taken by itself it might be argued that *power is not requirable or predicable of the corporiety*. Ability, in the strict application, would belong to Will alone. A thing is then held to be in a man's power, provided there is power in the Will, just because the full possession of the corporeal power is quietly presupposed. Really and truly, then, power or ability, with all the cognate terms, as *can*, *possible*, *able*, etc., is as truly affirmable or deniable of Will as of any other part of our nature.

What gives all the plausibility to the notion that ability or power is affirmable or deniable of the post-volitional or voluntary act solely, and not of the volitional act, is the fact that men have far Most common use and most proper sense of words. more occasion to speak of what they *can do* if they will than what they *can will*.* Practically men much oftener discuss their power to execute than their power to choose. And they are so constantly in this position of silently assuming their power to will, and requiring and predicating the power of the corporeal or post-volitional alone, that Edwards and other necessitarian metaphysicians stand up and most unwisely say that *ability has no proper predicability of Will at all*.

The definitions thus far given embrace the following Postulates:

1. Not every cause is inalternative or *unipotent*, that is, possessed of power to no other than one sole effect.
2. Causes, in reference to possible and actual effects,

* See p. 254.

are either adequate or resultant. A volitional cause may be adequate to an effect, yet that effect not result; it is, therefore, to that effect, not a resultant cause. This difference relates not so much to the nature of the cause as to the fact of the sequence.

3. Non-existence of a volitional effect is not absolute proof of non-existence of volitional power in the agent for that effect.

4. Non-exertion of power is not identical with non-existence of power.

5. The physical effect is always the measure of the intrinsic physical causality; but the volitional effect is not the measure of the intrinsic power, causation, or objective influence.

These postulates may be shaped in the following anti-thetic

CANONS

Of non-volitional or necessary causation.

I. Every actual non-volitional event has its necessary cause.

II. Every necessary cause is unipotent, that is, has its own solely possible effect.

III. Every non-volitional event which fails to happen fails to happen for want of a cause. For every no-event there is a no-cause.

IV. The effect is the absolute measure of the intrinsic power of the cause or influence.

Of volitional or non-necessary causation.

I. Every actual volitional event has its resultant cause.

II. Every volitional cause is alternative, that is, has either of several effects possible.

III. Non-occurring volitions do not prove non-existence of adequate cause. Not for every no-volition is there a no-adequate cause.

IV. The result is the measure of merely the assignable* power of the adequate cause or influence.

The phrase "exertion of power," as used in our fourth Postulate, when employed by Dr. Reid, underwent the following criticism of the younger Edwards: "To *exert power* to a volition supposes a double act, the *exertion* and the *volition*. But the *exertion* is an effect, and requires a *causal act*. And that causal act is

Exertion of power.

* See p. 134.

an effect requiring its causal act, and so in infinite series." But the act, and the exertion of the power for the act, are not two independent acts or effects. Every act is performed in the exertion of the power Such exertion not a separate effect. for the act. The exertion of the power is the drawing upon the energy which the act requires, in order to its performance. It is the manner or condition through which the act is performed. The phrase is a statement of the relation which the performance of the act bears to the inherent power.

Of the term CERTAINTY, the etymology (*certus* is derived from *cerno*=*κρίνω*, I adjudge) shows that its primary meaning is subjective. It exists in the mind rather than in the object. When my judgment of the reality of an externality is so firm as to be exempt from all doubt, there is a mental certainty. The certainty is none the less real though the object turn out to have been unreal. That is, I may be perfectly *certain* of a thing and yet be mistaken.

Objective certainty is the external actuality corresponding to and verifying a correct subjective certainty. The actuality or object may be also a necessary object; nevertheless its certainty and its necessity are none the less different things. The thing may be necessary by the simple necessity of existence; but the ideas of its necessity and its certainty are two distinct ideas. By its certainty it is able to correspond and answer to the mind's reliance that it is so; by its necessity it is unable to non-exist. Mere mental certainty cognizes that a thing *is*, not that it *must be*. To cognize its necessity requires a pure intuition over and beyond the simple perception that it is.

PURE CERTAINTY in a future event is the *futurition* of the event, implying simply that while power exists for it not to be, it yet ultimately *will be*. Certainty of future event. For it is plain that in this there is no contradiction. If

of several possible events one *will be*, then the *certainty* is nothing more than just that WILL-BE. And surely the supposition that several events are possible does not contradict the idea that one of them will, in the ultimate, become actual. Nor does the fact that *one will be* contradict the idea that several are *possible*. It differs from necessity in that the latter negatives the idea of diverse alternative or plural possibilities. Objective certainty of a future event is the futuration or will-be of the event. Subjective certainty is the conception or view in the mind of that objective pure futuration or simple will-be.

The future objective certainty of a free volitional act, being a pure *will-be* without the *must-be*, has no degrees.

Subjective certainty. A *will-be* cannot be more or less certain. But the corresponding pure subjective certainty, perfect and without degrees, the human mind does not possess. Credence or reliance is the more proper term for our subjective view of a non-necessitated futuration. To mere humanity there is no objective certainty in a free volitional future event. Perfect subjective certainty corresponding to the pure objective, which among diverse possibilities *will be*, belongs to the divine prescience alone.

Correlative of free will. Certainty, as above defined and distinguished from necessity, is the conceivable correlative of an alternative will. It is the proper predicate or epithet for that volition which will in a given case be put forth by a will by definition able to put forth other instead. They reciprocally presuppose each other. He who cannot admit that volition can be put forth with full power to have withheld it cannot conceive of simple certainty. With him certainty is necessity. His *will-be* is a *must-be*. The result is fatalism.

Certainty not predicable of Invariable Succession. Some leading philosophers have rejected the term and the idea of causation, and have substituted in its place an Invariable Sequence, which is as reliable in their view as the continuity of causa-

tion. The connection in such case of antecedents and consequents is therefore properly held to be as inevitable as the connection of causes and effects. The Law of Invariability is here as absolute as the Law of Causation, and chance or Atheism would as soon follow the supposition of failure in one as in the other. The connection is, therefore, not a connection of *certainty*, but of *necessity*. Where such an Invariability exists it contradicts and excludes all idea of failure, or possible variation, or power of alternativity, or contrariety. Absolute universal invariability, invariability as axiomatic as causal succession, is in contradiction with power of exception or alterity.*

CHAPTER V.

EDWARDS'S SYNTHESIS OF DEFINITIONS REVIEWED.

A DOCTRINAL scheme may be framed with a set of definitions dovetailed into each other with so exact a mutual fit, that the very coherency and structural exactness of the system of terms may seem to demonstrate the truth and solidity of the doctrine; and yet each definition may covertly so include more than truth, or an essential idea may be so excluded from the synthesis, that the doctrine may be imperfect or false. The terms must not only exactly fit each other and form a doctrinal structure, but they must fit the truth of things; and they must, without omission, include and fit to everything requisite to the true and complete synthesis. By transgression of these principles Edwards's synthesis of definitions becomes an artificial framework in which the whole question in debate is anticipatively assumed.

* See p. 231.

By that synthesis NECESSITY is held and defined as comprehending and identical with all existing relations; *certainty* is identical with necessity; and *contingency* is held equivalent to chance, to no cause, and so is excluded as absurdity. Now the very question being *whether* all relations are necessary; *whether* all certain futuritions are necessary futuritions; and *whether* contingency is not a valid idea of the understanding; a cool assumption of the result in definitions must be exposed by an analysis of the nomenclature.

I. Edwards, first, rejects a true and adequate definition of Necessity. "Here I might say that a thing is then said to be *necessary* when it must be, and cannot be otherwise. But this would not properly be a definition of necessity or an explanation of the word any more than if I explained the word *must* by there being a necessity. The words *must*, *can*, and *cannot*, need explanation as much as the words necessary and impossible, excepting that the former are words that children commonly use, we know something of the meaning of, earlier than the latter."—P. 30.

We reply, 1. There is no more true test of a definition than this, that it reproduce in the mind the clear and precise idea for which the term stands. That the definition be in words so familiar that it create the idea, even in the minds of children, is a real perfection. It is a decided proof of the universality and indestructibility of the idea as defined. It is fair ground of suspicion against a theory that it discards the clear for the obscure. Moral philosophers, after a world of recondite explication, find that no term or definition more clearly creates in the mind the precise *idea* of moral obligation than the verb *ought*, and have even found for this purpose the awkward noun *oughtness* a most expressive formation. Just so may we say that *certainty* or *simple* futurition has no better designation than simple WILL-BE; and necessity cannot find in all lan-

Edwards's assumptions by definition.

Definition produces the idea.

Necessity is *mustness*.

guage a simpler or more unmistakable exponent than the terms *must*, *must-be*, *mustness*.

Perfectly untrue is the assertion that *must* as much needs a definition as *necessity*; since *must* in every mind creates the exact idea. This fact is acknowledged even in faulting the term, and is the very charge brought against it. It is the obscurer term which always needs defining, and of which the plainer term is the definition, and the plainest the best. And if so, the only word in the language which can precisely define *necessity* is *MUST*, and this neither needs nor can receive a definition except by a synonymous word or phrase.

Equally inadmissible, therefore, is the objection that *must* may be defined by *necessity* as well as *necessity* by *must*. All words are interchangeable with their definitions; all words and their definitions mutually define each other. Associate with a word its synonymous formula, and that to any given mind will be the definition which is best understood. Even Edwards's definition of necessity will be found to be better defined by the word than the word by the definition.

Interchange-
ability no
fault of def-
inition.

II. Edwards next propounds a definition which gets no further than the definition rejected.

If, however, clearness to a plain or childlike mind be a fault in a definition, the definition of necessity, by Edwards, is in this respect to a high degree unobjectionable. "*Philosophical necessity*," he says, "*is really nothing else than the full and fixed connection between the thing signified by the subject and predicate of a proposition which affirms something to be true.*"

Edwards certainly does not here say what he means. He surely cannot mean that necessity is the *connection itself*, but a *quality* of the connection. The connection is a necessary or fixed connection. The connection and the fixedness or necessity are two things. The necessity is to be found as a property in the idea or reality of the connection.

This is not so much definition as exemplification. It does not so much tell us *what* necessity is as *where* it may be found. *What* it is may still be a dark question; for it may not be so easy at a glance to tell by description or synonymous terms exactly *what* the necessity is which resides in the connection between subject and predicate. Nor is the darkness much illumined by the adjectives "*full and fixed*," unless **FIXED** means *necessary*, which forces us into the circle of defining a thing by itself. Edwards, however, aids our difficulty by subdividing into three heads his exemplification of this *necessity in connection*, namely, 1. "Things may be connected *in and of themselves* as mathematical relations, etc. 2. Necessity may exist in the connection between *a thing and its existence*. 3. Necessity may exist between *cause and effect*." Now the various expressions designating the necessary element under these three heads form his real definition of the thing, as may be seen by the following exhibit.

1. "Things have a *necessary connection* in and of themselves, **BECAUSE** it may imply a *contradiction or gross absurdity to suppose them not connected*." "It would be the *greatest absurdity to deny*" "*the sum of all contradictions*," "it is *necessary*," "*fit, and suitable*." Under this head come mathematical and all self-evident truths. These are the only definitions or equivalents of the necessary element which Edwards furnishes in the first head of exemplification. 2. The connection with existence of a thing which has already come to pass, and can never *not-be*, "*may be fixed and certain*," "*made sure*," "*made certain and unalterably true*," "*fixed and decided*," "*impossible that it should be otherwise*." These phrases are the real designations of necessity in the second. 3. Connection of antecedent with consequent, or cause and effect, by which the latter is necessary "*consequentially*." This is "*a necessity of consequence*." Under this head all so-called

Edwards locates, not defines.

Three classes of necessity.

Necessity of past fact.

Necessity of consequent.

"certain" events are by him ranked;* that is, all future events, including all acts of the Will, and it is upon this necessity rests the great debate. Cause and effect are "*firmly and surely connected*," "*fully and thoroughly*" "*made sure*." After having rejected the simple MUST as too childish for a definition, Edwards gives a list of descriptives like these!

After having rejected the ordinary definition as a mere interchangeable equivalent; he furnishes nothing as a substitute but a catalogue of synonyms. Defines by
synonyms.

They get not one hair's breadth beyond the simple *must*. And what is more to our purpose, there is not one in his circle of identities which goes one hair's breadth beyond our definition, that "*necessity is the non-existence of power to be or operate otherwise*," but is the quality of what "*must be*," and "that it should be otherwise involves contradictions," and so it is "FIXED," "*made sure*," etc.

"The fixed and full connection" between the significate of a subject and predicate, he tells us, is necessity, or at least has necessity for a quality. But every connection is a *full* connection; for that which is only a part of a connection is less than a connection, and so no connection at all. *Full*, therefore, is superfluous, and may be omitted. Looking, then, between the subject and predicate we find that necessity is just FIXED CONNECTION, or rather the *fixedness* of the connection. So that *necessity* is *fixedness*. By whom or by what *fixed* is not said. But if we can conceive a *connection*, and then conceive that connection to be fixed, and then can

* Those who claim for Edwards a maintenance of a certainty of future acts of the Will as distinct from necessity will please here take note. Edwards expressly maintains, in his chapter on Foreknowledge, that the necessity of every future event foreknown, whether volition or mechanical effect, comes under as strict a necessity as a *past act*; and a past act, he here says, having "*made sure*" of its existence, is *necessary in itself*. Of a future and a past event alike he affirms that their necessity consists "in the present impossibility of non-existence of the event."—Edwards on the Will, p. 181.

isolate its *fixedness*, we shall have shaped to our mental view the Edwardean notion of *necessity*. Ask Edwards at last what *necessary* means, and he can only answer, "fixed," "made sure," "fixed and certain," "sure and firm," "contradiction to be supposed otherwise," etc.

This definition nevertheless *assumes*, in the next place, *the necessity of all known actual relations*. All relations assumed as necessary. Things between which any relations or connections actually exist, may be the subject and predicate of a proposition affirming something to be true. When there is such a connection, according to Edwards, then the thing affirmed is necessary. Let the subject, for instance, be *a modest man*, and the predicate be *is to commit a future murder*; if the copula be affirmatively true, the futuration it seems is *necessary*. Now this is denied. The connection of the man with the future murder, even though he by action ultimately proves its affirmation true, is not a necessary connection. The logical copula then simply expresses *certainty*. That is, it gives notice to the mind to feel that repose which is consistent with the view of a futuration which, *Falsely*, while there exists power for it not to occur, will occur. And this is not necessity. The definition, therefore, is false.

III. Edwards next, for a purpose, overstates the difference between the popular and the philosophical use of the terms.

"The word necessary," says Edwards, "is a relative term, and relates to some supposed opposition made to the thing spoken of, which is overcome, and proves in vain to hinder or alter it. That is, necessary, in the original and proper use of the word, which is, or will be, *notwithstanding all supposable opposition*."—P. 31. ". . . We are accustomed, in the common use of language, to apply and understand these phrases in this sense, etc. And if we

All necessity assumed to be against Will.

use the words as terms of art, . . . this habitual connection of ideas will deceive and confound us in our reasonings," etc.—P. 32.

Fallacious
transfer.

The purpose for which Edwards asserts this relative meaning of the word, and expatiates on its inveterate influence, is to provide a reply at the set time to the Arminian objection against the moral responsibility of a necessary action. Men bring to volitional necessity, he will tell us, the notion, long established by habit, of *necessity or compulsion* AGAINST the *Will*, and thus attribute to *necessary volition* that irresponsibility which belongs to *compulsory involuntary action*.

Confounding
necessity
with com-
pulsion.

But the importance attributed by Edwards to the plurality of meanings of the word necessity, impossibility, etc., is excessive and capricious. Few words in any language are absolutely single in meaning; there is no reason assignable why the different meanings of these words should be so strangely and inveterately undistinguishable.

Edwards's account both of the "original and proper sense of the word," and of the "proper use of language," as having some reference to *an opposed Will*, is, however, wholly incorrect. Reference to an *opposed Will* is, in the large majority of its applications, in the popular as well as the philosophical, so accidental or so remote as to form no proper characteristic of the word.

1. The "original and proper sense" of the word may be in some degree tested by its etymology. If the derivation be correct which deduces it from *ne* and *cedo*, its primitive meaning is *unyieldingness*. Now a thing may be unyielding to a *Will* or to a thousand other things. A rock may be unyielding to the waves, a tower to the storm, the clay to the sun. A *Will* itself may be unyielding to something else, as a temptation or an obstacle.

Radical sense
of necessity.

2. Nor has the "common use" of the word any proper reference to an *opposed Will*. In its most ordinary use the word necessary is equivalent to *requisite*—
 Most com-
 mon use is not
 most proper
 sense.
 requisite to an end. Thus, light is *necessary* to day; heat is *necessary* to the fusion of metals; moisture is *necessary* to vegetable growth; air is *necessary* to animal life. The necessity in such cases is the necessity of condition to result, and exists whether *Will* be involved or not. In these cases quoted there is little or no reference to *Will*, and that little is rather to *Will* accordant than to *Will* opposed. Nine-tenths of all its popular uses are of this nature, and bear no reference to voluntary opposition.

3. Popular language approaches more nearly the philosophical meaning in the words *impossible* and *cannot* than in the word *necessary*. They have, too, a more frequent reference to opposed *Will*. Frequently we say we *cannot* do a thing however much we *will* it. And things are *impossible* to us in the same sense. Yet Edwards states, far too unqualifiedly, that "*impossible* is manifestly a relative term, and has reference to supposed power exerted to bring a thing to pass which is insufficient for the effect." Strictly in accordance with the philosophical sense excluding all reference to opposed will or exerted voluntary power, a man of common sense would use these terms in phrases like these: it is *impossible* that nothing should produce something; a thing *cannot* be and not be at the same time; it is *impossible* for two and two to be five; it is *impossible* that space and substance should
 Necessitative
 terms not
 implying op-
 posed Will.
 be identical; it is *impossible* that two moments of time should change their order of succession. These and thousands of other instances which might be quoted wholly excluding any antithesis to *Will*, amply prove that such a *meaning* is perfectly familiar to common language, and the *idea* perfectly familiar to the common mind. They also show that between *necessity*

without any reference to Will, and compulsion against Will, there is no affinity which perplexes the most ordinary mind to distinguish.

IV. Edwards lastly *identifies certainty with necessity*. "Metaphysical or philosophical necessity is nothing different from (objective) certainty." That statement, we reply, can be true only on the assumption False identification of necessity and certainty. that *certainty* is a synonym with *necessity*. Edwards's metaphysical necessity is, as will appear in due time,* the necessity of a fact whose diverse is impossible, is unthinkable, is infinitely contradictory and self-explosive, is a causeless effect. If there be a *certainty* different from *necessity*, this is not that certainty, but *necessity*. If necessity and certainty are synonyms, the statement is nugatory; if not, it is untrue. The real fact is abundantly evident that with Edwards certainty and necessity were essential synonyms, the former being occasionally called in as the less repulsive term. When he says that any necessity is nothing more than certainty, he means not the Arminian's certainty but the necessitarian's certainty, which is indeed necessity. The proper subject of the epithet *necessary*, and so of both terms, is, according to his words, as quoted in our first extract in this chapter, that which "must be and cannot be otherwise;" a definition which he condemns, not as untrue, but as a mere convertible.

Contingent, according to Edwards, implies that an event is *accidental*, in the sense that its connection with its cause being unknown, its occurrence is unforeseen. Contingency, according to Edwards. "But the word *contingent*," Edwards adds, "is abundantly used in a very different sense; not for that whose connection with the series of things we cannot discern so as to foresee the event, but for something which has absolutely no ground (cause) or reason with which its existence has any fixed and

* See p. 221.

certain connection." If this means that any anti-necessitarian writers use the word *contingent* in the sense of *causeless*, we know not, nor does Edwards inform us, who those writers are. But we venture to imagine that Edwards imputes to them rather the meaning which their views seemed to him to involve, than that which they consciously affixed to the word. Our own use of the word appears in its proper place.*

The very nomenclature, therefore, of Edwards, as a whole, excludes *freedom* at start. Certainty=necessity is one side; contingency=no-cause=chance=zero is on the other. The two embrace all eventuality without any intermediate, and freedom is nowhere. And when the exigency of the debate compels him to get up and define a freedom, then freedom=the absolute subjection of being and action to the causations of necessity.

Falsely imputed to
freedomists.

False assumptions.

CHAPTER VI.

CONDITIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF WILL'S FREE ACTION.

WHEN we say that Will, or the self in willing, is sole cause of its own volitions, there is, nevertheless, one clause properly to be superadded, and always to be implied, namely, Will, *in its proper conditions*. And this leads to the discussion of the *conditions* or occasions and limitations of free action of Will.

Will in its
conditions.

The necessitarian insists that there is no consistent and maintainable difference between cause and occasion or secondary condition. Edwards says of *cause*: "The word is often used in so

Are cause
and condi-
tion differ-
ent?

* See p. 135.

restrained a sense as to signify that only which has a positive efficiency or influence to produce a thing or bring it to pass. But there are many things which have no such positive productive influences, which yet are causes." He instances as real causes the absence of preventives. The absence of the

Denied by
Edwards.

sun is a cause of the falling dew in summer, and of the freezing streams in winter. Mr. Mill, in his Logic, maintains the same doctrine, including the absence of preventives under the term cause.

And by Mill.

He further adds: "The state of the whole universe at any instant we believe to be the consequent of its state at the previous instant; insomuch that if we knew all the agents which exist at the present moment, their collocation in space and their properties, in other words, the laws of their agency, we could predict the whole subsequent history of the universe."—P. 199. From which it would seem to result, that every previous thing is the cause of every subsequent thing, and *everything that does not exist is the cause of everything that does exist!*

So far, however, as Will is concerned, perhaps a clear and permanent distinction may be drawn between cause and condition. The only difficulty of distinguishing subsidiary occasion or condition from cause arises from the fact that from different stand-points different antecedents become principal and cause; so that cause and condition are ever exchanging place with each other. Thus, of the death of Cesar, from one stand-point, a man may say that the sword of Brutus was the cause, and all other antecedents were conditions. From another stand-point another man may say that Cesar's ambition was the cause; another that a conspiracy of senators was the cause, and all other antecedents were conditions.

Difference
affirmed.

Where, however, there is a kind of *cause*, simple and elemental in its nature, whose direct and immediate

And shown as regards Will. effect is also always of one and the same simple and elementary sort, and is produced solely by that single species of cause, that cause may be always considered as sole cause, and all accessories as secondary conditions. *Will* is such a cause and *volition* is such an effect. *Will* is a simple elementary cause, directly productive of the simple elementary effect *volition* alone, and of nothing else; and *volition* is the simple, elementary, and sole result of *Will* alone. Of *volition* *Will* is sole cause; of *Will* *volition* is sole effect. All other antecedents are conditions, in accordance with whose existence *Will* causatively acts. If, therefore, we have drawn an invariable line of distinction between *Will* as cause of *volition* and all other antecedents of *volition*, we are freed from all ambiguity of an ever-varying sense of the word cause.

A *condition* may be defined as that attendant upon the direct cause without whose existence the cause is not to be conceived as resultant, but with whose existence the cause is still conceivably non-resultant. A *condition* enables but does not secure result. A volitional cause, or *Will* itself, does not differ from a volitional condition in the certainty or necessity of the result; for the cause or agent potential to causation may exist and the result not eventuate. The difference is that the volitional cause is always one, namely, *Will*, and produces the act by direct power resident in itself; whereas the motives are of variable nature, and only indirectly related to the result.

The CONDITIONS of all volitional action may be reckoned to be THREE, an Object or direction of action, Mental Comprehension, and Motive.

1. There can be no action, and therefore no volition without an OBJECT. The direct object of the volition is properly the postvolitional act which the volition produces; but there can be no volition

without also an object, or at least direction of the post-volitional act.

2. MENTAL COMPREHENSION is a condition; by which we mean that the objects and sphere of action must be within the knowledge, the recollection, <sup>2. Compre-
hension.</sup> and the reach of the attention. A volition for an inconceivable action, an unknowable direction, or for an unknowable action, is impossible. In order to choice, the alternatives of choice must be before the mental view.

3. MOTIVE is usually considered as a condition to the possibility of a volition by the Will; that is, it is frequently affirmed that men *never* act without motive. It may be conceded that motive is a usual antecedent to volition, but the strict universality of the antecedency may be doubted. The true principle will be found stated on page 139. The motive is that on account of which, (*propter*,) or in accordance with which, a volition is put forth. But, as with the word *cause*, so ^{3. Motive.} with the word *motive*, an extension is often made in the use beyond the definition. The motive is not only actual but potential. It is not only that in view of which the volition is put forth, but that in view of which the volition is able to be put forth. The motive is usually some quality in or attendant upon the object of volition by which it commends itself to the faculty of the mind other than the Will. Thus the pleasant flavor of an apple is that quality in the object why it is chosen.

The motive may be considered as objective or subjective. The sweetness, as existing in the apple, is the objective motive; the sweetness, as a conception in the mind, is the subjective motive. Or <sup>Objective
and sub-
jective
motive.</sup> even the feeling of desire, awakened by the flavor, may be considered as the subjective motive.

It is from the motive that the direct object of the volition normally draws its eligibility by which it becomes the object. It is not the bare ob- <sup>Motive and
object are
one.</sup>

ject itself which is willed, but the object as invested with the motivity borrowed from the collateral motive. Hence, it is not far from truth to say that it is the motivity in the object which is essentially chosen and is the real object. Thus, if I choose a rose from the motive of its sweetness, it is the sweetness in the rose which is most truly chosen, and the other constituents of the rose are chosen as embodying, or attached to that motivity. If I choose to walk into the garden for the same motive, every step is willed as embracing the same motivity, and not one step would be taken which is not invested with that motivity. Hence, the motive is chosen in the choice of the object. The choice of the object and of the motive is one and the same thing.

Subjective
freedom
with objec-
tive un-
free-
dom.

The Will may be *Subjectively*, and in its own intrinsic nature, free, while *Objectively* it may be limited and necessitated.

1. There may be no external motives in a given direction. So a person *may* be objectively incapable of sin from the absence of all temptation. He may be objectively unfree to good, and so be wholly depraved because he is out of reach of a single attractive object of good. When there are no motives within reach, save in one direction, the Will *may* be objectively unfree.

2. There may be but one external object or direction, actual and known, of action, and so of volition. In such a case the Will, though its intrinsic nature is unchanged, and is truly in its proper conditions free, yet is objectively circumscribed and rendered unfree. It can act but in one sole possible way. Objective volitional freedom requires external plurality or alternatives. But when there are two possible courses, non-action may be in fact a third course.

We have then here the limitations by which the freedom of the human Will is circumscribed. There can be no direction of volitional action which is not within the mental *view*, under the possible mental *attention*, and,

normally, also, commended by *motive*. When, therefore, we say that a free Will puts forth a volition with full power otherwise, we are always to understand it with a qualification, namely, *a free Will in its proper conditions*. Conditions always pre-supposed.

This remark obviates the misunderstanding of the Younger Edwards, who supposes that we imagine that the volitional faculty accounts for a volition without any postulate of conditional circumstances. "The man who is the subject of a certain volition had the power of Will long since, yet it never produced that volition, we may suppose, till this moment. What is the cause or reason that it produces it now and not before? To say it does it, because it will, is to say either that this volition is produced by another preceding, which runs into the infinite series, or that the power of Will, or rather the man in the exercise of that power, is the subject of volition, which is mere trifling. On the whole, the existence of a power of Will in a man will no more account for any particular volition of which he is the subject, than the existence of the *man* will account for the same volition, or the existence of a ship-carpenter will account for the building of a certain ship."—Works, vol. ii, p. 332. But, like all other causes, a volitional agent, in order to become an adequate and resultant cause, needs to be placed in the proper causal conditions. The powder causes the flash, but not until the spark is applied. So the volitional agent cannot will until the objects and the alternatives of volition are before his view. He then becomes an adequate cause for either of the alternatives that may result. The carpenter cannot build the ship until the object, motives, and alternatives are before him. But the objects and alternatives no more cause his volitions than the ship creates the carpenter. Younger Edwards's objection.

It need not be denied that motive is sometimes called Answered.

Motive and cause. cause, and that words are used both as nouns and verbs, implying a causative relation between the supplying of motives and the complying act that results. It is often said of a man, This ~~made~~ him do thus; that induced him to act differently. A tempter or seducer who furnishes motives to sin, in compliance with which destruction is incurred, is said to *cause* the sin and the destruction, to *involve* in guilt, and to *ruin* the victim. A person who supplies instructions and

In popular language. motives to good which, followed, result in excellence and happiness, is said to *cause* the excellence and to *produce* the happiness. This is said with that popular looseness which belongs to the word *cause*, and to most causative terms. It arises from the external relation of antecedency and sequence, which present the obvious objective appearance of true causation. This popular use does not assume to decide anything as to the intrinsic psychological nature of the relation. Yet how

Motive and reason. truly consciousness distinguishes between motives and causes (or between the two classes of causes) is clear, from the fact that a man seldom says that a motive "*caused me to do thus*," or that such or such was the "*cause why I choose thus*." Every man assigns not a *cause*, but a *reason* why he wills a given way. And if any one truly interrogates consciousness, why he rejects the word, it will be difficult for him to refuse to answer that the word *cause* is too mechanically necessitative a word, or not to feel that there is a conscious difference between a *cause* and a *reason* for action.

The sense of responsibility, too, is grounded upon the assumption of this difference. When the tempter presents the motive before his victim which he accepts to his own

Tempter and victim. ruin, the offerer of the motive is a sharer of the guilt. Yet, strictly speaking, he is not sharer in the guilt of the victim's act. Each party is responsible for himself and for his own act: the tempter for his presentation of the motive, the victim for his acting in

compliance with it. The heinousness of the act is indeed to a degree a measure of the aggravation of the tempting presentation, especially where it was legitimately calculable and so intentional. Yet the seduced sinner is not the less completely responsible for the full enormity of his compliant crime, on the plain principle that the motive did not necessitate the act; that the motives being all the same, he could have willed wholly otherwise; and that the full causation of the deed took a needlessly effectual origin in himself. And this brings us back to the axiom of universal common sense, that the sin taking its primordial origin unnecessarily from the free agent, the agent is, therefore, wholly and solely responsible. For the proper act the responsibility, Their distinct Responsibilities. as well as the unnecessary causation, takes beginning with himself; nor is it derived from, nor does it reflect back upon, the tempter or the creator. The tempter has, indeed, his own crime to answer for. The Creator has none.

Not only of individual volitions, but of the course of large masses of men we assign *causes*. We find *causes* of events in history; and these Historical causes. *causes* are simply motives that act in common on the totality of individual Wills. In these so-called *causes* necessitative and volitional elements variously blend. So far as they are purely and alternatively volitional they are not necessitative.

CHAPTER VII.

ANTERIOR STANDARD OF ACCORDANCE.

AFTER exterior freedom has been defined to be the "power of doing *as we will*," both the freedomist and the necessitarian are much inclined in a The volition AS SOME antecedent.

similar way to define the freedom of the Will to be "the power of choosing *as*"—something. The volition, forsooth, is *as* the last *dictate of the understanding*; as the *greatest apparent good*; as the *choice, wish, inclination, bias, or making up of the mind*; as the *sum total or balance of the entire anterior man*; as the *strongest motive*; as *it pleases*. Each and all alike of these for-

Fallacious
phrases.

mulæ may be used to fasten the Will with an iron link to an iron pillar. The simple truth is that the volition is not *as* any one thing whatever of a single anterior fixed nature.

Used by
freedomists
in a good
sense.

These formulæ, which have served the purposes of necessitarianism so well, were nevertheless, some of them, originally used pertinently by freedomists themselves to indicate the idea of free volitionality. That the agent "chooses as he pleases," has an obvious sense quite different from "chooses as he *is pleased*." The former has an active free look which suggested a freedom which it does not quite unequivocally express. Necessitarianism, in its habit of appropriating terms which have an exterior show of freedom with an interior necessity in them, has availed itself of this formula to mitigate verbally the hardness of its dogma. The formula that one *chooses as he pleases* may mean simply, and was used by freedomists to mean, that the Will chooses accordantly with *some*, or *any*, previously perceived choosableness or eligibility; with *some* motive, that is, though not a solely possible. The phrase "pleases" may designate *any*, or either one of several favorable views in favor of which the Will alternatively and independently of causation or invariability chooses. In such cases the free Will accorded with a particular motive uncaused by any controlling power, just as itself self-determinantly "*pleased*." Each motive or anterior favorable view for either one of several courses furnishes you an "*as you please*," the volition in favor of either

motive would be "*a choosing as you please*;" by that very accordance it becomes the *preferred motive*, the *strongest motive*, the *prevalent motive*, the *what you think best*, the *greatest apparent good*, etc., etc. Similarly necessitarianism has appropriated to its own fatalistic sense the formula that the volitional power *wills as it wills*. Both these formulæ, when used by freedomists as phrases of freedom, mean to exclude every extraneous necessitation or law of invariability to a sole volition, and to affirm that the source of the Will's action is its own self-contained, independent power. The Will, thereby, it is said, wills not as something else wills or causes it to will, but by its own intrinsic alternative power; it wills as itself alone wills or pleases. In this last term *wills*, the very unnecessitated free forthgoing of the act, unlike act of any other cause, was intuitively recognized by the speaker as intrinsic in its very conception. This recognition of intrinsic free spontaneity, in contrast with the inalternativity of mechanical action, in the very conception of Will induced also the phrase that the agent *acted* as he willed or pleased; a phraseology used by the ancient writers with the unquestionable purpose of excluding the idea of unitary necessitation. But the necessitarians caught at the phrase, *wills as it pleases*, and interpreted it to mean duplicate volitions *ad infinitum*; and the phrases have been abandoned. Over this abandonment necessitarians indulge a jubilation. "The old advocates of the self-determining power," says Dr. Pond, "used to admit freely that the mind chooses because it will choose; it puts forth voluntary" (volitional) "exercises, because it will put them forth. But our modern defenders of this kind of liberty have grown more wary. They are afraid, as they well may be, of Jonathan Edwards." And, doubtless, as the pillaging process goes on, by which necessitarians capture, through special definitions, the nomenclature of freedom, not only the terms

Necessitarian catch.

And disuse by freedomists.

freedom, self-determination, but any words or phrases we can invent, as *alternativity, counter power*, etc., may be loaded with a fatalistic meaning and compelled to surrender. We may then be "wary" and chary of their use, and task our power to invent new unequivocalities, which in turn may have to undergo the same dextrous verbal petit larcenies.

So Origen is quoted by Edwards from Whitby as saying "the soul acts by her own choice, and it is free for her to incline to whatever part she will." With Origen for the soul thus to "incline" or *will as she wills*, is to *will* independently of any anterior necessitation, or of anything but the *Will*. Thus also Justin Martyr is quoted by Whitby as saying, "We Christians do not think as do the Stoics, that all things are *done according to fate*; but that every man does well or ill according to the freedom of his *will or choice*." In this expression Justin, without doubt, includes in the doing *well or ill* the volition itself; and that volition is accordant with the *freedom* of the *Will*. Even Whitby's by himself says that liberty is a power of *acting* from ourselves, or *doing* what *we will*; where the *acting* and the *doing* both include the volition, and the phrase *we will* excludes the control of any power but *Will*. This sort of phraseology is verbally inexact; but there can be no doubt that it was intended when used, not merely by Whitby, but by the fathers of the Christian Church for the first three centuries, to express the exclusion of necessitation from the Will in her volitional action. But what will, in the minds of many, cover their errors with excuse, is the fact that both the elder and the younger Edwards, as well as jubilant Dr. Pond, were guilty of the oversight of calling a volition a voluntary act; whereas it is the corporeal act consequent upon the volition which is voluntary, and not the volition itself.

We find a vicious circle in Dr. Samuel Clarke's formula,

that *the last dictate of the understanding decides the Will*. Undoubtedly the Will decides immediately after the last mental act previous to its volition. The fact that the Will decides renders the previous mental state or act *last*. But so far from being true that the last previous mental state decides the volition, the truth is that it is Last dictate of the understanding. through the volition that the agent decides which is the last. That dictate of the understanding becomes *the last* by act of the Will. The Will decides not only the which, but the *when*; and by deciding the *when*, it renders the immediately previous the last. It is not then that the last dictate of the understanding decides the Will; it is the Will that causes the dictate to be last.

The phrases used to indicate a previous *mental making up* which necessitates the volition elucidate nothing. That antecedent *making up of the mind* is itself, in its terminal point, volitional; being simply a *predetermination* or resolution that at the proper moment a Making up of mind. given volition shall be put forth. That is, it is a previous volition that I will subsequently put forth another volition. What is commonly meant by this *making up of the mind*, is the comparative survey through the intellectual and moral faculties and feelings of the alternatives and a decision *by the Will*, settling the question by the formation of a purpose or standard determination, the nature of which is discussed in the proper place.*

To say that we will as we choose is to make one volition accord with a previous volition. To say Volition as previous wish. with Professor Lawrence that we will as we "wish,"† inasmuch as that *wish* is a fixed object secured by anterior necessitation, is to fasten the Will again to an iron post. We often will as we know we *ought*, not as we *wish*.

It is said that the *judgment*, that a given volition, is, *on*

* See p. 154.

† Bibliotheca Sacra.

Volition as different mental antecedents. *the whole, best*, is what the Will necessarily chooses. But, alas! every feeling claims that its alternative is *on the whole the best*. Desire, if relyingly listened to, affirms that its object is best of all, and *best on the whole*. Conscience, the moral feeling, affirms that the *right* course is *on the whole best*. Expediency affirms that the most profitable course *is on the whole best*. Esthetic affirms that its beautiful object *is best on the whole*. A previous choice or a wish affirms itself *best on the whole*. Reason, judgment, affirms that a rational course *is on the whole best*. These are all parties, and none final judges. Among them all the man makes his choice, and that *choice* is the true decision of the contest, the first and last strike of the balance.

Professor Haven, after having subjected all our volitions to causation by anterior choice, and all choice to causation by anterior circumstances, considers the question, *How then can we exercise a responsible power over our future volitions?* To this he makes this ludicrous reply: that it can be done "by shaping your character, which is under your control." Shape your previous character, that is, to higher good, and your future volitions may be directed to higher good. But on his doctrine of my having in the past exercised the solely possible volitions, any different shaping of my character has been out of power. I can neither in the past nor the future rise to any higher level of volitions than a fossil reptile imbedded in a rock could rise to a higher stratum.

Our conclusion is that neither any antecedent intrinsic strength of motive or class of motives, nor an antecedent standard of accordance, can be assigned as furnishing a limitative law of the action of Will to sole result. But if the choice or sequence of volition is regulated by no law, it is replied, it must be lawless and out of nature, a mere thing of chance. And this will be said not only by those who claim the Will to be controlled in its sequences by necessary causation, but by

Is Will lawless?

those who affirm invariable sequences and are ready to deny that such invariability has the quality of law.

If we reply, Law in all cases must be held to determine the particular sequent of the antecedent in all possible sequences, if it be such an expression of the order of sequence as that the consequent in the sequence is ever and always individually fixed, then it must be admitted that counter alternative choice must be a choice outside of Law. But if Law may be defined *an expression or description of the true nature of all sequences*, then an alternative choice is ever within Law. When before the Agent there are the alternatives B, C, or D, the agent is circumscribed by Law to these alternatives, but not by Law to a sole one. That is the full extent of the Law in the case. The non-resultance of rejected possible volitions is not a case of Lawlessness, for Lawlessness is the absence or default of Law *where there should be Law*, and is contrary to the nature of things; but such non-resultance is a case of limitation of the actual extension of Law existing in the true and essential nature of things.

CHAPTER VIII.

SCHEMATISM OF CONSCIOUS FREE WILL.

PERSONALITY, Personal Identity, or Self, is a simple substratum, directly known or intuited by the consciousness, which no analysis can explain. Nor can we explain how to the self, as to a center or Personality. nucleus, the faculties inhere. All the facts that present themselves to our experiential observation may, however, be stated in proper sequence.

1. By consciousness we note the operations of our own mind, and learn to classify them into intellections,

Seven constituents of free Will.

sensibilities, and VOLITIONS. 2. We are, from direct cognition, compelled to admit the existence of a central self or soul, which consciousness calls I.

3. We are with equal resistlessness compelled to admit that for each specific class of our classified mental operations there is a power or ground upon which they are based, which we call a *Faculty*. 4. Consciousness finds in her *I* a sense of appropriation by which the self claims all the operations and faculties to be its own. Of the operations, the conscious self says, *I feel, I think, I will*; and the same conscious self says, My sensibility, my intellect, my Will. 5. As in the self there is found a sense of receptivity by which certain operations are recognized as *incoming*, such as the *sensations* and *impressions*; so others are felt to be *outgoing*, as the *perceptions, affections, passions, and desires*. 6. But, besides both these classes, there is what we will call a sense of the free activity, by which we feel that not only the act goes forth by a capability,

Incoming, outgoing, and forthputting.

but is PUT FORTH from the central SELF-POWER.

So that all our mental operations are threefold:

either *incoming, outgoing, or forthputting*.*

And in this feeling of *forthputting* there is the half-latent, yet diffusive sub-sense that in such *putting forth* there is exercised the creative, directive power, including the equally possible withholding. For of the directing, shaping, and creating of the volition, the possible withholding is in fact a part. So that the full amount of the sense of *putting forth* is, that it is done with the full power of otherwise-doing or not-doing. There is a freedom both *to* and *from* the act. 7. The volition so *put forth* is claimed by the self to be pre-eminently its own; for its

* Dr. Day, (p. 161,) in opposition to the claim that action is attributable to Will alone, asks, "Is there no activity in the passions?" or in "reading?" or "thinking?" There may be action, we reply, that is, forthgoing action; but there is *forthputting action* only just so far as there is Will or volition, separately, or blended with the other action.

putting forth as it is or withholding, the self acknowledges the unique commensurate responsibility.

THE ISSUE AND ARGUMENT.

We have thus far, as our PART FIRST, stated the nature of the freedom of the Will as opposed to Volitional Necessity, and as required, in our estimation, by the doctrine of Responsibility. The form of the Argument upon this Issue is this. Through our PART SECOND, assuming the reality of this Freedom, we show that it is not invalidated by the Necessitarian Argument; and in our PART THIRD that it is established by its own Affirmative Argument.

PART SECOND.

THE NECESSITARIAN ARGUMENT CONSIDERED.

SECTION FIRST.—THE CAUSATIONAL ARGUMENT.

CHAPTER I.

THE NECESSITARIAN PARALOGISM.

It has been said that the sum total of the arguments for necessity, especially in the treatise of President Edwards on the Will, consists in the application in all its phases of the axiom that "every event has its cause." But perhaps a closer analysis will show that the necessitarian argument is founded not upon this axiom, but upon the *assumption* of another proposition which is neither equivalent to this axiom, nor in itself axiomatic and self-evident, nor justifiably assumed without proof, namely, the proposition that "every cause is inalternative or unipotent;" that is, that every cause is potent to but one solely possible effect, to wit, that effect which always follows, and no other. It is implied that, in volitions or physics, for every infinitesimal point of effect there must be the correlative sole infinitesimal point of cause, and *vice versa*. This is identical with the ordinary physical maxim that "like causes produce like effects." This maxim is the precise contradictory of the proposition that "some causes (namely, volitional causes) are *alternative* or *pluripotent*," that is, "capable of putting forth either of several effects." Now the assumption of

Supposed
Edwardean
maxim.

Real one.

the above necessitarian proposition is the assumption of the whole point in question. If ^{Its wholesale assumption.} it be granted, the whole discussion is foreclosed before it starts.

That the maxim that "every cause is unipotent" is not self-evident; that it is not, like the maxim that "every event has a cause," granted by every honest and intelligent mind as soon as its terms are fairly understood and fully weighed, may appear from the following consideration. Let us suppose the existence of individuals, two or more in number, so precisely alike in all the qualities of character, as that, in a ^{Experimental case.} given set of circumstances, they are each a reduplication or repetition of precisely a similar volitional experiment. If there be within them the power of alternative choice, there is no proof, from the nature of the case, (though there may be *assumption*,) that each will put forth precisely the same volition. And this not because of any *chance*, but from the most opposite principle—the mysterious responsible SELF. It is from the fact that, however like, each is a distinct responsible Ego; and that in each responsible self is the equal power of alternative choice.

We can recollect but one passage in which Edwards hits upon the thought of directly proving, as well as assuming, that a volitional cause is unipotent; and even in that, as usual, he assumes the point to be proved. Omitting clauses irrelevant to the ^{Attempt at proof.} present purposes, and directed to a point to be hereafter discussed, we here quote the passage. "That the soul, though an active substance, cannot diversify its own acts . . . is manifest by this, that if so, then the same cause, the same causal power, force, or influence, without variation in any respect, would produce different effects at different times." That is, if the soul can diversify its own acts, the same cause, in possession of the same power, can produce diverse ^{A paralogism.}

effects; in other words, if the soul can diversify it can diversify; if free Will is then it is. We avow both antecedent and consequent, both being the same. Our view (which seems not to be invalidated by the above argument) implies that in the soul is a sum of power, by different exertions of which it can produce different acts. The soul, with its power, is "without any variation in any respect" until the initial instant of such exerting. The power for either exertion is power for either act; and the soul, in view of a given set of motives, possesses a one sum of sufficient power for either.

"But if it be so," Edwards adds, "that the soul has no different causality or diverse causal force in producing these diverse effects, then it is evident that the soul has no influence, no hand in the diversity of the effect, and the difference of the effect cannot be owing to anything in the soul, or which is the same thing, the soul does not determine the diversity of the effect." That is, if it is not by a diverse causal power

Second at-
tempt.

in the soul that the diverse effect is produced, then it is produced by nothing in the soul. Why not? Why may it not be produced by the same causal power in the soul, and yet be produced by "something in the soul?" We should suppose that the two things not only could agree, but were identical. If there be, as we affirm, in the soul the power of producing either of several effects, then that same singular, or unchanged power, can "determine the diversity of the effect," can fix which effect shall exist, and either effect would be from something in the soul.

A second
paralogism.

Why, according to Edwards, does the soul require diverse causalities, or causative powers, to produce diverse effects? Plainly because a single causality, or causal agent, can produce only a single and sole effect, is unipotent. How is it shown that a single causality is capable of but a single effect. By assumption only of the thing to be proved. And this is the *bottom*, the *fundamental*

assumption on which necessitarianism is based. This it does not prove, but takes for granted, and uses to prove the system. But it is, also, the sum total of the system itself; so that the system is assumed to prove itself. The premise and the proposition are identical—an elaborate paralogism.

It is no doubt undeniable that if all cause be unipotent, then any supposed diverse effect is supernumerary, and so causeless. Causation then runs in single direct lineages; and every event lying out of the inevitable direct line is parentless, and cut off from possibility. If every cause has its one sole possible effect, any other supposable effect is one too many; it is severed from any cause, and drifts loose in the world. Now Edwards first assumes unipotence to prove diverse effect causeless, and then proves unipotence by the The comprehensive paralogism. causelessness of diverse effect.

We also make our counter assumption. In our very definition of freedom of Will we assume in the volitional sphere the inapplicability of the maxim that "like causes ever and always produce like effects." We assume that either one of several effects is legitimate from the same cause. And while we admit that in non-volitional causation the law that "every event must have a cause," means that every event must have its own peculiar cause, *adequate for itself alone*, in volitional causation an event may have a cause adequate either for it or for other event; and whichever event exists, the demands of the laws of causation are completely satisfied. If these assumptions, made in the First Part of our treatise, can hold good against the objections met in the Second, they will scarce need the affirmative argument of our Third to establish their validity forever.

CHAPTER II.

CAUSE OF PARTICULAR VOLITION.

AGAINST alternative causation the main amount of necessitarian argument may be reduced to the four following questions:

I. What causes the Will to act?

II. What causes it to put forth the particular volition; or the particular volition rather than another?

III. Why does the volition (or rather *nolition*) for which there was adequate cause not take existence?

IV. What cause for this contingent diversity of happenings, by which a result for which there is adequate cause does and does not take existence?

These questions we shall consider in their order.

I. To the preliminary question, *What causes the Will to act?* it is competent to reply that every agent in his proper conditions is under a general necessity of action, even while free in the particular choice. Thus an agent with three alternatives before him must choose one of the three or refuse to choose either. But this refusal is but a fourth alternative, and the refusing act or *nolition* is as true a volition as either of the three. So that the necessity is that he is compelled to take some one of the four; the freedom lies in his equal power of selecting either one of the four.

II. *But what causes the Will to put forth the PARTICULAR VOLITION and no other?* This is the crucial question which constitutes, it is supposed, the vital force of the entire necessitarian argument, which it claims as the unanswerable point, and by the complete answer of which it must confess itself conquered. "The question," says Edwards, "is not so much, How a spirit endowed with activity comes to act,

as, Why it exerts such an act and not another, or why it acts with such a particular determination. If activity of nature be the cause why a spirit (the soul of man, for instance) acts and does not lie still, yet that alone is not the cause why its action is thus and thus limited, directed, and determined. Active nature is a *general* thing; it is an ability or tendency of nature to action, generally taken, which may be a cause why the soul acts as occasion or reason is given; but this alone cannot be a sufficient cause why the soul exerts such a *particular* act, at such a time, rather than others.”*—P. 77.

The crucial question according to Edwards.

So also Mr. Day in his work on the Will: “Some writers speak of the *power* of willing, as being the sole and sufficient cause why the mind wills one way rather than another. But it is evident that the mere power of willing is not, of itself alone, even the reason why a man *wills at all*, unless the term power be used in the broad and unusual sense which includes *every* antecedent on which his willing depends. Is a man’s power to walk the only reason why he actually walks? Does a man always speak when he has the power to speak?”—P. 47.

According to Day.

“But whatever may be assigned as the reason why he wills at all, the main inquiry will still return upon us: Why does the mind will one way rather than another? why does it choose one object rather than its opposite?”—P. 48.

* We shall here note, as in many other instances, how preposterous the pretense that Edwards does not teach necessity, but only certainty. Edwards here argues that the motive sustains to the particular volition the absolute relation of cause and effect. It is necessary in order to the existence of the particular volition; and when it exists *it not only negatively renders other volition causeless and impossible, but it positively secures, causes, and necessitates the particular volition*. If there be any certainty distinct from necessity, this is not that *certainty* but *necessity*. There can be no stronger proof that Edwards excludes not merely the use but the existence of contrary power. His necessity is *certainty* just because *his certainty is necessity*.

“An equal power to will *any way indifferently*, is not surely the only ground of willing one way *rather* than another.”—P. 48.

To this we reply, 1. Though a general activity or power is a general thing, and accounts only for action *generally*, yet a particular power or cause is a particular thing and accounts for a particular action; and moreover *an alternative power or cause is an alternative thing, and accounts for the coming into existence of either one of several effects*. And that is the thing to be accounted for, and *so at once and for all the crucial question is answered*.*

“A general activity” or cause is an imperfect cause inadequate to any specific effect without the addition of some further causal or conditional element to render it particular and possibly resultant. When it is thus made specific and possibly causative of particular effect, the question may still remain to be settled not *à priori*, but experientially whether the cause be unipotential or adequate to an effect solely possible, or whether it may account for either one of several results. And in the latter case the existence of the single result and the non-existence of the others are as truly accounted for as in the former. For a cause capable of either effect is in nature as in our definition, *the cause of whichever effect results*. If consciousness cognize a class of causes of which each one is a sufficient cause for either of several effects exclusive of opposite effect, then whichever effect results has a sufficient cause for its existence excluding all effects contradictory to itself.

* “The particular determination is accounted for in the very quality or attribute of the cause. In the case of a physical cause, the particular determination is accounted for in the quality of the cause, which quality is to be necessarily correlated to the object. In the case of Will the particular determination is accounted for in the quality of the cause, which quality is to have the power to make the particular determination without being necessarily correlated to the object.”

This thought was, we believe, first introduced into the discussion by Dr. Tappan in his Review of Edwards.

If there be a cause as fully sufficient for either of several effects as a unipotent cause is of its own sole effect, then whichever effect results has as sufficient, as full, as complete and adequate a cause as any physical or necessary effect whatsoever.

2. Every cause, like every other thing, is to be tested by the conditions of its own existence and nature. A unipotent cause is to be held to the conditions of its own nature. An alternative cause also must be held only to the conditions of its own nature; it cannot be held impossible because Alternative causes. it does not comply with the conditions of unipotent cause. If a cause be by the condition of its own nature sufficient for either one of several effects, then either one of those several effects may be brought into existence in accordance with the conditions of the nature of that cause without requiring it to fulfill the conditions of another kind of cause. Now the necessitarian repudiates the alternative cause because that fulfills not the conditions of unipotent cause. He infers that because a unipotent cause cannot produce other effect than Not tested by inalternative conditions. one *without the introduction of a new antecedent*, therefore an alternative cause cannot; and therefore an alternative cause cannot exist.

But experience may show a class of causes from which either one of several effects may result, without the introduction of any new antecedent. Require no new causal element. In such a case, therefore, to demand a new antecedent, that is, to ask what causes the particular volition, or what prevents the counter, is illegitimate. It is to require conditions not belonging to the nature of the subject.

And this reasoning is good for whichever of the several alternatives occurs; for C as for B or A. If Solve either result. C result, then the assignment of an alternative cause of which C is a possible alternative effect, is just as true an accounting for C as if it were the result for which

we can assign a general cause rendered unipotent by the addition of the requisite causal condition. The same assignment is as good for B or A as alternative result of the same alternative cause.

3. Let us divide all causes into *partial* and complete, Adequate cause and partial. adequate or sufficient. A *partial* cause is that antecedent, or number of antecedents, necessary to a given effect, but insufficient to the effect without some further element added. It needs something to *cause* it to produce the effect. Thus powder is but a *partial* cause of flame, but not an adequate or complete. And it is properly asked *what causes the powder to produce the flame*, and the proper answer is *the spark*. The rail car is a partial cause of locomotion; and when it is asked what causes it to move, the answer is the steam power. A complete, sufficient, or adequate cause comprehends all the constituents requisite to the effect. The adequate cause existing, the effect is possible to exist. Thus the powder and the spark combined are a complete cause of the flame; the car and the steam power produce motion. It is absurd to ask or assign any additional cause for the existence of the effect of a complete and adequate Adequate cause needs no further cause. cause. For *the complete cause produces its effect* UNCAUSEDLY. The complete cause existing, the existence of the effect is finally accounted for. Requiring additional cause would be asking what causes cause to cause? What causes causation? The cause exists, and the effect arises; and that is the ultimate.

Now of its own effect, WILL, in its proper conditions, is not a partial, but a full and adequate *cause*. Will is adequate cause. Put your finger upon any effect (volition) and ask, What caused this result exclusively of the others? and the reply is, The Will, or the agent in willing. Ask then what caused the Will in its conditions to cause the volition, and the reply is, NOTHING. Nay, you are a bad philosopher in asking. For, for its own effect Will or the willing agent is a complete cause; as complete a cause

as any cause whatever; and *every complete cause produces its effect UNCAUSEDLY*. The volition, like every other effect, is completely accounted for when a complete cause is assigned. To ask what causes the complete cause to produce the effect, is to ask the cause of causation.

When, therefore, of the full, complete, and sufficient Cause, Will, it is asked, in its proper conditions, What causes it to produce the particular effect? we reply, *NOTHING whatever*. For a complete cause needs nothing to cause it to produce its normal effect. It is as illegitimate as for me to ask what confines necessary cause to one sole effect? What hems it to a single outlet? What excludes an infinity of different effects? For the sole unipotent effect, a unipotent cause is necessary; for either alternative effect the alternative cause is sufficient.

Or if the question be, Why did the Will in equipoise choose thus rather than otherwise? the reply is, Because the Will was a complete and adequate cause for *that choice rather than another*; and when an adequate cause is assigned the Why is answered. In inalternative causation the Why is indeed to be answered by furnishing the additional element which renders the cause adequate. In alternative causation there is no need of furnishing additional causality, for by its nature alternative cause furnishes adequacy for either; and for either *over*, or *rather than*, the other. In either alternative or inalternative causation, when the sufficient and adequate cause is assigned, there is an end of all questions, the *whys? wherefores?* and *what causes?*

It is in fact not true that "a general power" is truly *the* power—that is, *the* power adequate to the effect. It is only part of such a power, and must wait until the other part is supplied before it is *the* power relatively to the effect. When, in the proper sense, *the* power exists, the effect is accounted for. If a unipotent power, the one effect is accounted for; if an

For this rather than that.

Each effect conditions its own cause.

alternative power, either actual result is accounted for. If the unipotent cause exists, the solely possible effect must result. If the alternative cause exists, either alternative effect may result, and one of the several *must*. And these two exhaust all causality and all eventuality.

III. But be it admitted that a full and perfect cause accounts for the particular volition transpiring; Why not the counter? was there not also a *full and perfect cause for the counter volition?* If so, *what was the cause of its not coming to pass?* If the alternative Will is capable of either of several effects, what causes that some other than the actual effect does not take place?

If this has not been satisfactorily answered in the preceding remarks, consider the following points:

1. A particular volition implies and includes not only the actuality of itself, but the negation of the counter volition. Excluded by particularity. Particularity coming into existence is itself exclusive of all counter. Hence, if the actual particular volition be accounted for, the non-existence of the counter is accounted for, and the whole is accounted for.

2. The same reply is ready to be given for the rejection of the counter as for the actual particular volition. The rejection of counter is the volition. The said rejection is then to be viewed as *the volitional act to be accounted for*; and the same reason is to be given. The Will in its proper conditions is a full and perfect cause for the volitional act in question, namely, the rejection of the counter.

3. Our very definition of a free Will is, a power of choosing in a given direction, with a full power of choosing otherwise. Included in the definition. Now the rejection of a counter for which there is full power, in giving forth the actual, is included in the very idea of a free Will. To deny the possibility of this is to assume the point in question.

"I hold that to be a sufficient cause," says Hobbes,

“to which nothing is wanting to the producing of the effect. The same is a necessary cause. For if it be possible that a sufficient cause shall not bring forth the effect, then there wanteth somewhat which was needful to the producing of it, and so the cause was not sufficient; but if it be impossible that a sufficient cause should not produce the effect, then is a sufficient cause a necessary cause. Hence it is manifest that whatsoever is produced is produced necessarily; for whatsoever is produced hath had a sufficient cause to produce it, or else it had not been, and therefore also voluntary actions are necessitated.”

Hobbes's argument. A sufficient cause is a necessary.

That, we are here told, “is a sufficient cause to which nothing is wanting to the producing the effect.” That is, in other words, an adequate volitional cause is one to which no power is wanting for the forthputting of effect. It is a true proposition. But it does not necessarily follow that this adequate cause will be a resultant cause, as we have noted in the Second of our Postulates, (p. 55.) “The same is a necessary cause.” Not granted; but let us hear his reason why “necessary.” “For if it be possible that a sufficient cause shall not bring forth the effect, then”—what follows? It follows, we think, and is true, that there may be a sufficient or adequate cause which does not put forth “THE effect;” that is, *the* given sole inalterative effect. It follows, as we have stated in our Postulates, that there may be a volitional adequate cause for an effect which is not resultant in that effect, but in some other effect for which it was equally adequate.

Replies—adequate cause not necessarily resultant.

But Hobbes's inference is, “then there wanteth somewhat which was needful to the producing of it, and so the cause was not sufficient.” It is not admitted from the fact “that a sufficient cause shall not bring forth the effect” that “then somewhat” of power, sufficiency, or cause was wanting, “so that the cause was not sufficient.”

It merely follows (according to our Canon III) that "Non-occurring volitions do not prove non-existence of adequate cause. Not for every no-volition is there a no adequate cause." For an alternative cause may non-produce an effect for which it is sufficient, by
Want of result proves not want of power. producing the other effect for which it is equally sufficient. What is "wanting" for the non-produced effect is not power, but (Postulate IV) exertion of power.

A *sufficient* cause, Mr. Hobbes argues, uniformly produces; for if it ever produce not, it is not a
Statement of Causations. *sufficient* cause, and being uniform it is necessary. Substitute our other term, namely, adequate cause; and let us say, A free, conscious, adequate cause does not uniformly produce the required possible result; for there may not be a particular result, and yet the cause be consciously adequate: hence an adequate cause is not always a *necessary*, but often a non-necessary, alternative *free* cause. Hobbes will then have stated the necessary causation of physics; we shall have stated the free causation of Will.

The argument of Hobbes is essentially adopted by the
Hobbes's argument in other words. Princeton Essayist, p. 254: "If it (the contrary choice) is not made, then those conditions were wanting in it [the Will] as a cause which were indispensable to the effect, and in the absence of which it was not adequate to the effect." This assumes, with Hobbes, that there are no "sufficient" or adequate yet non-resultant causes; and that the absence of volitional result is demonstrative proof of the absence of volitional power.

Edwards uses an argument somewhat similar, drawn from the necessary *dependence* of the effect upon the cause. "If," says he, "the event be not connected with the cause it is not dependent on the cause; its existence is, as it were, loose from its influence, and may attend it or not, it being
Edwards's argument from dependence of effect on cause.

a mere contingency* whether it follows or attends the influence of the cause or not, and that is the same thing as not to be dependent on it. . . . So far as an event is dependent on the cause and connected with it, *so much causality there is in the cause and no more.*"

That all effects necessarily depend upon their causes, and if they exist are necessarily connected with their causes, no one denies. 1. Every *physical* cause and effect are so necessarily connected Reply. that either existing the other exists. 2. It is admitted that in the order of nature, so soon as a thing begins to exist, so far as it does exist, it *necessarily* exists, since it is impossible for the thing done to become not done. This necessity is consequent and subsequent in the order of nature to the existence. 3. It is granted that every volitional effect which comes into existence is "*connected with its cause,*" is "dependent on its cause," derives its existence from its cause, and would not exist as it does without the cause. 4. But it is not admitted conversely, that the volitional cause *depends on the effect*, so but that it can exist Cause does not depend on effect. in all its fullness and completeness, without producing that effect; or that it is *necessitated* to the effect. The proof is demanded that an agent cannot exist with full power to an act, without performing that act. The proof is demanded, but has never been furnished, that an agent may not be a sufficient or adequate cause without being a resultant cause.

If it be said that a cause without an effect is no cause at all, it is again merely a verbal argument. We may

* Let the reader note here that Edwards places volitional causation on precisely the same ground as mechanical. There is no "contrary power," no mere "certainty," no "always can but never will cause otherwise." Alterity is non-dependence of effect upon cause; it is "a mere contingency," that is, "no cause." The dependence is just commensurate with the causality. Nothing can with more mathematical accuracy exclude "contrary power."

define cause to be that *in which power to the effect exists*,
 and the argument is voided. We may affirm
 Effectless
 cause. that a cause *potential* to an effect which it does
 not produce is still to be called thereto a cause.

IV. But, finally, if adequate causes are not *uniformly and necessarily resultant*, if adequate cause sometimes produces and sometimes produces not, or what is the same thing, can be conceived as producing or not producing an alternative effect, necessitarianism holds all to be at loose ends, and asks, *What cause for this contingent diversity* of happenings, by which result for which there is adequate cause does and does not take place? Thus Edwards says,

What cause
 of diversity? "If there be any event which was not necessarily connected with the influence of the cause under such circumstances, then it was *contingent* whether it would attend or follow the influence of the cause or no; it might have followed and it might not when the cause was the same, its influence the same, and under the same circumstances. And if so, why did it follow rather than not follow? There is no cause or reason of this. . . . What can be the cause or reason of this strange phenomenon, even this *diversity*, that in one instance the effect should follow, in another not? It is evident by the supposition that this is wholly without any cause or ground. Here is something in the present manner of the existence of things and state of the world that is absolutely without a cause."—P. 112.

Doubtless this is a melancholy "manner of the existence of things and state of the world;" and perhaps our reply will in no degree relieve it. For, 1. It seems a little hard to be required to furnish a cause—that is, a general and uniform cause—for a *diversity*, we might say an infinite diversity, of particulars. Diversities countless in number may have a countless number of particular causes, tedious as well as difficult to enumerate. But not to insist on this, 2. To the argument how can the diversity found in alternativity be accounted for we return a

retort. How can we account for the uniformity found in unipotency? How can cause be necessitated to one effect? What forbids alternative effects, and limits and binds and imprisons cause down to one result? Here is a thing to be accounted for "in the present manner of the existence of things and the state of the world" which no man has ever yet accounted for; even this uniformity—this unipotency—by which every particular causality, physical and spiritual, finite and infinite, is fastened to one solely possible effect.

And when we have found the fastener, what fastens the fastener? The chain of fate fastens all things, but what fastens the chain of fate? If over the entire WHOLE of things, through immensity and through eternity, the iron casement of necessity is fast bound, to tighten every thing in its place, what holds the particles of the casement in cohesion, and what tightens the tightener? What necessitates necessity? The casement needs another iron layer, and another in an infinite series of adamantine strata; and is then never secure, for there must be no outside layer. For what holds the outside stratum, and what holds the whole infinity of adamantine strata in cohesion? What holds the essence of deity together, or gives omnipotence its strength, and causation its causality.

In short, alternativity is as easily accounted for as unipotence, diversity as uniformity. It is as easy telling how cause diverges as converges. *A priori* both are equally difficult and equally easy. One can be accounted for as much and as little as the other. Both can be accounted for by the same verbal solution. The uniformity as well as the diversity must be verbally accounted for by saying, Such is the nature of the case—there are two classes of causes: in one lies the power, I know not how, to terminate in one sole effect; in the other, I know not how, lies the power of terminating in either of several effects. And thus the necessitarian is answered by being shown that his own doctrine involves

What cause
of uniform-
ity?

Equivalent
difficulty.

all the difficulties he objects against us. And since it is agreed that these difficulties are not recognized as such by any reason or philosophy, the arguments of necessity, based on causation, disappear.

There remains one causational argument more by which President Edwards maintains the necessity of volitions, and which will require but a brief consideration. Every effect, he argues, is necessary; being absolutely produced and modified by its cause. Volitions are an effect; and as such are passively modified, and therefore absolutely necessary.*

Edwards's argument from necessity of all effect.

Now this may be fully granted without at all touching the question of *the freedom of the agent who produces the volition*. A volition, as a *fact* brought into existence, has indeed no freedom. It must take existence as it is brought into existence. It is a produced entity, and not a living principle. It did not make itself, and could not prevent its own existence, or make itself otherwise. But the liberty resides in the free-agent, who was able to produce that or other volition instead. It does not follow that because the volition must come into existence just as the agent brings it into existence, that therefore the agent cannot bring it any otherwise into existence, or could not have brought forth other volition instead. The necessity comes into existence after the free causation, which brings both the necessity and the volition into being together. A *free* volition is so called, not because, as an abstract caused fact, it has intrinsic freedom, but because it is brought into existence by a free causal agent.

Reply—Non-necessity of the free-agent.

So also reasons the younger Edwards, (p. 398 :) “Unless volitions take place absolutely without a cause they are effects; and every effect necessarily follows its cause.” If the phrase, “necessarily

Younger Edwards on necessity of all effect.

* Let the reader note that this argument assumes pure necessity; not any mere certainty in any sense distinct from inalternative causational necessity.

follows its cause," means that the effect truly takes the shape and quality derived from its causation, it is true; but this proves not that other effect instead may not have been produced by an alternative causal power, adequate to the other effect instead. He further reasons, "if the mind cause its own volitions it necessitates them into existence;" but that proves not that the mind is necessitated to necessitate them into that particular form or specimen of existence.

Proves not
necessity in
producing
the effect.

The same error of locating the freedom in the act as it receives existence from its cause, instead of in the free agent, is committed in the Princeton Essayist, who makes it the foundation of a fallacious argument. "If such an action as is possessed of such qualities, and no other, is free, it follows that if a given choice be free it must be such an action and no other." That is, a free act must be just such an act as it is and no other, and is therefore necessary. But we reply, that makes no difference with regard to the freedom of the agent, whose freedom consists in the power for this or for either of several other acts. Whichever act he produces must indeed be just such an act as it is and no other—it must be itself and nothing else; it must be free and not necessitated; but that does not prove that the agent could not produce other act instead.

Freedom not
in the pro-
duced act,

But in the
producing
agent.

If the reply be that still the agent must be possessed of certain qualities and no other, the reply is true, but nugatory. The agent must, in order to be a free agent, possess the quality of freedom. In other words, it is logically necessary in order to his being a free agent that he be a free agent. Whatever is, is.

The writer adds: "In order to freedom in the manner and quality of an action there must be a necessity as to its *event*; a necessity that it be as it is and not otherwise." If this mean that there is necessity in the agent to produce but that sole event it is denied. If it mean that the event must take existence as the agent causes it

A dead fact is not free. to receive existence, it is true but nugatory. A dead fact cannot possess power to unmake, transform, or substitute itself; nor does any theory we have maintained attribute to it such power.

In the same paragraph this writer affirms, as a "fundamental position of Calvinism," that "in respect to the choices of moral agents there is freedom as to the *manner*, and necessity or fixedness as to the *event*." But, we ask, is there any less fixedness or necessity according to necessitarianism in the "manner" than in "the event?" Does not necessitarianism as truly limit the *mode* as the *fact*? Would not an act performed in a different manner be a different act? If there be a greater freedom in the choice of the manner than the act, would that not require two choices for every act, one for the manner and one for the act? Or what kind of a freedom is that which consists in performing a fixed act in a manner as fixed as the event?

If there be no self-determining power in the manner of the action, no power of alteriety of manner of action, no power of contrary choice, then there can be no more fixedness or necessity in the event than in the manner, and no more freedom in the manner than in the event. And if the fixedness and necessity of the event are the antithesis and exclusive of freedom in the event, then that same fixedness and necessity are the exclusive of freedom in the manner. Both in the event and in the manner, then, there must be a necessity excluding freedom.

Leibnitz had a variation of the causal maxim upon which he much prided himself, namely, that "*nothing takes place without a sufficient reason*." Herein he misuses the last word of the maxim, "reason," by transferring it from the subjective to the objective. A *reason* is not the external or physical antecedent of the result. It is always something within the mind. When not a motive for a volition it is a premise for a conclusion, or an internal accounting for,

perhaps an external fact, by the mental assignment of its external cause. Yonder water-wheel, whirled by a stream, is not whirled by a *reason*; it is not so *reasonable* a being as to be moved by any *reason* whatever. The water is not a stream of reason; it brings not a reason to bear upon the wheel. But when I am asked why the wheel revolves, I assign Inaccurate terminology. the *fact*, that the *cause*, water, exists, to account for the *fact* that the revolution exists. That is one *fact*, the existence of the wheel, taken into the mind as premise or reason, enables me to see that another fact, the revolution, is a commensurate result. The perception of the fact is a reason for the affirmation of the conclusion.

But in volitional language there is a reason for action, which is not a cause. The cause is the agent or Will; the reason is that on account of which the agent acts or wills. To class this reason under the term cause is the gross sophism of Edwards; to class it under the same term as cause is made to bear, is the more delicate but just as deceptive sophism of Leibnitz.

As to the maxim, *Nothing takes place without a sufficient reason*, let us ask, What is the sufficient reason for a sufficient reason's being necessary? What is the sufficient reason for a sufficient reason's accounting Bootless maxim. for every thing? What is the sufficient reason for a cause's producing effect? By what sufficient reason is all cause limited to one sole effect? What is the sufficient reason why the march of cause and effect never stands still? If every cause is limited in physics to one sole effect, what sufficient reason is there that a volitional cause may not produce either of several possible effects? And if either one of said possible effects results, what is the sufficient reason why that cause should not be *adequate cause* and *sufficient reason* for that effect?

These questions are properly answered by saying that mind must stop at the boundary line of experience and intuition. It must take laws and Leibnitzian paralogism,

not attempt to throw anticipatory injunctions on the nature of things, nor try to project its inquiries beyond axioms and settled universal processes. Nothing takes place without a cause—without a sufficient reason being assignable. But suppose our experience and intuition affirm a sphere of conditions in which a one sufficient reason will account for either of several results; neither result would then eventuate without a sufficient reason; for, for either result actually eventuating, the actual sufficient reason is the amply accounting reason. Then as before, the mind must accept the laws and limitations which this experience and intuition impose. Questions must stop when our investigations strike against a wall of solid reality.

Leibnitz's reply is: "A man never has a *sufficient reason* to act, when he has not also a sufficient reason to act in *a certain particular manner*."

His blank assertion.

This is simply an authoritative assertion of the point in question; that is, it is a blank denial that there may be in condition a *sufficient reason* for either of several results. It is merely a statement of counter issue, for which we want and forever must want the argument.

CHAPTER III.

BOUNDARY LINES OF THE UNKNOWN.

The conclusiveness of our reasoning in the last chapter may appear more decisive if we duly consider what are the limitations of human knowledge, what questions in philosophy are legitimate, and of what questions no answer can be required because the answer lies in the domain of the Unknowable. It will be perhaps ascertained that no unanswerable question can be propounded to the side of Free Will which

Necessity
graveled by
its own po-
sers.

is not equally a poser for the side of necessity. The difficulties on both sides are identical, arising alike from our incapability of knowing the interior nature of causation.

Sir William Hamilton affirms that free Will is to be believed; although it cannot be conceived because the human mind cannot conceive the beginning of motion. For that same reason, we reply, necessity cannot be con-
Beginning of
effectuation
unthinkable.ceived; for we can no more conceive the initial point of effect springing forth out of a necessary cause, than of effect springing up from an alternative cause. Effect is ever born in darkness; and all movement is mystery. What has ever given to the cause of necessity an apparent victory has arisen from the fact that it has taken its turn to ask the question How, just at the boundary line of that unknowable which conceals the answer equally for both sides. It is just as difficult to answer How unipotent cause is limited to one sole effect, as How alternative cause is capacitated to either of several effects. And when from the difficulty of answering this question Edwards affirms that alternative effect is effect without cause, he forgets that unipotent effect is equally effect without cause. And when again Edwards assumes from the same difficulty that alternative volition can be put forth only by a subsidiary volition to fix its particularity, he forgets that unipotent causation, whether finite or Infinite, requires a similar subsidiary causation to limit its unipotence and ascertain its fixed effect.

And this may be the place to notice a profound difficulty stated by Sir William Hamilton against Cousin's theory of volitional freedom, (which is essentially our own,) that "divorcing liberty from intelligence, but connecting it with personality, he defines it to be a cause which is determined to act by its proper energy alone." This may be an over-statement of the difficulty in our theory. By our doctrine of motive influence, as hereinafter stated,

we profess to maintain a freedom which is not "divorced from intelligence." But letting that pass, our present purpose is to state the proper retort. All power is blind; all knowledge is impotent. How then, even in the constitution of the Infinite Being, does blind power recognize the dictates of intelligence and guide itself in absolute submission to its absolute impotence? Or Control of power by thought. how does the impotence subdue absolute power, which is unable to recognize its dictates, to its own control? Here, then, is a divorce of intelligence and force whose inter-action, though they can never be explained, must ever be accepted. If it be said that Personality forms the medium of transition by which power and intelligence come into contact, we rather reduplicate the difficulty. How do power and intelligence come into contact in the personality so that intelligence, which is impotent there, controls power; and power, which is blind, appreciates and obeys intelligence? And how does thought become fixed to substance so as to inhere? And how do the faculties fasten upon the self as upon a bare and rigid nucleus? We ask not these questions for their own sake. Their only purpose is to show that the difficulty is equal for necessity and for freedom. And yet if a complete answer be impossible, we may bring our conceptions perhaps as near as possible to a satisfactory state by the following statements:

1. By the division of faculties, admitted by modern necessitarians and by Sir William Hamilton himself, into intellect, sensibilities, and will, the Will is as truly divorced from feeling and intellection as by our doctrine of freedom. By that division the Will can neither think nor feel. It has neither eyes nor heart. It is simply a projectile lying between the opposite faculties to whose forces it yields with a mechanical exactness. It can never be explained how this blind insensate projectile Will is able to appreciate and know when the exact measure is furnished so as to obey it, nor how in-

telligence which is impotent can master and secure obedience. And then, assuming that this projectile may appreciate and obey, we can no better conceive it as appreciating a fixed measure and obeying with a mechanical spring, than as appreciating and obeying a variable measure with a contingent, living, freely selective elasticity, and from its own self-activity. Freedom is therefore no more a divorce of Will from intelligence than necessity.

2. Perhaps it further relieves the difficulty of a true conception to remember that this division is truly nothing else than a classification of operations of the single agent.* Will therefore is simply a fact that an intelligent agent chooses, and that he has power so to do. Volitions are therefore intelligent acts, put forth not by a blind, but an intelligent cause. Nor does our view of freedom make them less intelligent than does necessity. We suppose the agent to act in full view of all that intellect or all that feeling can present, yet with a power lying in his nature of responsibly choosing and deciding for either of their presentations. Freedom, therefore, is again no more a divorce of Will from intelligence than necessity.

Is a classification of operations.



CHAPTER IV.

FREEDOM INVOLVES NOT ATHEISM.

IN an eloquent chapter on the argument for Theism, Edwards maintains that inasmuch as alternativity of choice involves a maintenance of an event without a cause, the logical result is Atheism. His followers, even to the present day, are accustomed, with an air of taunting classification, to tell

Taunting association of freedomists with atheists.

* See p. 22.

us that Edwards demonstrated necessity against *Arminians, Pelagians, and Atheists*.

The heroic hardihood that thus classifies freedomists with Atheists or infidels illustrates the proverb that *Fools fear nothing* to any man who will consider the fact that there is not perhaps a single unequivocal advocate for alternative Will on record in ancient ages or modern who was an Atheist.* And though Edwards has laid open the route and made its breadth conspicuous to the world, by which transition from freedom to Athe-

ism is made, not the first man has ever been found to travel the road from either to the other, so as to become a sincere atheist as a result of his freedomism. The admission of the validity of the syllogism is not more clear from exception than the rejection of this logical transit. Nor do we need any better proof than this argument of the utter abstractionism of its proposer, or any clearer illustration of the entire want of intuitive sympathy which the intellect of Edwards, with all its acuteness, possessed with the true "universal common sense of mankind."

Enlarging our previous statement, we may now say that it will be very difficult to find exception to the rule that all Atheists, Pantheists, Materialists, and professed Fatalists are necessitarians. From Leucippus and Democritus, through Spinoza and Hume, down to d'Holbach and Comte, the whole mass, one and all, will agree with Edwards in maintaining the absolute

No man ever became Atheist through freedomism.

All Atheists are necessitarians.

* Epicurus alone is a cited case to the contrary. Yet had Epicurus been like one of the Christian fathers, a desirable authority, how easily would Edwards have shown the identity of that philosopher's opinion with his own! The words of Lucretius expounding Epicurus, "*ducit quemque voluptas*," is a true equivalent of the Edwardean liberty, "doing as we please." That the Will is "*fatís avolsa*" implies merely its exemption from the line of purely physical causation. The *clinamen*, or bent of the Will, is expressly assigned by him as in the line of inalterative causation, for the very causational reason assigned by Edwards:

De nihilo quoniam fieri posse videmus—
Nothing can spring from nothing.

universal necessitation of all events, whether volitional or non-volitional. The doctrine that one principle of causation or fixed invariable sequence rules all things, material or mental, and all events of Will or of physics, is central with the d'Holbachian Atheism and Edwardean Calvinism.

And at the present age especially, the same principle rules with that school of godless naturalism which threatens to overwhelm the thinking world with a base materialistic and lawless antichristianity. So in the present age. The very principle that Edwards and his followers endeavor to install in Christian theology, in order to rescue us from Atheism, is found by the mass of deniers of God, and immortality, and the soul, and the asserters of irresponsibility, and of death an eternal sleep, to be cognate to and congenial with their own unhallowed systems. We assert no theory, no rule with exceptions, but a *universal fact*; a fact which demonstrates our results, that the entirety of that class of antichristian thinkers take the necessitarian side. They do so because logically and morally necessity belongs in their system, and freedom of the Will does not. The doctrine that there is no soul and no Will exempt from that same invariable sequency which rules the domains of physics, that there is no God who does not come under the same inflexible inalterative law with matter, levels the whole into one system of fatalistic materialism. The subjection of human volitions to the same law eliminates responsibility, dispenses with retribution, divine government, and human immortality. And it is a memorable point in modern intellectual history, that when the European mind lay stagnant in the black quagmire of the sensual philosophy of Condillac and his brother materialistic Atheists, the first omens and the first start of the reaction in the hands of Maine de Biran, Royer Collard, and Victor Cousin, were the conception and development of the idea of Will, of active Power, and of Alternative Freedom.

As we have before said, it is the moral consciousness that rouses the question of freedom of Will. It is from the demand of the ethical intuitions, requiring a base for the sense of responsibility. It is from the high promptings of the soul refusing to be laid by dynamical law to the level of dead nature, and claiming the dignity of a self-determining personality. And that same sense of responsibility which assumes freedom for its base, looks forth and upward to immortality as its ultimate. And the same sense of responsibility which demands *freedom* for the agent demands a God as the *executor of responsibility*. Nor from any other quarter than from this high Personality within which the moral and free nature blend, can we find, out of Revelation, any valid proof of the moral personality of God; that is, any finite model for the idea of a true and real God at all.

The affinity of Edwards's system with the naturalism of Lord Kames early encountered his book on its first arrival in Scotland; and Dugald Stuart informs us that its effect in that country has been deleterious within the range of his observation. Its accordance with materialistic forms of Unitarianism, patronized by Belsham and Priestley, as well as with the worst forms of Universalism and Parkerism in our own country, are beyond dispute. Far be it, however, from us to intimate that the Christian surroundings with which Edwards and his followers have begirt their central fatalism, are at all congenial with the religious view and feelings of these various classes of errorists.

The charge of denying the axiom that *every event must have a cause*, has been made against the advocates of freedom by a late lively writer and disciple of Comte, Mr. George H. Lewes, author of "The Biographical History of Philosophy." "With respect to one class of

phenomena, more than half of the thinking world is firmly convinced that every effect does *not* imply a cause. The class of phenomena referred to are those of human volitions. All those who espouse the doctrine of Freedom of the Will declare that all our volitions are self caused; that is to say, our volitions are not caused by anything external to themselves, not determined by any prior fact."—P. 666. 1. Now it is untrue that freedomists are "firmly convinced that every effect does not imply a cause." They maintain the maxim of requisiteness of cause for effect as firmly as Mr. Lewes, and make careful provision for the strict universality of the maxim. They affirm that every unipotent effect implies a unipotent cause, and every alternative effect implies an alternative cause, and that neither of these effects can take place without its appropriate adequate cause. The averment that both these effects equally require a cause, and that the causes assigned are adequate, and all that the nature of things requires, does not imply an effect without a cause. All that Mr. Lewes is authorized by fact to say is that freedomists assign for a certain class of events causes which *he*, not they, excludes from the class of causes. The issue is not as to the affirmance of the maxim, but as to their success in finding for it a legitimate fulfillment. To assign a false cause, or even a cause which is not a cause, is not to deny the need of any cause. The real issue is whether alternative causes are cause; whether a class of alternate causes exist. 2. Unipotent causation and alternative causation differ, not in the requirement of an antecedent, but in the *extent of the possible area of the effectuation*. For instance, the unipotent cause being A, the solely possible result B constitutes the entire possible area of the effectuation of this cause A. But of the alternative cause N, there are the possible results, X, Y, Z, disjunctively taken.

False charge
that free-
domists deny
necessity of
cause to ef-
fect.

Area of ef-
fectuation.

This resultancy of X or Y or Z disjunctively, is the extent of the possible area of the effectuation of N. The difference then is in the extent of the area of effectuation; but of either area there must be its own antecedent, A or N. Neither alternative of the disjunctive area, X, Y, Z, can any more come into existence without a cause than the inalternative area, B. Assuming X, Y, Z to be the only alternatives before the Will, all other courses are excluded by a decisive and genuine necessity. The Will is then closed in to these sole avenues of action by an adamant wall. Any action in other direction would be out of the conditions of volition, and would be event without cause. All the contingency, that is, non-necessity, there is, lies in the alternativity of these directions. And as the total of the diversity of these directions, as has been shown, as much requires a cause for its existence as a single inalternative result, that totality is kept under the control of cause. The scope of freedom is therefore circumscribed within an outer boundary of impassable Law, and the Divine Ruler is thus enabled securely to admit a domain of freedom, dependent on cause circumscribed by Law, yet within its scope perfectly alternative in action.

Edwards maintains that not only every event but every modification of an event must have its own peculiar cause. And this is fully admitted, and is shown to exist in every alternative effect. But what Edwards further claims is that every modification must not only have its own peculiar cause, but also a cause which must be inadequate to be the own and peculiar cause of an alternate effect instead.* But he does not show that this last claim is necessary to the requirement of a cause for every event. If either of two possible events springs from a given cause, certainly it springs from a cause, and so is not an event without a cause.

* See p. 87.

Nor does such a supposition imply that any event could originally spring from non-existence without an antecedent, since even alternative effect and every alternative area of effectuation requires its own existent antecedent. It admits no result without a cause, no volition without a Will, no deed without a doer, no creation without a Creator.

In conclusion, let it be again noted that Edwards holds that motive is so absolute and inalternative a cause of the one particular volition, that the supposition of a counter volition is with him identical with the supposition of an effect without cause. That is, for contrary volition there is no causality or power. For the particular sole volition there is the direct necessitative causation. This is no mere *certainty* distinct from necessity, but necessity itself. It supposes not the non-usance, but the non-existence of contrary power.

No creation
without a
creator.

Edwards here
maintains
not certain-
ty but neces-
sity.

CHAPTER V.

WHAT THE USE?

IN disproof of the existence of "the power of contrary choice," it is sometimes asked, "What is the use of a power that is never used?"

We reply: 1. The argument lies only against a particular mode of expressing the alternatives of will, namely, the phrase "power of *contrary* choice." Should we say that freedom is a power of *choosing either of several ways* the question loses its force. The man has the power of either of several ways that he may choose one as well as another, or another as well as the one; and this may be far better than to be limited to one solely possible choice.

2. The objection in fact assumes that there exists be-

fore the volition a class or sort of motives or powers which the Will will not use. It means this or No class unused. it means nothing to the purpose. Now there is no such class *previous* to the volition. The unused possible volitions become a class *consequently upon the volition*. It is the volition that makes the class or sort. The assumption that there is a sort or class of volitions which is never used is untrue.

It is true that if Liebnitz, Dr. M'Cosh, and others' view be correct, that although there be "power of contrary choice" yet that it will never be used, inasmuch as the Will *will* always choose for the strongest motive, then there is an antecedent *unused* class. There is then a specific faculty given never to be used. It may well be asked what is the use of it, since by a law of correlation there is but one real object of choice.

3. The use or advantage of a power is that it may be *used*, especially if an advantageous use of it be before the agent. If a wrong course, for instance, be Makes right possible. before him, it is of vast importance that it be not *necessitatively to be chosen*; but there be also in power an alternative of right, that he *may* choose it whether he will or not. If a right course be before him, the having a wrong alternative from which he is excluded by neither necessity nor law of invariability becomes a trial of virtue, without which moral merit could never truly exist. That these opposite alternatives in the absence of such exclusion are not used, does not destroy their use.

4. To the question, What is the use of a faculty which is never used? it is a sufficient reply to say that Makes divine government possible. the existence of such a faculty, unprevented by law of necessity or invariability, is a necessary element of the existence of a free agent, without which there could be no just divine government. The use of such a power, therefore, is *to render a divine government possible!* And surely that is a very great use.

Somewhat similar to the above necessitarian argument drawn from "use," is the following drawn from the Baconian philosophy: "Adhering to this Baconian method of philosophizing by induction of facts, what legitimate evidence is furnished of the existence of such a faculty of contrary choice as we are now canvassing? That men choose as they do choose all admit, and of course maintain the existence of a faculty adequate thereto. But that they choose the contrary of what they choose none contend. How then can they contend for the existence of a *faculty* in all respects adequate to *do what confessedly is never done?*"—Princeton Essays, p. 253.

We reply: 1. The Baconian philosophy abundantly maintains a power and faculty for the happening of things which never have happened. One signal instance lies indeed at the basis of that philosophy, namely, the assumption of the permanence of nature. The past has happened, but the future has ^{Non-existent future.} not. Yet of the future the Baconian philosophy holds that it will be analogous to the past. The future never does and never will happen, but only the present. The actuality of the fact takes it out of the category of the future, just as the actuality of a volition takes it out of the category of the contrary; so that the future and the contrary are alike excluded from possible experience, and from all possible experiential proof of power alike for either. But as the Baconian philosophy allows an intuitive recognition of a power or faculty for the unexperienced and unexperienceable futuration of a fact, so may it for the alternativity of a volition. One is a permanent non-existent ahead, the other is a permanent non-existent at our side. There may, therefore, be a true Baconian recognition of a possibility or faculty for "what confessedly is never done."

2. Every man assumes intuitively and necessarily, before the exertion of every volition the existence of the power for its exertion. Otherwise he would not attempt

Assumed
power for fu-
ture voli-
tion. it. But that contemplated volition does not
and has not existed. It is future, and no future
is ever actual. It has never been and never
can be experienced. This necessary anterior assump-
tion of power, then, for a putting forth of volition never
yet experienced, is, according to the Essayist's reasoning,
anti-Baconian and false.

CHAPTER VI.

THAT ALTERNATIVITY IS CHANCE.

It is sometimes objected that not to be governed, that is, necessitated by some external cause operating upon our volitions, but to act solely from the self, is to be governed by chance. Says the Princeton Essayist, (p. 255:) "How can it (the Will) make any first choice between objects in a state of perfect equipoise between them? . . . Or could such motion be referred to anything besides the purest contingency and hap-hazard, or possess any property of a rational and accountable act?"

1. Alternative volition, we reply, is not by chance or by hap-hazard, but by the free origination exerted by the Self in the proper conditions, unnecessitated by any anterior or exterior forces, putting forth action consciously its own. If any thinker can form no third conception which is neither necessity nor chance, but free
Free self-
origination a
substantive
idea. originating personality, he seems to us to need
the creation of a new idea in his mind. He
stands much in the condition of the old moral
philosophers, who were perpetually resolving the idea of
right into utility, happiness, greatest good, until Butler
arose to convince them that right is nothing but right.
His maxim was "Everything is itself, and not something
else." So these thinkers need to understand that unne-
cessitated self-originated volitional action is not some-

thing else, as chance or hap-hazard, but is simply ITSELF, volitional freedom.

2. If, by *chance*, these thinkers mean the *total absence of cause*, internal or external, *for effect*, that is untrue; for there is all the cause that in the nature of things can be or need be. For if it be claimed that by our view the soul puts forth volition without a cause of putting it forth, or that the soul puts forth a particular volition without a cause causing it to put forth that particular volition, we answer, there is all the cause that the nature of causation requires in order to a full and complete causation in the case. As has been shown in the proper place, there is here no cause, because, by the true principles of causation, no cause is needed.

3. Instead of being governed by chance, hap-hazard, or caprice, it more properly may be said that the unnecessitated volitional *self* governs caprice, preferring it, bringing it into existence, shaping, limiting, completing its character, or rejecting it and acting the contrary. When the caprice is fully accepted, and constantly and habitually acted, it is indeed conceived as becoming the master. But that mastery is accepted, chosen, created, and so far forth *governed* by the self. The course of caprice, or order of law, or lawlessness, is freely, unnecessitatedly, and so responsibly selected by the agent.

4. But if the soul does cause its own volitions, without any cause back of itself, causing it to cause thus or so, and so uncausedly, it is asked, By what is the mind governed? There are reasoners with whom this is an inveterate question, What governs men's Wills? The impulses of their nature look for freedom; but their theory assuming that Will must be governed, that is, absolutely ruled and limited in the most infinitesimal movement, they vainly seek for freedom in some cause that can thus govern them, and yet leave

them free. They seek a contradiction. Just so far forth as the Will is free, we reply, it is not *governed* at all, but acts from itself, freely and independently. Government is limitation; and exactly so far as it extends is the exclusion of freedom. In the point and space of freedom there is the absence of restriction. The self does indeed create, bring into existence, shape and limit, and in all these senses necessitate and govern its volitions; but back of the self there is not, nor is there needed to be, by the true laws of causation, any cause causing self to cause volition to be thus or so.

5. The ascription of free volition to hap-hazard or chance stands in striking contradiction to that moral consciousness by which the soul affirms that its responsible actions are unnecessitated, put forth with power to have done otherwise, yet are of all actions most truly personal, appropriable by, and imputable truly and justly to, the SELF alone. Where the consciousness acknowledges responsibility, it denies chance, abjures necessitation, and affirms free self-origination. Where there is responsibility thence is the causation, and there the freedom. That independence of all necessitative causation by which the self originates its own responsible action is indeed unique and singular among things; as unique as responsibility itself. The self can lay no blame on contingency, nor on incoming causation, nor on necessitation, since itself is the sole source, and thereby solely responsible for its acts. For not obeying the divine command, it cannot plead that a stronger causation from without placed the obedient volition out of the power of the Will. For the criminal volition it cannot plead that a stronger force from without necessitated by absolute causation the putting it forth. The power and the accountability are precisely commensurate. SELF is *solely* and UNCAUSEDLY cause; and SELF is *solely* RESPONSIBLE or meritorious.

Responsibility and power commensurate.

Blame on self alone.

6. In the failure of Logic to identify free causation with Chance, recourse is next had to imagination. Freedom is idealized as an omnipotent "no-cause;" and this contingency is personified into a goddess rivaling Fate herself. Thus a certain author, Isaac Taylor, makes a free agent exclaim, "Wherever and as long as *my conduct is governed* by reasons and motives, I cheerfully consent to be treated as a responsible agent. . . . But not so in those dark moments when the fit of *contingency* comes upon me; then I am *no longer master of my course*, but am hurried hither and thither by a power in the last degree capricious, whose *freakish movements* neither men, nor angels, nor the Omniscient himself can foresee. . . . It is the unalienable condition of my existence to be governed by a power more stern and inexorable than Fate herself. Alas! Contingency is mistress of my destinies." To say, we reply, that the agent, who solely shapes his own acts, unobliged by any force from without, is "no longer master of his own course," is a self-contradiction. It is to say he is not master of his own course because he, and nothing else, is master of his own course. He is master of his own course in the purest sense of the terms. To act and to Will *from* self alone surely implies the completest mastery *in* the self. For the soul in the necessitarian sense to be "governed by reasons and motives," that is, necessitatively fixed ever and always by a particular stringent motive force occurring, excluding all power of choosing otherwise, is to be governed by something out of the self, by the not-self, and to be at the mercy of contingent external incoming forces. If the strongest happening motive is for wrong and death and hell, there is no power for choosing right; the incoming foreign force fixes the choice and the destiny; and if any rational man can "cheerfully consent to be treated as a responsible agent" without the power of choosing right, he is welcome to his very

Government
by self, not
by contin-
gency.

By incoming
forces is con-
tingency.

irrational "consent." Our moral sense accepts no such decision.

This "fit of contingency," as before shown, it is in the agent's power to accept or reject. He is free to Contingency is governed. it or the contrary. The "fit" never "comes" unless he brings it. It does not necessitate him by a stronger resistless impulse. He is not "hurried hither and thither by a power" from without. Whatever hurrying is done, is done by himself. If to be controlled by solely the *self* is to be controlled by *contingency*, then we have the absurd equation *self*=*contingency*.

A contingency by which the agent is "hurried hither and thither by a power," and is "governed by Is Necessity. a power," which is "in the last degree capricious," so that he is "no longer master of himself," is not freedom but necessity. It is necessity from without the agent himself. It differs from the more regular kind of necessity by being incalculable and violent in its successive causations.

Necessity is one conception; Contingency is a second; Necessity, Free Agency, Contingency. Free Agency is a third. Necessity is the control of the soul in volition by some foreign causation. Contingency (in the sense of chance) is the loosening of the volition from all, even the soul's, causation. Freedom is the control of the act by causative self. In the first an external accident is master; in the second nonentity is master; in the third the master is the agent himself.

SECTION SECOND.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ARGUMENT.

CHAPTER I.

SELF-DETERMINATION. INFINITE SERIES.

THE question is asked, "What determines the Will?" That this is an awkward question is evident from the fact that its consideration must be preceded by the previous question, What does this question mean?

"By determining the Will," says Edwards, "if the phrase be used with any meaning, must be intended, *causing that the Will or choice should be thus and not otherwise.*" That is, *causing the particular volition.* And that question has already been amply discussed.*

The phrase "*self-determining power of the Will*" we generally disuse, not from anything Edwards has argued against it, but from its own inherent ambiguity. The term *self* in the phrase may refer to ^{Self-determining power.} the *agent*, to the *power*, or to faculty of Will. The word Will also may signify either the *faculty*, or as it often does in Edwards, the *act* of the volition.† These last two significations produce questions of very ^{Ambiguous term.} different meaning, requiring very different answers. If, according to the latter signification, the ques-

* See p. 88.

† From this term arises also the fallacious remark of Professor Bledsoe, that the volition "is not *determined*; it is simply a determination." (Bledsoe on the Will, p. 228.) The remark is founded on the double meaning of the word determine as it signifies either to *limit* or to *resolve* or *purpose*.

tion be, What shapes, particularizes, individualizes, or specificates the volition? the answer is, The Will. If, according to the former signification, the question be, What causes the Will to specificate the volition? the demand is for a very different answer. We are called upon now, as formerly,* to furnish a cause *back of the Will* causing it to specificate; and we answer as before, the cause is *nothing at all*. The Will in its conditions is a full and adequate cause accounting for the effect, and no adequate cause needs any other cause to make it effective. It causes a particular effect UNCAUSEDLY.

Upon the ambiguous term and the usual maxim that the Will determines itself, Edwards founds a lengthened and intricate argument that freedom of the Will involves the consequence that every volition requires an infinite series of anterior volitions to bring it into existence, thus reducing the doctrine to an absurdity. It is important here to remark that inasmuch as this argument, held as it is to be complete demonstration, does, in the view of Edwards, exclude all alternative liberty of Will from the universe, and even from possible conception, it must be held to establish the very strictest and most absolute necessity, and not a simple certainty in distinction from it. So far forth as certainty differs from necessity, this is necessity and not certainty. It stands, therefore, in inflexible contradiction to the declarations of Edwards, (p. 421 and elsewhere,) that it "is called by the name *necessity* improperly," and "is more properly called *certainty* than *necessity*." By his own definition necessity is that which is "*fixed*," "*made sure*," and "*absurd to be supposed otherwise*." And surely nothing, even in mechanics, is more properly the subject of these predicates than that connection between the Will and particular volition from which all alternative or alterity is so perfectly excluded that it is not

* See p. 93.

only impossible that it should exist, but impossible that it should be conceived to exist. Contrary ^{And counter power to be unthinkable.} choice is not only an impossibility but an *un-thinkability*. Nor is it competent for Edwards first to prove the sternest necessity, and then out of his abundance to fling in a share of his conclusion and diminish it down to certainty, any more than Euclid may demonstrate that the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the squares of the two opposing sides, and then graciously compound for the conclusion that it is equal to just a square and a half. When we are told therefore that Edwards is "careful to say" that he holds only *certainty*, we reply that it is of no consequence what he *says*, provided we know what he *proves*, if he proves anything.

Edwards bases this celebrated argument upon a gratuitous supposition of his own in regard to the mode by which the Will determines itself. "If the Will, which we find governs the members of the body, and gov- ^{Based on false assumption.} erns and determines their actions, does also govern itself, and determine its own motion and actions, it doubtless determines them the same way, even by antecedent volitions." By this gratuitous assumption every volition of the Will is held to be, like the body, governed by a preceding volition; but that volition is governed by a preceding volition; that by a preceding; so that by computation every volition is preceded by an infinite series of volitions; each one of which series has its own anterior infinite series, with branchings backward into infinities of infinities. Edwards expands the argument through nearly three pages, demonstrating, with many a labyrinthine fold, over and over again, that "this Arminian notion of liberty of the Will is repugnant to itself, and shuts itself wholly out of the world."*

* The argument of the infinite series, so formally framed by Edwards to prove the absurdity of alternative Will, might be paralleled about as effectively in relation to the obligation to right, to consciousness, to cause, and to the possible exertion of power.

Why am I obligated to do *right*? Because it is right. But why am

The answer which we have already given to the question, What determines the Will? if valid, empties this famous demonstration of all substance, leaving of it nothing but a very sonorous reverberation. If the Will is determined by nothing whatever, then it is a superfluous benevolence for Edwards to furnish us the *method* by which it is done. If it is not done at all, we may venture to assume that it is done in no *way* at all. If done in no way at all, then it is not done by an antecedent volition, and consequently the entire tail of the infinite series is completely cut off.

Should the question be asked, What causes an alternative adequate cause to produce or cause a particular effect?

the answer might be, It causes itself; and then instead of a self-determining power we should have a self-causing power in every cause in order to causing an effect. The answer, though awkward, would nevertheless be true; provided it does not imply in such self-causation any new antecedental element; for that would bring in the infinite series. All that could be meant by the answer is, that it belongs to the very nature of cause to bring itself by its own inherent force to the production of the effect.

Edwards proceeds to "invent" several "evasions," as he is pleased to call them, and graciously bestow them on the Arminians. No one of them is identical with the reply which we have here furnished,

I obligated to regard that right? Because that right is right; and so on forever.

Consciousness is to know that I know; but I cannot know that I know unless I know that I know that I know, etc.

Cause in order to an effect must put forth a causative act; but that causative act being an effect requires a previous causative act, and that a previous, and so in infinite series.

There can be no power unless there be the power to exert that power; but that exertion is an act requiring a previous power to exert it, and that exertion a previous, *ad infinitum*.

Whether these are not as valid arguments as the infinite series of Edwards, and what their validity is, let the reader judge.

Same question in causative terms.

Edwards's "Arminian evasions."

and we cannot therefore accept the donation. The reader who chooses to examine them will see that we have no need to analyze their logic. But there is one which we may notice with reference to the above distinction between the different imports of the question, What determines the Will? The distinction truly lies between specifying the volition, which is done by the Will, and causing the Will to specify the volition, which must be done by an entity back of the Will, but which we deny to be at all required. Edwards supposes us to adopt the "evasion," or answer to the question, What determines the Will? as follows: "The exertion of the act is the determination of the act; for the soul to exert a particular volition is for it to cause and determine that act of volition." This reply makes us understand the question to be, What specifies the volition? and our answer would be, The Will. Edwards in refutation of this reply attempts to make the

Our reply.

due distinction between the two meanings of the question and fails. He charges that in this reply "the thing in question seems to be forgotten." "The very act of volition itself is doubtless . . . a coming to a choice between two things or more proposed to it."

Edwards's replication.

And now comes the distinction. "But determining among external objects of choice is not the same with determining the act of choice itself among various acts of choice." But the choosing between external objects and the determining the act of choice being both not back of but in front of the Will, cannot be and are in no way required to be different things. That is, no "determining the act" is required different

False.

from the *choosing of the object*. The difference of the object secures, and is one of the constituent peculiarities of, the particular choice. If there be three objects, A, B, and C, the selection of either object will secure the specific particularity of the choice. All the difference between the choices will be that A, or B, or C will be

chosen. The choosing the object is the shaping and bringing the choice into existence. Both the choosing the object, and the determining the act of choice, imply that the meaning of the question, What determines the Will? is, What specificates the volition? The answer is, The Will; and to specificate the volition is all it has to do.

But in the very next sentence Edwards vibrates back confusedly to the other meaning of the question. "The question is," he says, "What influences, directs, or determines the mind or Will to come to such a conclusion or choice as it does?" Here the question is made to demand a cause back of "the mind or Will," causing it to specificate the volition. Our reply is as before. Nothing does, or is required to cause the Will, anteriorly, to specificate the volition; and that breaks Edwards's cobweb. He goes on to ask, "Or what is the cause, ground, or reason why it concludes thus and not otherwise?" We again reply, No anterior "cause" is required; the word "ground" here is ambiguous, and demands no answer; and the "reason" or condition is, *the motive*, which, as is elsewhere shown, is no necessitative cause for the particular volition. Edwards continues to say, "Now it must be answered, according to the Arminian notion of freedom, that the Will influences, orders, and determines itself thus to act. And if it does, I say it must be by some antecedent act." But, we reply, as our "notion of freedom" requires no anterior causing or ordering of the Will to act, as we hold the Will in its condition to be a complete cause acting uncausedly, there is no requisition for any "antecedent act." And so again the necessitarian cobweb is broken.

As has been before remarked, when the Divine Law requires that an agent choose otherwise than he does choose, the question arises, Has he power in the case to choose otherwise than he does choose? The question supposes that the choosing otherwise would be simply

an act of choice. Whichever way the volitional action is, it is an *act of choice* and nothing ^{Alternative choice simply.} more. Though there be power of choosing either way, yet whether it choose this way, or that way, or the other way, all it does when it acts is simply and solely to choose, and nothing more is required. If the Will choose otherwise than a supposed way, there is in that case no more choosing to choose than if it chose the supposed way. That other choice would be as simply a choice as the choice actually put forth. Whichever way it chooses there is simply a Will putting forth a choice. And the simple question is, Has the Will power to put forth either simple choice? To which our reply is affirmative. ^{Nothing more than choice.} And having the alternative conditions before it, endowed with power for either way, whichever way it puts forth it does so without needing or having any causation back of it. There is a power of choosing either one of several different ways, and the exercise of it is the choosing either one of these ways.

To a statement of Dr. West, who says "the sense in which we use self-determination is simply this that we ourselves determine;" and that we are "the determiners in the active voice;" the Younger ^{Edwards} Edwards replies (p. 327) that Dr. Edwards perfectly agrees with such a view. "We grant that we are determiners in the active, and yet assert that we are determined, or are caused to determine by some extrinsic cause, at the same time, and with respect to the same act. As when a man hears a sound he is the hearer in the active voice, and yet is caused to hear the same sound by something extrinsic to himself." ^{Identifies determination of sensation and volition.} We pass by the fact here, that by this statement the volition is rendered as necessitated as the sensation. The true difference between the two is, as we maintain, that the determined act of hearing is performed *without*, and the determinate act of volition is performed *with* the power of other action instead. Both may be in the act-

ive voice; but both are not active *with an alternative power*.

Again, the Younger Edwards (p. 334) propounds the following dilemma: "If we cause our own volitions at all, we cause them by a previous volition, or without such a volition." Undoubtedly. And the horn we accept is "without." "If we cause them by a previous volition," then follows the infinite series. "If we cause them without such volition, we cause them involuntarily, without any design, any motive or agency." No volition, we reply, is *voluntary*, but *volitional*.* But that an alternative volition such as we state it is without "any design, any motive or agency," is not admitted, and is without proof.



CHAPTER II.

NATURE OF MOTIVE INFLUENCES.

THE terms denoting the comparison of motives, especially as used by necessitarians, are derived from various physical sources. The favorite descriptive terms are the *weightiest* motive, the *strongest* motive, the *highest* motive. Thus the dimensions of material objects and the forces of physical dynamics are ascribed to mental operations. They are endowed with an exact mathematical commensurability; and were our faculties sufficiently clear and penetrating to ascertain with sufficient precision, we should be able, it is assumed, to label antecedently the proper motive as, relatively to the given Will, "weightiest," "strongest," "highest." And it is in this superior power of perception consists the nature of the divine foreknowledge of human actions.

* See p. 22.

God's knowledge of the future depends on the causative series of results. Omniscience travels through the future on the bridge of causation. Surely the physical nature of the very terms used should warn these philosophers of the danger of error. Certainly the application of mathematics to quantities and weights of thought is a very questionable dogma. Nor is there any reason to know or to suppose that any acuter power would enable us to detect what does not belong to their intrinsic nature. The qualities of thought, like other qualities, may be comparable without being commensurable.

Comparability and commensurability.

The comparability of motives may be supposably ascertained either from extra-volitional or from volitional sources. Thus we may compare the different degrees of excitement in an emotion, a moral feeling, a desire, a fear, a sense of obligation. Some we may know to be prevolitionally and intrinsically intenser than others. Impressions made by external objects upon the mind are comparable; and where the external object is itself mathematically commensurable, there arises the most plausible appearance of a mathematical commensurability in the impression. A thousand dollars may make a stronger impression on a miser's mind than can nine hundred and ninety-nine dollars and ninety-nine cents, and that greater impression may, for aught we know, be pronounced arithmetically exact in its surplusage. But prevolitional impressions are not so properly motives in themselves, but in their relation to the Will.

Volitional or extra-volitional.

What is in truth meant by the highest or strongest motive must be derived from the Will itself; and thence we have this definition, which is all important to this discussion, that *the so-called strength of a motive is the comparative prevalence which the Will assigns it in its own action.* Or, otherwise, it is *the nearness with which the Will comes to acting according with or to it.*

Volitional measurement.

Defined.

Volitionally considered, (the only true mode of consideration,) the so-called strength of a motive may be again defined *the degree of probability that the Will will choose in accordance with it or on account of it.* And Further defined. it is most important to remark that the *result is not always, nor in most cases necessarily, as the highest probability.* The Will may choose for the higher or for the lower. And as the Will may choose for a lower rather than for a higher probability, so the Will may choose on account of what is called antecedently a weaker over a stronger motive. And hereby is once for all established the difference between mechanical force and motive influence, that whereas in the former by necessity the greater effect results from greater force; in the latter the less is possible from the greater, the greater from the less.

That result is not as the highest probability is shown in the Doctrine of Contingencies or Probabilities. The chance may be improbable and yet prove successful. Doctrine of probabilities. So the volition calculably improbable may become the actual. On the contrary, there may be the highest probability and yet a failure. And this is equivalent to saying there may be the strongest motive and yet the Will reject it. Aggregate calculations are in a degree reliable in practice; and yet individual results are fallible. A margin of so-called reliable *certainty* there is, that is of probability, so strong that a quiet Result not as probability. and settled reliance is practically reposed upon it. For life is practically based on probabilities. But when the probability is raised so high that it is absurd to expect that it is ever reversed, we arrive at necessity.

The intrinsic strength of a motive antecedently to its effect in volition must consist in the strength of some pre-volitional mental operation; that is, in the intensity or Prevollitional motive-strength. itiveness of some intellection. It is only

through these that any motive can be called intrinsically strong antecedently to the Will. It may, then, be granted that where there is an opposition of motives, the probabilities are as the above-named intensity or positiveness. Yet, as we have already illustrated, the result is not always as the strongest probability, that is, as the intrinsically or prevolitionally strongest motive. Relatively to the prevolitional faculties, the strongest motive often fails; relative to the Will, the strongest motive is but another term for the accorded motive.

That a six may be the next cast by a player at dice may be a fair probability. That it should occur twice in succession is improbable; but Illustration. though the stronger probability be against it, it does and may occur. Still stronger the probability against its occurring thrice; but against that stronger improbability it is yet a possible result. Four and five are increasingly improbable, and possible in diminishing and doubtful degrees, and can hardly be supposed able to happen. At six or seven perhaps the probability is held to have ceased; and as the synthesis of causes exists in the cosmos, possibility is excluded and absolute necessity prevails. So under a certain state of intense pre- Degrees of probability. volitional strength of motive it may be in the highest degree probable, affirmatively or negatively, that a given volition will be put forth, and yet that highest probability may fail. The probability may diminish and reversely be opposed and yet succeed. Against increasing balances of improbability the event may occur, but with diminishing possibility. But when the point is attained, though but indistinctly visible to observation, at which it is true that such a choice never would be made, by any rational free agent, either actual or possible to exist, necessity commences and normally responsibility is at an end. When from the very nature of things a choice is such that, though the conditions be repeated an infinite number of times, it is self-evident or intrinsically a fact

that no Will would ever put it forth, as true a necessity is attained as rules over matter, or over the passive operations of mind. It is in this interval of area, between opposite necessities, where event may overrule probabilities, that freedom and responsibility exist. As human perception covers a narrow interspace between two unknowables, so human freedom covers a narrow interspace between two necessities.

It may indeed be said that at *each single throw* the upturn of a six is possible, no matter how many times it has been repeated; and as it is possible each single time, so it is possible an infinite number of times. Distributively (as the logicians say) or individually, this may be admitted to be true; and yet it is collectively untrue. Each particular case is held possible, but not all the cases together. More than a given cycle of cases (whose terminal point cannot be exactly fixed,) *cannot* be.* We know this comprehensively, because we know that such is the synthesis of causes and causations in the system of things that an adamant estopment exists at some point. It may be true that in a system of probation an agent may be able to do right each single time and yet may not be able to do right collectively through all time. In the presence of some constant powerful temptation, from which he is never protected a moment, an agent may be able to resist each single time without the ability to resist through the whole. And so Wesley reasons against Taylor, that Adam's one sin did not prove him depraved; for any one sin may be committed by a pure free agent; but how comes it, he asks, that all sin universally and constantly? This is not solved by saying a pure free agent may sin any one time, therefore he may sin all times. What is distributively true is not therefore collectively true. The supposition that an infinite series of

* See pp. 167, 225, 335, 339.

sizes might be cast with a perpetually decreasing probability down to the infinitely small, yields no result. A power infinitely small for a volition would furnish no basis to the view of common sense for responsibility.

May be collective necessity.

The contingency thus calculable is in reality grounded in Will. For casting a six is the result of a certain method of motions by the player. A series of minute and unseen volitional and muscular causations eventuates the result. Could the same method be performed any number of times the same result would follow. The method being produced by the volitions, the contingencies are all really based in the Will of the player. Strictly, then, there is external *contingency*, but no intrinsic *chance* in the matter. Though, phenomenally, *freedom* is thus illustrated by *chance*, their *bases* are different. A chance event is one whose cause being concealed is but uncertainly calculated; a free volition is one whose alternativity, and so measurable incalculability, is grounded in the agent's nature. The illustration of freedom from chance, indeed, has but a negative value, as showing that Edwards's application of the logic of mechanical dynamics to Will is not the only possible method of reasoning. Thereby our thought is enabled once for all to emancipate the sequence of motive and volition from Causative Necessity or Invariable Law.

The maxim that "the effect is the measure of the cause" * has a double meaning, and is, under limitation, true in both. The effect may be the measure of the cause either *intrinsically*, or as *conventionally assigned*. In the former case the effect is not only the *measure*, but the *manifestation* of the antecedent intrinsic amount of causation. Every infinitesimal addition or subtraction of intrinsic causality has its necessary showing in the effect. Such is the fact in all cases of physical or non-volitional

Effect measure of cause.

Essentially.

* Hume. And also Edwards, as quoted, p. 97.

causation. The effect, on the contrary, can be only a conventional or assigned measure, when there is no exact intrinsic proportion in the causality, and the effect is merely an *assumed* test of its greater or less amount. The greater or less amount of the matter, or contents, making up the antecedent condition does not always show itself in the result. Here the result is no measure of the intrinsic antecedent force, but is held so arbitrarily because there is no other measure. In the physical instance the anterior causality *measures out* the fixed proportional result; in the volitional the result creates all the measurement there is for the antecedency. More properly we may therefore say that in the former case the antecedent causality is the fixing measure of the effect; in the latter the result is the conventionally assigned measure of the antecedent influence.

We are now able to apply these views to illustrate the nature of what are called *influences*, that is, *motive influences*, in relation to Will. As Will acts more or less in accordance with such influences, there is a due propriety in saying that influences act upon Will. But there must be most clearly understood, as resulting from our statements thus far, the distinction between a *physical force* and a *volitional influence*.

A *physical force* is the same as a physical cause, or rather it is as causation acting to produce effect. Its effect is the fixed and proportional manifestation of the real and intrinsic causation. A certain amount of force manifests itself in a certain amount of effect.

A *volitional* or *motive influence* has not in the result any absolute and precise proportional manifestation and fixed exhaustive of its intrinsic amount. Its connection with result is contingent. That is, the greater intrinsic intensity constitutes an external *probability* of the proportionate result, yet neither the necessity nor absolute certainty. For, as in the doctrine of contingent-

cies, as already illustrated, the greater probability may fail, the lesser probability may result. This establishes a doctrine of *contingent motive probability*.

This contingent character of motive *influence* is correspondent with the alternative character of that which is its sole possible object—Will. An alternative Will and a contingent motive influence are correlatives. They mutually explain and sustain each other. To admit either is to admit both. And so a unipotent Will and a necessary motive influence are correlatives. He who is compelled to admit one is compelled to admit the other. It will be a mere controversy about a word to say that an influence which does not produce effect is no influence. That may be legitimately called an influence which is conceived as *potentially* such though *contingently*. That may be legitimately called an influence, it is important to add, which is conceived as *possessing an intrinsic probability for result, though the higher probability be a contingency* for which there exists power of failure. If so, then contingent motive influence is established, and the doctrine of volitional necessity is at an end. The relation between physical force and effect is necessity; the relation between motive and volition is contingency.

These views illustrate our use of the term *Contingency*. We do not call the action of Will *contingent*, but rather *free*. The word *Contingency*, by habitual association, approximates so near the idea of *accident* that it should scarce be made the characteristic term for volitional action. It implies a sort of blindness in its subject which may not improperly be attributed to motive, in its influence toward Will, but not to the Will, that is, to the agent himself. Or, we may say, that while freedom is the intrinsic quality of the agent in volition, contingency is the exterior view of the same thing. To us, as we contemplate it from without, the act which is free is phenomenally

Contingency
of motive
influence.

Term contin-
gency.

contingent, for we are previously uncertain which way it will turn. To the motive itself the result is contingent, for the motive is blind, and its success may or may not result.

It may be granted that where a given course is urged upon the Will by some highly excited feeling antecedent, or by some moral obligation, or by some reasonableness, or some calculable interest, there may be in each of these antecedents an intrinsic comparable strength constituting an anterior probability, which the mind admits, that the choice will accord with it. The probability however which is the stronger may fail and the weaker prevail. The probability may be so strong as to produce that feeling of subjective repose called assurance, reliance, or, less properly, certainty, and yet fail. It is not until the condition of motivity is such that it is true that all Will as Will would decide but a given way, that necessity commences and responsibility ceases.

A volition, a train of volitions, may be so probable as to be reliably certain, that is, probable, and be practically far beyond all rational doubt before it become metaphysically necessary. We rely on the undoubted purposes of

others in many cases with as much repose as we do upon the stability of physical objects and causations without confounding the practical reliability of the former with the absolute necessity of the latter.*

From these elucidations we have the following results:

1. The apparent contingencies of human action are explained, being verified by their *bases* in the very nature of Will. Human behaviors are truly to our eye externally or phenomenally made up of certainties and uncertainties blended or alternating. This contingency arises in the category of chances from *our ignorance* of the causes; and it arises, in the case of Will, from the very *intrinsic*

* See p. 164.

nature of the cause. There is a phenomenal resemblance; but the essential BASE is different.

2. Will is made to appear, as it reveals itself in consciousness, not a bleak, mechanical thing. It is not a projectile made to protrude or withdraw, as by a spring, according to the rigid forces that propel it. It acts, in the natural alternations of the soul, with a free living power.

3. We have the explanation how motives have a living and proximately calculable influence on action, without fastening or locking its movement as with an iron bolt. We see how appeals to feeling, to reason, to conscience, are reasonable appliances, and rightly expected to impress the mind and reach the Will, without squarely producing in it a fixed motion according to the proportion of solid momentum applied, or securing it as a fixed invariable sequence. We see how the strongest appeals and the most powerful impression may meet with prompt repulse from no other assignable cause than a determinate WILL. Hereby we are presented in theory with a view of the things, creating in our minds precisely the same impressions as naturally result from the contemplation of their reality in life.

These principles furnish us with solutions of many of the sophisms of necessitarianism.

1. We may test Edwards's doctrine of the "fixed" gradational antecedent strength of motives. (P. 132.) "There is," says he, "such a thing as diversity of strength of motives to choice, previous to the choice itself." Motives, he proceeds to argue, have an antecedent "strength" because "they do previously invite, induce, excite, and dispose the mind to action," or to "volition previous to volition itself," and that previous "strength" is causation, and the effect is necessary upon the cause. That there are differences of intensity of feeling, of clearness of intellectual conviction, or solemn-

Prevolitional
motive-
force.

nity of sense of moral obligation, prevolitionally existing, we may abundantly admit. How far these are of a commensurable nature, reciprocally, we discuss in the proper place.* These prevolitional conditions, we also admit, may, by their different degrees, produce a greater or less probability that the Will will accord to them what is the only test of motive-force, the prevalence by volition. Nevertheless the result is not always as the greatest antecedent force=greatest probability of the volitional accordance. The highest of the motives may fail, the lower motive may prevail, and Edwards's causational argument of necessary effect fails.

2. We may solve the problem, considered by Sir William Hamilton insoluble, of the Will's being able to choose against a stronger motive expressed even in an arithmetical form. "On the supposition that the sum of the influences (motives, dispositions, tendencies) to volition A is equal to 12, and the sum of counter volition B equal to 8, can we conceive that the determination of volition A should not be necessary? We can only conceive the volition B to be determined by supposing that the man creates (calls from non-existence into existence) a certain supplement of influences. But this creation, as actual, or in itself, is inconceivable, and even to conceive the possibility of this inconceivable act we must suppose some cause by which the man is determined to exert it. We thus in thought never escape determination and necessity. It will be observed that I do not consider this inability to notion any disproof of the fact of free will."

No creation or calling power from non-existence is, we reply, needed in the case. The numerals 8 and 12 are

Arithmetical but representatives of the different degrees of
equation. anterior probability that the Will will decide in favor of A or B. It is a chance as two to three that the agent will decide for A; but this does not settle the ques-

* See p. 145.

tion, as in a counter action of mechanical forces. The weaker probability may, in strict accordance with the Doctrine of Probabilities, receive the accord of the Will; and B may, without any contradiction to any existing truth, be chosen. What is wanting is not creation of new power, but use of power already in existence.

3. We may furnish a rational solution to the question, *Can an agent choose without a motive?* The cases of no motive may be reduced to three classes: 1. Where the opposite alternatives are perfectly and so equally valueless; 2. Where they are equally valuable; and 3. Where there is value, and so motive on one side, and all the no-motive is on the other side. 1. Where there is no value, and so no motive on either side, *it is a balance of ZEROS.* Yet from the very definition ^{Motiveless choice.} of free Will that it is the power of choosing either of several ways, as well as from the fact that non-action is impossible, and a choice between the zeros is necessary, this case becomes a balance of not only improbabilities, but of probabilities. It is equally improbable, that is, equally probable, that the Will will select either one. And this selection of either one, actually made, would be a choice without a motive. 2. Where the value and so the motive on each side is equal, there is motive for each, but no motive for either over that of the other. Here the probabilities are equal, and, as before, (like a case of equal probability of casting a six,) the result either way is accordant with reason. Such a balance of equal forces in physics would prevent action; in volition there would be action without antecedent *predominant* motive. 3. Where the alternatives are unequal, as zero against 2 or 3, the probabilities are all on one side, and a possibility only on the other. The no-motive is a zero, its alternative is a unit; and for that unit the chance is equal to just the possibility or probability that an improbability will result. As the 2 or 3 increases, the improbability converges to and finally may arrive at

necessity. It is at this *necessity* that the impossibility of choosing without motive is absolute. Such a state of motivity for good, for instance, insures an entire depravation—a total depravity.

4. Arminians, Edwards argues again, admit that motives are necessary to choice; but what motive can there be for choice for a lesser motive? He claims, hence, to exhibit a clear Arminian contradiction. For Arminians hold that the Will cannot act without motive, and yet really hold to a case of acting without motive; for what motive can there be for acting contrary to the strongest motive? We here avail not ourselves of our showing that we hold not the doctrine that Will cannot act without motives, nor of our future showing of the antecedent incommensurability of most motives.* Our business now is to apply the solution derived from the doctrine of probabilities. The choosing for the weakest motive is nothing more than choosing according to the lesser probability; and then the question, What motive can there be for acting in favor of weaker motive? is just equivalent to the following question: *What probability can there be of an event in favor of a lesser probability?*

The strongest of the motives has only the highest of several probabilities in its favor; yet as the event may actually accord for the lower probability, and there is a probability that it will, so the volition may actually accord with the weaker motive.

5. Edwards still further argues that the *weaker motive* not only *affords no motive* for being chosen, but it really *affords a contrary tendency*. In such case the Will would choose not only *without motive* but contrary to motive. So far as the motive is less, so far there is from it a contrary influence. But such, we reply, would be simply a case of superior counter probability. Let the influence of one motive be

Choice
against
strongest
tendency.

* See p. 145.

8, and of the other 6; the superior probabilities would be 8 to 6, and yet the 6 and not the 8 against *the contrary tendency* may result.

6. Edwards puts the case of a man with *two different foods* before him, with a superior appetite for one, and every other motive perfectly excluded; there could be no motive, he argues, for the choosing the inferior, and he would choose the superior necessarily. The comparison of motives would, we reply, be as in the preceding paragraph. As to the choice, there is either a certainty, or rather reliable probability, that he would choose for the superior motive, or, at the proper point of increasing probability, a necessity. Specimen instance.

7. Similar was the reasoning of the Younger Edwards against West, who admitted that Will could not choose unless the object had something in it "eligible;" that is, unless there was some quality constituting a motive for it. Then, replies Edwards, the Will cannot choose for a lesser motive, for that would not be "eligible." And yet, we reply, though *not on the whole* "eligible," the object may have in it *something* that is "eligible," and that single item of eligibility is motivity. There then arises between the two motives two counter probabilities, of which, again, according to the theory of Probabilities, the lesser may prevail. Lesser motive "ineligible."

8. The Younger Edwards asks whether, (p. 352,) "when several motives are proposed to a man, he sometimes passes by the most persuasive, and follows the least persuasive? If so, what is the motive in this case." The term "persuasive," we reply, expresses not so much a relation to the Will, as to the feelings. That an object is more persuasive to the feelings, does produce a higher probability that the Will will choose in accordance with it as motive; yet, as before shown, the higher probability may fail, and the lower meet with accordance. To ask what is the motive for this choos- Motive for lesser motive.

ing for a lesser motive, is to ask again what is the probability in favor of a lesser probability.

9. These views show the futility of an argument by the Younger Edwards (p. 380) to prove the necessitative character of motive influence. "To be influenced by motives is to be really and effectually influenced, just so far as the influence is exerted by them at all. And so far as he is influenced or persuaded by them, so far he is governed and determined by them. For that is what we mean by a determination by motives." "To be influenced by motives," and to "be really and *effectually* influenced," we reply, are not one and the same thing in any sense suitable to Edwards's purpose. To be "*effectually* influenced" must mean, to suit his purpose, to be so influenced as that the *effect* is resultantly secured and accomplished. But we have already shown that the agent may be prevolitionally influenced by motive objects, nay, may be most strongly influenced by them, and yet the influence be not *effectuated* in the result. The result is not the measure of an antecedent intrinsic force, and so is not necessitated.

10. These views show the fallacy of Edwards's argument by Approximation, or rather Recession. (P. 265.)

Inducements, he argues, may be presented so strong as to be "invincible," which he apprehends Arminians will hold "destroy liberty." Then he infers if "invincible" arguments "destroy liberty," half as strong will half "destroy" it, a quarter a quarter, and so on. The destruction of liberty will be in proportion to the amount of motive. This reasoning, we reply, is parallel to the following argument: "If, at a certain limit, approximating probabilities merge into necessity, then half that approximation destroys half the probability, a quarter a quarter, and so on. The destruction of probability will be in proportion to the approximation." But the approach of the probability of the given volition to necessity does not diminish the liberty or the power

All influence
effective in-
fluence.

Argument by
recession.

for a counter volition; it is simply a diminution of the probability of its exercise, which diminution may be cancelled by the free volitional act.

The increase of difficulty for a free volition or for any action is not equivalent to a diminution of power. Suppose a person able to lift a hundred pound weight. He has more difficulty in lifting fifty than in lifting ten; and yet he has just as truly and just as much the power to lift fifty as ten. He has the full complete power of lifting ninety-nine pounds. And so difficulty for free volition is no diminution of power. In the overcoming of that difficulty is the probation and trial of virtue. That difficulty is no otherwise a diminution of liberty than as a requirement of effort. In such effort, and in the abolishing by effort all difficulty, and making the right easy, natural, and finally necessitative, all probationary virtue lies.

To his chapter upon this point Edwards adds three Corollaries, the first of which alone requires any attention. In this he argues that if motives are not necessary causes, producing volitions securatively, then exhortations, the presentation of inducements and reasons, in order to bring about desired choice, are all in vain. To which we reply, as before intimated,* that the common sense of men does not consider exhortations as producing volitions necessitatively, destroying all power of counter choice in the cases in which they are complied with, but as being contingent influence, probable with given intrinsic force, to result in choice, yet leaving a possibility of counter choice. This view of the matter leaves full scope for the reasonableness of exhortations, for the probable calculation of contingent results, and for the free play of alternative Will. And such are the plain truth and nature of the case.

Non-necessity of motives implies non-influence of exhortations.

Answered.

And as motives are not in their nature compulsory, or

* See p. 137.

securative of a necessary effect, destroying all counter power of choice, so inducements offered or influence brought to bear by the divine administration or by the operations of the Holy Spirit, normally leave in the agent the power of otherwise choosing, and of successfully "resisting the Holy Ghost." It is of the very nature of probation, that no influences shall be applied to the Will which the Will possesses not full power at its own responsibility to reject and nullify. The whole world has the full power to reject God and his Gospel; and the reason why the world is not now holy is, not that God has withheld anything of all that the laws of free probation permits, but that men in the use of alternative power, with full volitional ability to do otherwise, do restrain the progress of truth, the operations of the Divine Spirit, and the course of Grace.

Predestinationists often claim that the prayers even of Arminians presuppose that God may at any time consistently with his administrative system convert any man they are praying for, or even the world, at any moment. But in this matter Predestinationists as truly contradict themselves. They pray, as the result often shows, that God would do contrary to his own predestination. Their prayer, though itself decreed, is often against God's decrees. They pray that God would act contrary to the strongest motive; which themselves say God has no moral power to do. That is, they commit these contradictions unless all prayer is considered as offered under the proviso that what is asked for be consistent with the Divine Will, and is in fact asked for so far only as is allowable by the fundamental laws of God's administration. Not my will but thine be done, tacitly or expressly limits and underlies every true prayer. And such a proviso as fully explains the prayer of the Arminian as the Predestinationist. When an Arminian prays that God would awaken the public mind to repent-

Divine influences non-necessitative.

Arminian prayers.

And Calvinistic

Consistent on same grounds.

ance, or convert an individual, or spread his Gospel through the world, and turn all men's hearts to righteousness, he thereby expresses his earnest desire that such things may be accomplished in accordance with fundamental laws; just as when he prays that a temporal blessing may be bestowed, as health restored, or life preserved, he usually expects no unequivocal miracle, but trusts that it may be done in such way as Infinite Wisdom may devise in accordance with the constitution of things; and that on condition of his prayer it may be ordered otherwise than if such prayer were not offered. We know not how far the prayer of the saints is a condition to the goings forth or puttings forth of God, nor how fully he requires the co-operation of his Church, in order to render possible such displays of his truth as will convince the unbelieving, and such impressions by his Spirit as the free-wills of men in process of time will, it is foreseen, accept and obey. Certainly man's Will and not God's remissness has prevented the complete good of the world. Of the world God truly speaks when he says, What more could I have done for my vineyard.

CHAPTER III.

COMMENSURABILITY OF MOTIVES. VOLITION AS GREATEST GOOD.

THAT *motives prevail by their antecedent strength* so that the strongest is ever victorious, just as the heaviest weight must always turn the scale, is the doctrine of necessity. It assumes an exact and infinitely perfect antecedent commensurability as a certain fact. How true this assumption, is a point worth an examination.

In regard to COMMENSURABILITY things may be divided into TWO CLASSES, those which are measurable by each other and those that are not.

To the first class belong things of the same denomination, as dimension with dimension, weights with weights, and abstract numbers with abstract numbers. And when objects of this class come before the mind there is an antecedent commensurability of motive which on the doctrine of probabilities renders the result reliably certain or probable, and even necessary.

Where in opposite scales of choice before a miser's attention there are ten dollars and a thousand dollars, every other inducement being excluded, there can be little or no doubt which he will choose. It is a condition of motive balance in which all Will would choose alike. There is an exact intrinsic commensuration between the two objects, establishing an antecedent subjective probability amounting to reliable certainty, and perhaps to even "secured certainty" or necessity, that the agent will choose in a particular way.

To the second class belong all those objects belonging to different denominations, or received by the mind through different senses, faculties, or impressibilities.

There is no commensuration or comparableness between a pound and a rod; between the brightness of the day and the force of magnetic attraction. Still less commensurable are material things with mental: as the weight of a rock and the honor of a gentleman; the hardness of iron and the sternness of Cato; the length of a walk and the glory of a victory.

It would not afford much sense to say that this night is as dark as this rose is odorous; that this timber is as solid as this woman is beautiful; that this fruit is as sweet as that crime is wicked; that this truth is as clear as that desire is strong; that this music is as sweet as that duty is binding; or that this color is as deep as that action is honorable. And yet these comparisons may represent the balance of opposite motives antecedent to volition.

A cold intellection is not intrinsically commensurable with a deep emotion; nor a sentiment of taste with a feeling of moral obligation; nor a physical appetite with a sense of honor or duty. These influences receive their degree of prevalence, and consequently their comparative so-called *strength of motive*, from the Will.

This class of cases makes clear to our consciousness the fact that the volitional preference assigned to the motive is the actual so-called *strength* of the motive. Nor is there any force in the assumption that if our faculties were keen enough we should be able to see that even these were intrinsically mathematically commensurable. What we should see were our perceptions omnisciently clear is not so certain. But we venture to believe that we should see in our responsible volitional nature the power to choose independent of the exact control of motive necessitation.

But to all this the objection is sometimes made that prevalence is the sole proof of greater antecedent weight or force even in mechanical dynamics. We only know, for instance, that a certain steam pressure is cause of the motion of a locomotive only by the motion itself. We know that the stroke of the hammer is cause of the entrance of the nail only by the sequence. To this we reply:

1. The intuitive common sense of all mankind cognizes matter as intrinsically inert and dead.* It possesses no intellective power to discover and select a direction of action, and no inherent force to move itself if it could select. In all these respects we find it contrasted with mind, which we can as intuitively contemplate as the seat and residence of both selective self-direction and dynamical self-activity.

Antecedency
of mechanical
force.

Proved from
1. Inertia.

* This, with some subsequent passages, was written before the dynamical theory of matter had become a topic of discussion. The writer has seen no ground to change the opinion here expressed. The next sentence is valid in its argument on any theory of matter.

2. As matter is thus inert, it moves only by forceful impact from without. A body moving against it must propel it. Mind thus does cognize the propelling and the motion as cause and effect, and it recognizes cause and effect as moving from behind onward. And as the moved body is inert in itself, the mind is compelled to hold that it is passively caused to move, and that its motion is not independent and concurrent, but dependent, proportioned, and caused. It is the antecedent that effectuates the consequent and makes it *be*; not the *being* that makes that the antecedent.

3. Of the same sort of matter a given bulk and density possess with uniform exactitude a given weight and force; so that weight and force are seen to be intrinsical, and the movement of the impelled body to be a proportionate and necessary effect. By induction the same law is extended over all cases, and natural philosophy constructs her system on that conclusion, with full confidence in the results.

4. To all these views of material motion as an effect of impulse from without, there is no contradiction, either from consciousness, experience, or moral sense. Whereas in Will consciousness finds self-activity, experience finds incommensurability of motives, and the moral sense denies necessitated volition.

Others have argued that we have the same proof that volition is the exact effect of motive force that there is that perception is the exact effect of the external object force produces perception. To this we reply, consciousness and the moral sense present the most positive contradiction. One of the strongest proofs that Will is free we derive from the conscious feeling of the inalternativity of perception as compared with the alternativity of Will. Let our readers on this point consult (besides p. 14) our chapters on the Responsibility for Belief, and on the proof of Freedom from Consciousness. And this con-

scious difference between perception and volition furnishes an *à fortiori* proof for the difference between matter and Will.

A due consideration of this antecedent incommensurability of motives may aid in deciding the question whether Edwards's maxim be true, ^{Greatest apparent good} that *the volition is always as the greatest apparent good*. By this is meant, let us carefully concede, not necessarily, the greatest *actual* good, nor the greatest *absolute* good; but what *appears* to the given mind at the moment the greatest good within its survey. According to this maxim it may be said that the particular motive receives from the prevolitional faculties its decision and character, as greatest apparent good, according to which Will always decides. To which we reply, that the prevolitional faculties do receive and compare the different eligibilities presented as commensurable or incommensurable, or as in one point or another preferable; and there are particular motivities for which we may calculate a higher or lower degree of probability of their receiving the volitional accordance; and yet it is matter of both observation and consciousness that, *while* the judgment has decided that a course is for the greatest good, even *cotemporaneously* with that judgment, the Will often does, from the suggestion of some inferior motivity, decide ^{Does not always determine volition.} against that acknowledged greatest good. In such a case the necessitarian will indeed reply, "Yes, but then that inferior motivity was to the mind at that moment the greatest good." That, we reply, is a paralogism. It is the regular necessitarian dodge. The Will, forsooth, chooses for the greatest apparent good; for it is of course the greatest apparent good *if the Will chooses it*.

The intellectual and volitional actions described by the poet Horace,

Meliora video, proboque
Deteriora sequor,

The better I see and approve, the worse I follow, were perfectly simultaneous. Even while volitionally preferring the worse, he prevolitionally preferred the better. Their being *meliora*, he could *see* only by comparing the two; and it was while so comparing and *seeing* that he chose the *deteriora*. He chose for the weaker motive, and for the lesser apparent good relatively to his mind at the moment of choosing. He *made up his mind* prevolitionally that the *meliora* were the greater good; he *made up his mind* volitionally by choosing for the *deteriora*. President Mahan truly remarks, "How often do we hear individuals affirm, 'If I should follow my feelings I should do this; if I should follow my judgment I should do that.'" That feeling and that judgment present motivities often intrinsically and entirely incommensurable; whence, then, the decision but from the Will?

A Southern planter, let us suppose, sees that the approaching rebellion will be his absolute ruin unless he escapes, which he can do with all his property and ultimate honor; yet he determinately says, "I go with my State." He sees that such course is *not to him* the greatest apparent good, but the greatest possible ruin; yet he chooses it *so seeing*—knowingly chooses what is *no apparent good* at all. So far as the motives were commensurable he doubtless chose for the weaker against the stronger. An Edwards might well ask, What motive had he for so choosing against the stronger motive? It might be replied, None at all, yet he so chose.

If any assert that the most intense and exciting *desire* or other *emotion* is intrinsically the strongest and always decides the Will, that is denied as contrary to experience. Quiet judgment or duty often gains the day over the highest human feeling. So the boy required to stand the fire by his father's command until devoured by the blaze, willed the calmest duty

Choosing for
weaker motive.

As no apparent
good.

Strongest desire
non-prevalent.

against the highest torture. The Indian wills the coolest intellection in spite of the highest agonies. The Wisconsin boy who, when required to recant a true statement, expired under the infliction of repeated whippings, persisted in the utterance of truth against the highest possible immediate motive. How often are men of intensest passions accustomed to subdue their storm by the stern imperative of Will. How often are we called upon to suppress every variety of emotion, grief, joy, love, anger, and laughter by the central volitional energy? So striking an instance of this was Socrates, that when a physiognomist told him that his lineaments showed him to be a natural profligate, the philosopher admitted that he was so by passion and good only by Will. In such cases it is the volitional power which strikes the balance, and not the judgment, for the very contest is between judgment and feeling. *Judgment is not the judge, but one of the parties.*

If any one assert that the firmest and coolest *intellection* prevails, every deliberate sinner who, knowing and believing that an endless woe is the penalty, commits sin on the slightest temptation is proof to the contrary. A moment's gush of feeling overthrew the life purposes of Coriolanus; while Brutus sacrificed the deeper sense of parental feeling at the requirement of cool calculation.

The very strongest *moral obligation*, fully acknowledged and most deeply felt, is made to yield to the slightest *desire, interest, point of honor, or æsthetic gratification*. The preference of less to greater, even as they confessedly appear to the individual mind at the moment, is here often pre-eminently marked.

If any say that the strongest motive prevails because that is strongest which the Will chooses, he gives up the question. If by *the strongest motive* is meant simply the motive chosen, then to say that the strongest motive prevails is only to say that the mo-

Strongest intellection.

Strongest moral force

The prevalent is the strongest.

tive chosen prevails, or the motive chosen is the motive chosen. It concedes our position that the strength of a motive is the comparative prevalence which the Will in its own action assigns to it, or is the nearness to which the Will comes to acting on account of it. Men, thereby, do not always choose what they most desire, nor what they think best, nor what they think they ought; but for these or some other eligibility; and for whichever eligibility they choose, that, forsooth, is the strongest motive.

That motives are not subjectively and intrinsically commensurable, either geometrically or arithmetically, is confirmed by the doctrine of contingencies. Suppose two players at dice, one of whom has two sixes and the other has three. The goodness of their chances therefore is as two to three. That is, the latter has one third a better chance than the former. His lot is as a motive which is one third better than its opposite. Yet though the better chance has the higher probability than the other, yet it may fail and attain but an inferior result. So the so-called stronger motive may fail of its comparative result. When compared in regard to their results, they are utterly incapable of exact commensuration. There is no adding them so as to produce an exact sum; there is no subtracting them so as to obtain a precise remainder; there is no commensuring them so as to obtain exact comparative magnitudes. Their true superiority consists in their prevalence; which the volition does not reveal as occultly intrinsic in them, but creates. Opposite probabilities are comparable, but not with absolute exactness commensurable.

This non-commensurability of motives appears in various phases of life. A self-interest and a sense of *the heroic* stand before the agent's attention; there is no intrinsic commensurability; is it not the Will that decides between them? A man will sac-

Paralogism.

Incommensurability and Doctrine of probabilities.

Instances of non-commensurability.

rifice property, life, every selfish interest, and encounter the most terrible forms of danger from a *point of honor*. Another man will say, "Burn my private property if it will serve the public good." Doubtless, as has been elsewhere shown, some basis for the possibility of such acts must be found in the character; but a large share of that character is formed by the volitions, and a large amount of solution of the immediate acts must be found in Will.

Leibnitz illustrates the freedom of the Will from that eager spontaneity with which men seek after happiness. It is necessary; yet how free! But Spontaneity happiness is by no means the *summum bonum*, the pole-star regulating all our volitions. Bishop Butler and Dr. Chalmers (in his Bridgewater Treatise) have well shown that we have other than selfish feelings. A man loves a *thing itself*; not merely the happiness he gets out of the thing. He may love, not the *happi-* Toward hap-
piness. *ness*, but the *thing*. A mother loves the well-being of her child, not because it will make her happy, but because it will make her child happy. Though she was to know that well-being but for one moment of her existence, how much more of her own happiness would she sacrifice than could be crowded into that moment of calm intellectual knowing that the child's well-being Happiness
not sole ob-
ject. was secure. So in myriads of instances sacrifices of selfish feelings of interest must be looked upon as instances disproving the doctrine that our own happiness is the generic motive moving all volitions.

"However it may be requisite," says the Princeton Essayist, "in order to men's being responsible, that they be able to do as they please or choose, yet who will claim that it is deemed necessary that they should have the property of *choosing the exact contrary of what on the whole appears to them most eligible and desirable?*"

—P. 254.

We "claim" this very thing. If God, for instance,

The "eligible" and the obligatory. commands the agent to choose the very reverse of what appears "most eligible and desirable," (a frequent case,) every man of sane moral and common sense would affirm that power to that reverse is "necessary" in order to responsibility for not choosing that reverse. If moral obligation require a choice contrary to the apparently "most eligible and desirable," then there must be power for that contrary choice. Otherwise there is requirement for the performance of the impossible, which is infinite injustice, and penalty for the necessary and inevitable act, which is the most appalling fatalism. It will indeed be doubtless replied, "If God's command be obeyed, then God's command will have been the most eligible and desirable." But does not this logician see that he is landed in the old paralogism? The most eligible is chosen, because the chosen was most eligible. The volition is the test of the eligibility.

Since the prevolitional views and feelings are thus, as motives, to a great degree incommensurable, whatever previous "making up of the mind" precedes a given volition which assumes and is based upon their commensurement must itself be, as has been before said, (p. 79,) at least in its terminal point, *volitional* and *free*. It must assign the commensurement, and fix the apprizement and balance of the intrinsically incommensurable but comparable and opposing motives. Here plainly a vital point of volitional freedom lies. It is not by perception merely that a set of motives intrinsically incommensurable are commensured; but it is the Will which assigns the balance of the motives, and often furnishes a determination or purpose as to further volition.

A thing or act may appear in many respects most eligible and desirable on one side, while another thing or act may appear most eligible and desirable in many respects on the other side. There may be no intrinsic commensurability between them; and between these two the agent through the equipotent Will makes his decision. It

was with a full perception of strongest motive—strongest, that is, in different respects—on both sides that young Solomon chose “an understanding heart.” It was with a full comprehension of the comparative superior inducements in different respects of either side that young Hercules, in the apologue of Prodicus, chose the offers of Virtue rather than of Pleasure. It was with a vivid view of strongest motives on opposite sides that Cesar chose to cross the Rubicon. There were counter alternatives, and according to our definition the agent put forth the choosing volition with full power of reverse choice instead.



CHAPTER IV.

MOTIVES NO NECESSITATIVE CAUSE OF VOLITION.

By the principles thus far ascertained we meet the arguments assuming that motives are causes that necessitate volitions.

I. The *assumption that for the WILL TO ACT IN ACCORDANCE with a motive, and for it to BE CAUSED to act by the motive, is essentially the same thing.*

“It comes to just the same thing: to say, the circumstances of the mind are such as tend to sway and turn its inclination one way, is the same thing as to say, the inclination of the mind, as, under such circumstances, tends that way.”—Edwards, p. 263.

The two things are very different. It is one thing to say that the extrinsic “circumstances” impose a necessitative fixation upon the Will to tend a given way; it is another thing to say that “the inclination of the mind,” that is, the Will, “under such circumstances,” with full power, normally exercised, of tending either way, “tends

that way." It is one thing to say that the exterior object *secures* the volition, excluding power from the Will, to will otherwise; it is another thing to say that in full possession of power to will otherwise, the Will acts in accordance with the exterior object. It is one thing to say that the external presentation fixes the Will to a given act; it is another thing to say that the Will, in presence of several equally possible alternatives, acts for that external presentation. The former of these respective couples of phrases affirms that motive fixes the Will, that the relation of motive is the relation of limitative cause and effect, and that the motive secures the particular volition as its one solely possible result; the latter affirms that the relation of a given motive to will is that of condition to one among several other possible results.

Between the so-called "tendency" of a physical object to a given movement and a *tendency* of the Will to a given direction there is a wide difference. The *tendency* of the physical object is in fixed proportion to the forces applied, and is the inevitable result of those forces. The *tendency* of a tower to lean is in precise adjustment to the measure of opposite forces that press to a downfall or sustain its erectness. The tendency of the Will to a given direction is simply the degree of probability that it will act in that direction of which the result is fully able to be no exact measure. The tower acts in precise fulfillment of the strongest force; the Will acts in no precise fulfillment of the strongest probability. With the tower there is no possibility for the strongest force to fail; with the Will there is full adequate power for the strongest probability to prove null.

II. The *assumption that motives are CAUSES that NECESSITATE volition.*

The following is one of many passages to this effect:

"If every act of the Will is excited by a motive, then

that motive is the cause of the act of the Will. If the acts of the Will are excited by motives, then motives are the causes of their being excited, or what is the same thing, the cause of their being put forth into act and existence. And if so, the existence of the acts of the Will is properly the effect of their motives. Motives do nothing as motives or inducements but by their influence; and so much as is done by their influence is the effect of them. For that is the notion of an effect, something that is brought to pass by the influence of another thing. And if volitions are properly the effects of their motives, then they are necessarily connected with their motives; every effect and event being, as was proved before, necessarily connected with that which is the proper ground and reason of its existence. Thus it is manifest that volition is necessary."—P. 126.

And again the following:

"And besides, if the acts of the Will are excited by motives, those motives are the *causes* of those acts of the Will which makes the acts of the Will *necessary*; as *effects necessarily follow the efficiency of the cause*." —P. 266.

The points here made are:

1. That as volition is produced or excited by motive, so the relation of motive and volition is that of inalterative cause and effect.

2. To arise from the "influence" of motives is to be the inalterative effect of motives.

3. To be the effect is to be necessarily caused; the relation of cause and effect being a necessary relation.

4. Therefore volition is *necessarily caused by motive*.

Before directly meeting these points we may note that it will not do to say that all this necessity is really but "*mere certainty*," that is, any certainty distinct from the most absolute necessity.

If there be any necessity which is *different* from cer-

Not certain- tainty this must be that very necessity. For
 ty but neces- it is that necessity which exists in the relation
 sity. of inalternative cause and effect; and it consists in the
 non-existence of power for the effect to be without the
 cause, or to not be with the cause, or to be otherwise
 than caused. It is not the mere *non-usance* but NON-EX-
 ISTENCE of such power. This relation is just as nec-
 essary as any other causal relation whatever;
 Non-exist- for Edwards claims that if it can be loosed,
 ence of counter
 power; not
 non-usance. every other causal relation will be loosed and
 atheism will result. So that it is as strong and immov-
 able as any causal relation in the universe; and all things
 fall to pieces if it be in the least degree softened or in-
 validated.

To the above points we now state our counter points.

1. *Motive and volition do not stand in the relation of inalternative cause and effect.* Of volition the cause, the sole cause, is Will. Motives are collateral conditions without which there is no adequate power for the volition to be; with which there is adequate power for the volition not to be. The relation therefore is not "fixed;" the antecedent motive does not "make sure" the enacting the volition; the relation is not that of necessity. Notwithstanding the motive, the Will in projecting the volition is non-necessitated and free.

To say that "the acts of the Will are excited by motives" is scarcely correct; for feelings, not volitions, are the object of excitement. But it is untrue that
 Their rela- for motives to *excite the volition* is the same as
 tion not ne- cessity. for the motive necessitatively to cause the volition; for the motive is only the occasion, and all its acts of *excitement* amount to no more than this, that they stand as probable conditions opening the way toward which the Will thereby acquires opportunity to act with full adequate power of not acting. And this is very far from being "the cause of their being put forth into act and existence."

2. For the volition *to arise from the influence of motives is not the same as to be the effect of motives.* To be the effect of motives, in the Edwardean sense, is so to depend for existence upon the motives that the motives existing there is no adequate power for the volition not to exist. As motives, then, are no ^{Motive not cause proper.} cause of volitions, so volitions are no effect of motives. Volitions are the sequents, and the results, or events of motives, not their effects.

3. *The relation of cause and effect is not* (so far as Will is concerned) *a necessary relation.* The affirmative of this proposition is assumed by Edwards as universal, not only in physics, where its universality is admitted, but in volitions. On the contrary, we exclude it not only from motives in relation to volition, but from Will as inalternative cause of inalternative effects. The relation between motive and volition we hold to be contingency, which in itself is blind; the relation between Will and volition we hold to be alternativity, which is not blind. The Will is cause and not the motive, not because the relation of necessity exists in the relation between Will and volition, but because the position of Will is central and constant, while that of motive is subsidiary and transient; and because the Will is the controlling conscious self in the exercise of direct power in producing volition. The volition, though effect of this power, inasmuch as it is able to be withheld, is not necessarily caused.

4. *Nor is volition the necessary result of the motive.* If, though the motive exist, there is full power for the volition to exist or not exist, arising from the causative power of the Will, then the relation of the Will to the motive is not necessitation, and the volition is not necessary. If there be the higher probability that the motive will result in the actuality of the volition, and yet the higher probability yield to a lower counter probability, then the relation between motive and volition is not that of necessity.

III. The argument *by pseudo-synonyms*.

Edwards argues from a series of equivalent terms in the following manner :

“If motives dispose the mind to action, then they *cause* the mind to be disposed; and to *cause* the mind to be disposed is to *cause* it to be willing; and to cause it to be willing is to *cause* it to will; and that is the same thing as to be the cause of an act of the Will. And yet this same Mr. Chubb holds it to be absurd to suppose motive to be the *cause of the act of the Will*.” —P. 143.

But the question is not whether motives cause the soul to will, but whether the cause is necessitative. Words expressive of causation, both nouns and verbs, we have in the proper place stated, are with allowable impropriety applied to designate the influence of motive upon Will, without deciding that they express more than contingent condition. Motives upon the individual Will, or upon the Wills collectively of whole masses, are frequently called cause, actual or potential, whether the action really follows or not. If a given motive condition be accorded with by the Will, it is a resultant cause; if it be not accorded with, it may still be called a *cause*, adequate and potential, yet not resultant.

IV. The Argument *from Approximation*.

Edwards argues that “when motives are very strong all will allow that there is some difficulty in going against them. If they were yet greater the difficulty would be stronger. Unless, therefore, men have an infinite power of resistance, the motive influence might be so strong as to be impossible to be resisted.” Such is the argument by approximation. We remark :

1. If the influence be solely on one side and no alternative present before the mind oppositely, it has already been stated in the proper place that there is an objective-limit to freedom in the case. If there be opposite motives, then influence, however

Motives solely one side.

great, cannot be infinite; for it is only the remainder after the opposite has been subtracted.

2. The amount of motive influence must be also measured by the receptive capacity of a finite being. Motive measured by capacity. Only an infinite capacity can receive an infinite amount of motive impression, and that same infinite capacity aided by an opposite motive (which is always to be supposed) can resist it. Human experience amply shows that the human Will can, with motive opposite, resist the utmost motive influence that human capacity can receive. Mrs. Hemans has celebrated in verse the boy Casabianca, who was stationed upon shipboard and charged by his father not to leave his post. Strongest motives resisted. He firmly maintained his stand, even though the fire raged before his face, and perished in the flame, a martyr of constancy. He withstood the most immediately intense and powerful motive that could be brought to bear upon the human Will.

But the motive, however strong, unless it be of such a force, or of such suddenness of shock as to expel and exclude all counter motive, or so decisive that all Will as Will would choose in accordance, and so produce an objective necessitation, leaves the freedom Counter probabilities. untouched. Between the motives within these limits there will still arise counter-probabilities, to which the law of probabilities will still apply, that the higher may yield to the lower.

V. The notion that *not to be causatively necessitated* by strongest motive force is an irrational exemption from all motive influence, and *is to be insanely loose from all reason*.

By what can a man be better governed, it is asked, than by *the highest reason*? To be governed otherwise is to be the subject of folly. And to be *no way* influenced by it, which, according to free-willism, must be the perfection of freedom, would be a complete exemption from sense or reason.

The highest freedom would therefore be the completest idiocy.

If, we reply, by *the highest reason* is meant the motive apparently to the individual most strong, brutes, fools, and madmen are, by the necessitarian theory, as much governed by it as anybody. And this, by any theory, is the obvious fact; for the volitions of such persons very much resemble the mechanical movement under strongest motive-force which necessitarianism implies. If by *highest reason* is meant the absolutely *truest wisdom*, there can be nothing higher and better, or more unlike idiocy or madness, than to act, as a free agent, according to its influences. . As a free agent, we say, for if it be as a living sensitive automaton, fixedly giving forth the motions, corporeal or volitional, precisely according to the motive-force applied, then there can be something better and nobler, of which this is but the mockery. There can be a true free agent, willing, with power otherwise, most freely, for the true highest reason.

The *highest reason* is often, necessitarianism being judge, to the individual *the lesser motive*. Necessity in such a case excludes him from the highest reason and shuts him to the opposite. Freedom is the condition of choosing according to the highest reason, even though against the relatively strongest motive.

VI. The *sum of contradictions*.

Edwards thus sums up the opposite sides of Mr. Chubb's statement of free will :

"And if we compare these things together we have here again a whole heap of inconsistencies. Motives are the previous ground and reason of the acts of the Will; yea, the necessary ground and reason of their exertion, without which they will not be exerted, and cannot in the nature of things take place, and they do excite these acts of the Will, and do this by a prevailing influ-

Madmen
governed by
strongest
impulses.

Freedom ne-
cessary to
choice of
highest rea-
son.

Necessity oft-
en excludes
it.

ence, yea, an influence which prevails for the production of the act of the Will, and for the disposing of the mind to it; and yet it is absurd to suppose motive to be a cause of an act of the Will, or that a principle of Will is moved or caused to be exerted by it, or that it has any causality in the production of it, or any causality to be the cause of the exertion of the Will.”—P. 143.

The “heap of inconsistencies” lies in the supposed contradiction between the two members of the sentence lying before and after the phrase “and yet.” But taking the words “cause” and “causality” in the latter members of the sentence in the necessitative sense, both sides are consistent and soundly true. Motives may be “the previous ground and reason of the Will, yea, the necessary” (in the sense of *requisite*) ground, etc., without which the Will acts not; they may *excite* by a prevailing influence, which prevails for the act; they may be fully and freely acted in accordance with; “and yet,” astonishing as it may seem, the said motives may still not be the necessitative causes of the volition. They may still be sidelong conditions, without which the Will cannot act; with each one of which there is a probability, more or less strong, that the Will will act accordantly; which probability though superior may fail by the Will’s acting not accordantly, or the inferior may prevail by the Will’s acting accordantly. And so the motive, though a requisite condition, is not a necessitating cause.

Contradictions reconciled by freedom.

CHAPTER V.

UNIFORMITIES OF VOLITION.

As free-will has been viewed by those who have little studied its nature to be synonymous with lawlessness, so on the other hand the impossibility of lawlessness and the actual experience of uniformities of volition both in the continuous life of one individual and in the aggregate of masses of men, are held by some as demonstrative of necessitarianism. A Napoleon through a whole career puts forth an entire series of volitions in conformity with one great predominant purpose. A jailer's will is, practically, as reliable as the dungeon walls. An army with the uniform and concurring will of its hundred thousand soldiers is the despot's reliance for the stability of his throne. A uniform number of suicides in a given community, a uniform number of letters passing through the post-office, in the course of several years marks the uniformity of human volitions. On all this I remark:

1. The very definition of a free Will is in proof that uniformity may be its course as truly as variety or irregularity. If the Will can choose either way, it can choose in a uniform way. If it can choose lawlessly, it can also choose a rule, and ever after put forth its choices in accordance with that rule.

2. In our chapter upon the conditions of Will we have in effect shown causative limitations by which however subjectively free it is objectively un-free. Thus much uniformity is accounted for.

In accordance with principles previously laid down, uniformities of volitions may be considered as taking place from *positive* reasons or *negative*.

Necessity
often in-
ferred from
volitional
uniformities.

Freedom ad-
mits uniform-
ity of action.

Uniformity
accounted
for by limit-
ations else-
where ex-
plained.

Positive and
negative rea-
sons of uni-
formity.

The *positive* methods consist in the influence of motives, which we define* as consisting in the probabilities with which the Will is likely ^{The Positive.} to choose in behalf of such motives. The greater the probability, therefore, the more conclusive the explanation of the fact of the uniformity. The uniformity may be calculably so probable as to be practically, though not absolutely, certain or necessary. Empirically, though not apodictically, the uniformity may be general if not universal.

The *negative* method by which volitional uniformity takes place consists in the mental exclusion of ^{The Negative.} all attention to or thought of a counter course or alternative. This is a strictly necessitative limitation in the given case, drawing an impassible boundary line around the area of volitional freedom. If there is no adequate power in the given case of bringing within the knowledge or mental comprehension any other than one course, volitional freedom is limited to that one course and there arises an absolute necessity.

We may specify four generic cases in which one or the other of these two methods takes place, namely, ^{Four generic causes.} CORPOREAL NATURE, DISPOSITIONS, STANDARD PURPOSES, and HABITS.

Without adopting the theory of unisubstanceism † as held by Spinoza, we may maintain the very fact that substance itself lying at the basis of all agents ^{Corporeal nature base.} forms a most generic basis of unity and uniformity. But in addition, all human agents being CORPOREAL, with a corporiety the same in nature, as if all were organic structures made from the same material, possess a still more specific ground of natural and necessary uniformity. To this bodily basis belongs a set of natural properties as of mere matter, a higher set as of corporeal matter, and a still higher set as of corporeal organism, in all of which all bodies agree and are uniform. These bodily or-

* See p. 130.

† Buchanan's Modern Atheism, p. 147.

ganisms, as they blend with mind and unite with soul, furnish a large nature-base for an immense amount of uniform phenomena. Corporeal form, strength, and peculiarities shape a large number of the actions and habits of men. Hereditary constitution, national peculiarities, and personal idiosyncrasies modify a large part of our manners, movements, impulses, and mental tendencies. This corporeal basis receives a large share of its fixed nature at birth, and the born material does, through all the changes of age, receive from surrounding circumstances its shaping, as a cast is modeled by its mould. Such is the lowest, the nature formation, upon which as a primitive the successive strata of character are formed.

By DISPOSITIONS we mean the entire set of primitive prevolitional mental tendencies in the natural constitution, as well as all those that have *grown, or been acquired*, upon this constitutional base. The intellectual views and beliefs, the emotional susceptibilities, the desires and appetencies, the moral sensibilities and tendencies, the nervous and sensorial excitabilities, the corporeal appetites, all combine to furnish motives, amid which the Will decides; and as these different constituents exist in different force in different individuals, so there exist accordingly greater or less probabilities that the choices will or will not take place in given directions. As a practical rule, it may be laid down that where there is no prevolitional propensity of some one or more of these kinds, there will be no corresponding action. As a practical rule, too, where given propensities are strong and temptations constant in a given direction, a reliable certainty of yielding action arises, which bears an exterior resemblance to necessity. The individual who resists once, twice, or thrice, yet is exposed to a perpetual temptation of intense character against which he can interpose no excluding barrier, is wearied out, and seems as it were not to possess the

Primitive
tendencies.

Cycle of ne-
cessity.

amount of capital of resisting strength to maintain a perpetual warfare and a perpetual victory.* However volitionally free such an agent may be intrinsically, the probabilities of his sinlessness are likely to be in inverse proportion to the continuity of his exposures.

These prevolitional tendencies, with their corporeal nature-base, when intensely favorable to evil in their character, and accepted by the Will, constitute the fountain of which evil conduct is the stream. If all adequate possibility of interposing good motive into the mind be wanting, then, by the very laws of ^{Depraved inability to good.} mind, there is likely to be an absence of volitional freedom for the good. If such is the state of the dispositions that the love of God cannot be a motive of action, then there results a state that may be called *total spiritual depravity*; and where this exists a spiritual renovation is needed, either by injecting the possibility of spiritual motive into the dispositions, or by a correction of the dispositions themselves, or ^{Regeneration.} both. And this is Regeneration. Where such a state of dispositions or surrounding circumstances, or both, exists as that moral motive cannot be interposed as a ground of action, then we have a moral depravity or lawlessness.

Where the absence of the possibility of motive for good, and so of action, is from the first moment of volitional capability necessitated, there can be no moral probation, responsibility, or just penalty. Where the possibility once existed and has been freely and positively banished by the agent, the responsibility remains. Where it has been congenitally non-existent, but has been graciously placed within the reach and freely rejected, the responsibility remains. Where the depravity is congenital, yet the offer for its regeneration is freely presented but the retention of ^{Depravity appropriated.}

* See p. 132.

depravity is freely preferred, then it is ratified, sanctioned, and responsibly appropriated.*

HABITS are uniformities of action which may be said to *grow upon us* by repetition. They are uniformities of *volition*, too; and they are often performed with so little deliberation as to acquire a resemblance to instinct. *Positively*, habit arises by the influence of the same recurring motives for which the Will will act. These motives are brought up by the laws of intellectual association of time, place, objects, and causation. Natural impulses seem to spring up in the being, physical and psychical, suggesting the usual volition. Meantime, *negatively*, counter motive and counter thought are gradually more perfectly and constantly excluded. No other than the given way is imagined or enters into the mind. And thus the volitions move, as in a passage way walled upon either side. The wall is an amalgam of blending freedom and necessity.

Habit, being self-formed, however strong, seldom or never ceases to be volitional and responsible. Even should the circumscribing wall become hardened to a "fixed" necessity, responsibility can perhaps never terminate. No man can build up a palisade to exclude himself from the path of righteousness and then excuse himself for not treading therein.

STANDARD PURPOSES are volitions adopting an extended course of volitional actions, and to which, in consequence, an extended number of volitions subordinate themselves. They are plans, enterprises, resolutions, determinations, which contemplate and include a due number of volitions in obedience to themselves. Yet it is important to note that these standard volitions do not of themselves directly and of their own power necessitate the subordinate volitions. A man is free in carrying out his plans and resolutions. The existence of the *plan* as a permanent standard motive furnishes the

* See pp. 328, 400.

probability, more or less strong, that the subordinate volition will sustain it. The motive may be so permanent and strong as to create a firm reliability that the subordinate volitions will accord. Indirectly, the counter motives may be excluded so as to leave the mind completely shut up to the positive motive, and a necessitation is superinduced. Men, thus, may be so absorbed in their plans as to cease to be free, alternative agents. But they seldom or never thereby lose their responsibility.

Men put forth at given points of their life decisive volitions to which their whole subsequent history becomes more or less subordinated. A person engages in a profession, contracts a marriage, undertakes an enterprise, becomes absorbed in a study, which may be a life-long matter. But lesser standard purposes there are, covering a much briefer line of volitions. A man takes a journey of a few hours, undertakes a brief essay, or manufactures a single article. The number of subordinate volitions herein included is far larger than might at first be imagined, but small in comparison with our life-long settlements. But there are lesser inclusive purposes still, which are occurring every hour and moment of life, to which their little sets of minor volitions subordinate themselves. We cannot walk across the floor, or eat a meal, or read a page, or even write a single alphabetic character, without a purpose fulfilled by lesser volitions. How numerous and rapid the volitions by which a lady executes her *purpose* of playing a tune upon the piano! Indeed, as the tones of music are a succession of infinitesimal pulsations or vibrations, melting into each other so as to form a *flow*, so most of our courses of action are formed of a series of infinitesimal volitions.

Generic
volitions.

Volitional
flow.

Maxims and opinions may be volitionally so adopted as to become standard purposes. An opinion may be theoretically believed with no practical effect until the

Will has adopted it as a reason of action. A man may disbelieve the Christian religion, and yet may act his disbelief so little externally that it may be supposed by his acquaintances that he is a theoretic believer until he commences a course of open opposition. A large share of education consists in the volitional adoption of maxims and principles as fundamental and permanent grounds of action. Repentance and reformation are the adoption into practice of a belief of the badness of sin, and the preferableness of a right cause. By means of all those fundamental adoptions a character different from the first and natural constitution is with more or less completeness newly formed.

So largely and effectively do the dispositions, the habits, and the standard purposes influence the volitions, both by position and impulse, and by excluding counter courses from the view, that the agent, however *intrinsically* and by nature *free*, is to a great extent *objectively* unfree. Perhaps of many lives, if not most, or all, a full analysis would show that a large majority of the volitions are thus objectively not free. And this very consideration may serve to explain the error of many thinkers in too hastily inferring that ALL volitions are unfree, and that the agent is not free intrinsically and by nature. They select a few cases which are in fact cases of objective necessitation, and draw the rash induction of necessity over all volitions, human and divine. A large number of the test instances selected in the argument between freedom and necessity may be cases of necessitation from the above-named influences, and so may be hastily held to decide the question. The observation of an inquirer may rest mainly upon volitions of this class; and so he may fall under the impression that *life is ruled by necessity*. The true ascertainment of the sorts of choices that are hemmed in by objective limitation, may serve as the proper guard against these heedless generalizations.

Maxims volitionally adopted.

Great extent of unfreedom.

Inconclusive test cases.

Thus, if we have rightly traced the process, is constituted CHARACTER. Upon a basis of corporeal, physiological and mental nature, are overlaid a primary superstratum of dispositions blending the native and the volitional, and a secondary formation of generic purposes wholly volitional, and formed by repetition into a tertiary of habits; and thus we have in his mingled constitution of necessitation and freedom an agent prepared for daily free responsible action. The question arises not only how far this *character* is *necessitated*, but how far it is *necessitative*. How far is the *character* a fixed antecedent, limiting and unipotently excluding all but a sole volitional resultancy.

Is "character" necessitative?

At start we may repudiate all such one-sided and extravagant statements on this subject as the following from the Princeton Essays: "All will doubtless admit that, although the natural faculty of Will exerts the choice, the direction of that choice under given outward motives is determined not by the bare natural faculty, but by its moral state. Thus the faculty of the will equally in good and bad men exerts their volitions; but their moral goodness or badness determines the direction and quality of those choices."—P. 255. If this indeed be true, then all the actions of a holy being must be necessarily holy. How, then, the first holy angels sinned, how the first Adam fell, how the second Adam was really tempted, how a holy universe originated transgression, it would puzzle the Essayist to tell. If his doctrine be true, the sinful being must as necessarily emit sin as the charcoal emits its black shade; and the holy being must as necessarily shed holy effect as the diamond radiates the bright beam. All moral change for either good or evil in the finite agent must be by reconstruction from an arbitrary interposing omnipotence. From the omnipotent first cause all secondary causes must receive the necessitating causation of their good or evil effects. Evil as well as

Then change impossible.

good finds from this awful doctrine the primordial, necessitating, intentional cause in God. And yet, contradictorily, this is impossible; for God, being holy, can cause nothing unholy, and so no sin can exist.

In the first place, large admissions may be readily made in favor of the actual power of the past over our present actions, as well as over the permanent nature of our future action. It may be, so far as it extends, a real causation, sometimes a necessitation, limiting the free futurity. Or it forms a basis of probable, often of reliable but not apodictical calculation. Our every-day life in its details is more or less voluntarily and volitionally surrendered over to its influence.

1. A CHARACTER may be formed with a mind so wholly circumscribed within a circle of sensual feelings and conceptions, selfish and corrupt maxims, sordid purposes and habits, that the complete inventory of the thoughts is depraved, and no honorable or truly ethical volition is within the catalogue of possibilities. Of *such* a character it may be said, without our being obliged to define whether it be a case of necessity or reliable certainty, that he *cannot* will nobly or rightly. On the other hand, another *character* may be formed, by a noble course of self-education, by the continual rejection of the sensual, selfish, and sordid, and the constant adoption of the honorable, the intellectual, the just, and the independent; so that, finally, everything mean or depraved is spontaneously rejected, the motivity of its presented alternative being impossible, or repelled by mental exclusion; and the man's admirers shall say with possible truth that it is impossible that he should have descended to a particular vile action. These are cases of reliable probability, possibly of necessity.

Comparatively few, however, in all probability, of these are cases of unequivocal necessity; few or none perhaps there are of whom such an impossibility can be affirmed in regard to every form of excellence or unworthiness.

Even the very permanence of the constitutional base, both on the worthy and the unworthy side, secures to a very great degree the power of motivity in opposite alternatives, and maintains a foundation for a reversal of generic determinations, of life-laid plans, and long indulged habits.

There is plentifully in the history of free agents such a thing as "*acting out of character.*" There is often the action, great or small, which reverses the record of a life, or a protracted course of action. He who well watches his neighbor, however blind he ^{volitional self-contradictions.} may be to his own practical self-contradictions, is sure to find, even in the life most even in its great outline, plenty of minor inconsistencies. Or as Müller, in his Doctrine of Sin, well says, that both our observation and our subject's temptation may occur just at the moment of one of his great volitional turning points. From the apostacy of the first angels, and the fall of man through the ^{And revolutions.} whole course of human history, we have innumerable instances of revolutionary volitions, not only *out of* the previous character, but shaping a new character. The one disastrous sin of Moses, the one great complicated crime of David, the apostacy of Solomon, the wisest of men, are all proofs how, not only in contrasted traits, but in revolutionary acts, a man may be

The wisest, greatest, meanest of mankind.

2. Cases of apparent necessary action from antecedent character are often solved upon the principle of contradiction. A man can neither be nor do contradictory things at the same moment. He cannot at once maintain and abdicate a given character.

That original thinker, Père Buffier, in his *Traité des Premières Vérités*, supposes the question, *Can a sage enact the mountebank in the public street?* Fenelon had decided it to be a *moral impossibility*; yet defining, in an undertone, this impossibility to be only a *very difficult*

thing which *might* sometimes be done. Père Daniel had decided that from want of motive the thing could not be done by a true sage.

Père Buffier decides that the *man* could play the buffoon, but yet the playing buffoon by a *sage* could never be done. Why? Because the buffoon player Principle of contradiction. *by the very act* is *no sage*. It is the impossibility of incompatibility or contradiction. Whichever side is assumed excludes the other. Ice cannot be melted, for to be at once melted and ice is a contradiction. The carnal heart cannot be subject to the law of God, for the heart when conformed to the law is no longer carnal. Carnality and conformity to holy law are a contradiction. So a perfectly chaste woman cannot be a prostitute; nor a truthful man a liar. And when from long observation of a woman or a man we feel confident of the character, we take, inductively, the affirmative that they are permanently chaste or truthful, and with some generous hyperbole we pronounce in the instances that *she* cannot be immodest, that *he* cannot have grossly lied. It is in this principle of contradiction that terms of power or want of power are extensively used where many have supposed there is only want of willingness. This point we discuss in another place.*

3. From the very nature of this *formed* character we expect the immediately future action to be in accordance with it. And this not because the coming action is necessitatively shaped by the character, but because visibly the character is as the sum total of the actions. Or rather upon a correct view the character is an amalgam of the free volitions and the prevolitional dispositions as contemplated together. When a volition comes unexpected and *out of character* we accept it, Character as the sum of volitions. correct our previous estimate of the man, and add the new fact into the sum total of which his *visible* character is made.

* See p. 263.

But the power to predict action from previous character is often greatly overestimated. Hits of that kind, instead of proving the completeness with which it can be done, prove the very reverse, for it is the extraordinary character of the hit that makes it impressive. The knowledge of the style of action to be expected is usually very generic, and leaves a very broad play for varying particulars. When it is specific it is of some single trait or two which streaks through the action of life. We have a clear idea of a lady's style of motion, even in casting a dice; but how totally we fail to predict what depends upon the character of the motion, the particular throw she will turn up. Of the nearest friends with whom we associate, and whose character of mind, and habits, and peculiarities we best understand, while we can give some general account and make some fair general predictions, yet how utterly will we be at a loss, ordinarily and every hour of the day, to tell what will be the next immediate action, or how they will choose in given circumstances. You cannot conjecture with any confidence, usually, what, with the circumstance before you, will be the words your most familiar friend will next pronounce. You can but very generically predict in the morning what minuter motions, steps, walks your bosom friend will, even in a given set of circumstances, perform during the day. In all life, character, course of action, there is variation ever more widely varying, opening new traits to view, defying all mechanical calculation, and attesting the reality of freedom.

Power to predict overrated.

Our estimates generic.

Impossibilities of prediction.

4. Statistics are cited by necessitarian writers showing that in Paris the amount of crimes, even those crimes which may be especially supposed to depend upon individual peculiarities, is annually nearly equal. This is held by many to be an arithmetical demonstration of the doctrine of volitional necessity. But,

1. It does not appear why this might not as truly be

Individual freedom and aggregate uniformity. the case on the doctrine of freedom as the doctrine of necessity. In the calculations of contingencies, as we have very fully said,* while results of compared large aggregates, in the same conditions, may approach equality, the *contingency of each individual case remains still a contingency*. If our best illustration of the contingencies of freedom is drawn from the laws of Probability, what is more reasonably to be expected than that the most perfect alternativity of individual Will should result in a degree of aggregate uniformity? So, though large aggregates of free volitions, surrounded by the same round of motives, may approach equality, *the freedom of each individual Will remains*.

2. This uniformity of statistics can be true only so long as the aggregate character of the city remains contingently the same. It amounts to this, then, that where the aggregate character remains the same, the number of individual crimes will be about the same; and when the number of individual crimes shall change, the aggregate character will change. That is, the aggregate character is made of individual facts. A city is thus like a stupendous individual, whose stages of development are on as stupendous a comparative scale as its magnitude, but which in its life of centuries within its compass of surrounding influences acts with its full measure of limited freedom. Its free development is partly a sum total of individual freedoms and partly organic in character.

3. But while such statistics show that freedom often operates in the aggregate very much by rule, we are confident there are others which are, or might be kept, which exhibit freedom in its full variations. Accurate Church registers, kept by permanent pastors, show very different numbers of conversions per year. Some seasons surely are remarkable for a much greater religious interest than others. The number of public general prayer-meetings

* See p. 130.

in New York city has greatly differed in different years. Other seasons are specially marked by an extraordinary number of burkings or garrotings. Particular periods occur of specially numerous suicides, or fires, or steam-boat or railroad accidents. If uniformities, thus, prove necessity, these irregularities must equally demonstrate freedom. From all this we conclude that while it is not to be unexpected that freedom should result in great aggregate uniformities, there are ample enough varieties to vindicate the Will from the imputation of necessity.

CHAPTER VI.

DOUBLE VOLITION.

FALLING back upon our first definition that free will is competent to choose either of several objects, each several object stands before the Will, being an object only as invested with the motivity. Therein the Will chooses, by its own one act, either one of the Object, with motivity. several objects, with a stronger probability, perhaps, arising from the motivity of choice for one over another, yet with the full possibility that the counter of that one may be chosen. The freedom lies in the agent in the motive conditions, at the initial spring of the volition; so that the volition is called *free* because it springs from a free cause, that is, a free agent. The particular object chosen receives its prevalence from the "Will makes the motive." Will and by the choice; so that taking the word Motive in the sense of prevalent motive, there is a truth in the maxim that "it is the Will that makes the motive." For though the choice is subsequent to the perception of the eligible or potential motive quality in the object, and may be called an alternative consequent of it, yet it is that subsequent choice itself by which the potential mo-

tive becomes actually prevalent motive, that is, by which a motive becomes *the motive*.

The motive is often an agreeable or otherwise eligible quality in the object chosen. An apple is chosen for its sweetness as motive; a rose for its beauty; a perfume for its fragrance. At other times there is a separate motive-object which invests the object of choice with its motivity. The game is the motive for which the sportsman chooses a gun. Money is the object for which the laborer toils. Yet after all these motive-objects lend their motivity to the choice-object and thereby render it the choice-object. It is the motivity by which the object of volition becomes its object. The motivity is the true object in the object and is really chosen in it. Necessitarians say we choose what we think best; and if so the said *best* is ever both the true motive and object, one and the same. So that ever and always we truly choose the motive when we choose the object, by one and the same act.

These views may refute the imputation by Edwards against a certain freedomist, Mr. Chubb, of really holding that in every volition we first choose the motive for the volition and then we choose the volition. Mr. Chubb holds language like this: "Every man has power to act or to refrain from acting, agreeably with or contrary to any motive that presents." "Every man is at liberty to act, or refrain from acting, agreeably with or contrary to what each of these motives considered singly would excite him to." "Man has power, and is as much at liberty to reject the motive that does prevail, as he has power and is at liberty to reject those motives that do not." These are perspicuous statements of the truth of the matter. But Edwards imputes to them the doctrine that the Will first by one volition chooses the motive to which it will yield, and then by a second volition acts from the motive. Thence would follow not only that each volition is du-

Motive-object
and choice-
object.

Chubb's doc-
trine

Of choice for
or against
motive.

plicate, but that each one of every duplication is also duplicate *ad infinitum*. But,

The eligibility, motivity, or excellence borrowed from the motive-object is or becomes a quality in the object or alternative of volition. It inheres, as quality, and goes to make up the object. Now surely it is very absurd to say that it requires one choice to choose the quality, and another to choose the object. The object with its qualities stands as alternative with others before the Will; and the agent chooses with full power of choice for either. So that Mr. Chubb is correct in saying, "Every man has power to act (volitionally) or to refrain from acting, agreeably with, or contrary to, any motive that presents." And this does not imply that there must be duplicate volitions, the one to choose the motive and the other to choose the object.

CHAPTER VII.

ACTIVITY NO PASSIVITY.

SOME advocates of the doctrine of volitional freedom have made it a part of their argument to maintain that there can be an activity without a passivity. Taking the liberty which every writer has the right to assume of defining his own terms and adhering to his definition, in the present discussion they have limited the terms *act* and *action* to the *exercise of the Will*; and have thence maintained that there is such a thing as action which is no passion, an agent who is not a patient, a mover who is not moved, a doer who is not caused to do.

In reply, Edwards maintains sternly that there can be no agent who is not caused to act, and who so far as caused is not a patient. Every mover is

There may
be agent, no
patient.

Contradicted
by Edwards.

caused to move, and he moves only as he is moved to move. To move and to be moved are but opposite sides of the same thing. There is no *movement* which is not a *being moved*. All agents act as they are caused to act; activity and passivity are inseparable correlatives.

How strict a fatalism this is, and how truly Edwards, who maintains it, is a fatalist, and how his argument excludes not merely the use but the existence of power of counter choice, we need but leave the reader to decide. Every agent and every Will is but a term in a series of inflexible causations; the volitional is as fixed as the material term or unit in the series. The dynamical series is just as rigorously exact, just as absolute a necessity in contradistinction to certainty, in volitional agency as in mechanics or any part of natural and physical forces.

If our view of volitional freedom be true, there is action where there is no passion. There is such a thing as an uncaused causal act. It exists in the Will putting forth its alternative volition. The Will in its proper conditions is a full and complete cause *uncausedly* effectuating the particular volition.* In the particular act, in the putting forth of the volition there is a causative-producing which is itself uncaused by any thing beside or back of Will, and which, as has been shown, the laws of causality do not require to be so caused. A unipotent cause must in its every particular action be caused to put forth that particular effect; but of an alternative cause either one of several particular results may be the effect without any antecedent to cause that alternative cause to produce that particularity. Here, then, is so far an agent not a patient, an activity without a passivity, and that without any harm to the laws of causation.

"And this implies," says Edwards, "that action has no cause and is no effect; for to be an effect implies

* See p. 92.

passiveness, or the being subject to the power and action of its cause." Undoubtedly, the "action" is caused by the agent in bringing it into existence; but the agent is not caused to bring it into existence. The action, indeed, as the receiver of existence, as the abstract fact produced, is necessitated to undergo the agent's causation and come into being. But the agent is patient to no anterior cause necessitating the bringing the act into existence. There is an agent no patient.

The agent no patient.

This "notion of action," Edwards continues, "implies that it has no necessary dependence or connection with anything foregoing; for such a dependence excludes contingency and implies necessity." Undoubtedly, the *act* or deed is dependent on the *agent* for its existence. As a condition to the fact's existence, the factor's existence is *necessary*; in the sense, however, of *requisite*. The *deed* could not exist without the *doer*, or the *volition* without the *willer*. But this proves, not conversely, that the agent could not exist without the volition, the potential factor without that particular fact. Nor does it touch the question whether the agent, putting forth the particular volition, may not be a cause uncausedly producing effect, and so may not be an agent no patient.

Act depends on actor.

But not actor on act.

The final argument of Edwards on this point, that freedomists require that free choice must be put forth by previous free choice, comes under his old fallacy of the infinite series. His argument here is in form of a dilemma. Free choice must be chosen by free choice, and that is infinite series; or the mind is made subject of free choice without any free choice in the matter, and that is necessity. Very well. It then follows, and this is all that follows, that the agent is necessarily a free agent. For, to be the subject of free choice, is to be a free agent; to be so without any previous free choice of our own is to be necessarily a free agent. But that proves not that the free choice

Free choice from free choice.

itself is in its particularity necessitated. It still leaves us an agent, no patient. There is a free cause which causes a particularity without being caused to cause it and without needing any cause of its causing.

The acts of a free agent are, therefore, not a fixed term in a necessary series. They are not in the line of fixed nature. They are not, like a mechanical operation, *a moving as moved*. Inevitable forces do not rule all things; necessity is not master of the universe; fatalism is not lord of God and man.

From what has been said above it may appear that there is some difference between saying that the Will *acts on account of a motive*, and saying that *the Will is governed by the motive*. Govern-
On account of motive. ment, just so far as it goes, implies limitation, control by causation, non-existence of power but to a fixation. It implies in the Will passivity without proper activity; that the activity is only passivity, caused motion rather than free action. No doubt limitative causation (and so irresponsibility) rules the main part of our nature. But just where is the alternative action of Will the limitative force approaches but does not touch. The Will freely *acts on account of* the motive but is *not governed by* it.

CHAPTER VIII.

DETERMINATION FROM INDETERMINATION.

FROM our definition of freedom of the Will, that it is the power of choosing either of several alternatives, it will follow that before the putting forth of the given
Indeterminate state. volition there is a state, during a longer or shorter period, of deliberation, balance, or equilibrium. This state may last but an indivisible instant, and terminates at the initial point of the volition. The

commencement of the volition is the close of the indetermination. In this case, as in all other cases of cause and effect, the effect goes forth, or rather is put forth, in a manner not to be explained, from a quiescent cause.

This state of indetermination of the Will has been called *indifference*, and hence the phrase, *liberty of indifference*; but as it is the act of volition which terminates the balance and creates the difference, the state previous to the volition may truly be called a state of volitional non-difference rather than indifference. The non-difference is not in the prevolitional faculties, but in the will. But inasmuch as at the *present* day the term indifference is exclusively applied to the feelings or prevolitional operations its use is likely to mislead. The so-called liberty of indifference is the liberty of a will existing in such a state of previous indetermination as that it possesses full conscious power to choose either of several ways.

Of "Indifference," so called.

Improperly at the present day.

This non-differentiation of the Will anterior to the given action, and while it is quiescent as to the particular volition, is perfectly consistent with the abundant existence of differentiations in the prevolitional mental elements. In the intellect, conscience, emotions, desires, there may coexist plenty of inclinations, predispositions, tendencies, preponderances, and preferences, either way or both ways. All these might exist and fluctuate with terrible energy *without the existence of even the faculty of the Will in the soul*.

Does not exclude prevolitional predispositions.

This statement of the coexistence of prevolitional preferences with a non-differentiation in the Will, will solve at once much of the necessitarian verbal argumentation in which the term "inclination" is made to play an ambiguous part. Thus the Princeton Essayist says, "For if the Will be in a condition by which it is fitted or liable to turn either way, then it cannot be already inclined by a preponderating bias in one direction: for

this is but saying that it chooses the contrary of its own preference." "Inclination," we reply, may be either volitional or prevolitional. In the latter case it is fully

Hence neces- consistent, and may be coexistent with a "con-
sitarian fal- dition" of the Will's being able "to turn either
lacies re- way."
futed.

If by "a preponderating bias in one direction" is meant what we have elsewhere called a permanent state of purpose into which the agent has been resolved by a previous volition, then, as has been explained, that purpose or "bias" simply constitutes a *motive*, which will come into view when the question of change at any time rises before the Will. The change of such a "bias" is an ordinary occurrence in the operations of the human mind. It is a choosing by the agent of "the contrary of its own preferences" previously existing. True it is, the Will cannot choose the contrary of its own volition; for a volition proper is an instantane-

Change of "bias." neous act, and such choosing the contrary would imply the coexistence of contradictory volitions. But the moment the volition has passed, having placed the mind in a state of determinate *purpose*, such purpose, as above said, becomes simply a motive against change by the Will, and not a necessitative exclusion of change.

The inclusion by Edwards of all our active sensibilities under Will betrays him into the conjuring up of imaginary contradictions, such as (p. 100) "to prefer contrary to its own preference, or choose contrary to its own choice;" "to prefer and not to prefer at the same time, or to choose contrary to its own present choice." That such contrarieties do coexist in the mind we trust has been amply and satisfactorily shown.

In his chapter upon Liberty of Indifference, Edwards makes the following points: 1. He assumes that the "Indifference" preceding the volition is a self-balanced inertness, a dead-lock, a complete blocking of the whole being; from it, therefore, he argues that no action can

take origin. 2. This indifference must be not partial, but total and absolute; so that no action to produce volition can co-exist with it. 3. He assumes the necessity of producing volition by a previous producing act, which must, by self-contradiction, be put forth within the stagnant indifference. 4. The freedom=indifference and the volition must coexist; which is a further contradiction.

Edwards's
points on
Indiffer-
ence."

1. Upon the first of these points we remark that the Will, or the volitional agent, is not a powerless, indifferent, inert substance, in perfect stagnation; but a full, free, complete and adequate causal power, in the proper conditions for the alternatives before it. It is not a state of powerlessness, but the seat of primordial power, the type whence, perhaps, our primitive idea of power is obtained. We know nothing of power except as the basis and source of action. Wherever we see the action, or by experience recognize the antecedents of action, unipotent or alternative, or by consciousness recognize the sense of the interior causal capacity for action, we locate the power. Before action that power is in apparent repose. Before the flash, at the contact of the powder and spark, there is the instant of indifference, but from this indifference the action takes its causal origin. Yet in this equilibrated instant the powder plus the spark are a full, complete, adequate, unipotent cause of a sole effect, just as the agent in his proper equilibrated conditions is a full, complete, adequate, alternative cause of either of several effects. There is no more inertness, or powerlessness, or mystery in the one case than in the other. The assumptions of Edwards would prove that the repose of even physical cause could never awake. Cause would forever cease to go forth, the universe of things would stand still, and activity would forever die out.

Undecided
mind is a
fountain of
power.

Power exists
before ac-
tion.

2. To the full existence of equilibrated freedom, it is not

necessary, as Edwards claims, that a complete expurgation should be made of all preferential, prevolitional feelings, views, or motivities. It simply implies, as we have already shown, that anterior to the choice the Will is, in its proper conditions, an agent or power in an indeterminate state, and that the determination or particular volition takes origin from this previous state, just as all causational action takes origin from a previous inaction—inaction, that is, as to that particularity. If there exist previous preferential feelings, or previous predeterminations or prepossessions, these do not destroy the liberty of the ensuing volition. They are not contradictory of the “indifference,” or deliberative equilibrial state of the Will previous to the action. They only constitute motive influences in favor of some one of the alternatives or other, and these influences are simply among the conditions of volitional action. And these motive influences do not impair the liberty; they only constitute a probability that the Will will act in accordance with them; yet the higher probability may be rejected. They simply increase the number of motives. Between acting in accordance or against them, there is still a freedom of the Will.

3. The old sophism that a preceding volition is necessary to produce a free volition here recurs. Edwards requires that “the Will, while it remains in perfect equilibrium, without preference, determines to change itself, and excite in itself a certain choice or preference.” No will to will. The agent, we reply, in view, it may be, of a variety of preferences, before it has decided, and is yet “in equilibrium,” does (not “determine to change itself,” “excite itself,” etc., but) in full power for either volition, puts forth one of the volitions which are in power. The equilibrium in the order of nature precedes the volition, the indecision precedes the decision, the indetermination precedes the determination, just as the quiescence of cause precedes the effectuation. The volition then put

forth is not a determination, previously, to change itself, but is itself a change; the *change* and the *volition* upon its object being the same. Nor is the non-differentiation of Will before volition a stagnant idiocy or unconcern in regard to the alternatives. Edwards argues copiously that such indifference cannot even "begin" to act so as to originate volition. The deliberative mind is able to "begin action." If such "indifference" be indeed a dead impotent stagnation, such an argument would be conclusive. But the case is that of *power*. It is simply the condition of an agent before action in whom resides the element of power of or for action. That so-called "indifference" is simply the equipotence for action in either of several directions. How absurd to say that an agent in whom exists the power for action cannot act or "begin" to act! That the Will does in presence of alternatives, and in this state of so-called "indifference," or weighing of alternatives, possess full power for action, is a matter of universal consciousness.

4. Nor will necessitarianism gain much from this notable axiom—"every act of freedom is done in a state of freedom, and not only after such a state." "It will not suffice, that the act immediately follows a state of liberty; but liberty must continue and exist with the act." That is, as Edwards maintains, inasmuch as Arminian liberty consists in "indifference," therefore choice and indifference=freedom, preference and non-preference, volition and non-volition, by the Arminian hypothesis, must exist at the same moment; which is a contradiction. "How ridiculous would it be for anybody to insist that the soul chooses one thing before the other when at the same instant it is perfectly indifferent with respect to each."—P. 103.

Now these things "are very inconsiderately spoken." The doctrine of free Will doubtless requires that the volition should spring from a power capable at the point of choice of either alternative choice. But it does not

require that freedom to an act should exist after the act itself exists. Freedom from the act is out of the question after the act has taken place. Freedom in regard to the act, or any infinitesimal part of an act, already existing, to cause it never to have existed, is not claimed. It is not required, as it is impossible, that the deed already done, or so far as done, could be rendered not done, or the fact be made to be no fact. The completed and past act is out of power. But that does not disprove that such act is a fact, now and forever, which was *produced by an alternative Will and* in that proper sense *a free act*. Yet although the existent act is no longer in power, freedom still remains as the quality of the Will; which Will is still the antecedent, whence may spring continuous free-volitions.

The volition by the very definition of freedom is called a free volition because it receives existence from an alternative cause, namely, the free-agent. The freedom lies in the cause, not so properly in the effect. To its being a free volition, it is not necessary, by any definition, or any view of freedom that such cause be able to render it, so far as it exists, not done. It may change it anew, but cannot render it never having been done. Yet the soul was *free in its antecedency*; and is still free, not to the destruction of the existent, but to the alternative causation of the still non-existent.

It is not true, therefore, that the freedom to a particular act in the order of nature coexists with that act; nor does the doctrine of freedom so require. Cause and its particular effect cannot coexist. In the order of nature the commencement of effect is the cessation of cause. The moment an infinitesimal part or point of effect exists, its infinitesimal point or amount of cause, as cause, has ceased to exist. The object which caused may exist, but no longer as cause. All cause expires in child-birth; but the fact that the effect has once come into existence is indestructible. And so

Causation
and effect
not coexist-
ent.

doubtless a free cause IN THE ORDER OF NATURE, precedes its effect; and as a cause and as a free cause, in regard to the particular effect produced, namely, the particular infinitesimal part or point of effect which may be produced, it is no longer a cause or a free-cause; and so far as produced, the effect is out of power. The freedom to that act lasts so long as the causality lasts, and no longer. And so the free-cause as such, in regard to that particular effect, is no longer a free-cause; it does not coexist with the effect. And if the axiom of Edwards that "every act of freedom is done in a state of freedom," means that causality coexists with effect, or that the free causation does not precede but coexists with the freely produced effect, it is a sophism and not an axiom.

Free causation precedes free act.

And yet this does not disprove that the cause in the production was free; nor that it still remains a like cause for future free production; the cause always antecedent the effect of which it is the free producer.

None the less freedom.

Surely it is not a strange or abstruse idea that the causing of the deed precedes the deed instead of coexisting with it; or that the doer could at the point of choice choose or not choose; or that the choice once made, even though withdrawn or changed, remains *as a fact*, forever a fact; or that all this is consistent with the freedom of the doer in that choice, or its still permanent freedom for all future choices.

We conclude by calling attention to the fact that the argument of Edwards if it be valid proves not any mere *certainty* of the volitional event different from necessity, but it proves necessity itself. That is, he proves not the *non-usance* but the *non-existence* of any power of different volition or contrary choice. Edwards can affirm that his necessity is certainty only because his certainty is necessity.

Not certainty, but necessity.

CHAPTER IX.

CHOICE BETWEEN EQUAL ALTERNATIVES.

ALTERNATIVES may be before the mind so equally eligible that, so far as consciousness may be judge, the Will decides *without motive* upon its object.

In anticipation, however, necessitarians meet these instances by affirming, *first*, that they cannot be genuine cases because there *can* be no volition without motive; *second*, volitions without motive can possess no moral character; and *third*, the cases are of so trifling a character as to be inconsequential in the argument.

The FIRST of these affirmations, though the most influential upon the minds of men, of course takes the conclusion for granted, and proves itself by itself. The whole of this treatise is our entire reply.

SECOND, that motiveless actions can have no moral character has been too lightly conceded by the advocates of free will. For a person guilty of repeated profanity, or theft, or murder, it would be no defense that the crime was without motive. Indeed, motiveless crimes and sins may be many times altogether aggravated by the very fact that they are motiveless. If the slightest act of sin is an infinite sin, as Edwards holds, then an infinite sin may be committed supposably without a motive.

THIRD, the minuteness of the action by no means diminishes the importance as a test experiment. The experiment decides, so far forth as the decision of consciousness is clear, that volitional cause is different from any cause in material dynamics. Natural philosophy knows no cause which can act either way in face of an equilibrium. The minutest successful experiment proves the whole doctrine of volitional freedom.

The ability of the Will to choose in equilibrial alternatives establishes the reality of that point of freedom which Mr. Locke and others find in the power of *volitional suspension*. The Will, say they, often meets alternatives before which it is not necessitated at the instant to decide, but may hold the mind in an indeterminate state; which is doubtless true. But, replies Edwards, in this there can be no freedom; for this *holding* the mind in suspense is an *act*, and for the act there must be the motive. But, we reply, if the Will can in any case act by intrinsic power without motive, however minute the case, or however strong the probabilities against it, the reply of Edwards is invalid, and there lies a freedom in this power of *volitional suspension*. Volitional suspension.

Each for himself must decide the case. So far as my consciousness can decide, after I have been induced by motives to engage myself in the experiment, I make movements for which the nicest observations of consciousness can detect no motive. Having purposed to move one of my fingers, I detect no motive for the particular one moved. I close both eyes, and can open one of them without motive for either. Pointing my finger over the center of a chess-board, I touch without any individualizing motive a particular square. I pronounce names, John, or Thomas, or Samuel, without any motive for the priority of either. I perform these experiments guarding against all the causes of preference suggested by either the Elder or Younger Edwards, and with a clear result. And so far as this is a clear result it is a decisive result; decisive of the whole question. For if any, the slightest, volition ever took place without the impellency of motives, necessitarianism is a false system. The experiment.

And in our individual practical history how infinitesimal are the beginnings which involve in the long run even infinite consequences. How slight and often motiveless the acts which give a new Importance of even motiveless actions.

turn to our career and a new complexion to our destiny. Nay, the slightest and most motiveless act may produce effects upon the history of nations and change the face of the world.

There are, however, two kinds of equilibrial case. One is, as we have already discussed, where the two or Two kinds of motiveless acts. more sides are equal because *equally valueless*; the other is where both sides have a value and, so far as the prevolitional faculties are concerned, an *equal value*. It is not to be inferred that because the motives are balanced and no superior strength stands on either side that the importance of the opposite interests is therefore infinitely small. On the contrary, the most momentous value may belong to each. Momentous balances. For aught we know the opposite motives before the mind of Eve may have been subjectively equilibrial, and thus the moral destiny of the entire race may have been decided by a volitional act which was by cancellation without a motive. Cesar paused at the Rubicon; motives of stupendous magnitude held the scales even; perhaps it was Will that decided. So God is conceived as deciding between two undifferenced points of space by Will.

A theory of equilibrial freedom, called "liberty of indifference," is propounded by Archbishop King King's theory. with much ability and at full extent in his "Origin of Evil." It limits freedom to that class of volitions which the mind puts forth, without any preponderating motive on either side; but maintains that consequent upon the volition the thing chosen becomes agreeable, and is fully and permanently accepted because it is chosen. While in a large class of cases the desires and appetites precede, induce, and determine the Will, in other cases the Will precedes, and the fixing of the appetencies upon it follows. Not only are things chosen because they are first agreeable, but things are often agreeable because they are previously chosen. And,

thus, a choice without any previous motive, and so perfectly free, creates a permanent motivity in the thing chosen, whereby the consistency of the man is maintained, and he becomes a free creator of agreeableness in objects and happiness to himself.

There are some inconsistencies and crudeness, both of thought and expression, in the details of the archbishop's system.

He made but an incomplete approximation to an accurate expression of the true view when he said that "things are loved because they are chosen." Doubtless this is sometimes, though not uniformly, the truth. But the real fact ordinarily is that the volition determines the mental position. It settles the question of preference between alternatives, dismisses the counter motives from view, and closes the debate. Opposing inclinations, desires, inducements, and feelings of obligation disappear, and that preference to which the Will gives predominance becomes sole and settled master. The Will passes the mind on to new objects and the discussion of new alternatives. Meanwhile it adds a new Adherence of Will to choice. and irrevocable fact to the history; perhaps contracts a new responsibility; and often gives a new change to the entire destiny. Whether the choice has been for a higher or a lower motive, in favor of its moral interests or of its sensual propensities, a self-commitment may have been made which will lead to incalculable results.

The appetencies and affections usually do form around even the object chosen at first with little or no Appetencies confirming it. motive; and there is no want of verifications of the maxim that "things are loved because they have been chosen."

CHAPTER X.

EQUALITY OF DIVINE MOTIVES.

NECESSITARIANS are obliged by the nature of their argument to apply the assertions of necessity to mind as mind, to Will as Will, to cause as cause, whether finite or infinite. This very boldness enables us to adduce an instance of equilibrical choice of a character so pure and perfect as to give it the nature of a demonstration.

Pure infinite space is everywhere perfectly and absolutely alike. Before creation of any *body* or *substance*, there is nothing in one *where* to afford any motive for preference over *everywhere* or *anywhere* else. It is impossible, then, for a motive to be offered *here* for the placing a world or a universe rather than *elsewhere*. No place or point can therefore be selected, and no universe can be created, because it cannot be located. The same argument applied to the absolute similarity of all points of time would prove the impossibility that the world could be created *ever*.

This argument assumes the doctrine of Sir Isaac Newton, that the universe is finite. Leibnitz denied this upon grounds now altogether exploded, though he admitted the possibility or power in God to create a finite universe. Dr. Clarke conclusively replied that the very admission that God could create a finite universe is full concession that the universe might be established in particular space without particular motive.

In his reply to the arguments of Samuel Clarke and others in behalf of the freedom of the Divine Will, drawn from the equality of different spaces, times, and objects, Edwards maintains that there is a contradiction in the very terms; for things between which there is no difference, whether spaces, times, or objects, are absolutely the same; so that to speak of a choice between them is

absurd. He thereupon institutes an elaborate argument in which he makes the following points:

I. He confounds *resemblance* with *identity*; he confounds difference and sameness in point of *resemblance* with difference and sameness in point of *identity*. He invalidates all essential self-identity or individualization in any given unit.

II. He reduces infinite time and space to mere conditions of body.

III. He confounds the abstract qualities of bodies with the *bodies* themselves and their individual *realities*.

IV. He supposes a false analogy between body and sound.

To all these we offer what we trust are satisfactory replies:

I. There is one sort of *difference* between objects in respect of resemblance, and another sort of difference in respect to intrinsic identity; and these are two different senses of the word *difference*, which, unless we would confound things by words, must be kept separate and distinct. The word *same* also is still more ambiguous. We call individuals of the same class Difference
and same-
ness. or species the *same*; which is a *specific sameness*, as, *e. g.*, all human nature is the *same*. We call a successional aggregate, which is continually changing its constituents, the *same*; as a *river* whose waves are perpetually different is the *same* river; or the human body, though its particles are perpetually substituted; and this is a *historical sameness*. Two individuals, more or less alike, we call the *same*; and the resembling qualities of two bodies we call the *same*, which is the sameness of *resemblance*. But all these are secondary or transferred meanings. The strict essential meaning of sameness, or identity of an individual, is its essential separate selfhood, by which it is not and cannot be identical with any other thing, but must be itself and nothing else.

Though the word *same* or *sameness* is applied to both, yet *resemblance* and *identity* are essentially two very different things. Increase of *resemblance* is no approximation to *identity*. Things most perfectly *like* are no more *identical* than things most perfectly unlike. Suppose I have in my right hand an ivory ball, and in my left an iron cube; it is at once seen that the two have little *resemblance* and no *identity*. Suppose by power of will I could transform the iron cube to an iron ball of precisely similar size and roundness with the ivory. The two are no nearer *identity* than before, though far less different in point of *resemblance*. Increase of resemblance, diminution of difference in point of resemblance, then, is no ap-
 Perfect re-
 semblance
 not identity. proximation to identity. Let a second dictum of Will transmute the iron ball into ivory. The resemblance, then, becomes absolutely perfect; the non-identity remains just as absolutely perfect. No change of position could affect their respective identities. If my hands should mutually exchange them, their reciprocal position would be changed, but not their intrinsic identity. Each hand has a different ball in possession from what it had before; different in identity, but absolutely alike in resemblance; and just as different in identity as if there were no likeness in resemblance. Let there be a million such ivory balls, perfectly like, flung in perfect disorder through the sky, and of not one of them would the identity be changed. Unless we allow the confusion, which doubtless would reign in our perceptions at the sight, to disturb our minds, we shall see that although the whole million have no difference in point of resemblance, yet their individual identities are just as distinct and changeless as if there were no resemblance at all.

When Edwards asks, therefore, of two different bodies perfectly alike, "If they are absolutely *without difference*, then how are they different objects of choice?" the mere play upon words becomes transparent. They are "*with-*

out *difference*" of resemblance; they are with *difference* in identity. They are perfectly alike, they are absolutely non-identical. No exchanges, nor Edwards's quibbles. legerdemain, nor confusions of our perception of them, can ever render them not different in identity. And when Edwards adds, "If there be absolutely no difference in any respect," (we do not say there is "no difference in *any* respect;" we say only there is no difference in the one respect of resemblance,) "then there is no *variety* or *distinction*;" we reply, certainly there is both variety and distinction in point of identity. And further, "If there be no variety among proposed objects of choice, then there is no opportunity for variety of choice or difference of determination." There is, we reply, a variety of objects of choice, namely, a variety of intrinsic, inexchangeable identities, which perfectly resemble. And it is the absence of difference of resemblance between the different objects which renders it an exact case of choice for one or other without specialty of motive.

And, again, when Edwards gravely tells us, "Two different bodies are not different or distinct in any other respects than those wherein they differ; they are two in no other respects than those wherein there is a difference," the remark is neither profound nor pertinent. We grant that bodies are different in just those respects in which they are different, for that which is, is. But that does not show that bodies may not be without difference in point of resemblance and yet with absolute difference in point of identity. "If they are perfectly alike in themselves, then"—then what? Then they completely resemble in themselves, but are none the more identical with each other in themselves. "For it is difference only that constitutes distinction." A truism; difference in resemblance constitutes one distinction; difference in identity another.

The freedomist proposes the case: Let there be two different objects perfectly alike, and the choice of either

Verbal argu- must be without motive. For the necessitarian
ment, to reply if they are perfectly like and there is
no *difference*, then there is no *variety* of objects, and so
no two or more alternatives to choose from, and there-
fore the choice is the same, is no reasoning at all. It is
play upon words.

II. The freedomist again argues that all space being
perfectly similar, though with an infinite variety of iden-
tity, there can be no motive for the selection of one point
or portion of space for a creation than another, and hence
neither choice nor creation.

In reply, Edwards denies the existence, beyond the
limits of creation, of space, of infinite length, breadth,
Measurable and depth, truly and properly distinguished
pure space. into different measurable parts. He denies at
some length the division of immensity into "miles and
leagues" and "sorts of measures." The absurdity of
measuring immensity by miles and the absurdity of
measuring eternity by years he thinks to be equal.

In reply we might ask, Would not an infinite number
of years be eternity? If so, then eternity can be con-
ceived divisibly, as an infinite number of years,
And time. just as well as undividedly, as an endless time.
An infinite number of years would be endless time; end-
less time would amount to an infinite number of years.
If an *infinite number of years* and *eternity* be not equal
and one thing, which is the longer and which the
shorter?

Space is affirmed by the human reason as being external
to the self, and as that in which all body must neces-
sarily be. It is held necessarily to *be*; for if
Analysis of space. in thought you abstract from it all body, space
is still left; and if you attempt to abstract space, space
will not undergo abstraction, but remains. Space is con-
ceived as infinitely extended. For you can in thought
fill it with infinite body; it will then no longer be void
space, but occupied space. The extension of the space

is thereby measured by the extension of the body, and proved to be infinite. If the body then be removed, there then remains an infinitely extended vacuity, an infinitely extended capacity, from which all body, substance, or thing, is absent. Space is, but space can scarcely be said to exist; it is reality, and yet it is the boundless absence of all substance, an infinitely extended nonentity. And because it is nonentity, it is vacuity, and receptive capacity for something.

We do indeed feel in our own efforts at thought the need of some regulative object from which to calculate directions and distances, in order to ^{Need of regulative object.} determine any particular place in infinite space. When we attempt to identify a point in infinitely pure space, the impression is apt to arise that it is all "the same;" and we forget ourselves and reduce infinite space to a sole point, annihilating, by mental withdrawal, all other space. We forget that this "*sameness*" is such only in point of perfect *resemblance*, and that our very phrase "immensity of space" is an assertion of boundless *variety* in point of identity and reality. Were infinite space conceived as filled with an infinite system of stars, then infinite space would be commensurated with an infinite orrery—the infinite by the infinite. Each star would be in its own place and not in another. If, then, every star but one be blotted out and all other space be left pure, that other pure space still exists; and all the points once occupied, though unmarked and pure of all trace, as if no substance had ever been there, still exist as truly as if the orbs were still there. Blot out that last star, and then, though there is nothing left but pure void infinite space, yet its infinitely extended capacity remains, and all the places and points once occupied remain. But those places and ^{Points in infinity.} points were not created or intrinsically differentiated by the orbs. All we have gained from them is aid to our thought. The places and points

in the infinite sameness of resemblance but variety of reality, of immensity of space, are conceivable different places and points of capacity for occupancy by substance. One place in infinite pure space is not another place; one point is not another point. Immensity of space is an infinity of singly measurable *places*, which, if occupied, immensity of space is filled by equal immensity of occupancy.

We could not in that case speak, in Edwards's phrase, of "milesquares of Deity." But as a cubic mile of body can fill and measure a mile square of space, so by mental withdrawal of the body we should have a cubic mile of space remaining.

If all this is true, then anterior to all creation there would be in infinite space an infinite variety of determinable spaces, either of which could be occupied by body, but no one of which presents any difference from any other, rendering it preferable for the occupancy of any particular body. And if no one could be selected by the placer's Will without some superior eligibility over all others, then the Will would be held in immovable equilibrium, and the occupancy of any point be infinitely impossible. We therefore do know "what we mean if we say the world might have been differently placed from what it is in the broad expanse of infinity."—Edwards on the Will, p. 338.

The above exposition of space will facilitate the true view of *time*. We do not, indeed, know what Edwards means by saying that eternity, the "eternity of God's existence," for instance, is his "possession of the whole of his unlimited life, together and *at once*." We can no more conceive how eternity can be condensed to an instant than how immensity can be condensed to a point. If time, as Professor Hickok remarks, presents itself to all minds as a river flowing equally from an infinitely distant source, creation is

No prefer-
able differ-
ence of
points.

Points of
time

necessarily conceivable as fixable at a point higher or higher up the stream. The world may be conceived as created at sixty centuries ago; or it may, if geology can ascertain a precise chronometry, be at sixty billions or octillions of centuries ago; or, transcending all point, matter may be held eternal. All re-^{Without preferableness.} quired by the freedomist is the conception that of the beginningless stream there are higher or higher points really conceivable, between which, as time is ever alike, there must be a selection without a determining motive.

III. Having exhausted his logical double-entendres on the words *different* and *same*, as applied to things, Edwards expends a few in application to the *qualities* of things. Of two perfectly similar particles or atoms he tells us, "The figure is the same, the measure is the same, the solidity and resistance are the same, and everything the same but only the place." We may here, by the way, ask why, by Edwards's reasoning, is not "the place" "the same?" In that, as in every respect specified, the sameness is merely sameness of resemblance; and surely one space is as much another space as one quality is another quality. The so-called sameness of qualities in different bodies is what we have above defined as specific sameness, namely, that resemblance in the qualities of different objects by which we are able to classify them into species. One body's quality, however like, is no more identical with another body's quality than one man's headache, however similar, is identical with another man's headache. No absolute resemblance of qualities in two different bodies—much less of the substratal bodies themselves—even approximates to an identity. As the bodies are for their resemblance none the more identical, so the qualities are for their resemblance none the more identical than if they had been a contrary sort of qualities.

Edwards puts the case: "Supposing that God in the

Why that sphere? beginning had created but one perfectly solid sphere in a certain place, and it should be inquired, Why God created that individual sphere in that place at that time? and why did he not create another sphere perfectly like it, but numerically different, in the same place, at the same time?" we reply that to answer these "whys" is to assign a motive for creating the particular sphere, which is the very thing, we argue, cannot be assigned. But if the question be *whether* God could have created a perfectly similar other sphere instead, or either one of an infinity of similar other spheres instead, we answer promptly, Yes. And not one of those spheres will be another any more than if they all were of different shapes, colors, and substances.

IV. Edwards next argues that it would be just as rational to ask why a given sound is not by the Different like sounds. Almighty supplanted by another sound precisely similar. And he argues that as a perfectly similar sound substituted would be the *same* sound, so a perfectly similar body substituted would be the same body.

The cases, we reply, are not analogous. It is by the Not analogous. circumstances in the case that the self-sameness of the *sound* is constituted. It is of the sameness of time, place, material air, impulse, atmospheric motion, sensation, and quality that the sound is what it is. Change either of these and the sound is no longer the same. These being the same the sound could not in the nature of things be replaced with another sound precisely similar by any power, even omnipotence. Self-sameness consisting in circumstances. It is of these that the intrinsic nature and individualization of the sound is made up; and the self-sameness of these is the self-sameness of the sound, which, therefore, cannot be exchanged with or replaced by another.

Dr. Clarke's conclusions, then, remain untouched by

the logic of Edwards. All space is perfectly alike; all spaces are different identities. Their different identity creates a plurality of objects of choice; their perfect likeness excludes any superiority of motive. A particular space, therefore, cannot, according to necessity, be selected for creation, and creation is therefore impossible.

CHAPTER XI.

USELESS MODIFICATIONS OF NECESSITY.

NECESSITATION, so far forth as it exists, and Responsibility, are incompatible. No matter as to this incompatibility what 1. The SOURCE, 2. The MODE, 3. The POINT or part of our being necessitated, or 4. The RESULT. Necessity (not self-superinduced) and responsibility cannot cover the same ground. They cannot coexist; but just so far as one exists it excludes the other. This essential incompatibility is in the nature of things unchangeable and indestructible by any power, even Omnipotence.

1. THE SOURCE. Whether the source or cause of this necessitation be infinite or finite, God or second causes, a physical or an inalternative motive force, the non-freedom is the same. A finite cause excludes the contrary power, and an infinite cause can do no more than exclude it.* By either cause there is equally only the freedom of the clock-hammer, *to* but not *from*. If one non-freedom excludes responsibility so does the other.

2. THE MODE. Whether by *creation*, by secondary causation, by birth, by in-formation, or by insertion, necessitation is equally exclusive of freedom, and so of responsibility. A necessity formed within me, or put

* See p. 42.

into me, is no more a non-freedom than a necessity imposed upon or intrinsic in my nature.

3. THE POINT. Whether the point or part of my being upon which the necessitation is imposed be mind or body, intellect, sensation, or Will, the necessitated action of that part or faculty—so necessitated as to be inalterative to the agent—is irresponsible. A necessitation upon Will to volitionate, upon the muscle to act, upon the intellect to perceive, are alike irresponsible. It is absurd to say that a volition is responsible purely because it is a volition and not something else.

4. THE RESULT. Whether the result necessitated to exist be a volition, a nature, a state, a condition, or an action of body or mind, it is in either case equally unfree and irresponsible.

Dr. Emmons heroically maintained that we are free and responsible even though our evil volition were created and put into us. Dr. Shedd rejects These evasions equally useless. that absurdity, but maintains that we are responsible, even though our sin be a necessitated *nature*. Dr. Pond rejects our responsibility for a nature, and boasts that he places our responsibility not in nature but in action. Professor Lyall abjures necessity from causation, but places responsibility in intrinsic spontaneous necessity of Will to obey motive.* Dr. N. W. Taylor rejected all these and placed responsibility in a power of willing either way, which, meanwhile, is secured by a Law of Invariability, or intrinsic spontaneity, to be exerted in but one sole way.† All these distinctions are foreclosed by Edwards, who maintains that it matters not to responsibility how we come by our volitions. With Edwards we agree that it matters not how we come by our necessitated volitions,—or our necessitated anything else; all alike and equally are irresponsible. Not one of this list has any ground of boast over venerable Dr. Emmons. That is, the maintainer of responsibility for volition cre-

* See p. 212.

† See p. 220.

ated within us, is no more absurd nor any less justifiable than the maintainer of responsibility for a necessitated nature; or for a necessitated action; or for a spontaneous necessity to obey the given antecedent without existing counter power; or for a spontaneous necessity to obey such antecedent by an invariable non-usance of an existing counter power.

I. Dr. Shedd (Discourses and Essays, pp. 219-271) holds, 1. Sin is not so much an act as a "NATURE" or a "STATE," and as such is guilty and damnable. 2. This nature is a "product," namely, a product of the human Will; and depravity lies properly "in the Will;" and consists in the Will's ^{Sin a nature.} necessitated state of everflowing evil volitions. 3. The Will is not the "mere volitionary faculty;" but is inclusive of the affections, emotions, intellections, fused into a necessitated mass; the whole man himself viewed as necessitatively determined in unity to a given and fixed direction. 4. In all this the Will is *self-determined*; but only as all unipotent cause determines itself in a solely possible direction; that ^{In what sense.} is, the self-determination is a necessary one. But in this most fatalistic view of stereotyped depraved Will, ever by necessity tending to evil, Dr. Shedd sees something highly consistent with responsibility. At least, it is not so bad as an inserted or omnipotently deposited depravity. It is free, (in the sense that necessitated choice or power of choice is freedom;) self-determined, (in the sense that every material cause is self-determined;) originating in Will, (in the sense that the Will is the amalgam of all the necessitated faculties of the mind,) and is not half so bad as an omnipotently interpolated depraved nature.* "Were this nature created and put into man,

* There is no necessitarian writer, we think, who more unrestrainedly appropriates a freedomistic nomenclature under a special and "private interpretation" to express necessitarian dogmas than Dr. Shedd. (See also his History of Christian Doctrine, pp. 15, 16, etc.) The reason doubtless is, that he unites a freedomistic heart with a

as an intellectual nature or as a particular temperament is put into him by the Creator of all things, it would not be a responsible and guilty nature, nor would man be a child of wrath. But it does not thus originate."

But if this "nature," intrinsic and necessitated upon the agent by birth, is any more responsible than inserted or in-created "nature," what is the ground for such greater responsibility? Not certainly a greater freedom; for in both cases the freedom is equally the mechanical freedom to and not from the "nature," whether of the "volitionary faculty" or of the whole man determined in unity. Nor, as above premised, matters it at all whether the *cause* of a necessitation be creation, insertion, or birth; nor what the *result*; whether an act or a "nature," or an act and nature identified, the responsibility is excluded by necessitation.

II. Dr. Pond, in his representative exhibit of Hopkinsianism, (Bib. Sac., vol. xix, p. 636,) tells us that Edwards taught—"in opposition to Arminians, Pelagians, and infidels"—that liberty of Will consists in "merely choice or the power of choice." In other words,

Freedom consists in action. President Edwards maintained that "freedom is an essential *property of Will*," just as striking is an essential property of a clock. And he specially boasts that his system deposits freedom and responsibility not in *state, nature, or condition*, but in "ACTION." And similarly Dr. Hitchcock asks, (Bib. Sac., July, 1863,) "So long as they act voluntarily do they not act freely?" Freedom and the power of choice are by this identical. A volition however necessitated is free and responsible just because it is a volition and not something else. We remark:

fatalistic head, intuitions tending to the right hampered by a falsifying logic. Why is it that necessitarians so struggle to clothe *their* dogmas in our terms, while we so struggle to clear our phraseology from all affinity or resemblance to their dogmas? These verbal appropriations of theirs (see p. 77) are the tribute paid by fatalism to freedom; just as hypocrisy is said to be the compliment which virtue pays to vice.

1. This definition voids the word *freedom* as applied to Will of sense or meaning.* If volition, choice, or the power of choice is *liberty*, then there is no such thing as free choice, for that would be free free-
Voids free-
dom of
meaning.
 dom; nor for the same reason any free power of choice, or power of free choice. There can be no free volition nor freedom of volition. You have said the whole when you have said *volition*; and the word free prefixed to it is otiose, superfluous, and a mere sound and no word. A *free* volition is a *volitional* volition. A free volition is as absurd a phrase as material matter. All you can say then is, that over and above the being a volition or the power of a volition there is no freedom. The word free adds no idea, expresses no individual thought, element, or perceptible quality in the volition. *Free* volition is just as correct as *zero* volition.

And so there is no sense in the word free as applied to Will. Will is the faculty of volition; free will is nothing more. You have neither added any idea by the epithet free, nor particularized an individual idea in the Will. Thought can individualize no point, phase, or property in the subject answering to the term. Abolish the word and no meaning is lost. Predicate or affirm freedom of the Will and you have predicated nothing. You have merely said, Will is Will. To all Dr. Pond's statements, Fletcher, eighty years ago, furnished a concise but most ample reply: "It is not barely the having a *Will*, but the having *free Will*, which constitutes us accountable, judicable, punishable."

2. Freedom, say these theologians, consists in the power of willing. Freedom from what? we ask. For freedom is a relative term, implying exemption from something. It can only be freedom from its opposite, that is, freedom from not willing. But in that same method sensation is free—free from not-sensation. Everything is free from its own opposite. And so this definition of voli-

* See p. 35.

tional freedom makes the Will or the volition just as free as a mathematical figure. If necessitated volition is free why not necessitated perception or necessitated clock-striking?

Why is *action* any more a freedom than inaction? There is often a delightful freedom in repose; in exemption from the necessity of *action*. The slumberer after fatigue delights to be *free* from disturbance. The ocean enjoys a tranquil *freedom* from storms. And we see not why the exemption of the soul from all choice might not just as well be called freedom as the existence of choice. The clock without a hammer, a stagnant marsh, a block of granite are all *free*. Each state is exemption from a reverse state.

3. But Dr. Pond considers it (what is here our main point) a great merit in his system to locate responsibility Necessitated action or state. in *action*, exercise, volition, however necessitated; and not in state, being, or nature. But we reply, as above premised, that under necessitation it matters not whether it be state, condition, action, or inaction; responsibility is equally incompatible.

Would any sensible man give a flip of a copper for choice between damnation for necessary action and damnation for necessitated being? Is a necessitated motion any more responsible than a necessitated quietude? Motion or action is simply change in space or time. Is necessitated change any more guilty than necessitated sameness? Necessitated motion is, in fact, necessitated being; *being* necessitated to exist in different successive spaces. But why is necessitated being in different successive spaces any more responsible than necessitated being in the same space through successive time? God can as well necessitate me to *be* a certain thing, and then damn me for it, as necessitate me to *do* a certain thing and damn me for it. For herein *doing* is *being*; for necessitated *doing* is nothing but necessitated changing states of necessitated *being*. Justice can just as readily

hold me condemned for a necessary essence as for a necessary quality; and for a necessary quality as for a necessary *operation*: for a necessary operation is a property, and a property is but the essence manifest. Yonder metallic shrub, shaped by the cunning hand of modern art, standing with its stately stalk, lifts aloft a little wilderness of foliage and vines, most light and airy to the eye; but those clustering festoons and the rigid stalk are, alas! alike—*cast-iron*! So the stalk of a necessitated nature, and the wildest wreathings of necessitated action, are alike *cast-iron*—irresponsibly fatalistic. The actions and the being are one inseparable piece, one being, one nature. And this doing-being is created by God; for it is necessitated by him into existence, and to necessitate into existence is to create.

We could as reasonably be held retributively responsible for a necessitated shape of our person as for a necessitated shaping of our actions or motions. One is but a necessitated moulding of our body in space, the other is the necessitated moulding of our being in space and time.

Dr. Pond says that an African incurs no "guilt" "for the color of his skin," because it is not "action." But the shedding necessitated colored rays from his cuticle is, we reply, as truly "action" as the shedding necessitated evil volitions from his Will. His cuticular pigment can just as easily radiate a white as his volitional faculty can volitionate a good. An automaton may just as well be held guilty for being *wooden* as for *projecting his arm in a blow when the spring is touched*; that is, as well for a necessitated nature as for a necessitated action. And so when another writer* tells us, by way of justifying damnation for a thing decreed in us, that "it is decreed that we be perfectly voluntary" in it; decreed "that we shall act of our own accord;" neither that "voluntary" nor

Neither responsible.

Radiations and volitions.

Decreed to be voluntary.

* Dr. Nehemiah Adams. Evenings with the Doctrines.

that "accord" is any more responsible than a decreed wart on the face, or a foreordained and secured black luster beaming from the skin. Is a previously decreed volition any more responsible than a previously decreed intellection or muscular spasmodic motion? If God decrees my necessary damnation he may as well secure it through a hempen cord, an electric shock, a muscular movement, or any other necessary thing, medium, or operation as a necessary volition. God may as well secure my damnation without anything voluntary as secure it by securing the voluntary. Securing my volition in order that he may secure my voluntary sin and consequent damnation is about the poorest piece of sneaking despotism that one could attribute to an omnipotent Evil.

III. The same point that volition=freedom, and that necessitated volition is responsible because it is volition and not something else, is thus put by another writer.

1. "There can be *no necessity in volition*. It is *the very opposite of necessity*. It is *liberty itself*. Because volition has a determinate cause which makes it what it is, this does not alter the case. If the cause be a free agent, and the kind of volition be determined by the unconstrained inclinations of the heart, the freedom of our actions is no how affected by this *certain connection* between volitions and their cause." So says the Princeton Essayist, (p. 277.) And yet this writer, who calls volition *the very opposite of necessity*, also calls the volition an "effect" of a certain "cause" of which it cannot but be the result, unless he admits, contrary to his own doctrine, that a cause can fail of its sole effect. But if the volition cannot but be the solely inalterative effect of the existing cause, how is it other than necessary? How can it be "the opposite of necessity?"

2. This writer, who talks of a mere "*certain connection* between volitions and their cause," denies the power

in Will to will any otherwise than as we please. That is, as he explains it, the volition has no power to be otherwise than as the antecedent inclination or mental state. So that by his own express statements And no counter power. it is not a mere *certain* but an absolutely *necessary* connection. But that antecedent inclination cannot but be the effect of antecedent causation. The agent comes by birth or creation into existence, and has a *first* caused *inclination* which causes other mental states; the *first volition* is the effect of the antecedent *inclination*; and so is the second of its antecedent inclination; and so all the succeeding volitions; and thus each volition of his entire existence lies as a term of a necessary series of causes and effects, all equally certain and equally necessary. If an external physical object *strike* the surface of the body a *sensation* is a necessary result; of that *sensation* an *inclination*; of that *inclination* the *volition*; of that *volition* the external *act*. If the sensation be the necessary result of the corporeal stroke, and the inclination the necessary result of the sensation, is not the volition the equally necessary result of the inclination, just as the external act is the necessary result of the volition? For why is the sensation the *necessary* effect of the stroke but because there exists no adequate power in the terms of the series for that result to be otherwise? But the writer affirms an equal non-existence of power in the case for other volition. There must, therefore, be in the volition an equal *necessity*. So that the stroke, the sensation, the inclination, the volition, and the external act are the *five links of an adamant chain of necessity*. Hence, a chain of necessity. What sense is there, then, in arbitrarily interpolating the effeminate word *certain* between either two of the links? The volition is just as *necessary* and just as *certain* as every other link of the causational chain. What sense, then, in his telling us that "there can be no necessity in volition?" All the links are just as *necessary* as the impulsions of a row of

elastic balls, or any other chain of mechanical effects whatever.

3. But he tells us next that the volition "is liberty itself." Then, we reply, it can have no liberty; for liberty cannot have liberty. But if liberty consists in the volition itself, then it does not consist in being the opposite of necessity, for even a necessary volition is a volition, and is therefore liberty. The freedom, then, is not freedom from necessity, but freedom from not being a volition. And that notable freedom belongs to every block, clock, or everything which happens to be itself and nothing else.

IV. No truer responsibility can be found in a necessity professedly divorced from cause and made intrinsic and spontaneous in the agent himself. This view appears in the following extract from a work entitled, "Intellect, the Emotions, and the Moral Nature. By Rev. William Lyall, Free College, Halifax, Nova Scotia." The work is published in Edinburgh, and enthusiastically indorsed at full length by the Princeton Review, edited by Dr. Hodge, and by the British and Foreign Evangelical Quarterly, edited by Dr. Cunningham.

"Is it *causation* where the will follows upon desire? It is here, we think, that the whole stress of the question regarding the freedom of the Will lies. It does not seem causation in the same sense between the strongest emotion, or the prevailing desire, and Will, as between a judgment and an emotion, or an emotion the effect of a conception or judgment." . . . "The Will follows reasons, inducements, but it is not *caused*." . . . "Even with the strongest motive that could operate, to obey that motive is to be free, it is to will, and that is freedom. The will does not determine itself; it may be allowed even that it is *determined* by motive; but still, to will is to be free, or it is to act; and if we attend to the idea implied *in action*, we have the essence of free-

Liberty is not
free.

Intrinsic ne-
cessitated
spontaneity.

dom. What other freedom could be desired? The Will does not control motives; *it does not even choose between motives*; it follows or obeys a motive, a motive prevailing at the time—the strongest motive, as apprehended; but in doing so it *wills*, and that is activity, freedom. Freedom is freedom to obey motive—for *the Will* to obey motive, or to decide in obedience to motive. In that consists essential freedom.” . . . “Will is far from the nature of a mere effect.” . . . “It is an effect so far as it is under influence, but it acts under that influence by an activity of its own, derived from nothing without itself.”

The obedience of Will to motive as here described is obedience by intrinsic necessity. It is intrinsic because it inheres in all Will as Will, belonging to its nature. There is no possible freedom consisting in a power of disobedience to highest motive. Obedience is freedom; and there is no other freedom. It is, therefore, what must be; an inherent intrinsic necessity, or spontaneity.

But it matters not to responsibility whether necessity is from a specific antecedent cause, or is thus spontaneous and intrinsic. Cause can do no more than put into the volition the necessity to exist. That is, cause simply infuses the necessity into Will for the volition; and the necessity thereby becomes an intrinsic necessity in the Will for the sole putting-forth. Cause, as has been said, expires as soon as effect exists, but the necessity for the effect to exist even then still remains *intrinsic in the agent or subject of the effect*. So that, whether by a specific cause or not, the necessity is ever intrinsic. In the one case the intrinsic necessity is caused once for all in the primal causation of Will itself; in the other it waits for the specific cause.

Nevertheless, Mr. Lyall's obedience of volition to motive is, in spite of himself, caused by motive. For by intrinsic necessity it acts according to the motive; and

Intrinsic necessity is caused necessity. the motive decides and fixes, determines and secures what the act shall necessarily be, and other than which it cannot be. It is the same old clock-hammer freedom—power *to* without power *from*. Between the motive and the act the relation is necessitative, for the motive is the antecedent by whose strongest force the act necessarily takes place.

To be an effect is to be determined necessarily in direction and measure by an antecedent. But the result in the case of intrinsic necessity depends upon, is fixed by, the antecedent. But to be necessarily dependent upon and fixed by a previous antecedent is to be necessitatively caused by it. The antecedent causes the intrinsic necessity of the agent to act in a certain measure and direction in conformity to itself. In respect to responsibility this necessitation differs not from causation.

CHAPTER XII.

INVARIABLE SEQUENCES OR SPONTANEOUS NECESSITY.

It was Mr. Hume who first performed that analysis by which the sequence of cause and effect was reduced to “a constant conjunction of objects;” and the idea of “cause” or “causation” was placed by him in the category of “prejudices” arising from “custom.” So far did he carry his analysis as to invalidate the legitimacy of all assurance that the stated *consequent* will follow the experiential *antecedent*. Dr. Thomas Brown, taking this theory, identified the connection of cause and effect as mere “invariable sequence;” banished causation from existence; but, with at least a less absurd philosophy, legitimized the *ex-*

Constant conjunction.

Hume and Brown's theories.

pectation of the sequent upon the experiential antecedent, as a valid intuition of all mind.

This theory has been adopted by two very different classes of thinkers. FIRST is the class who, adopting it with strict consistency, apply it alike to all the dynamical sequences of mental and physical science. SECOND are those (generally among theologians alone) who admit causation in the phenomena of *physics* and of intellection, but exclude it from the sphere of *free agency*; therein substituting Invariable Sequence. Between these two classes the question is whether or not the causations of *physical* and volitional action are alike reducible to Invariable Succession. To the former class belongs a large class of naturalistic savans, including the positivists John Stuart Mill and Comte. To the latter class belong, especially in this country, the body of necessitarian theologians who desire, in *phraseology* at least, to recognize the alternative power of the human Will.* These two classes in order we may now discuss.

I. Mr. Hume congratulated himself (ironically perhaps) upon the result of his analysis as furnishing a termination to the controversy upon necessity. In this fancy he is followed by some of his followers. Mr. Mill, in his confused chapter on Liberty and Necessity, contained in his work on Logic, takes this ground. Necessity, all that there is, simply implies the fact that a

Sequences
extravolitional.

And volitional.

Universal Invariability.

* The theory, however, nearly if not quite coincides with the view of Leibnitz. For instance, take the following passage from his "Causa Dei Asserta:":

"*Libertas exempta est tam a necessitate, quam a coactone. Necessitatem non faciunt futuritio veritatum, nec praescientia et praeordinatio Dei, nec praedispositio verum. Non futuritio: licet enim futurorum contingentium sit determinata veritas, certitudo tamen objectiva, ser infallibilis determinatio veritatis, quæ illis inest, minime necessitati confundenda est.*"—Opera, p. 660.

Leibnitz moreover invented the doctrine of a Sufficient Reason; that is, an adequate antecedent which in physics the sequent always *must* obey and in free agency *will* obey.

volition, like every other effect, is “an invariable sequence” of the existing sum total of “antecedents.” That is, did we know all the antecedency completely, we could infallibly predict the consequent volition—we should know how the man will act. And surely, he argues, this sure and invariable futurition ought not to be called Necessity. To which we may briefly reply,

1. That we should be able to predict which way a person will choose from knowing him perfectly, is more than any one is able to affirm. That there is much ground for probable prediction we have fully shown in what we have said upon the Influence of Motives and upon Uniformity of Volitions. But this assumption is, that we only need the perceptive power to analyze the exact interior mechanism of Will, and a perfect motiveometer to take the dynamics of the forces in contact with that machinery, to calculate with as absolute mathematical accuracy the direction and the momentum of every future volition, as we can the direction and momentum of a material machine. This is precise necessity. It finds an agent a true machine. It is based upon its mechanical dynamic. And it is a pure, gratuitous, and most unnatural assumption. If we could clairvoyantly look upon the interior of a man’s mental being we might, and if consciousness and moral sense are veracious we should, find a controlling alternative power which would baffle our predictive inferences.

We do not understand that it is by an accurate tracing of cause and a reasoning to effect, that God foreknows the way in which a free-agent will act, but by the uncaused perfection of his own absolute omniscience. It is not in the divine mind *calculation*, but pure *knowledge*, taking in the fact past, present, and future precisely in its form and nature. Had we, therefore, power to inspect all the elements of a free agent’s nature to the utmost, and power to deduce all the legiti-

Including
Will.

Prediction of
volitions.

Foreknowl-
edge not
calculation.

mate inferences therefrom, it is neither self-evident nor demonstrable, nor naturally probable, that we should by calculation foreknow the agent's future free act. As a free choice is not a necessary result of a given cause, so a reasoning from inalternative cause to effect would fail to furnish a sure prediction. To make the conclusion infallible, the result must be a necessitated result. The logical calculator of a free volition would make but a probable guess. Far in the ultimate depths of his being he would find a *self-center*, capable of projecting action, which, without the intrinsic nature of chance, would be as incalculable as the most absolute chance itself. The contrary of this is mere assumption; of no more value at any rate than our assumption.

2. Mr. Mill does not hesitate to admit that *our volitions are on par in this respect with mechanical causations, forces, and operations*. My choice is, by his view, in given circumstances as "invariably" resultant, and as fixedly as a bullet from a revolver. We are thus again reduced to a mere mechanical freedom, a freedom *to* the sole but not *from*. A will is just as free as a clock-hammer and no more. Nay, inasmuch as even mathematical certainty is, in Mr. Mill's view, empirical, he must maintain that the agent puts forth volition, just as fixedly as 2 and 2 become 4. Now all these physical and arithmetical results are, even by Mr. Mill, called necessary. Why not the equally sure and fixed future volition?

Volitional
and me-
chanical se-
quences.

3. If it be right to banish that hard looking word Necessity, a large retinue of words—all the words implying power, efficiency, avoidance, with their contraries, and the auxiliaries *can* and *must*—must follow. Nearly every causative verb in the language must either be expunged or adapted to new conceptions. For if there be such a thing as *power* and such a true word as *can*, and their negatives, and there be a *power* to put forth a certain volition, and no power to withhold or sub-

Necessita-
rian terms.

stitute it, then we shall want some word to express this unipotence; and whatever word would serve that purpose would soon acquire the rigid features of this word Necessity.

4. Nor are we at all helped by Mr. Mill's substitution of "invariable sequence" and "antecedence" in the place of effect and power. If it be fact that my volitions start up before or in me, as independent events—"sequences"—it helps me not a particle; it distresses me all the more to know that they are "invariable." If I have no power over them except to stand a passive "antecedent," and they come into existence, "invariably" tacked to me, it is very hard for me to be *responsible* for them. There is only the power *to*, not the power *from*. If it be indeed my destiny to be antecedent of a certain set of "invariable sequents," I see not how I can be divinely and justly required to be "antecedent" to another set, over which I have not the least power whatever. Moral obligation to a different course is thereby impossible. I stand a helpless stock for "invariable sequences" to be fastened upon; and neither praise nor blame, merit nor demerit, guilt nor desert, responsibility nor honor, reward nor punishment, can be for me any just attribute.

5. Mr. Mill doubtless would say that reward and penalty are the inducements, that is, the "invariable" motive "antecedents" for the right series of volitional "sequents." This reduces penalty to a mere expedient—a method—like the application of a sidelong force to right a wrong-going mechanism. The true *morale* is thus expunged, the *expedient* alone remains. The theory is saved at the terrible expense of the annihilation of Eternal Justice. A questionable intellectual notion is established, but the moral sentiment is forever invalidated.

To this general head we may conveniently refer the opinions of Kant. This philosopher, dividing our con-

Invariability
irresponsi-
ble.

Penalty an
expedient
and no just-
ice.

ceptions of things into the *phenomenal*, or external, or empirical, and the *noumenal* or transcendental, places all freedom in the latter. The noumenal, concealed in the phenomenal, as the marrow is centralized in the bone, is reached and seen only by the intuitions of pure supersensuous thought. Such thought recognizes that there is this deep intrinsic sub-phenomenal freedom in man, which forms a just basis for imputation, by our pure moral intuition, of guilt for sin, although all our phenomenal or empirical volitions and external actions are bound to succeed each other by as fated a law of invariable sequence as rules over the mechanical operations of physical nature.

Kant's noumenal freedom
With phenomenal necessity.

It may indeed be acknowledged in reference to this, that freedom is deeply intrinsic in our nature, and that it clothes itself to the outward glance with a succession of phenomena, very much like a causal succession, very much like the wave evolving wave in the current of a stream. In volitional, as in external nature, there is a large amount of ascertainable causation. In external nature, statics and dynamics are capable of accurate measures of causation in the form of physical force; and where no accurate measurements of causation can be taken, science still has not, from any warnings of consciousness, or of the moral sense, any fear to apply her exact inductions and assume that necessitation reigns absolute. But in the volitional sphere we have not gone far in this direction before awful consequences loom up and stern negatives bar procedure. Plain indications reveal themselves that the laws of so much exact result for so much exact antecedency are no longer fully applicable. Freedom does not clothe herself with phenomena bearing, always and unequivocally, the evident laws of exact physical causational or invariable succession. But a volitional freedom, be it noumenal or phenomenal, limited to the process of necessary successional causation, is no responsible

Noumenal freedom is mechanical.

freedom at all. It is the old mechanical freedom over again, the freedom *to* but not *from*. It is freedom to a solely given direction, and so inalternative. It is Edwards's freedom, the power to *will as we will*. This phenomenal, yet actual necessity of volition, is not a jot helped by laying under it a noumenal freedom; for if that freedom can never give a volition for right against the strongest motive force, what is it good for? It neither furnishes power for the right or responsibility for the wrong. It solves no problem, and furnishes no relief.

II. The second class of thinkers surrender all events outside the Will to causational necessity, but subject volitions only to the law of spontaneity, or invariable sequence to the highest motive. The Will possesses power, but never uses it, for counter volition. An agent always *can*, but never *will*, choose otherwise. This they hold to be the true *certainty*. All volitional certainty thereby presupposes a one particular kind of condition, namely, strongest antecedent motive force, and a particular kind of result, namely, obedience to the strongest motivity under a particular law, namely, invariable succession upon major force. Any event or futuration not under such condition or law is absurd chance or lawless uncertainty. Such Law of Uniformity or spontaneity of obedient action under condition of superior force is seen to be absolute, not merely in all experienced cases, so as to be an induction, but in all possible cases, so as to be seen superexperientially and intuitively true, and therefore it is self-evident and axiomatic. It would be intuitively true, as the contradictory of lawless chance, upon an infinite number of repetitions of an infinite number of cases; so that it is a strictly absolute and true universality. As the sole exemption from a self-contradictory chance, it is apodictical, and (so we

Spontaneous
necessity
with coun-
ter power.

infer) a necessity. But by them it is named certainty, and held to be the only true certainty, as distinguished from necessity on one side and chance on the other.

On this theory of so-called certainty we make the following points:

1. The advocates of this view must, with us, refute the main body of Edwards on the Will.

We have shown at the various points that whatever may be Edwards's occasional professions, (and he never professes that *his* necessity is equivalent to *our* certainty,) his *argument* demonstrates necessity in distinction from certainty, if any distinction exists, and the non-existence instead of the non-usage of the power of contrary choice. The certainty to which he affirms his necessity to be equivalent is the necessitarian's, not the freedomist's certainty. His argument demonstrates these or nothing.

Edwards
proves non-
existence of
counter
power.

At start* he excludes "power of choosing otherwise in given cases" as an unthinkability. His argument of the infinite series boastfully reduces the *conception* of diverse power to infinities of infinities of contradictions.† His causational argument knows only inalternative cause, and the effect of any other sort of cause is a causeless effect.‡ He identifies the necessity of a past event and of a future event as one.§ His reduction of free Will to Atheism proves, if anything, that the supposition of the existence of a power of counter choice logically supposes the non-existence of God.|| His identification of Will with desire excludes the possibility of a counter volition as truly as of a counter sensation.¶ His argument against liberty of indifference excludes all power for Will to

* See this work, p. 29. † Ibid., p. 122. ‡ Ibid., p. 157. § Ibid., p. 63.

¶ Professor Park, in an able article in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, vol. ix, p. 212, speaks of "the element which Edwards disclosed to the Church, the union between certainty and spontaneous choice." But Edwards's certainty is as absolute a necessity as the divine existence. A variation would be a causeless effect.

¶ See this work, p. 15.

flow but in a certain channel.* All activity is with him a passivity.† All causality is exhausted in the result.‡ In none of these arguments can invariable sequence be substituted by a modern thinker without destroying the argument. Withdraw these arguments and what is left of Edwards? A valueless shell from which the kernel has been completely extracted. To deny that Edwards taught pure necessity as distinct from certainty, non-existence as distinct from non-usance, is as absurd as to deny that Euclid taught geometry. To demonstrate necessity against the *existence* of a self-determining power, that is, a power in the self of determining the Will otherwise than a one causal way, is the very object of his entire body of argument. To attribute to a man a doctrine which he does not affirm is bad enough; to attribute doctrines which he denies is worse; but what shall be said of the attempt to attribute to Edwards the very doctrines which it is the very purpose of his work to demonstrate to be absurd and unthinkable?

For this modern distinction of non-usance of contrary power from its non-existence, Edwards had no use. The object of its invention is to reconcile necessity with responsibility; but Edwards had other modes of such a reconciliation, and wholly ignored this. His modes, as in the proper place is shown, were two, and contradictory ones at that. 1. Natural ability, which was either a power to *will as we will*, and no otherwise, (a positive contradiction of the power of contrary choice,) or a post-volitional power of fulfilling the volition. 2. A denial that power must underlie responsibility; which is equivalent to affirming that no power of contrary choice is requisite in order to obligation to contrary choice. Edwards would therefore have promptly told these philosophers that their power of contrary choice is as useless as it is absurd. He would have soon convinced them that he was not for them a strong-

Edwards's
system re-
quired not
counter
power.

* See this work, p. 184.

† Ibid., p. 180.

‡ Ibid., p. 97.

hold or a standard, but an opponent and a foe, without an overthrow of whose positions there is no status for them.

These Christian philosophers, then, if they are good logicians, must cordially unite with us in the overthrow of nearly the entire body of the argument of Edwards. We both are equally

Its maintain-
ers must re-
fute Ed-
wards.

bound to refute his position, that there is no power of contrary choice. If our argument on this point is valid, they are bound to sustain it; if weak, to strengthen or to replace it with a better. And that would be an end of Edwards's work as a theological authority. We may, indeed, have a subsequent issue with them, namely, upon another point. After we have together disproved the necessity of Edwards, consisting in the non-existence of power of contrary choice, they may attempt to set up another necessity consisting in a Law of Invariability, a necessity as fixed and as destructive of responsibility as the causal necessity of Edwards. Their issue with Edwards's positions is then succeeded by an issue with us. We deny the necessity both of the law of causation and of the law of invariability.

And when they have cancelled all the arguments of Edwards that rigidly prove the non-existence, instead of the non-usage of counter power, their theory of non-usage is itself left about proofless. The residuum of Edwards which they can appropriate will be found the least demonstrative part of his argument, a part which we trust will have been very amply refuted in this present treatise. A main objection, then, at start against this theory is its destitution of evidence.

They will then
have left
themselves
no ground.

2. The doctrine that the *Will always can but never will* volitionate for weaker motive is supposed by its advocates to be covered by the maxim, which they illustrate by various instances, that *many things can be but never will be*. That maxim is true, but it does not cover the doctrine.

Always can
but never
will.

True maxim.

Theirs is a *never-will-be* of a specific and a peculiar kind, under conditions and presuppositions that nullify the *can-be*. When a *will-be* or *never-will-be* under a certain fixed sort of condition results with absolute uniformity, even upon an infinite number of repetitions of the experiment,* including all possible cases, then a reverse *can-be*—either to the given *will-be* or given *never-will-be*—is impossible. The *will-be* or *never-will-be* is, then, a necessity, and not a mere certainty. The sort of condition in this present case is the strongest motive; and a certain obedience assumable, invariably and eternally, without exception, even in an infinity of repetitions, is necessity.

The maxim that *things can be which never will be* is true, for instance, in the following cases, without covering the doctrine of invariability:

1. The free-agent always *can but never will* contradict or vary from the way that God foreknows; but that, as

1. Foreknowl- shown in the proper place, is a case in which edge verified. a constant cause, Omniscience, ever operates adequate to foreknow the way which with power otherwise *will be* chosen, and so, without necessity on the choice, is necessity of result and agreement between foreknowledge and choice. 2. God *always can but never*

2. God's right will do counter to right; but that is simply doing. the firm purpose of one, not of an infinite number of agents. 3. Of all the rejected possible volitions or nolitions of all free agents, it is true, each and every

3. Rejected volitions. one, that it *can but will not be*; but that is not the infinite repetition of equivalent or identical cases, but an infinite variety of single, peculiar, and individual cases. It is simply a collection of all the cases in which a possible volition is rejected; not of uniform cases under given conditions. But what is affirmed by this theory is that a strongest motive case, repeated an infinite number of times by an infinite number of agents

* See p. 85.

and by all possible free agents, is intuitively seen to be sure of the same result.

It is also said to be true that nobody *does as well as he can*, and so there is a *can-be* which never *will-be*. Distributively or individually, that is None do well as they can. not true. People often do *do* as well as they *can*. Our Lord testified of one that "she hath done what she could." People sometimes, but not usually, do as bad as they can in the given case. But the maxim may mean, collectively, *nobody through his whole life does as well as he can*. If that means that *free agents*, who have the evil and the good constantly tempting them, are in the highest degree likely to choose sometimes one and sometimes the other, that is true. But we have elsewhere* shown that it may be true distributively that an agent is able to choose in each and every single instance for the rightest and best without being able to choose *always* rightest and best. This high collective *can*, therefore, is not true. Mankind cannot choose as well as they can. It is, on the *whole*, a pure and impossible ideal. Nor is it quite certain that there are no ones who collectively do not on the whole do as well, at a lower scale, as they can; and who, if they should ascetically strain for a higher *can*, would, in fact, do worse.

3. Pure certainty, as in the proper place we define the word, and as distinct from necessity, is not Invariability is not certainty. predicable of, nor to be identified with, invariable sequence, or with the relation between the antecedent and consequent of such a relation. This, our pure certainty, is the simple futuration of an event which is possible to be otherwise. Invariability is no element of certainty. Pure certainty is the pure futuration of the event irrespective of invariability. To add that such a certainty is limited to a sole condition of strongest antecedent force, and is ruled and fixed by a law of sequence

* See p. 132.

and to a sole result, furnishes new elements not belonging to the idea of pure futurity. This becomes a certainty of a special class of the entire genus, which is really no certainty at all. For if the so-called certain act is formulated by a previous fixed universal law, selecting a particular set or sort of facts, then to that law it *must* conform; and that is necessity. The totality of facts which must be presupposed as taking existence under restriction of this Law of Invariability is an entirely different *totality*; that is, embraces facts entirely different from the totality of pure, unrestricted certainty. A Will or system of Wills, producing volitions under a certain law of sequence, would supposably produce an entirely different totality of volitions from a Will or system of Wills producing volitions unrestricted by such law. Any anterior prototype decree, rule, configuration, especially an eternal one, and still more a universal one, founded on the very nature of things, to which the free act, by the nature of the case in all possible instances, conforms, causes it to be no certainty but necessity. To be pure

Pre-formed certainty is necessity, certainty the anterior prototype must take its form or configuration wholly from the posterior free act; and if the act must take its configuration from the prefixed prototype, it has no longer freedom, nor pure certainty, but necessity. Such conformity being pre-assumed, the act *must* be accordant and *cannot be otherwise*; and that is necessity. For the predestinarian, however, on the other hand, to affirm the ultimate conforming of the free act to an anterior configuration, which configuration has in truth been antecedently conformed to the free shaping of said free act, to be equally a necessity, is inadmissible. The free act would then only be conformed to a true expression of itself; that is, would be conformed to and be itself. But if the anterior configuration take its shape not from the free act, but from some other independent source, be it the divine decree or an axiomatic law, (as, for instance, of Invaria-

bility,) and in order to its own truth requires the act to conform to itself, the act is not free.*

Hence the phrase to *secure the certainty of a free act* is absurd, because contradictory.† To *secure* ^{"Secured certainty"} a thing truly and absolutely is to make an opposite thing impossible. To *secure* the safety of a sum of money is to prevent the possibility of its abstraction. To *secure* the impregnability of a fortress is to prevent the possibility of its taking. To *secure* the certainty of a thing is to preclude the possibility of an opposed or different certainty. Now a pure certainty, as above shown, cannot be anteriorly secured, caused, shaped independently, but as it takes shape from (not gives shape to) the future free act. The true certainty is simply the futuration; and the futuration takes its nature and being from (and not *vice versa*) the free volition. "Coming events cast their shadows before," and it is the event which shapes, secures, fixes, causes the anterior shadow, not the shadow the event. To "*secure the certainty*" anteriorly to and independently of the event, is to destroy its nature of certainty and make it necessity. To secure it according to a previous universal Law attains a different individual event and a different set of events from the events of a futuration free from that Law. The securing the previous certainty of the event can be done only by SECURING THE EVENT ITSELF *in the future* by which such certainty is caused or shaped; and ^{Is necessity.} to *secure the event* is to destroy the power of

* Prof. Park (Bibliotheca Sacra, vol. ix, p. 177) says New England Calvinism maintains "that a sinner *can* perform what a reasonable law requires of him, and [yet] that he *certainly* never will do as well as he can, unless by a special interposition of Heaven." But this "*certainly-never-will*" is secured by an absolute law of Invariable Sequence, namely, of obedience to strongest motive force, an exception to which would be chance, uncertainty, and Atheism. With what truth is it said, then, that the sinner "*can*" achieve such an exception? Can chance and Atheism be made true? Or what practicable basis does such a "*can*" afford for responsibility, retribution, or theodicy?

† See p. 282.

contrariety and transform the whole into necessity. The freedom and responsibility of the act expire in the process.

To secure the certainty of an event is, as has been said, to *secure the event itself in the future*. This *securing the event* can only be by a causative influence extending from the securing antecedent to the event itself. This antecedent must both positively fix the event and also exclude efficiently all contradictory events. But that would be a necessitated, not a merely certain event.

A necessitarian writer* says: "To say 'an event certainly will take place,' is one thing; to say 'an event must necessarily take place,' is another thing." True. But to say that it is previously secured that an event *will* take place, that is, that the event is secured to take place in the future, is to say that it is necessitated to take place, that it cannot but take place, and so *must necessarily* take place.

To bring into existence some event sequently upon which an agent will perform, with full power otherwise, Certain sequence is not secured. a volitional act, is not to *secure the certainty*. A minister preaches a most excellent sermon, and one of his pewholders sequently blasphemes about it. Now the sermon did not "secure" (that is, render the opposite impossible) either the certainty or the blasphemy. The certainty is not an anteriorly secured matter. It is simply futuration, and takes its existence from the shaping of the free act and from nothing else. But to *secure the certainty* of a future act by bringing into existence an object or event which includes the future act within the law of invariable sequence is to necessitate that future act. The substituting invariable sequence for necessity of volition does not, consequently, clear the Divine Being from the authorship of sin. God is thereby made to bring the agent within the invariable sequence of sin, which is as true a necessity as the sequences of causation.

Predestinarians at the present day define decree or

* Rev. Mr. Fiske, Bib. Sac., April, 1862, p. 405.

predestination as simply *rendering certain* the free act of the agent. And by this phrase is meant that God so plans as that the event is *brought into the category of invariable volitional sequences*, so that a completely new theological nomenclature comes into use, softening predestination in words, but retaining it intact in fact. Thus Mr. Fiske says: "By the doctrine of divine decrees we mean that God from eternity purposed or de- <sup>Predestinat-
ed secured
certainty.</sup> termined so to constitute and govern the universe as to *make it certain* that all events would take place precisely as they do take place."—P. 401. "The decrees of God are not merely his purposes to *permit* events to take place as they do. Some hold with regard to the existence of sin, we can only affirm that the divine decrees extend to it in the sense that God determines to permit it, that is, not to prevent it. But the decrees of God are not mere negatives. They are purposes positively to do something; and to do that which *renders certain* the existence of all events, sin included."—P. 404.

The phrase here to "make certain" is equivalent to "secure a certainty." The phrase to "render certain" is ambiguous. It may signify to cause that an agent will do a thing excluding from him power for any other doing by setting in operation a train of causations securing his act. In that sense we reject the phrase, <sup>Render or
make cer-
tain.</sup> for the thing is necessity. Or it may mean *the doing a thing sequently upon which an agent will do some other thing*. Thus, I may give a servant a direction to do a thing, and he, in a spirit of perverse independence, does the opposite. Did I cause, produce, create, or make the certainty, or render it certain that he will do so? I think not. *Certainty is not a made thing*. It is simply this—that he will so do, and all its reality receives existence from the doing, reflected backward. If, however, this is all that is meant by Mr. Fiske, that God does a thing sequently upon which there arises a volition or act from man, that is

what Arminians have ever held. But that is not Calvinism.

The Princeton Essayist (p. 70) argues that inasmuch as the doctrine of foreknowledge concedes that all future events are *certain* and foreordination does nothing more than to *render them certain*, therefore there is no difference between the two. We reply, 1. If God renders the future event certain so as to *secure* its coming into existence, he is made *responsible* for its existence. To render a thing certain is to secure its existence in the future and so to become its author. The difference then between the *certain*ty of the event *secured* by foreordination, and the simple certainty apart from foreordination, is that one makes God the author of sin, and the other does not. 2. This securing a certainty secures according to a certain special rule; and so secures a special set of facts, differing from those involved in a simple certainty. Foreknowledge and predestination therefore presuppose different courses of events. 3. By this foreordaining securement of a special set of facts, the facts are made to accord with the antecedent causational securement or predestination, and not, reversely, the anteriority conformed to the posterior result.

Dr. Bonar, of Scotland, narrates a colloquial argument to the following effect: You admit that in order to foreknowledge the future event must be *certain* and *fixed*; will you please to tell who *fixed* it? In this argument the word *fixed* has two separate meanings, namely, as an *adjective* and a *verb*. The axioms of mathematics are *fixed*; will you please to tell us who fixed them? The adjective *fixed*, as applied to a future alternative act, if properly applied at all, signifies simply *certain*; that is, the act which of several possible acts *will be* performed. And that *fixed* futurity does not need that anybody should *fix* it. Its future certainty is simply its *will-be*; and that *requires no present cause*, nor any

Foreordina-
tion and
foreknowl-
edge.

"Fixed" fu-
ture events.

cause whatever, excepting the future agent who will perform it.

4. Our ground, as already stated,* is, that where it is a conceded point that a volition would be put forth in the given or equivalent case, not only ^{Universal uniformity is necessity.} by all actual but all possible free agents, the case is not a certainty, but a necessity, and the counter power is an unreality. The case must take its place with all other facts or laws among fixed principles founded in the nature of things.

This fact of spontaneous Invariability must be validly pronounced to be a necessary Law, as absolute and as necessary as the Law of causation, being secured in fact by necessary causation. ^{Necessary Law.}

It extends in its true statement not only to all actual, but to all possible cases. *If any actual or possible diverse be admitted* that indeed alters the case, for we then have *a crude freedomism* hereafter to be considered.† It must be held that God himself cannot create a being who will choose counter to highest motive, for if he can man should be that being. For man is the being required to act out of that Law of Invariability both by the moral Law and by his own highest well-being. ^{For all possible cases.} If then such a case as a chooser against strongest motive is impossible to exist even to Almighty power, the invariability covers all possible cases in every part of the universe through absolute eternity and as exceptionlessly as the Law of causation. It exists immutably *in the nature of things*; and what by the very nature of things exists, exists necessarily, and exists necessarily every moment and in all its individual instances and particular acts. It is not an induction to be held true until contradicted by some counter experience; but an intuition to be held true in all possible cases, the possible counter being intuitively excluded. It is not created and empirical, like the Law of gravitation; but uncreated and

* See p. 132.

† See p. 238.

primordial, like the law of causation, modifying the nature of creation itself. Like the Law of Causation, it is strictly and self-evidently assumable of all its species of instances. It is then a necessary and absolute Law; and to it as a Law its subjects are subordinated; and to attribute to them a power to break it is a contradiction. You might just as well attribute to inalterable effect the power to nullify its own causation. No act or event can break an axiomatic Law.

For that which is seen, not experientially and inductively, but intuitively, to be strictly true of all possible cases, universally and eternally is self-evident and necessary. Self-evident, for that is the very nature of intuitive truth, which is whatever is seen, not through media and evidence, but immediately and by its own self-presentation. Whatever is self-evidently true is necessarily true; for the basis of the self-evidence in the thing must intrinsically and necessarily verify the intuition. The intuition is fixedly and necessarily true; and the correspondent fact must be as fixed as the truth of the intuition. An intuitive truth defining the mode of a subject's action is a necessary law, and the action and the law are necessary each, a necessary type and antitype of each other, the necessity of each insuring the necessity of the other. Now what in the present case is thus intuitively seen as universal and eternal in all Will, as Will, is the invariable accordance of all Will with strongest motive force. That accordance, therefore, is necessary. And that necessity stands in contradiction to the power of an opposite fact, a contrary choice. A necessity and a counter possibility cannot coexist.

As a basis for the affirmation of such invariability in the Will, the intuition must cognize in Will, as Will, a sufficient ground, nature, and cause to exclude all opposite or exception. That cause, intrinsic to Will, as Will, must be inseparable and necessary. Its effect, namely,

this invariability, is also necessary. For it is, in the nature of things, commensurate, and completely resultant in the effect in all possible cases, and cannot fail. The counter event is completely excluded, by a cause in its own nature efficient and resultant in all possible cases. The counter is therefore impossible. A *will-not-be* which is prevented from existing by antecedent commensurate causation, in all possible cases and in the nature of things which cannot be otherwise, cannot exist. A *will-be* whose counter is by the nature of things efficiently and resultantly excluded in all possible cases, is a *must-be*. It is a secured certainty—a necessity. And, being grounded on inseparable *cause* intrinsic to and inseparable from all Will as Will, it is a *causal necessity*.

Prof. Lyall's theory (p. 212) is that Will possesses a spontaneous intrinsic necessity to obey strongest motive without a counter power; this theory is that, with a counter power by necessary spontaneity unused, there is a spontaneous intrinsic necessity to obey strongest motive. By both theories there is equally a necessary spontaneity to obey strongest motive. By the present theory there is negatively a necessary spontaneous necessity of non-usance of counter power, and positively a spontaneous necessity to obey strongest motive. And these two are one necessity. But as before argued, a power by necessity unused by the agent is not a power at the command of the agent, and so is truly not in his possession. He *cannot* do the act, and so his power for it does not truly belong to him.

It is the *non-usance* of the counter power—the positive strongest-motive volition, which lies in the eternally uniform succession of events; that is, in “the constant conjunction” of Hume, the “invariable sequence” of Brown, and the “unconditional invariable sequence” of John Stuart Mill. It amounts to this, that the *non-usance* is the sequent of a given

A causal
necessity.

Spontaneity.

The direct
volition in-
variably se-
quent.

antecedent, unconditionally, in all time and place. How far it, hence, differs from Lyall's spontaneous necessity of action according to cause, or from the invariability of physical events as held by Brown, let the reader judge.

5. The arguments adduced in behalf of this uniformity demonstrate the impossibility of contrary choice, and so demonstrate necessity. To deny invariable sequence, as our freedomism does, it is argued, is to introduce an absurd and inconceivable uncertainty into all volitional events. It dissolves all firm relations and disintegrates all moral system. It abandons the world to random Chance and consequent Atheism. It takes away that fixedness of future events by which they can be the subjects of a sure foreknowledge.

If this argument is solid then all choice is necessary, and all counter choice is impossible in the nature of things. For chance is impossible. Uncertainty is impossible. The defeat of God's foreknowledge is impossible. Not a single case of chance, uncertainty, or defect of God's prescience is able to occur. The non-existence and contradictory of these is absolute, universal, eternal. The opposite of these, to wit, uniform choice for strongest motive, is therefore an absolute necessity.

If to act counter the "invariable sequence" is chance, then freedom, consisting in a power of choice counter to invariability, is a power for absurd and impossible chance, and the act is an act of chance. To obey God against the strongest counter motive, is to act chance; and a life of obedience to God's law against temptations sufficiently powerful, is a life of absurd chance. God requires of a man in such a case to act by chaotic chance, and damns him to all eternity because he does not act by chance, but does act as all free rational moral intelligences, God himself included, through all the universe and through all eternity have acted, and ever do and ever will act.

Chance the
opposite of
invariabil-
ity.

Proves ne-
cessity.

Chance, then,
is freedom!

6. Nor does this scheme explain the sense of conscious and self-condemning guilt. All guilt has by it this excuse and justification, that there is no being in the universe, high or low, finite or infinite, that in ^{All alike would sin.} the same category, namely, of strongest motive, would not commit the same guilty act. Whether the most pious saint or the most abandoned sinner, whether the purest angel or the blackest demon, whether a blended character or an extreme, all alike, high or low, finite or infinite, do will for the same one highest motive or uniform standard of accordance. The merit hereby of all the good, is not that they would do any better than the worst. It is only their fortune that they are not in the same predicament. Place any other actual free agent or any other possible free agent in the same category and he would do the same. Guilt is then a matter of position, a thing of accident, chance, or fate. Place any real or conceptual being in the right relation and he is a sinner.

The sinner, then, has ample precedent for his sin. He is authorized and justified in sin by the sanction of all beings really or virtually in his place. The universe is on his side. His sin has this surpassing excellence, that there is no being, however excellent, ^{Sin justified.} wise, or powerful, that would not in the same category, though endowed with the power of choosing otherwise, choose exactly as he does. Sin is, therefore, excellent, being the virtual act of all excellent beings.

And yet how is one agent any more morally excellent than another? All are ready, however endowed with contrary power, to sin just as soon as the proper conditions are presented. The criminal stands on the same ground of exculpation or inculpation ^{All distinctions of moral character destroyed.} as the judge, the sinner as the preacher, the demon as the angel, the Satan as the Messiah. All owe their accident of excellence to their position; all are potentially and virtually alike, good or evil. The trans-

gressor, but for the circumstantial category in which he stands, is as good as the saint, the devil as good as the angel. The culprit can call all beings to acquit him. He has the entire Totality with him. The line of moral distinctions is expelled from the sum of existing things.

This theory is framed for a practical purpose, namely, to evade the intuitive feeling of the impossibility of responsibility for a necessitated act. It thereby admits that impossibility. It is specially framed to enable the necessitarian preacher of righteousness to remove all excuse from inability to do otherwise than sin, even according to strongest motive. It is thought, forsooth, to be very effective to be able to say to the sinner, Theory practically bad. "Plead not the strength of temptation; you are able to disobey the most powerful temptation and the strongest motive, and so are without excuse." This is a "Moral Ability;" that is, a claimed Volitional Ability to put forth the required volition, and the preacher is able to use the *words* of the freest Arminianism. But, alas! this preacher here tells but a part of his story. He conceals what he knows to be fact, what proves this Moral Ability a worthless ideality, and what is the sinner's valid and ample excuse. Let that preacher tell that sinner, "You are condemned for not disobeying the highest motive because you had the power. It is true, no man ever did use that power, no man ever will. Nor will any being, angelic or archangelic, demoniac or diabolical, ever exert that power. Every being that ever did exist, or ever will exist, or ever can exist, will do and would have done just as you have done. I should have done the same, Gabriel would have done the same, Jesus Christ would have done the same, the blessed Jehovah would have done the same. But you, for doing just what I, what Christ, what God would have done, are to be condemned to everlasting death." Surely any sinner would feel it intuitively just to reply, "If I am con-

demned for doing what all other beings would do and have done, why should not they be condemned with me? How is the throne of my judge less guilty than I?" Go to the sinner, Mr. Preacher, with such a story and you are logically and demonstratively estopped. Go to the sinner with such a story lurking concealed in your theory, and you *ought to be* estopped, logically and morally: logically because your theory is absurd, morally because your concealment is deceptive.

There is no other way of solving the problem of responsibility, justice, guilt, and remorse, than Freedom alone explains responsibility. by the hypothesis of a counter power which may be supposed as practically *used*, in act, against the so-called strongest motive. The proposition that consciousness affirms the prevalence of *strongest motive* as uniformly our own case, and therefore by an induction always the case of all, can never be proved. I am, as a man, sensible that I choose, or have chosen, against the strongest reasons, against the strongest temptations, and against the strongest moral obligations, and so to all appearance against the strongest motives. No consciousness of mine asserts this invariable prevalence of strongest motive.

7. Against this theory the question lies in full force, What is the use of a power which is never used by any being whatever? The answers which we have The theory is useless. rendered in our own behalf* cannot avail for this theory. It cannot be said that there is no antecedent class of unused motives. For, by this theory, there is antecedently a class which will be used and a class which will be rejected. Nor can it be said that it is a power which may be used for a good purpose; for it is useless to expect that such a purpose will ever be attained. Nor can it serve in any degree as a basis for a just divine government; for no divine ruler could ever require an act of righteousness which neither himself nor

* See p. 113.

any possible being in the conditions would ever perform, namely, the act of choosing contrary to the uniform law of motive. Of what use, then, is this power tacked to the being? It serves no purpose; it elucidates no difficulty; it satisfies no moral demand; it is not good for anything.

CHAPTER XIII.

COUNTER CHOICE A PRODIGY.

A FEW thinkers there are who abandon necessity, both causational and uniformitarian, and maintain that counter choice may supposably happen, but nevertheless is an extraordinary or a prodigy.

Against such a view we can of course have little argument; for our issue is with necessitarianism, and these thinkers advocate a real freedomism however crude. This theory freedomistic. Edwards maintained that counter choice is unthinkable; they maintain that it may be held, not only as thinkable, but as often taking place; for extraordinaries in the course of centuries do often happen.

This freedomism, however, can scarce give a rational account of itself, either to the reason or the moral sense. For if necessity and uniformitarianism are fairly abandoned, and freedom consists in counter choice supposably sometimes made, why should not either alternative be often equally easy, probable, and normal? What reason is there for supposing such choice may happen which does not indicate that it may ordinarily happen? More-
Incomplete. over, since this view admits that power is necessary to obligation, it follows that the greater the prodigy the less the guilt of non-performance. Is it just to require of weak man the performance of prodigies? Here these thinkers stand upon an inclined plane, perpetually tending to diminish the pro-

digiousness to justify the divine government, and ever descending to the level of plain freedomism. But as it is of the purely natural man they affirm this freedom, this descent is into old Pelagianism. From this they can be saved only by the Arminian doctrine that grace underlies all our moral probationary freedom; a doctrine that affords a freedomism ample enough for the broadest Pelagianism, and an honor to divine grace that should satisfy the highest Calvinism.

Tends to Pelagianism.

CHAPTER XIV.

VOLITIONAL POWERLESSNESS, OR "MORAL INABILITY." *

THE necessitarian has demonstrated to his own satisfaction that for volition, even for right, against strongest motive-force, there is in the agent no adequate causality or power, and that such volition would be what, by a forcible solecism, may be called a *causeless effect*; and this non-causality-in-Will=volitional powerlessness he is pleased to style "Moral Inability." The common sense of mankind then demands what obligation there can be upon any agent or cause to produce, without causality or power, an act which is best expressed by a solecism in words, because it is a contradiction in thought and in thing.

Volitional non-causality.

Basis of obligation?

1. His answer, according to Edwards, *should* be that no power *to* an act is necessary in order to obligation; no power *from* an act in order to responsibility or guilt.

* In necessitarian nomenclature "Moral Ability" is *the power to will*;=volitional ability or power. "Natural Ability" is the sequent power to obey or fulfill the volition;=post-volitional ability. A man wills to strike by a "moral ability;" the arm executes the blow by a "natural ability."

His maxim is, *no matter how we came by act; if it be ours, the merit or demerit is the same.** When, therefore, he proceeds to furnish the underlying power upon which responsibility is really based, he contradicts himself. The whole procedure of furnishing any ability whatever for the act in order to obligation is absurd. It is affirmed that responsibility is without a basis of power and yet has a basis of power. We will call this contradiction *number first*.

2. But when he proposes to furnish an underlying power for the required act, of course it must be what he proposes to furnish, namely, *an ability* FOR THE REQUIRED ACT. It must not be some other ability, and for some other act or thing. Now, what he is to furnish is the ability for the volition required.† But what does our necessitarian do? He is compelled by his own great demonstration to admit and maintain that there is no causality, power, or ability *in the Will* ("Moral Ability") for the *volition required*. And so in the lieu of that he proceeds

to say that though there is in the Will no power for the volition—no Moral Ability—yet there is out of the Will in the agent a power—"Natural Ability"—for obeying, fulfilling, or post-volitionally executing the volition, provided it could and did exist. The man who has not the power to *will* is responsible, because he has power to externally *do*—if he did will. This, we say, is furnishing a power

* See p. 402.

† Edwards says, (p. 228,) "*The Will itself*, and not only (merely) those acts which are the effect of the Will, is the proper object of precept or command. . . . The motions or state of the body are matter of command only as they are subject to the soul, and connected with its acts. But now the soul has no other faculty whereby it can, in the most direct and proper sense, yield to or comply with any command but the faculty of the Will. . . . Other acts, that are not acts of the Will . . . are obedience or disobedience only indirectly, as they are connected with the state or actions of the Will, according to an established law of nature," etc.

for the act required which is not the power for the act required; and this we label contradiction *number second*.

This contradictoriness, number second, is self-evident. The thing claimed to be furnished is a power for a given volition; but the very point, aim, or gist of the whole necessitarian argument is to demonstrate that no power for the given volition, the sole power required, can exist; and for that power he substitutes a power which is not *in the Will*, nor *for a volition*; but it is a power *out of the Will* and for a *post-volitional* and ordinarily a mere corporeal, material act. Now this, we say, is a self-evident contradiction. It is a power furnished which is in the Will, but is not in any sense in the Will; it is for a volition, which is in no sense a volition.

Power out of
place and
for other
thing.

If the power be not in the Will it is not anywhere. Nowhere else can there be any power to the purpose. It might just as well be a power in the Pleiades as even in the agent *out of the Will*. And if it be not for a volition, but for something post-volitional, it is nothing to the case; nothing in the world is done. It might, so far as human responsibility is concerned, be a power in the Pleiades to discard gravitation.

Power no-
where.

And for
nothing.

3. But there is a self-contradiction *number third*. This "natural ability" is the power in the agent to fulfill the volition; but what volition? A volition which not only does not and cannot exist, but which it is the very purpose of the entire necessitarian argument to *prove* to be unable to exist. The proffer of this natural ability is to furnish a power in the lieu of that demonstratedly impossible volition. The external, or post-volitional fulfillment is furnished under the very presumption of the absence and impossibility of the very volition it is to fulfill. Necessitarianism first demonstrates the impossibility of the voli-

Contradic-
tion third.

Impossible
fulfillment
of impossi-
ble volition.

tion, and then proposes to base responsibility on the power to fulfill or obey that demonstrably impossible volition. The fulfillment is post-volitional, with no possible volition before it. It is the fulfillment where there can be nothing to fulfill, and is in fact proffered *because* there can be nothing for it to fulfill. The very fact that there is no possibility for the volition is the reason why its imaginary fulfillment is proposed as a most solemn reality—a basis for a most momentous responsibility.

Both the exercise and the existence of this natural ability are a *causeless effect*. The *exercise* of this ability would be a causeless effect, because, as necessitarianism itself demonstrates, its sole possible cause, the antecedent volition, cannot exist. The exercise must be the effect; the antecedent volition the cause; but the antecedent volition necessitarianism has shown to be itself a contradiction, and so an impossibility. The exercise then would be an effect without a cause. And equally the *power* for such exercise—the “natural ability” itself—must exist only as effect without cause. Without the existence of that same antecedent self-contradictory volition, the *power* for its fulfillment has no existence. The self-contradictory is the cause; the power to fulfill it is its effect. No “natural ability” to fulfill a volition against strongest motive ever did or can exist except as a *causeless effect*, the self-contradictory consequent of a self-contradictory *antecedent*.

If any one wishes to know how contradictory, self-explosive, self-expelling from existence, unthinkable and idiotic a thing necessitarianism holds that *antecedent* to be, let him read Edwards’s famous demonstration against the self-determining power. And then let him mark that it is upon the power and act *consequent* to that contradictory, unthinkable, self-determining act as *antecedent*, that Edwards bases human responsibility. Now if such

Effect *be-*
cause no
cause.

“Natural
ability” is
causeless ef-
fect.

“Natural
ability” is
the conse-
quent of
self-determ-
ination.

be the nature and character of the *antecedent*, what must be the nature and character of the consequent—the necessitarian base of human responsibility? It requires that power and act of "self-determination" which Edwards so scouts to bring "natural ability" into existence. The whole, then, of that renowned demonstration against "self-determination" is an equally strong, and still stronger demonstration against "natural ability"—still stronger, for the self-determining act, with all its absurdities, must exist, in all its completeness and finish, *before* the "natural ability" can *begin* to take existence.

There must exist in the agent the adequate *causality*, namely, the antecedent volition, or there cannot exist in him the effect, namely, the post-volitional, corporeal, or intellectual ability, that is, the "natural ability." And if there cannot be the "natural ability," that is, the causality for the post-volitional act, then there cannot exist the causality for the *required* post-volitional act. Necessitarianism, therefore, builds responsibility on a basis which she has previously utterly and overwhelmingly destroyed. She thereby overwhelms herself in her professed effort to furnish a power for obligated act. She sinks by her own self-contradictions back into her position, that an agent is required to act without power for the act required; that a cause is obligated to produce a causeless effect.

Where there is no *moral ability* there can be no *natural ability*. Where there is no power to will, there is no power to execute the behest of the will. That behest cannot be obeyed if it cannot exist. If there be no adequate power for the given volition, there is no volition to obey, and so no power to obey. An impossible volition cannot be fulfilled. If a man through counter motive-force has no power to *will* otherwise than sin, he has no sequent power to *do* otherwise than ^{No "natural ability" without "moral."} sin. If a man has not the power to will right, he has not the power to act right. An agent can perform a bodily act

only through his Will. And as it is a universal law that no agent can *do* what he cannot *will*, so it is a universal truth that where there is no power of will, there is no bodily power to fulfill the volition which cannot exist. What a man cannot *will*, that he cannot *do*. That is, where there is no *moral ability*, there can be no *natural ability*. Hence it is helplessly absurd to propose "natural ability," in the absence of "moral ability," as a ground of responsibility.

CHAPTER XV.

"MORAL ABILITY" AS TREATED BY EDWARDS.

CLEARLY to state this notable necessitarian theory for the solution of responsibility for necessitated volition is to make bare its absurdity. It is tolerated only when wrapped in ambiguities of phrase. Edwards's definition, for instance, of his moral inability or necessitarian volitional powerlessness, which he assumes to have overwhelmingly demonstrated to be produced by counter strongest motive-power, is when he comes (Part I, sec. 4) to meet the question of responsibility, in its case a signal instance of the "use of words to conceal thoughts." He does not tell us, as a definer should, what this necessitarian powerlessness or non-causality from strongest counter motive-force is; but he professes to tell us in what it "consists;" and yet he really does not tell us in what it "consists;" he only tells us upon what *conditions* it exists, or by what it is *caused*. He tells us it "consists" (p. 45) "in either, 1. The want of inclination, or, 2. The strength of a contrary inclination, or, 3. The want of sufficient motives in view to induce and excite the act of will, or, 4. The strength of

apparent motives to the contrary." The whole four of this amusing enumeration of particulars is embraced in the last; namely, in the strongest counter motive-force. The quadruple consists of two couples; the two members of each couple are the same thing; and the two same things are finally one same thing; and that same thing is the strongest counter motive-force. The first couple is the "want of inclination" to a given act or "strength of contrary inclination" against it; but these are the same thing; for strength of contrary inclination is want of favorable inclination, and where they amount to a moral inability the mind is under strongest counter motive-force. The second couple are one; namely, a mental condition of subjection to strongest counter motive-force. So that in all cases subjection to strongest counter motive-force is the condition, volitional powerlessness to the required act is the result. The act cannot take place for want of cause, or because strongest contrary causation makes it impossible.

Edwards himself indeed reduces the four to "inclination." But "inclination" cannot in any case be the inability itself, but the condition of the inability.* Inclination can reach the will only through or as motive; and the inability is the result of motive, namely, of the counter motive-force. The inclination is therefore one or two steps anterior to the *inability*, and not identical with it.

Of the instances Edwards gives, a single one will furnish exemplification to our argument: "A woman of great honor and chastity may have a moral inability to prostitute herself to her slave." That is, according to necessitarianism, such is the permanent state and correlation of motives with her mind, that there is not in it the causality for the volition; so that the volition would be a true instance of causeless effect. If so, then we say that the external act would also be a

His ambiguous definition.

His instances.

* See p. 52.

causeless effect. So that if there is no moral ability, there is no natural ability. If the absence of motive, or force of counter motive, render the volition impossible, the absence of volition renders the external act impossible. What she cannot will, that she cannot do. It is simply the impossibility of an event without a cause; the universal impossibility that a fixed train of causes and effects should run off the track.

It is true that in the frame of the above-mentioned lady there may be corporeal strength for the act named, *if* the other requisite causalities were present. But that is only one constituent of the necessary adequate power.* It is, as is elsewhere shown, only a *power* in the sense of a part of *the power*; it is not the underlying ADEQUATE power, sufficient for the effect, of which alone the requisition for responsibility can take cognizance. The act is not responsibly possible without that totality of causal constituents requisite for its existence.

Into this so-called *moral necessity* or *moral inability*, by which this lady is powerless to the named volition, there must not be incautiously infused any infinitesimal particle of Arminian contingency. Necessitarianly speaking, it is as fixed as the motion of the planets in their orbits, when all the forces of attraction and repulsion are in their well-adjusted play. It is fixed by that professedly demonstrated absurdity of a self-determining power, or power of diverse choice, than which no mathematical necessity, no necessity of the divine self-existence can, according to necessitarianism, be more fixed. Edwards, indeed, graciously tells us that volitional or "moral necessity *may be* as absolute as natural necessity;" that is, as physical or mathematical necessity. But there is no "may be" about it. All necessity is absolute and equally absolute. There can be no tight and loose necessities. Necessity, if necessity, is perfect,

No tight and loose necessities.

* See p. 51.

and has no degrees. It is the non-existence of adequate power to be otherwise, and non-existence cannot be graduated. There can be no fractions of nothing. Moral, that is, volitional necessity, physical necessity, (with all its sub-classes of mechanical necessity, chemical necessity, magnetic necessity, electric necessity, etc.,) and mathematical necessity, differ only in the termini connected not in the absoluteness and fixedness of the connection. Certainly if any other necessity is a soft necessity, this volitional necessity, according to Edwards, with his demonstrated infinities of infinities of absurdity, even in the conception of a diverse or self-determining power, is quite as absolute as the most absolute in the catalogue. And it is by that so-called necessity that the lady in question has no power either moral or natural for the wickedness named.

We have remarked that much of the necessitarian language on this subject seems used, unconsciously, we presume, to conceal thought. We now say that the very terminology is false and deceptive. The terms *moral* and *natural* as thus applied to ability ^{Bad nomenclature.} and inability convey, especially to the popular mind, false ideas, and are among the misleading ambiguities that should be banished from any metaphysical or theological nomenclature that aims at precision.

This moral inability, so-called, is in the Will; it is therefore a *volitional inability*, powerlessness, or non-causality. Natural ability is made to cover the whole field of our nature *outside the Will*; it is therefore an *extravolitional* or post-volitional *ability*.

The apology framed by Edwards for these terms may excuse the user, but does not authorize the use. He admits that his *moral* is as truly ^{Bad excuse for it.} *natural* as his *natural*; and his *natural* he might admit to be as truly *moral* as his *moral*. But he tells us that nature being observed to be "in a settled course," "the word nature is often used in opposition to

choice." But that is a very untrue statement. The word "nature" is no ordinary antithesis to "choice." God and nature, man and nature, grace and nature, are normal antitheses, but not choice and nature.* And what aggravates the falsity of this antithesis is the fact that the term *nature*, as used in this terminology, is made to embrace with external nature man himself—except his Will. It is the Will *versus* human and universal nature. That is, every other part of man is nature; is of a piece with external nature; but the Will is not natural, it is no part of even man's nature!

These terms, *natural* and *moral*, as thus used, are no exclusive antithesis; that is, they do not ex-
Terms "nat-
ural and
moral." clude each other. Many things are both *moral* and *natural*. Why should *natural* be opposed to *Will* when the Will is as natural a power as the intellect or the corporeal strength? The volitions are as truly natural as any bodily act. The Will is a *natural* part of the human soul. The ability or inability of the Will is a natural ability or inability. There is no faculty more natural than the Will, or that stands above it, or antithetical to it, as more eminently natural. On the other hand, to make moral=volitional is absurd; for many acts of the Will belong not to the sphere of *morals*. They are not moral or ethical acts, and therefore they exert no moral ability; and so again the power to will is not a moral but a natural ability. A large share of our volitions are wholly unethical. So that this volitional ability, unless conferred by supernatural grace, is always most truly a *natural ability*.

This misuse of terms infringes upon and tends to sup-
Bad use ex-
pels right
use, plant their legitimate application to their proper significates. There is a proper natural

* Perhaps Dr. Bushnell's *Natural and Supernatural* contains an attempt to inaugurate this antithesis. But his theory identifies *choice*, not as *moral*, but as *supernatural*.

ability, moral ability, and *gracious ability*, to which these terms should be exclusively applied.

Natural ability or abilities include all the abilities or powers with which a man is born or into which he grows. *Natural* is hereby often antithetical to *acquired*. The term ability includes capabilities of body or mind; of mind including intellect, Will, or moral sense.

Moral ability, being a species under natural ability, is every power of body or mind viewed as capable of being exerted for a moral or immoral purpose.

Gracious ability is an ability, whether of body or soul, conferred by divine goodness over and above the abilities possessed by man by nature, that is, as a born and growing creature.

Language, we repeat, may be so used as to conceal thought, and this may be done with great unconscious skill. Edwards, after having demonstrated positively, in behalf of the doctrine of necessity, the non-existence of power of volition against strongest motive-force, having named this no-power *moral inability*, next proceeds in behalf of the demands of responsibility to declare that this moral inability is *no inability at all*! This denial is in fact *nominal* and of the *word*, but is so phrased as to seem *real* and of the *thing*. Thereby necessity is really saved, and responsibility is saved in words; for while a no-power is demonstrated, an *inability* of some sort may be denied, as well as some sort of *ability* be affirmed.

Edwards's
denial

Is verbal.

The word *inability*,* he says, more properly belongs

* "The word *inability* is used in a sense very diverse from its original import. The word signifies only a natural inability, in the proper use of it; and is applied to such cases only wherein a present Will or inclination to the thing, with respect to which a person is said to be unable, is supposed. It cannot be truly said, according to the ordinary use of language, that a malicious man, let him be never so malicious, cannot hold his hand from striking, or that he is not able to show his neighbor kindness; or that a drunkard, let his appetite be never so strong, cannot keep the cup from his mouth."

not to the Will, but to the sequent powers of fulfilling the Will's command. There is no verbally proper *inability* in the ruffian's Will to withhold the ruffianly blow, or in the drunkard's Will to reject his cups.

To this we reply, 1. Whether "the *word* inability" be the proper term to designate the *powerlessness* or non-causality in the Will to volitionate counter strongest motive or not, is irrelevant to the case; the only question being whether such powerlessness be fact. And as it is the whole purpose of the necessitarian argument to prove that it is fact, it is the same as the question whether necessitarianism is true. If necessitarianism be true, then such powerlessness is fact. Blocked by counter motive-force, the ruffian's Will and hand are equally powerless for the blow, the drunkard's for the cup. As the entire body of Edwards's argument, if it proves anything, proves it true, it is altogether irrelevant for him to state that a particular word is not the right name to call it by. The applicability of a particular word has nothing to do with the question of the real existence of the fact that this necessitarian powerlessness really exists, and is the negation of all basis for just responsibility. Volitionally and muscularly powerless, no agent could be required to act or not act. The term *inability*, at any rate, is so far suitable and pertinent as that it calls up the actual fact as it is asserted by necessitarians to exist; and being by them selected it is very inconsistent in them to criticise it; and it is palpably deceptive to so repudiate the *word* as to seem to deny the *thing*.

2. Either there is this powerlessness to will, and so to fulfill volition counter strongest motive-force, or there is not. If there is not such powerlessness against such force, then there is a true and real adequate *power* which may be exerted of volition counter strongest motive; that is, there is that famous "self-determining power" so scouted by necessitarians; that "power of contrary choice" which is the contradictory and over-

Question of
fact.

Either coun-
ter power or
not.

throw of volitional necessitarianism; and then Arminian freedomism is true, and all the demonstrations of Edwards roll up into vanishing vapor. It is to demonstrate this point, namely, that *there is not the adequate power in Will to choose counter strongest motive-force* that Edwards wrote his book. That is the very doctrine of Necessity. But if there be, according to necessity, that demonstrated powerlessness and non-causality against motive-force, then let the necessitarian stand to it. Let there be no wordy legerdemain, no verbal denials that there is an *inability* in the Will because "the word" inability, "in the proper sense of it," is applicable solely to the sequents of Will, which denials are accepted by the unwary as equivalent to an affirmation that there is a power in the Will, and consequently in the sequents of Will, which is ample base for responsibility.

But Edwards next proceeds to maintain that the terms *power and ability* are here inapplicable, because not properly applied to will or choice, but to the powers and actions sequent to choice; since a thing is, in strict language, held to be in power, if the post-volitional capabilities are able to fulfill the Will or volition if present.*

Edwards's
next position.

So far as this argument is merely verbal, dealing with the application of a term, it has no validity in determining the reality of the irresponsible powerlessness. So far as it is a real argument, it is a most unconscionable statement that power and no power are attributable to the post-volitional powers alone, and

So far as real,
erroneous.

* "In the strictest propriety of speech, a man has a thing in his power if he has it in his choice or at his election; and a man cannot be truly said to be unable to do a thing when he can do it if he will. It is improperly said that a person cannot do those external actions which are dependent on the act of the Will, and which would be easily performed if the act of the Will were present." (Edwards, p. 48.) This and the quotations which follow in this chapter are successive sentences in the closing passages of Edwards's chapter on "Moral Inability."

not to Will; and that they are not predicable of the agent as inhering in the Will. We affirm, in contradiction, that a man's will may truly be said to be *without power*, or *unable*, or under *inability* to choose; it is rightly said that he cannot choose for want of power to will, and that he cannot *do*, or *move*, or corporeally *act*, because he cannot *choose* to so do, move, or act.

1. If human language affirms that "a man has a thing in his power if he has it in his choice," common language is herein Arminian. Human language does hold that "a man has a thing in his power if he has it in his choice;" but human language does not affirm that he has it in his power by having it in his choice, if the choice itself be a causeless effect, and so out of his power. What Edwards does is to clap necessity upon will, and then appeal to our natural, spontaneous consciousness (which is Arminian) that our free will is free will in proof that a necessitated will is free will. It holds a thing in his choice to be in his power, because it holds his choice to be in his power. The external act is in the power of his choice, and the choice is in the power of the man; therefore, the external act is in the power of the man. Hence the human consciousness is herein Arminian. And if the thing be commended by the weaker motive, and still be in power, then common language and common sense hold that the choice for a weaker motive is in power. 2. But a thing is not in the choice or at the election of a man, when to choose that thing would be an effect without a cause, or when the

very principle of causation itself secures another choice, and so another act, and therefore annihilates all power or possibility to this. For certainly nothing can be in the power of an impossible choice; and a choice that would be a causeless effect must be an impossible choice. 3. It is, in spite of Edwards, very properly said "that a person cannot perform those external actions which would be easily performed if the

Men's phrase,
Arminian.

At a man's
choice.

act of the Will were present," provided there exists no power for the act of the Will, that is, provided that act of the Will were a causeless effect. 4. If some other causation than the influence of counter highest motive, as mesmerism or fascination, were to exclude the power to a volition, it would be immediately seen and confessed that there would be no power in the corporeity to perform the unwilled act. Of a man without power to choose a thing—as against counter strongest motive-force—it is not true that "he has it in his choice or at his election;" for an impassable gulf lies between him and that choice. It is certainly most true and properly said "that a person cannot do those external actions which are dependent on the act of the Will, and which would be easily performed if the act of the Will were present," whenever there is in the person, from strongest counter motive-force, no adequate power to will. For the sequent acts of the volition cannot be performed without both the power of volition, and the exertion of that power. The power of volition is a causal condition, requisite in order to the existence of the power of post-volitional action; and when the condition cannot exist the result cannot exist. *What a man cannot will, that he cannot do.* Where there is no power of Will, there is no power of action consequent upon Will.

Not at his choice.

Separating our nature thus into *two factors*, the Will and the sequent *Post-volitionality*, it is plain that in each factor there must be its own adequate power for its required action, and there must be co-operative exertion of each power for the composite action of both. There must be power in the Will for volition; there must be power, also, in the Post-volitionality, whether body or mind, for obedient execution of the volition. It is surely untrue to say that the power of each is not requisite for the composite action of both. Taking stand-point, indeed, with either one of the above

Two factors:
Will, and its
executor.

two factors, and tacitly assuming its adequate power, a man may say that all the ability is to be required solely in the other factor.* *Taking thus stand-point with the Will*, a man may say that the thing is in his power if he can post-volitionally fulfill the Will's behest—just because he tacitly *assumes his own power of Will*. And as men are practically most obliged to discuss what they can ex-

ternally accomplish, *assuming their power of Will*, so they talk, without express reference to Will, as if the corporeal or post-volitional thing were in their power if there is corporeal or post-volitional ability to perform it. But they surely do not mean that, without any volition or power of volition, their corporiety is able to start up of itself and perform the thing unwilled. They do not deny the requisiteness of the power of Will; they assume that power to exist, ready for action in the proper conditions; and that all that is now wanting for full composite action is corporeal power. For *taking the contrary stand-point*, with the corporiety, and *assuming its adequate conditionality*, the same man

may say that the thing would be in his power, provided he had the ABILITY to will it. And from that stand-point it is right to say "that a person cannot perform those external actions"—for want of a power of Will—"which are dependent on the Will, and which would easily be performed if the act of the Will were present." A man can TRULY "be said to be unable to do a thing"—for want of a power of Will—"when he can do it if he will." For *what a man cannot will, that he cannot do*. *What a man cannot will, he can neither will nor do*. The terms *can* and *cannot*, *able* and *unable*, *ability* and *inability*, are thus with quite sufficient accuracy applicable to either, and *the idea conveyed is not the less true because the phraseology is not normal*; but whether the term be or be not verbally accurate, there is affirmed by necessitarianism a *powerlessness* in the

* See p. 54.

Will for volition against strongest motive-force, to which the necessitarian has affixed the term *moral inability*, which negatives all basis of human responsibility.

And note, it is in the absence of the requisite causal conditions necessary to the result, (namely, of *power of Will*,) that necessitarianism requires the result to be possible. Its defender cannot say that he only asserts or requires the resultant power or possibility under assumption that the causal conditions all do exist and are present. He is assigning natural ability as a ground of responsibility *in the absence of moral ability*. That is, he is assigning the power of post-volitional corporeal action in the *absence of power to will* that action. Its very object is to find ground of responsibility *in an admitted case of non-existence of power to will*, and finds it in the power of external action in that same instance of no-power to Will. We are held to be obligated to perform an act, because, forsooth, we possess power to perform it without power to will. That is, we are obligated to bring into existence a result for which the requisite conditions cannot exist. That is, we are obligated to produce an effect without cause, a deed without the power of doing.

Natural ability is to supply the want of the moral.

And inasmuch as this is the effort of necessitarianism to furnish a power adequate to responsibility, it admits for the time being that adequate power is requisite to responsibility. And yet it offers no power that exists. It offers only the impossible power of doing a thing without the power to will it; of effecting a thing without a causal power; of producing a result without the existence of the necessary conditions. That is, necessitarianism acknowledges the requisiteness of the power but furnishes none.

No basis of responsibility.

A command, let us say, comes to me from God requiring a volition contrary to the strongest motive-force. But I have no power of contrary choice; contrary, that is, to the highest motive-force. Now what adequate power

have I to obey this divine command? I have no power in the Will, for that would be the condemned power of contrary choice. I have no such power in the body, for No power in mind or body. the body cannot move where there is no volition, much more where there is no power of volition. There is no power, then, either in soul or body, by which I can obey the divine command. And every case of actual sin is a case of this kind. Every case of actual sin is a case in which counter motive-force, that is, counter causation, excludes, first from Will and then from body, all adequate power to obey the divine command. Sin always occurs, a thing the sinner cannot help. God's command is always disobeyed because it cannot be obeyed. No agent ever sinned who had, in body or in soul, the adequate power not to sin. Men are always damned by God for not doing what they cannot do; or Sin cannot be helped. for doing what they cannot help doing. God first puts in motion those causations that cut off the volitional power of obedience, and then damns a man to all eternity for disobedience! All this "to the praise of his glorious justice!"

Though our Calvinistic friends say that we have no *moral ability*, that is, ability in the Will, for the right volition, yet—*something* supplies the want of it—namely, *natural ability*, that is, ability in the body. But, alas! just when the moral ability is wanting, always and ever, the ability in the body, which is to supply the deficit, is An evasive power. wanting too. A most villainous ability surely is that which always, and for ever and ever, steps out just when it is wanted! It not only does not *stay*, but it does not *be*. It steps not only out of reach but out of existence. *What a man cannot will, that he cannot do.* That is, where there is no "moral ability" there is no "natural ability."

Edwards adds, "It is still more improperly said that he is unable to exert the acts of the Will themselves; because it is more evidently false with respect to these

that he cannot *if* he will." But there is no ^{If he will} "if" allowable in the case; the case being that of counter causation excluding both the "Will" and the "if." Edwards, in his chapter on the self-determining power, has professedly demonstrated that the very conception of this "he will" with the "if" before it, is infinitely and infinitely absurd. And the conditional "if he will" being absurd, any consequent power of Will as basis of responsibility is absurd. It is not "improperly said that he is unable to exert the acts of the Will themselves," because the very "if" which supposes them possible in the case is absurd. A stone may start up and fly, *if it will*; but the very *if* being absurd, the consequent is equally absurd.

Last comes the cap to the whole climax of absurdity. "There are," Edwards concludes, "faculties of mind and capacity of nature, and everything else sufficient, but a disposition: nothing is wanting but a Will."

Now, in every sense of this triply ambiguous dictum, it is, on his own necessitarian hypothesis, vitally and fatally false. If the wanting "WILL" means the volitional faculty of the man, the constituent power ^{The triple untruth.} *to will* in the human soul, no man, not even the vilest sinner, wants that integral part of the man. If it means the disposition, or temper of heart, or "inclination," not only is that wanting, but, what is very much more, and the very gist of the difficulty, the power to the "inclination," or temper, or disposition is wanting. If it means that the *volition* merely is wanting, that is as momentously untrue; for it is the POWER *to the volition* that is wanting.*

* It was to meet the moral demand for *power* in such case that the doctrine of Invariable Sequence, discussed in a former chapter, was invented. Its maintainers "can preach moral ability" to will against strongest motive! Alas! it is by an absolute universal law an unexercisable power; a power not in the possession of the agent; no power in him at all. Such a power furnishes no escape from the argument of these chapters.

CHAPTER XVI.

"MORAL ABILITY" AS HOMILETICALLY TREATED.

THE closing remark of the last chapter exhibits a radical error running through all the necessitarian utterances on this subject. It is the confounding the *want* of the act with the *want of the power of the act*. It is the confounding of the absence of inclination or volition with the absence of the power of or for the inclination or volition. And the reason, or rather motive, of this perpetually cherished fallacy is obvious. The ignoring the fact that not the act but the power of the act is wanting evades the negation of responsibility. The mere ACT may be wanting and the responsibility remains. The POWER of *the act* is wanting, and responsibility disappears. But the necessitarian is unjustifiable in thus substituting the want of mere *act* for the want of the *power*. It is founding responsibility upon a falsification of facts. If the strongest motive-force must prevail, as every efficient cause must produce its effect, if the self-determining power be infinitely absurd as in any physical cause, if the power of contrary choice is inconceivable, if a choice counter strongest motive-force be an event without adequate causality, then there is a powerlessness, a non-causality, of the Will to choose in the case just as absolute as in a physical agent to produce a causeless effect, and not the mere absence or withholding of the act of choice.

The most melancholy point in these systematic misstatements of fact is that they are introduced by the preacher and practical pastor into his sermons and his dealings with men's souls. Thereby the minister of Christ becomes, unconsciously and uninten-

Preaching
equivoca-
tions.

tionally, we gladly admit, an equivocator and a sophist. We wish herein to indicate the sad mismanagement by which the cause of God and righteousness is betrayed, and the best of the argument yielded to impotence and sin, in order to clear the way of truth to the consciences of men, and to render the labors of such a minister more successful in subduing their hearts to the obedience of the faith.

To exemplify these equivocations we take some passages from a sermon of the excellent Dr. Wardlaw, (an extract from which, six pages in length, we find in "Rutherford on Election," pp. 199-205,) in which the fallacy appears in its various forms.

1. *Substituting the want of the ACT for the want of POWER for the act.*

"To say you *would* believe if you *could* is not only not true, it is the precise opposite of truth. The plain truth is that you *could* believe if you *would*; there being no one thing whatever that prevents you from believing but the *want of Will*; nothing between you and pardon but the want of Will to have it in God's way—that is, freely, and in connection with holiness, with newness of life."

We find here the same ambiguous use of the word *Will* for *volition*, as in Edwards; and the same assumption that what is wanting is the mere Want of act for want of power. *act*, instead of the *power* of the act. Yet so long as the counter motive was strongest, that is, so long as the adverse volition really existed, Dr. W., as a necessitarian, was obliged to admit that the *power* did not exist. He was, therefore, requiring an impossible act, a causeless effect, which his audience could deny to be just. The advocate for God is a sophist, and his reasoning a fallacy. The best of the argument is with the sinner.

2. *Confounding the faculties of the mind with the specific power in the faculty for the required particular act.**

* See p. 51.

“You have all the natural faculties and powers that are necessary to constitute a ground of accountableness. You have the natural powers required for considering, understanding, believing, choosing, loving and hating, speaking and acting—and moreover, for asking.”

The sinner may have all these faculties, including that of “choosing;” but while counter motive is strongest he has not the adequate power in the faculty for the required choice. There is a faculty of choice, but it has not the specific power to choose the thing. If adequate power must underlie obligation there is no obligation to the required act. The best of the argument is again with the sinner. The cause of God is mismanaged and betrayed.

3. *The identification of power and no-power, ability and inability, with inclinations, dispositions, and their opposites.*

“So far from being unable, in any sense that palliates your unbelief and impenitence—your *inability*, rightly interpreted, resolves itself into the strongest mode of expressing your culpability and guilt. For what does the word mean? Simply *the strength of your antipathy to God and to goodness*. Your inability to believe is only another phrase for your aversion to the truth of God. Your inability to ‘repent and turn to God, and do works meet for repentance,’ what else is it, less or more, than your fondness for the service of sin and of the world, and your unwillingness to relinquish it? What is it but that you cannot give up the world—you cannot renounce your favorite sins.”

Here inability is identified with an “antipathy,” an “aversion,” and a “fondness.” Now these “inclinations” are no power or want of power; for power is an attribute, and these are subjects of an attribute.* Inclinations are the result of a want of power superinduced by strongest counter influence resistlessly producing the inclination.

* See p. 52.

They are also a cause of inability, or the absence of the conditions of ability, when they exclude power to a given volition. But they cannot be the inability itself. And as necessitated, and then necessitatedly necessitating, they are equally irresponsible.

But Dr. W. here identifies this necessitated inability with "culpability and guilt." He could do this only on the assumption that power to a different course was requisite for responsibility for their actual course. He must deny that they are irresponsible for the absolutely inevitable. And thus his gospel is at issue with the surrest moral intimations of the human soul.

CHAPTER XVII.

"MORAL INABILITY" EXPRESSED IN ORDINARY PHRASE.

THIS imaginary "moral inability" has been found also in one of the ordinary modes of expression in which we at first view seem to affirm a mere unwillingness or opposition of Will by terms that signify want of ability. Instead of instituting ^{Popular phraseology.} an analysis to ascertain the psychological solution of this fact, these theologians have grounded upon it that most unscientific identification of *inclination* with *power* which we have exposed in the preceding chapters.

We give the grounds of this verbal argument in the words of Dr. Pond, from his article in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* on Hopkinsianism: "We find it in all books, and in reference to all sorts of subjects; so that those who are inclined to repudiate it find it next to impossible to succeed. The *μη δυναμί* of the Greek, the *non possum* of

the Latin, the *ne puis pas* of the French, the little *cannot* of the English, are continually used in two different senses: the one what is called a *moral*, the other a *natural* ability; the one a *mere inability of disposition and Will*, the other an *inability extraneous to the Will*,* and over which the Will has no power. We ask a pious friend to lift for us a thousand pounds. He replies, "I cannot do it." We ask him to go to some place of amusement on the Sabbath; he replies again, "I cannot do it." In both cases he pleads, and pleads properly, (as terms are used,) an inability. But who does not see that here are two kinds of inability? Our friend has no natural power to lift a thousand pounds. He could not do it if he would. He has the natural power to comply with the other request, and only *lacks the willing mind*.†

"Joseph's brethren hated him, and *could not* speak peaceably unto him." (Gen. xxxvii, 4.) "We *cannot* but speak the things which we have seen and heard." (Acts iv, 20.) "I have married a wife, and therefore I cannot come." (Luke xiv, 20.) In each of these cases there is obviously no lack of capacity, of natural power. The inability is wholly of a moral nature, the inability of Will.

"Natural ability has respect to the natural capacity or faculties of an individual.‡ Moral ability has respect to the disposition, the concurrent Will, or (which is the

* Suppose, then, the command be to *will right*, and we have only this natural ability, "extraneous to the Will." Are we morally obligated without any power intrinsic to the Will to *will right*? If yes, then, contrary to what is said below, we are obligated to do what we have no power to do; for certainly a power "extraneous to the Will" is not a power to will. If *no*, then no volitional sin was ever committed; for all such supposed sins are committed under strongest motive, and without power to will otherwise. And if no volitional sin, then no sin at all, for Dr. P. makes sin consist in volitional "action."

† Does he not, Dr. Pond, according to necessitarianism, lack the power of the willing mind?

‡ Is not the Will a natural faculty?

same) to the predominant motive, with which the Will always coincides.

"Besides, this kind of ability* constitutes the ground and the measure of our moral obligation. We are morally bound to do, and God justly holds us responsible for doing all the good which he has given us the natural ability, the capacity to accomplish. As God has given us our faculties, he may justly require us to exercise them all in his service. And this is all that he can justly require. Should he command us to *exert powers which he has not given us?*"†

Now upon a little analysis it will perhaps be found that this so-called "moral cannot" does express a true inability, a natural inability, a physical and metaphysical impossibility, and as perfectly absolute a powerlessness or non-causality as nature or thought affords. All the cases that can be quoted belong to the <sup>Its grounds:
The Law of
Contradiction.</sup> *impossibility that both sides of a contradiction should at the same instant be true*, the impossibility arising from *incompatibility*. In all cases if one side of a contradiction be *assumed* as true—whether it actually be true or not, whether the truth be real or conceptual, removable or irremovable—the opposite side of the contradiction is pronounced impossible. And even if the contradiction be but a pretended one, still it is a natural, logical, and metaphysical impossibility, which is intended. If a certain course be held as so fixed that it cannot even be discussed or held questionable, then surely the opposite course is excluded as incompatible and so impossible. If I assume it as a settled point, not to be called in question or at all considered, that I am to remain in my study and write a chapter of manuscript, I shall tell my friend who invites me to a pleasure-ride that "I *cannot* go." For

* And why not the other kind too?

† If, then, he has never given us power to *will* right against strongest motive, can he "justly require" us to will right against strongest motive? Must not the strength of the motive furnish the measure and limit of the obligation?

Cannot by assumption. I assume it a fixed fact (however volitionally removable it may really be) that my person is to be in my chair; how then *can* it be in the carriage? or how can I will that it be so? By such a reply the refusal is based upon an assumption presupposed (whether validly or not) to be immovable, and the acceptance is excluded as an incompatibility, and so an impossibility, for which there is an "inability." "Ye cannot," says the Saviour, "serve God and Mammon." That is, assuming that we serve God, then we *cannot* serve Mammon; and assuming that we serve Mammon, we then *cannot* serve God. "Ye *cannot*," says the apostle, "drink of the cup of the Lord and the cup of devils." And, therefore, whichever they should do, by the law of contradiction they *could not* do the other.

Thus assuming that God has laid down unchangingly the laws of nature, we say with reverence that he cannot restore our departed friend to life, or cause a child to be a man in a day. We mean not that he cannot violate or change these laws. But tacitly assuming that he will not, then either of those things are impossible, because contradictory and incompatible. So assuming the eternally unchanging truthfulness of God as beyond all question, we affirm that he cannot lie.

God's "cannot." The assumed side of the contradiction may be a falsehood, a removable state of things, or an immutable fact and necessity. The condition to the impossibility or "inability" is the presupposed (not always the actual) immovability of the assumption; the impossibility lies in the incompatibility between the assumption and its opposite.

Thus God commanded Samuel to go and anoint David king; the prophet replied in his unbelief, "How can I go? If Saul hear it he will kill me." The prophet's double assumption that Saul would kill him, and that he was bound to keep out of danger, was false; but never-

theless, being silently assumed as true and settled, his going is impossible.

"How can ye believe," says the Saviour to the Jews, "who receive honor of one another, and seek not the honor that cometh from God?" The assumed and real condition of the mind of the Jews was voluntary and removable. But their tempers remaining as they were, and presupposed as not to be removed, the two things were incompatible.

A circle, presupposing that that figure remain unchanged, *cannot* be an angle. Here both a contingent and a necessary matter is assumed, namely, the unchanged self-sameness of the circle and its properties, and the impossibility lies in the incompatibility of the two figures. But the impossibility is in itself no more absolute than in the previously adduced examples.

So the texts quoted by Dr. Pond. Joseph's brethren "hated him, and could not speak peaceably unto him." Their hatred being presupposed as complete and firmly settled, is incompatible with peaceful speech. Perhaps they could have renounced their hatred; perhaps it was a psychological and a *natural* impossibility to do so; for we cannot always by any volitional or other natural power control our feelings or change our tempers. It may therefore have been an instance of the assumption of an unchangeable fact. But at any rate the sacred writer gives us a clear idea of its all-controlling intensity, by assuring us that it was utterly incompatible with a peaceful word. "We cannot but speak the things which we have heard." The not speaking and the fixed feelings prompted by the things heard were incompatible, perhaps intrinsically and irremovably, and perhaps not. "I have married a wife and cannot come." The presupposed and settled plans, purposes, feelings, and arrangements attending the matrimony, one or all, by incompatibility excluded his *coming*. In all these cases, and in every case of this class, one side being assumed as settled and

of course, for the other side there is a "lack of capacity, or natural power." And so of the supposed extra-scriptural instances of Dr. P. To lift a thousand pounds, and to break the Sabbath, the former by reality and the latter by assumption of the contradictory, were equally and equally naturally, physically, and metaphysically *impossible*. The latter was an impossibility by the law of contradiction, perfectly absolute in itself, though apparently not absolute because the assumption was of a removable fact. Equally natural and equally absolute, and on the same principle, is the impossibility of the leap from the precipice.

This class of linguistic expressions then does not indicate that inclination is itself power, or that there is any propriety in the distinction proposed between moral and natural power. Universally they indicate *a metaphysical and logical impossibility existing between a presupposition and its contradictory*.

SECTION THIRD.

THE THEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT.

CHAPTER I.

FOREKNOWLEDGE AND PREDESTINATION.

INTELLECT and will we are obliged to recognize in the divine Personality as truly as in the human. They are there as distinct as God's attributes of omniscience and omnipotence. And as foreknowledge belongs to the intellect, and foreordination to the Will, the former being perception and the latter volition, there can be no excuse for confounding the two or not recognizing their wide diversity. And as intelligent volition, or indeed any real volition, is preceded by perception, so God's foreordination must be viewed as being preceded by foreknowledge. Besides, as God's foreknowledge, being but a particular phase of his omniscience, is an attribute, and is of the essential attributes of the divine nature, so it must in the order of nature, even if both are eternal, precede foreordination, which, being a volition, is an act. Even in the depths of an antecedent eternity, as an eternal cause must be held in logical order to be antecedent to its eternal effect, so God, as omniscient and therefore as foreknow-
Foreknowl-
edge and
foreordi-
nation.
Their order of
precedence
in time.
ing, must be held to be antecedent to God, as acting, willing, and foreordaining. It is indeed impossible to conceive the Deity as acting or willing in unintelligent darkness. The knowledge of all futuritions, possible or

actual, even of his own divine actions, must in the order of nature precede the actions themselves. And as we purpose to show that the freedom of an act is not affected by its being the object of foreknowledge, so the freedom of the divine predeterminations is not restricted by the previous existence of the divine prescience of them.

In foreordination or predestination the divine volition is logically antecedent, and the event predestinated is immediately or mediately consequent. Their comparative relation to the event. Predestination is as an antecedent stereotype, to which the consequent total *complex* of events *must* conform. The consequent complex must conform to the antecedent stereotype; not, as in foreknowledge, the stereotype to the complex. Foreknowledge takes shape from the fact, the fact takes shape from the predestination. Predestination is the causative, logical, and chronological antecedent of the fact; foreknowledge is the chronological antecedent, but logical and causational consequent of the fact. If the stereotype conforms to the complex, then the complex is foreknown first, and then willed; which as between foreknowledge and foreordination concedes the former. It supposes that God foresees man's sin and ratifies it. The future fact is first overlaid with foreknowledge, and then that foreknowledge is overlaid with predestination, and thereby with necessitation. It implies all the dependence of God upon man which predestinarians object against Arminianism. It incurs all the charge of making God the authorizer of sin, which can be truly made against any form of predestination.

The distinction between "Causative and Permissive decrees," if by the latter is signified simply "Permissive decrees." God's volition to permit or non-prevent the free act of the free agent, is the Arminianism of Arminius himself. With it we have no controversy; for it appears in the proper place to be the very doctrine maintained in this treatise. But we may here note that by

the proposition that "God foreordains what-ever comes to pass," it is the *event* which is foreordained or decreed, and not its *permission*; so that such foreordination cannot be a mere "permissive decree."

Event, not permission, is foreordained.

Against the doctrine that foreknowledge precedes pre-determination the following is the argument.* "The foreknowledge of actual future events is not an *essential* attribute of God. We can conceive of him as a perfect God without it. If he had not chosen to create a universe he would still have been God.¹ But in that case there would have been no future events.² Foreknowledge must be distinguished from knowledge. The latter is an essential attribute of God, and extends to all possible existences; but the former can extend only to things which will actually exist.³ It must therefore first be determined that events *will be*, or there can be no foreknowledge of them.⁴ They must be transferred from mere future possibilities, which are objects of God's knowledge, to future certainties, before they can become objects of his foreknowledge. But this transfer can be made only by the Will of God.⁵ He alone can determine whether a thing that *may be* will be. His determining purpose must precede and be the ground of its certainty.⁶ Therefore God as decreeing must be conceived of as preceding God as foreknowing, and hence it is perfectly legitimate to reason from his foreknowledge to his decrees."⁷

Argument for precedence of pre-determination to fore-knowledge.

The fallacies, as we esteem them, are here so numerous that we mark them in the quotation with numerals for successive correction under corresponding numerals. 1. God cannot be conceived "as perfect God" without a foreknowledge of all future possibilities and actualities. *Whatever* of the future is *certain*, reflects its *certainly* back into the essential, eternal om-

Replies.

niscience of God. If omniscience be an attribute of God, the knowledge of all futurity is an attribute of God; and that is foreknowledge. 2. If God had produced no future events, then he would have eternally foreknown the absence of all future events. It is not the knowledge of future *events* exclusively, but the knowledge of all futurity, all that the future does or does not contain, which constitutes foreknowledge. Foreknowledge is omniscience comprehending the future. 3. *Foreknowledge* differs from *knowledge* just as much as a thing differs from itself. The knowledge of a future event or a future no-event is just as truly *knowledge* as the knowledge of the past or present. Omniscience includes all three. "*Known* unto God are all his works from the beginning." 4. If "it must be first determined that events will be," then, as that determination is an "event," so that event must be foreknown in the essential omniscience of God. And that comprehensive event being foreknown, all the events it comprehends must be foreknown. 5. And this "transfer," being an event, must be foreknown; and it must, before that event, be foreknown into what "probabilities" and into what "certainties" the transfer is made. 6. The certainty of the "purpose" itself does in the order of nature precede the "purpose" whereby the "purpose" is foreknown in the essential omniscience of God, which, "in the order of nature," precedes all volitional act, even of God himself. That "certainty" is not antecedently grounded or caused by any previous act, since it consists in the pure futurity of the certain event, and has no ground except in the event of which the futurity is predicable. 7. If God's omniscient foresight of all that is or is not in the future is the effect of God's determination, then an attribute of God is created by an act of God. If God's foreknowledge depends on his determination, and must wait until after its existence, then he can have no foreknowledge of his own acts, and must wait for *present* or *after* knowledge of them.

And, finally, if God can be "perfect God" without "the foreknowledge of actual future events," then he can be perfect God with an omniscience empty of facts. His omniscience, then, instead of being an actual knowledge of futuritions, would be only a *capacity for knowing*, and not the knowledge itself. From all which it follows that of all futuritions, whether events or no-events, whether necessitated facts or free acts, it is an essential attribute of God to possess an eternal knowledge.

CHAPTER II.

RECONCILIATION OF FREE AGENCY AND FOREKNOWLEDGE.

THE advocates of predestination and necessity maintain, with great show of logic, that free agency, as we hold it, is inconsistent with God's foreknowledge. *A finite agent, they maintain, cannot possess power to do otherwise than God foreknows he will do.* Nor can any event be *otherwise than God foreknows* and so *contradict his foreknowledge.* We address our argument to this point.

I. We may first remark that *our view of free agency does not so much require in God a foreknowledge of a peculiar kind of event as a knowledge in him of a PECULIAR QUALITY existent in the FREE AGENT.* This is a point apparently much if not entirely overlooked by thinkers upon this subject.

Power is a substantive quality intrinsic in the agent possessing it. It is a positive element in the constitution of the being. To a knowing eye it may be perfectly cognizable. If any power be planted in an agent, God, who placed it there, must know it.

Power a
knowable
element.

And if that power be, as we shall assume to have proved, a power to do otherwise than the agent really does do, God may be conceived to know it and to know it in every specific instance. That is, God knows in every case that the agent who wills a certain way possessed the elemental power of choosing another way, or several elemental powers of choosing several other ways. God may know the way in which the agent will act, and at the same time there may be seen by him in the same agent the substantive power of acting otherwise instead. The two facts, namely, that *he will act thus*, and that *there resides in him the power of other action*, may be seen at the same time by God and be mutually consistent with each other. God's foreknowledge, therefore, of the volition which will be put forth is perfectly consistent with his knowledge of the agent's power of willing otherwise. That is, prescience in God is perfectly consistent with freedom in the finite agent.

Surely if an agent can will either one of several ways, God may know each one of those several ways; and if of those several ways there is one which the agent will *will*, God may know which that way is. His knowing the way which, of the several, the agent will choose, does not negative his knowing that the agent possessed powers for either of the other ways. For all those powers are simply positive elements in the being of the agent, which God is certainly to be conceived as able to know.

This view reduces the whole question to discussion of man's nature, or the proper analysis of the nature of a free agent. It becomes a discussion not of the metaphysics of events in regard to their necessity or possibility, but of psychology or anthropology; or rather (what is of momentous consequence in the controversy) the psychological investigation and decision overrule and predetermine the metaphysical. If there

A point of
Psychology.

be, in the free agent, ascertainable by psychology, or required by intuition, or supposably seen by the divine eye, the power of putting forth the volition with full power of alteriety, then God knows that power. And, then, God knows, or knows not, the agent's future acts. If he knows them not his foreknowledge does not extend to all free acts. If he does know them, then he knows the future act which will be, while there is full adequate power for it not to be.

If these views be just, the question is settled. The free agency of man is consistent with the fore-
knowledge of God. What is true of one free
agent may be true of all. Agents, acts, and events may exist, free in their character, which are known of God in perfect harmony with their freedom.

Settlement of
the question.

As a COROLLARY resulting from these views, we note that an agent may be supposed to possess a
power of acting otherwise than the way that
God foreknows he will act.* The proposition
that an agent cannot act otherwise than God foreknows he will act is not clearly certain, nor possible to be proved. He can act otherwise, for there is seen by God in him the element of adequate power for other action. And yet *God will not be deceived*; for such is his perfection of knowledge that it is known to him which power of action will be exerted. So that there is a perfect compatibility between the two propositions, *an agent can act otherwise than the way that God foreknows*; and, *God can never be deceived in his foreknowledge.*

Power for oth-
er than the
foreknown
act.

II. There is a class of thinkers who avoid the difficulty of reconciling foreknowledge with free agency by DENYING *the existence or the POSSIBILITY of the FOREKNOWLEDGE of a FREE or CONTINGENT EVENT.* They affirm that a free act is, previous to its existence, a nothing, and so

* Of course in all such propositions as this we mean otherwise *instead*, (see p. 27,) or substitutively; and not two opposite ways at the same time.

Denial of Fore- not an object of knowledge. The knowing it,
knowledge. therefore, supposes a contradiction. And as the impossibility of performing a contradictory act is no limitation of Omnipotence, so the impossibility of a contradictory knowledge is no limitation of Omniscience. Undoubtedly this view would be preferable to the admission of predestination, provided it solved the difficulty and was necessary to its solution. But it may be doubted both whether it be necessary, or whether it solves any difficulty.

Whether there be any foreknowledge or not, it is *certain that there will be a one particular course of future events and no other*. On the most absolute doctrine of freedom there will be, as we shall soon more fully illustrate, a one train of choices freely put forth and no other. If by

Free events will be some particular way. the absolute perfectness of God's omniscience that one train of free events, put forth with full power otherwise, be embraced in his foreknowledge, it follows that God foreknows the free act, and that the foreknowledge and the freedom are compatible. The difficulty does not indeed lie in the compatibility of the two. The real difficulty, (which we distinctly profess to leave forever insoluble,) as may soon more

The Real difficulty. clearly appear, is to conceive *how God came by that foreknowledge*. But that is no greater difficulty than to conceive how God came by his omnipotence or self-existence. It will be a wise theologian who will tell us how God came by his attributes. It will require a deep thinker to tell how the universe or the immensity came by its real or actual deity; or how the present self-existent came to be, and no other.

III. Freedom, in every individual case, as we have defined it, implies, that *of several possible volitions, one and no other will take place*: one in opposition to many—*numerically*; one in opposition to any other instead—*alternatively*. And so of a whole series of volitions, namely, of the entire existence of any one free being,

temporal or even eternal, each one volition, and the entire series of his individual volitions, though possible to be otherwise, yet will be each ^{Of several possibilities, one will be.} some particular one way. Certainly, when we define that a free volition is one which *is* or *will be* put forth one way, by a will able to put forth some other way instead, we do not deny that such particular *one* will be put forth; nor that such *ones*, infinite in number, through a whole series endless in length, will be put forth. And so we may affirm of the infinite number of individual volitions of each one of an infinite number of free agents, in one vast TOTALITY—interweaving ^{The future free Totality.} in mutual correlations with each other, in infinities of infinities—that while *there is power that each should not be*, yet each and all WILL BE in its own one way, and not another instead. Such a free totality can be viewed simply in itself as being *just as free as if it were unknown; just as free as if there were no God to foreknow it*. So that the freedomist, with perfect ease and consistency, is enabled in conception to survey the one great free *whole* of all future volitions as a valid conception; and he can speak of it, and argue about it, as that ONE which in each particularity could NOT-BE, and yet individually and wholly WILL-BE.

This conception of a system of free ALTERNATIVITY stands opposed to the conception of a universal system of absolute NECESSITY, as taught by Edwards; of which ^{Opposed, 1. By Necessity.} every event is a fixed product of fixed causes; and the TOTALITY, one solid fixation; of which it is a contradiction to suppose, that either for the whole, or for a single item of the whole, there is the least possible power* to be otherwise. Of the former, the *entirety*, all the *elements* are pervaded by the *will-be*, and yet the *can-be-otherwise*; the other by the *must-be* and the *can-be*

* For according to necessity the effect is always the measure and the exhaustive of the power. The Totality of events is the exhaustive of the Totality of power.

no-otherwise. The former is pure *certainty*; the latter is *necessity*.

Opposed, secondly, to this free volitional *totality* is a 2. By Invari-
ability. *totality* ruled in its events not by the law of causation, but by an anterior law of Invariable Sequence, to which by the very nature of things all volitional events conform themselves according to the same conditions of comparative strength of antecedents, and with the same absolute Uniformity. This claims to be a *totality* of simple *certainty*, but upon false grounds. Simple *certainty*, unrul'd by anterior fixed and fixing law, belongs to the volition which, with full alternative power, *will be* by the agent ultimately put forth; this Uniformitarian law, if it be what it claims to be, an absolute invariability, requires and secures that the volitions and the *totality* should be configured as necessarily to its own anterior type as does the law of Causation. It secures a different set of individual volitions from the ultimates of free alternativity, but identical with those of causative necessity. It excludes from the agent, if not the intrinsic power of putting forth a different volition, certainly the exertion of that power. And when we understand that to put forth that different volition would be to annul an axiomatic law, we shall conclude that the power itself does not and cannot exist.

Opposed, thirdly, to this simply certain *Totality* is the 3. By Predesti-
nation. *Totality of Predestination*. According to this a Will, not dependent on foreknowledge of the futuration, selects and predetermines it, contradicting and excluding the possibility of a substitute alteriety, and causatively securing the identical event. In foreknowledge the divine cognizance is shaped by the future event; in predestination the event is shaped by and to the predetermination. Even if by some inexplicable coincidence, therefore, the event predetermined is in all cases the very event at which the alternative Will would ultimately arrive, still the very moment it becomes predetermined the

power is foreclosed, contradicted, and causatively excluded for it to be otherwise, and the agent is no longer a free agent. But a predestination based upon foreknowledge is not the actually maintained predestination. In a true predestination the totality and the individual events, not foreknown previous to predestination, but predestinated in order to be foreknown, are originated and stereotyped, not by the aggregate of free agents, but by the Predestinating Volition primordially causing the efficient finite causes to cause, and the effects to exist.

That supposed Divine Volition by which all events are said to be predetermined or predestinated cannot include less than *these three things*: FIRST, *origination* of the event; SECOND, *exclusion* of every contradictory or preventive; and, THIRD, *securement* of the *identical* event. The event must of course have its FIRST conception in the divine mind, and be fixed upon by the divine Will, and that must be the first intentional cause of its existence; for if the divine Will predetermine the act, it cannot stand in an inert but in a causative relation to the event. Unless causative of the event, it is a *brutum fulmen*, a blank, and a nothing. NEXT, the divine Will as cause must pledge itself, and efficiently secure that no adequate contradictory prevents the identical event; by which all counter cause or *contrary choice is rendered impossible*. And, THIRD, as cause the divine Will is pledged to secure positively that the identical event in the identical way come into existence, so that the actual future is solely *possible*, is *necessary*, and *must be*. Less than this predestination cannot be. And through whatever secondary causes or agents the events be effectuated, one thing is self-evident, that the divine Will is perfectly and intentionally its responsible author. The first cause is responsible cause for the last effect.

IV. We have then before us the true distinct conception of a FREE TOTALITY of free-volitions; the infinite, universal, eternal *system of free events*, which while they are each

one able to be otherwise than *thus*, yet will freely be *thus*; and while they are able to be *thus*, and truly *will* and *do be thus*, are able to be otherwise than *thus*. Now

The free Totality is the foreknown Totality. of this *free totality*, thus clearly, we trust, conceived, our doctrine affirms that it exists in the anterior omniscience of God, and *is the very future totality which God foreknows*. It is that grand totality (each item of which *will be* with full power *otherwise*) which is the totality embraced in God's foreknowledge. And just because it is this grand free alternative totality which stands included in God's foreknowledge, therefore God's foreknowledge embraces a grand, free alternative totality. That is, God foreknows an infinite amount of free acts which will be put forth with full power of alteriety. That is, God's foreknowledge of the act is perfectly consistent with freedom of the act. And that is, finally, that God's foreknowledge of the act neither makes nor proves its necessity.

Of this FREE TOTALITY, let us suppose, there actually existed, before its commencement, a RECORD, Record of a free future destroys not its freedom. perfectly accurate, of its futuration. It would be a most wonderful thing. If that record were on the tablet of the Divine Mind, it would be one among the many wonders of God, above the power of human reason to conjecture *how it came to be*. But such a record would not at all change the nature of the future *free totality*. By the supposition, *it is the free totality which is on the record*, and not *the fated totality*. That is, it is the totality which in the ultimate *will take place*, though there be full power at each volitional act for other to take place, which is on the record. There is full power for other than the recorded events to take place; just *because it is the events which will take place though there is full power for other events*, which are the recorded. If that record be the divine Prescience itself, then *its full possession of the accurate futuration of all free volitions is fully consistent with*

No more does foreknowledge.

the full power of their being put forth otherwise than they will be put forth. The entire system of free agents are fully adequate to bring into existence an entire totality of acts different from the foreknown future free totality. Nay, there is power existent in the entire system of free agents for an infinite diversity of free totalities; and we may add that there may be in the first progenitors in that system adequate power for *the generation of an unlimited diversity of totalities of FREE AGENTS themselves.*

Different system of Agents possible.

Of our allegorical tablet, above supposed, the apparently contradictory propositions are true, 1. That it is absolutely impossible that its record should not be true; and yet, 2. That it is perfectly possible that the events it contains should not take place. The first of these two propositions is true; for by the very supposition the one actually future event amid the many possible future events, is the event which is ever with absolute accuracy recorded. The second is true, because by the very supposition every event recorded is an event for which there is an existent power that it should not be. From the very nature of the record it is impossible that it should be changed and impossible that it should err; and yet it is perfectly possible (for where there is power for the different, there is possibility for the different) that the event should be otherwise; and between these two statements there is no contradiction.

Record true, yet reverse event possible.

V. That the FREENESS of *the act* is NOT AFFECTED BY *the* consideration of *its* BEING FOREKNOWN of God, may appear from the fact that both may be viewed as independent, yet coinciding facts. We can conceive of the *freedom*, first, abstractly from all *foreknowledge*, or foreordination. There is, as before remarked, a large class of thinkers who deny foreknowledge, and contemplate the field of free events as spreading out, uncovered by any anterior prescience. Nay, an Atheist is fully

able to conceive a world of free agents without any omnipotent personal first Cause. At any rate, it is fully possible for our mind first to posit a world of free agents, who put forth an illimitable totality of free volitions, in full power for other volitions instead. Such a totality may be viewed as being *just as free as if no deity existed to decree or foreknow them*. And, then, after the con-

The event as free as if there were no God. ception of this totality has been fully formed and amply contemplated, we are fully able to conceive, additionally, that a foreknowledge, existing incomprehensibly to us, *may take just this totality into its comprehension, without producing the least change in its free nature*. The foreknowledge has (unlike predestination) no causative influence on the free event to change or destroy its freedom. It is a free totality in the first stage of the above conception; it is a free totality in the second stage. It is a free totality which is presupposed; *it is the same free totality which is foreknown*. That is, there may conceivably be a foreknowl-

Foreknowl- edge affects not freedom. edge of all the free acts of all free agents without at all affecting their freedom. God may thus foreknow all that the whole universe of free agents will do without any contradiction to their free agency.

VI. If it be true that *an agent THIS MOMENT puts forth an act in the full possession of a power for con-*

The transpiring act free now. trary act instead, then the doctrine of freedom is just and true. But the proposition that

such an act will be put forth—namely, an *act put forth with full power for contrary*—though unknown to any human mind, was true A MOMENT BEFORE *the alternatives arose*. Were the proposition declaring *which act will be thus put forth, with absolute accuracy affirmed one moment before the alternatives arose, such a proposition, however undiscoverable by the human mind, would be perfectly true*. Such a proposition, affirming, with

Always true that it is now free. perfect accuracy, which act would be put forth by an agent possessed of contrary power,

would be true not only a moment, a year, but a whole eternity before its occurrence. And the truth of that proposition from all eternity is fully consistent with the doctrine of freedom. That is the truth of the eternal proposition that the agent will certainly, unfailingly, surely, positively act thus and thus is fully consistent with the proposition that there was full power in said agent to act oppositely instead. And if the eternal truth of that proposition is thus perfectly consistent with its alternativity, so must the *knowledge*, the *eternally anterior knowledge* of that truth, be so consistent. If the proposition may be eternally true consistently with alternativity, it may be eternally known consistently with its alternativity.* Consistently with that alternativity it may be written on the divine mind; it may be written upon the pages of the anterior eternity, upon the firmament of heaven, upon the surface of the primitive rocks, upon the pages of the prophetic word. If on any of those tablets every future volition of every future free being were minutely recorded, it could neither make nor prove any change in the nature of its freedom.

If eternally
true yet free,
then eternally
known
yet free.

From these views two inferences may be justly drawn.

1. The PROPHECIES of Scripture, were they ten times more numerous and explicit than they are, *furnish no argument for necessity or predestination*. Men are adequate to falsify both divine foreknowledge and divine prediction. The free agency of Jesus was uncontradicted by the predictions of his conduct. *He himself affirms his own full power to falsify the predictions of the Old Testament.*† His mind could fully comprehend the relation in which he stood to prophecy, to divine foreknowledge, and to the divine purposes, and recognize his

* But not also eternally decreed consistently with that alternativity; for, while knowledge has no influence on the act or event, decree is causative, securative, and fixing of the act.

† See p. 310.

obligation to fulfill them all. Men know not their relation to foreknowledge; and although they possess adequate power to act otherwise than the foreknown or predicted way, yet whichever way they do really act, omniscience will be beforehand with them, and fully and accurately foreknow it. Hence no argument could be drawn from the prophecies of holy Scripture, to prove the predestination of human actions or the necessitation of human agents.

2. If by setting a train of causes in motion the future existence of a particular living free agent is absolutely secured a thousand years hence, its contradictory being absolutely excluded, his existence is a necessity. If that agent in a given case be able to will either of several ways, *there is no need of a present causation to make it certain* which he will do.* The agent, by his act in the future, makes all the certainty there now is. It is by and from that act solely thus put forth that the present *will-be* of the act exists. He will put forth his act unsecured by any *present* inalternative making or securement. Whichever act he puts forth it is true that he *will put forth*; and that now unmade *will-put-forth* is all the certainty there is. It is by that putting forth solely that the present *will-be* is true. All the certainty there is, that is, all the *will-be* about it, depends upon, and arises solely from the free act of the agent himself. It is simply the present uncaused *will-be* of an act which can otherwise be. Certainty, therefore, is not a previously made, caused, or manufactured thing.

As to the "certainty in things themselves," of which Edwards talks, I pretend not to know what it means if it means anything else than *the will-be of the thing*; but if it be anything which anteriorly fixes the sole one way of the thing, thus making it a solely possible futuration beforehand, that is no pure certainty, but a necessitated certainty, a pure necessitation.

* See p. 227.

CHAPTER III.

EDWARDS'S ARGUMENT FOR NECESSITY FROM FOREKNOWLEDGE.

VII. THE first and main argument of Edwards (whose logic we now propose to discuss) against pure foreknowledge may be thus abbreviated.

An event connected by a tie of necessity with another absolutely necessary event is itself necessary. But a future volition is an event necessarily connected with a past, and therefore necessary event, namely, God's foreknowledge; therefore the future volition is necessary. The foreknowledge of God, being past, has already made sure of its own existence, and cannot but be, and is therefore necessary. With this past and so necessary foreknowledge, the future fact is connected by the necessity of knowledge, and is therefore necessary.

The necessary connection of the free volition with the past omniscience, is the weak point of this argument. That necessity requires indeed that the *foreknowledge* should, in order to its accuracy, *know the right fact*; and not that the fact must accord with the foreknowledge. THE NECESSITY LIES NOT UPON THE FREE ACT, BUT UPON THE FOREKNOWLEDGE. The foreknowledge must see to its own accuracy. Pure knowledge, temporal or *eternal*, must conform itself to the fact, not the fact to the knowledge. Knowledge, by its very nature, accepts the fact as it is; it does not shape the fact to itself, or require the fact to be configured to its own type. All the *necessity of connection* there is between the divine foreknowledge and the event is this, that it is necessary—in the sense of *requisite*—in order to the accuracy of the divine foreknowledge, whichever act the free-agent

Edwards's
great argu-
ment.

Its weak
point.

Necessity is
on the fore-
knowledge,
not on free
act.

with full alternative power puts forth, to have in possession that act, and no other instead. But that is *no necessity on the act*. The rightness of the knowledge must be seen to eternally before the act. The act is bound by no necessity to conform to, or be connected with, the knowledge. It is perfectly free to contradict the knowledge, and the knowledge must take care of itself. The act can be as it pleases, and the knowledge must conform. The act is under no necessity to agree with the knowledge. And these relations are essentially the same whether the knowledge be temporal or eternal. If the knowledge be absolutely eternal in the past, and be pure knowledge, it must as truly be conceived as conformed to the fact, and not the fact to it, as any knowledge of the present instant. How such knowledge can come to exist, receiving beforehand the independent self-shaping of the fact, is not the question. It is now enough to maintain that such is the intrinsic relation between fact and knowledge. There is, therefore, no connection between divine foreknowledge and the free act imposing any necessity upon the latter.

Knowledge
necessitated
to get right
fact.

VIII. Upon the minuter points of his arguments we may next note:

1. Edwards reiterates, with some attempt at emphasis, "Infallible," the terms "infallible," "unfrustrable," and "indissoluble," etc. We admit that omniscience is infallible, in the sense that it cannot err, and therefore will have the right fact; and unfrustrable, in the sense that it cannot be frustrated, because it cannot err; but deny that between the foreknowledge and the act of the agent-power the connection is necessary or indissoluble. The foreknowledge is infallible because in possession of the truth of the futuration; but the agent-power is not necessitated to produce the act which is foreknown to be the true. For the true futuration, foreknown as such, is true not necessarily; but made true by a power adequate to

make it not true. Between the foreknowledge, therefore, however fixed, past, made sure, infallible, or unfrustrable, and the event or act which will be put forth, there is no such necessary indissoluble connection as necessitates the act to any particular conformation. And the argument of Edwards to that effect is a failure.

By the *content* of a knowledge we mean the matter or matter of fact, as contained in the mind, which makes up the knowledge, and of which the knowledge consists. Now Edwards thinks that in divine foreknowledge there is an "indissoluble" connection between this internal *content* and the external act, requiring the latter to conform to the former. But there is not. There is an "indissolubleness" requiring the former to conform to the latter; but that is bound to have been taken care of an eternity ago, and the present free act has no concern with it, and is bound by no necessity to it.

Content of
knowledge
and the ex-
ternal act.

2. Edwards says: "And so does certain foreknowledge prove that now in the time of the knowledge it is, by some means or other, become impossible but that the proposition which predicates future existence on the event should be true." Edwards is here certainly mistaken. A proposition affirming a certain futurity is perfectly consistent with the power for the futurity to be otherwise. That such a proposition is certain does not prove the necessity of its verification. Such a proposition cannot, indeed, be true and false at the same time; but it can be true *in full consistency with the existence of a power adequate to make it false*. That the proposition is certain does not prove the non-existence of the power, nor the impossibility of its exertion; but simply that it will not be exerted. The proposition simply affirms which of several powers will be exerted, and which of several possibilities will become an actuality. But that is not affirming but there were the other powers and the other possibilities in the case.

Proposition
and the fu-
ture fact.

Indeed, in a true view of the case, we may say that the agent is able to falsify that proposition, by which the divine foreknowledge affirms that a particular act will be put forth. If the divine foreknowledge be not falsified, it will not be because there is not the full power for such falsification in the free agent. The foreknowledge secures itself against falsification, not by limiting the power of the agent, but by allowing him its full exercise in putting forth either one of several possible acts, and conforming its own pre-perception to that one. It remains, therefore, still true, that while there is in the agent full power to falsify the divine foreknowledge, the foreknowledge can fully guard itself from the exercise of that power, and maintain the requisite necessity, that the accuracy of omniscience should be absolutely perfect.

3. "To say the foreknowledge is certain," says Edwards, "and infallible, and yet the connection of the event with that foreknowledge is not indissoluble, but dissoluble and fallible, is very absurd." 1. The foreknowledge, we reply, is infallible in the sense that it will not fail of the truth; whichever is truth will and must be infallibly known; yet inasmuch as "*the event*," that is, *the act*, is not necessarily the truth or true act, the connection between that event and the foreknowledge is "dissoluble and fallible," in the sense that there is full power for other event or act instead, and to say that is not "absurd." 2. There is, says Edwards, a "necessary connection between a proposition's being known to be true, and its being true indeed." As just shown, a proposition may be "known to be true," it may be consequently "true indeed;" and yet not necessarily "true indeed;" there may be power for it to be made untrue. 3. "If there be any infallible knowledge of future volitions," Edwards adds, "the event is *necessary*; or, in other words, it is *impossible*

Power to falsify the foreknowledge.

Connection of foreknowledge and event.

How "infallible."

Proposition known to be true and true indeed.

but the event should come to pass." There may be an infallible knowledge of future volitions; yet the volition infallibly known may be one put forth with full power for other volition instead. The infallibility consists in the fact that of either put forth, the knowledge will be accurate. Nor is it "*impossible* but that the event should come to pass;" for the very event infallibly foreknown is an event for which there was a power adequate for it not to come to pass. 3. "If it be not impossible but that it may be otherwise," he adds, "then it is not impossible but that the proposition which affirms its future coming to pass may not now be true." The word *may* here is ambiguous. It may imply subjective uncertainty arising from ignorance, as "the thing may be so for aught I know;" and in this sense it is here inapplicable. It may imply a *power for either way*. In that sense it is here true. It is not impossible but that for the proposition which affirms a futuration, there should be a power adequate to render it "now untrue." It is true not for the want of power to make it "now untrue," but because that power will not be exerted, the very act foreknown being the one for which the power will be exerted. So that it correctly follows, and is true, that "it is not impossible but that there now should be no truth in that proposition which is now infallibly known to be true." The proposition is infallibly known to be true, not because it is *impossible to be untrue* instead of true, but because it *is true*. It is true, though there exists a power adequate to make it untrue instead. The knowledge has truly in possession that futuration, which the agent, possessed of power for either of several futurations, will produce.

Knowledge of future non-necessary event.

Double sense of "may."

IX. Origen is quoted by Edwards as saying "God's PRESCIENCE is NOT *the* CAUSE OF *things* FUTURE, but their being FUTURE is the CAUSE of God's PRESCIENCE that they will be." To this view of the matter, which has

been commended by Arminians, (and we indorse it with them,) Edwards furnishes two answers: 1. If foreknowledge does not make future events necessary, or impossible to be otherwise, it *proves* them so; and 2. It is as strong arguing from effect to cause, as from cause to effect; if foreknowledge be a fixed effect of things future, then the future act, being alleged as its cause, must be equally *fixed*.

God's foreknowledge, we reply, neither makes the future event necessary nor *proves* it so. The event foreknown is the resultant or ultimate act put forth by an agent possessing power for different act. The fact that an agent, or an infinite number of agents, perform an infinite number of acts, with power in every instance for other act instead, does not disprove that such acts will be put forth. And certainly the fact that those acts are foreknown no more *proves* than it makes them different from what they were before, namely, the free acts of free agents. They were *each* able to be otherwise, and they were *all* able to be otherwise; nevertheless, of all possible ways they are thus, and as thus are foreknown. But their being foreknown neither takes away their freedom nor proves it gone.

Nor, assuming that the foreknowledge is the *effect* of which the free act is the *cause*, does the fixedness of the eternal *effect*, namely, the foreknowledge, prove the fixed necessity of the *cause*, namely, the *act*. For whether the act be free or necessitated, its eternal anterior effect must be equally unvarying. If my present free alternative act send back, in the very process of being freely performed, its eternal image of itself into the depths of the divine omniscience, it sends it back, with no trembling line, a true image of itself—a free alternative act. It creates in the divine mind an eternal unchanging perception of itself as it is, a *free act*. If the divine omniscience be supposed

Foreknowledge
proves not ne-
cessity of fu-
ture events.

Foreknowledge
as *effect* of fu-
ture fact as
cause.

to have truly ascertained and taken possession of the true free futuration, what demand can there be for change or unsteadiness in its eternal pre-perception? When once right it would be its business *forever to stay right, and be forever immutable in its rightness*. If the ray of the divine eye be once "fixed" upon the free act, it should forever stay fixed.

Edwards (p. 185) makes the supposition, so fully made by us, that the future action may be written in a book, as, for instance, in prophetic prediction, and draws the inference of necessity. "If so then it is impossible it should ever be otherwise than that that predicate and the event should agree; and this is the same thing as to say it is impossible but that the event should come to pass; and this is the same thing as to say that its coming to pass is necessary." The agent-power, we Agent not necessitated to verify. reply, is not necessitated to make its act to be the act with which the predicate affirmed by foreknowledge agrees. The foreknowledge must take care of itself. All the impossibility there is that "it should be otherwise than that the event and the predicate should agree" must be secured by the care of foreknowledge to get the right event under its predicate. So long as that is duly taken care of the disagreement between the predicate and the event is sufficiently "impossible," and the freedom of the agent is not thereby affected.

Edwards flings into a variety of forms the reiterated argument, or rather assertion, that foreknowledge demonstrates the necessity of the future fact. "I freely allow that foreknowledge does not prove a thing to be necessary *any more than after-knowledge*; but then after-knowledge, which is certain and infallible, *proves* that it is now become impossible but that the proposition known should be true. . . . And so does certain foreknowledge prove," etc. After-knowledge, we reply, Foreknowledge and after-knowledge. embraces a fact which there is no power to cause to be no fact, or to make to have been not done;

for the past is out of power. The fact accomplished can never be made no fact. The past fact has an intrinsic necessity of its own, the necessity of already secured existence; and that is a perfect necessity whether known or not. But for the future possible fact there is an adequate power for rendering it otherwise than it will be.

X. Edwards (p. 184) considers the notion that God is *above the conditions of time*, and endeavors to show that it demonstrates necessity. This notion is that there is "no succession of time to the divine mind," "no fore-

knowledge or after-knowledge," but that all is "an eternal now." Edwards endeavors to appropriate this notion to the purpose of his argument, first, by the maxim which we have already considered and, we trust, refuted, that "knowledge proves necessity of the thing known." God, he says, "always sees things just as they are in truth;" of which we have no doubt, and hence infer that he sees a free act to be a free act. But Edwards infers, "hence there never is in reality anything contingent in such a sense as that possibly it may happen never to exist." But it may still be true that a thing may be contingent in the sense that there is full power for it not to be.

Edwards thus puts the point of his argument: "If, strictly speaking, there is no foreknowledge in God, it is because those things which are future to us are as present to God *as if they already had existence*." In regard to free future acts, the palpable error of Edwards occurs in the italicized words; in place of which should stand these words, *as if they were now transpiring*. Events

The foreseen free "be-coming" of event, viewed *as if they already had existence* are, virtually, past and gone, not *now* and *present*.

It is the *becoming* of all acts which the "eternal now" of God supposes; not the *have become*. It is as if God were a person now present looking upon the free act as now alternatively *being performed*. That *now-being-performed-act* reflects itself into the divine mind just

as it comes into existence; and just according to its nature, free, and under condition that other act instead were in power and possible. And so the act is not necessary, and is divinely seen to be not necessary.

The "eternal now" supposes that God is as a man who stands in the sunlight of a clear day and "*now*" watches a leisurely walker directing his steps in whatsoever path he pleases, looking to any point of the compass, employing his hands in any business he will. Neither the sunlight, nor the ray of the watcher's vision, at all limits, circumscribes, hampers, or destroys the freedom of the traveler's movements. The vision of the watcher takes in the free action just as it transpires. God's mind, according to the "eternal now," is like this mirror, before which I may stand. Every movement of my head, hand, body is reflected with perfect accuracy according as that movement is by me freely and alternatively made. The image in the mirror does not shape or constrain the movements of my choice, but accepts them in all their freedom, and represents them precisely as they are successively *becoming*. My free act causes the reproduction in the mirror, not the mirror a necessitated act. If the conditions of time, as Edwards allows, may be, even for argument's sake, considered as supposably non-existent to God, then his mind, filling eternity, must be considered as ever present at the moment and mirroring the *acting*, not the *act*; the thing as *under the doing*, not the thing as *done*. And not one free act alone, or the acts of one free agent, but the *totality*, all are mirrored in the divine mind, in their present tense, just as they are when they transpire, free and alternative. The divine knowledge *takes* them, not *makes* them. If the act is thus, then thus does the divine mirror receive it; if otherwise, then otherwise. The act could have been otherwise than it is mirrored; for were it otherwise, then the mirroring would be otherwise. The act causes the mirrored reflection, not

Vision of the
free event.

the reflection the act. The mirrored image conforms to, is shaped by, the presented object. Supposing, then, omniscience to be above the conditions of time, it is a present mirror, a divine transparency, taking in the reflection of the act as the moving of the act presents it. And thus in the pure, perfect, infinite, boundless light of God's omniscience is the limitless Totality of all free acts coming into existence. It neither makes the act unfree nor proves it so. Whatever freeness may be in the nature of the act remains unchanged.

XI. As regards the individual human being, the doctrines of predestination and of foreknowledge may be illustrated by the following two views :

1. Before every man at his birth (according to predestination) is a certain course of actions, which by an infinite causation it is secured that he must take, all others being decretively and causatively excluded. In this statement predestination, necessity, and fatalism coincide.

2. Before every man at his birth, according to foreknowledge, there is a course of actions, which he will choose among many others equally in his power of choice, and from which he is not excluded by antecedent causation.

Both these cases agree in the futuration of some one course, but differ in the nature of the agency which produces the course.

Now it would seem that if by some perfection of the divine nature there should exist a tablet, upon which were written, without any connection with the course, except the most truthful agreement, the exact details of this case No. 2, it would prove nothing as to the intrinsic capability in the man of taking any other course. It would amount to this, that the course which, in full possession of ample power to choose any other course, he actually will choose, is the course which is written. The existence of such a tablet would certain-

ly not affect his freedom. Nor would it disprove his freedom; for any theory of freedom admits, not only of one man but of all free agents, that there is a certain one course which he or they will, freely and alternatively, of all others take. And if by supposition that is truly the one recorded, the existence of the tablet a million of years, or from all eternity, neither makes nor proves the actions of the agent to be not free.

The difficulty, then, is not to tell how our freedom is consistent with foreknowledge. It is to tell how God is omniscient. We shall not trouble our mind with that inquiry.



CHAPTER IV.

PREDESTINATION AN UNNECESSARY HYPOTHESIS.

PREDESTINATION, as we have in the proper places delineated it, is not only involved in endless difficulties and perplexities, but in meeting the demands of a rational theodicy and of Scripture interpretation, it is an unnecessary hypothesis. The plan of the universe may be rationally outlined; the text of Scripture can be naturally construed, without owing it any obligations.

The Divine Plan, as embraced in God's predeterminations, is a scheme strictly embracing only the Divine Actions. Supposing that in the infinitely distant anterior "timelessness" God is employed in selecting from all possible systems that which his wisdom best approves, the system which he is to be viewed as finally adopting is a *system consisting, properly and directly, of his own future actions*. Knowing indeed by the absolute perfection of his own attribute of omniscience all future possibilities, including all

Predetermination of God's own acts.

possible results from any supposed arrangements, God does, in full foreknowledge of all results in the case, so plan all *his own* actions and courses as seems to him wisest and best. So far forth as sequently upon any act or course of God any free being will sin, for that sin the free *being*, being fully able to avoid it, and bringing it unnecessarily into existence, is alone responsible. He alone has intruded it into existence.* God neither predetermined, foreordained, willed, nor desired it. God's predeterminations of *his own* future action, or courses of action, are to be considered as so far *contingent*, as that their execution or coming into existence is conditioned upon the coming into existence of many presupposed free actions of finite agents, which are able not to be put forth. Yet, nevertheless, inasmuch as God's omniscience does truly and fully foresee the free volition which will actually, with full power otherwise, be put forth, *there is no proper danger that God will be deceived in the perfect wisdom of his plans, or be frustrated in any of his actual purposes.*

Let us, as a theodidic illustration, suppose that a perfectly good and wise prince, absolute in authority, rules over as many tribes and nations as Persian Xerxes; the large share of whom are hostile to each other, and desperately depraved. His plan is not to destroy, nor to interfere with their personal freedom, but so to arrange their relations to each other as that he may make them mutual checks upon each other's wickedness; that the ambition of one may opportunely chastise the outrage of another; that those wrongs which will exist may be limited and overruled; and that even the crimes which they will commit may further his plans of reformation, gradual perfectability, and highest sum total of good. If it is seen that a traitor will assassinate, be

Leaves finite
Agent free.

Yet God never
deceived
nor disap-
pointed.

Supposed hu-
man prince.

Non-prevents
but limits free
sin.

* See p. 42.

the victim in his way one whose death will be a public benefit. If brothers (as Joseph's) will envy their brother, let their victim thereby so conduct himself as that he shall be the saviour of great nations. If a proud prince will wanton in his pride, so nerve him up, vitally and intellectually, as that his wantonness shall spread great truths through the tribes of the empire. If a warlike king will conquer, let the nation exposed to his invasions be one whose chastisement will be a lesson to the world. If a numerous tribe is bent on devastating the earth, let their hordes so ravage as that future civilization shall spring from the desolations they make. So after long years his scheme of development may work out its divine results.

If we may suppose that he was endued with a more than mortal foresight; if we may imagine that he had a plan, partly *à priori*, and partly based on foreseen deeds of his subjects, we might then conceive that he could take all the passions, crimes, bold enterprises, and wild movements which he foresaw men would exhibit, into his account, not as by him determined, but as cognized parts within his stupendous scheme of good.

Takes all free sin into account in fixing his own plan of conduct.

He would so collocate men and things into a whole plan, that their mutual play would work out the best results. And if his wisdom, as well as his power, is infinite, and his existence is eternal, then the entire scheme could be comprehended within his prescient glance in all its grandest and minutest parts, with all their causations, freedoms, and dependencies, and so comprehended that his pre-determinations touch properly his own acts, leaving the free acts to the self-origination of free agents. And this may be, in the great whole, in spite of permitted wrong, the best possible system. We should then, in vision, behold all beings, however free, spontaneously, uncompulsorily, without command or decree, moving in harmony with his outlines of event, which is but the transcript of their

free actions, and by their very iniquities and abominations, without any countenance from him or any excuse to themselves, working results they never dreamed, but which are in his plan.

Of this prince two sorts of language will be held. On the one hand it will accurately and truthfully be said that he was a wise, a good, and a holy prince. He Double lan-
guage. neither intended, nor necessitated, nor countenanced, nor purposed, nor decreed, nor ordained, nor instigated any wrong. He never foreordained what comes to pass. No one ever sinned by any necessitative motive-force, or law of invariability. Each one had power for other volition. And so Scripture expresses itself when it describes the divine character or the comprehensive ethic of the divine government. On the other hand it will be popularly and elliptically, though not with literal accuracy, said, that these brothers were *instruments in his hands* to send their youngest to another land to be its saviour. It will be said that *he sent* this assassin to accomplish the beneficial death of that victim. It will be said that he armed this conqueror to chastise that nation; and that he poured those hordes over those plains in desolation. And so Scripture expresses itself when its stand-point is upon the plane of popular thought, and its purpose is merely to express the divine side of events. In literal truth, HE neither ordered, did, nor approved any of those things. Yet as they were done under his administration, as they were cognized in his plans, as they worked out his results, so with a conventional, popular, conceptual truth, it will be said that HE *did the whole*.

It might seem as if the very births and coming into existence of men involved human history in an inextricable interweaving of fatalism. Edwards has a passage Birth not fa-
talistic. (p. 159) expatiating upon the immense number of physiological minutiae, requiring the whole train of antecedents which actually exist, which resulted

in the birth "of the great conquerors of the world who, under God, have had the main hand in shaping the state of the world in after ages, such as Nebuchadnezzar, Cyrus, Alexander, Pompey, Julius Cesar," etc. Nay, what an infinite number of slight incidents have resulted in the birth of each one of us, and have, as it were, become solidly embodied in our persons; indicating that all those incidental antecedents, slight and slender as they seem, were as fixed as a most complex piece of adamantine machinery.

If, however, any man will consult his own consciousness, he will recognize that there is a *Self* ^{Real self under historical self.} within him, underlying all the facts of his history, in which he feels a deep, unchangeable, untransferable interest. He has an intransferable interest in his own joys and sorrow, well or ill-being, which he can conceive as extending through eternity. No alterations in his past or future history can change or diminish it. He can feel that there are points of time in which his whole history might have been revolutionized. His fortune, rank in life, place of residence, profession, matrimonial connections, and children, might all have been different, and yet that conscious interior Self, in which he feels that untransferable interest would have been the same Self.

Still further, I can conceive that this Self might have had a different birth. I, this same conscious self-interested Ego, might have been born in Helvetia, in the time of Julius Cesar, of Gallic parents. My name, history, and entire stock of thoughts might have been different, and yet their subject might have been this same essential I. And so I can conceive that same *Self* as passing through thousands of incarnations and metempsychoses, as being born, living, dying, in a thousand different spheres, without any change in my underlying self-sameness, or any diminution of conscious interest in my own destinies.

If so, my essential Self lies deeper than my historical Self. Upon what slight chances of smiles and glances does marriage often depend; and yet the existence of your manly son or blooming daughter depended upon it? Not quite certainly so. That very son, in all that makes his essential *Self* interesting to himself, may have been born of other parents, even in another age and country, and with a totally different set of externalities. God can thus locate a human being at any point he pleases in human history without changing his essential self. Nor is our personal existence that accident of accidents it might seem.

1. God, in accordance with the laws of human descent, yet as wise Sovereign, bestows the individual personal human spirit upon each human body procreated; he furnishes, in what measure he pleases, the power and abundance respectively of intellectual, volitional, and emotional nature. He, too, frames the body, furnishing its natural growth, its proportions, and its qualities of strength and beauty, or the reverse. He supplies, too, the vital power, the nervous vigor, and the animal exuberance, or their reverse.

2. He *locates* the individual in the system of men and things. In what country, parentage and family, rank, or time he pleases, he assigns us our existence.

3. He modifies our immediate being. Without touching our moral nature, at any rate for the worse, he may for the time being strengthen our powers and faculties, or weaken them; giving us extraordinary perspicacity, or eclipsing our intellects. He may suggest ideas not of unholy nature, but of a good, or of an unethical quality.

4. More or less resulting from these, arise juxtapositions and correlations, by which divine ends are most easily secured in the natural course of events. Without being a tempter, for instance, God

God's loca-
tion of indi-
viduals.

God shapes
the individ-
ual.

Locates,

Modifies,

Assigns re-
lations.

may interpose before a man of raging passion the object whom he would have punished.

Before a powerful and ambitious prince, as Nebuchadnezzar,* to whom he has given birth in the royal family of Babylon, and placed upon its throne, God spreads the guilty land of Israel. Nebuchadnezzar. Voluntarily and unmoved of God, with full power of doing otherwise, the wicked prince ravages the land as a beast of prey. The *end* of God, the punishment of Israel, the monarch thus, without divine decree, temptation, influence, participation, or sanction, accomplishes. In that work, though God's enemy, and guilty therein of crime and sin, he has become God's servant. God, nevertheless, needed not Nebuchadnezzar. He could have punished Israel by other hands; or by natural means, as with earthquake, fire, disease, or storm.

At a certain time Jehovah would manifest his glory over the idols and the royalty of Egypt. He opens his series of plagues upon PHARAOH so powerfully that the proud heart of the monarch would Pharaoh. have softened, not with penitence, but with fear. In order that the series of miraculous displays may be continued to their full number, God "hardens his heart;" † that is, strengthens its physical energies without touching his moral nature, or necessitating or tempting his will; and the proud king's own wicked will, resuming its courage, freely completes its wicked purpose.

God wills (not as Edwards says, that Christ should be "crucified," but) that his son should lay down his life to redeem lost men. The Crucifixion. There are thousands of methods, from heaven above, or from earth below, in which it can be accomplished. But God foreknows that at that period and juncture the worst of men are living and ready to betray and to crucify him. It

* In the following illustrations we take the Scripture instances ad-
duced by Edwards, pp. 357-360.

† See Prof. Bush on Exod. iv, 21.

was fitting that God should permit the world to show how wicked men could be, as well as how good is God. A traitor there is in the twelve that is ready, and foreseen to be willing, to be the undecreed, unnecessitated betrayer. The Jews and Gentiles are both at Jerusalem, foreseen to be ready and willing to be the unobliged crucifiers. Jesus has but to take his position at that central point and bide his time. Freely, responsibly, without decree, participation, or sanction on the part of God, the traitor and the murderers accomplish the work. Thus God's *end*, that *his Son should lay down his life*, is accomplished. It is done by wicked men; yet neither are they to be thanked, or God to be implicated.

Thus, indeed, is God a wonderful King. Great in truth is Divine Sovereignty. Other monarchs have friends and servants to fulfill their orders; but for God the King, even enemies in their crimes run, without orders, connivance, or thanks, and with ready spontaneous subservience perform his purposes and win his battles.

Sinners effect
God's ends. And when men, or even Satan, thus subserve the accomplishment of God's end, Scripture does often give only the divine side of the transaction, and elliptically speaks as if the whole were done by God. That is, God, without causing the wicked act, or sharing its performance or guilt, accomplishes through it his holy purpose. In this sense does Scripture represent God as performing what the wicked instrumentally accomplish.

Thus may it be seen that Predestination is wholly unrequired and useless in theology.

CHAPTER V.

CHRIST NOT A NECESSITATED, BUT A FREE MORAL AGENT.

CHRIST was unsurpassably meritorious, yet Christ had no volitional power to sin. Necessity and desert are therefore intrinsically compatible. So Arminianism is false. Thus reasoned Edwards through nearly twenty pages, on the distinct basis that the argument is decisive of the whole question: "I have been the longer in proof of this matter, it being the thing denied by some of the greatest Arminians—by Episcopius in particular; and because I look upon it as a point clearly and *absolutely determining the controversy between Calvinists and Arminians*, concerning the necessity of such a freedom of Will as is insisted on by the latter, in order to the moral agency, virtue, command or prohibition, promise or threatening, reward or punishment, praise or dispraise, merit or demerit."—P. 211.

Grant to Edwards the conclusiveness of his argument, and his claim to have settled the compatibility of necessitation and desert is undeniable. Yet, strange to say, a large class of Arminians, from a notion that what they call "a liability to sin" includes some taint, or suspicion, of sin, or corruption itself, grant all that Edwards argues, and so grant that necessitation of Will is no bar to merit or guilt. What need, then, of claiming non-necessitation of Will in order to desert in any case?

The phrases "power to sin" and "liability to sin," as predicated of Jesus or any other being, are of different import. The latter is not a true expression of our doctrine of Jesus. "Liability to sin" gives the impression of a weakness justifying an expectation that the sin will probably take place, and often implies proclivity to sin. Though free agents to those sins,

we would hardly say that Aristides was liable to thieving, that Howard was liable to commit murder, or that Washington was liable to be a despot.

The free, volitional power to sin, so far from being a defect, an impurity, an imperfection, implies and is a high quality;* a condition to responsibility, to probation, to a high, well-deserving virtue or holiness. Not only may it be possessed by a being perfectly pure, but it must be primordially possessed by a being meritoriously pure. No being ever possessed the fullness and height of a moral nature without it. No moral being ever held command of the entirety of his moral nature, or over a lofty probationary moral career of destiny, without it. No finite creature ever attained the rewarding plaudit of the Sovereign of the universe without it. Effeminately to strip Jesus of the attributes of which this possibility is an implication, is not only to dehumanize him, but it is to snatch from him the conditions of his high achievements. It destroys the reward by nullifying the struggle. It makes his whole mission an automatic series of movements; a mere organic piece of a mechanical panorama.

Whether Jesus was "in a state of probation" is a question irrelevant to this point. The axiom that necessity is *intrinsically* incompatible with moral desert is limited to no one sphere. It belongs to all actual and all possible being, whether in a probational state or not. Desert, merit, guilt, responsibility, is, *in its own intrinsic nature*, incompatible with volitional necessitation.

1. Christ was truly and perfectly human. He had a completely human body and human soul. All the physical and psychological sensibilities which analysis finds in humanity existed in their completeness in his nature.

Their superior purity consisted in their symmetrical proportions and their complete harmonious

* See p. 322.

subjection to a free will which warded off the approaches of all stimulants to too intense an excitement, or to any irregular action, and held the whole being in blessed conformity to the moral law.

How temptation without sin might take place may be illustrated by the case of the hungry Jesus. His rightful appetite existed, and food was the correlate rightful object by which it might be ordinarily gratified. The tempter presents the object, contrarily to the divine order and law. The mind's eye of Jesus fully recognizes the object, and fully *understands its power to gratify* and to satiate his demanding appetite. Thus far no sin on his part exists; for fully to understand, intellectually, the desirableness of a thing is not to desire it. His sense of Moral right cognizes that between the object and the appetite the divine Law interposes a veto. With that veto the Will coincidingly interposes, and shuts the object out from the mental desire or consent. It is the intellect alone that entertained the object, and that only so far as fully to comprehend its correlations. Thus is temptation possible without sin.

2. He was a true and real free moral agent. In him, as in all other moral free agents, psychological analysis must find a Will able to choose either one of two, good and evil, alternatives. This is the most striking attribute of all complete humanity. If he had a complete human soul, then he had a Will and a free Will. Without it in the nature the being is not a man. To separate it from Jesus is to dehumanize his nature. We might as well, and far better, with the ancient Docetæ, reduce his corporeity to a phantasm of a human body, as to reduce his soul below the conditions of a human free moral agent.

3. Without the power of volitional compliance temptation is an unreality. Temptation to impossible act is impossible. It is preposterous to say that I am tempted *to fly to the moon*; or that I am tempt-

How his
temptation
possible.

A true free
agent.

Truly tempt-
ed so able to
yield.

ed to *make two and two to be five*. But even for these I am able to make some abortive attempts at volition. I am able to be *willing* to do them. But in the case of Jesus, it is the very volition which is supposed to be out of his power. His so *willing* is supposed to be as impossible as my so *flying*. His *willing* is as impossible as my *flying without a Will*. Now in the very nature of things such a temptation is no temptation. Temptation is offered inducement to do something doable. The very supposition reduces the whole scene and history of the temptation to a phantasm and a figment.

4. If Christ were not a free agent, even between alternatives of good and evil, then he can be no example for human free agents. He is either exalted far above or sunk far below any exemplifying analogy. When he is proposed as an example of perfect virtue suffering temptation, the conclusive reply may be made, "Make it impossible for me to sin and I will be as holy as he." Nay, such a view of Christ sinks his virtue below the standard of genuinely tempted and truly resisting human virtue. If the beautiful sentiment of Fletcher be true, that "before the Lawgiver and Judge of all the earth the unnecessitated voluntary goodness of one angel or one man is more excellent than the necessary goodness of a world of creatures as unavoidably and passively virtuous as a diamond is unavoidably and passively bright," then does it irresistibly follow that the unnecessitated virtue of one man is more excellent than the virtue of a whole world of necessitated Jesuses.

5. And this brings us to the final point. The fundamental Arminian maxim is, that *power to the contrary is requisite to all moral merit*. It is applicable to all volitional agents whether "under probation" or not. And unless this fundamental axiom, lying at the basis of all just moral government, is to be upturned and totally abolished for all cases, then if we hold to the merits of Jesus we must hold to the free

Counterpower
er requisite
to merit.

moral agency of Jesus. We shall otherwise be obliged to affirm the maxim that *volitional necessity of nature is compatible with volitional responsibility*. And that being granted, the statement of Edwards is incontrovertible that it “is a point clearly and absolutely determining the controversy between Calvinism and Arminianism.”

The two general theses of Edwards’s extended argument on this subject are, 1. It is impossible that the acts of the Will of the human soul of Christ should be otherwise than holy; and, 2. Christ in his holy behavior was a moral agent, subject to commands, meritorious and eminently praiseworthy.

In proof of the first thesis Edwards argues from God’s promises to Christ, to uphold him, to give him an everlasting kingdom and priesthood; from God’s promises to the Church, to the elect, that Christ should be a sure saviour; and from the surety of the salvation which Christ was to accomplish.*

All this needs here but a brief reply, which we will draw from the nature of God’s foreknowledge and prophecy, and from the conditionality of God’s promises.

1. We have shown in the proper place† that the prophecies of Scripture do not in any degree affect the necessity of any future event. If every future free act foreknown by God were written upon the skies, it would neither make nor prove it necessary. That record would prove not the necessity of the event, but the inexplicable character of its own origin.

2. Still less can be made from the promises of God which are founded upon God’s foreknowledge; and which are, even when no condition is expressed, to a great degree conditional.

* The texts are such as the following: Isa. xlii, 1–4; xlix, 7–9; 1, 5, 6; Psa. cx, 4; ii, 7, 8; xiv, 3, 4; Jer. xxiii, 5, 6; xxxiii, 15; Isa. ix, 6, 7; xi, 1; liii, 13; Gen. xxii, 16, 17; Psa. lxxxix, 3, 4, etc.

† See p. 281.

The great Law of the *conditionality of God's promises* is expressed in various forms in the word of God, and is authorized to be ever inserted as tacitly implied when it is not expressed. Thus in Ezek. xxxiii, 13, we have the general principle of conditionality in regard to individuals: "When I shall say to the righteous that he shall *surely* live; if he trust to his own righteousness and commit iniquity, all his righteousnesses shall not be remembered; but for his iniquity that he has committed, he shall die for it." The word *surely* here indicates the fact that the promise is made in the most unconditioned form; yet the principle none the less holds good that the condition is still implied. If the character of the promisee, in consideration of which the promise is made, becomes freely and voluntarily changed, the grounds of the promise disappear and its validity ceases. In the following context, verses 14-16, the same principle is applied in regard to the divine threatenings.

Shown to be conditional No matter in how unconditioned a form the divine justice may be pledged, if the guilty character by which it was induced is changed by repentance and reformation, the force of the divine threatening ceases.

However unconditioned in terms.

In Jeremiah xviii, 7-10 the same principle of conditionality is laid down in regard to God's apparently unconditioned promises and threats addressed to nations. "At what instant I shall speak concerning a nation, and concerning a kingdom to pluck up and to pull down and to destroy it, if that nation against which I have pronounced turn from their evil, I will repent of the evil that I thought to do unto them. And at what instant I shall speak concerning a nation and concerning a kingdom, to build and to plant it, if it do evil in my sight that it obey not my voice, then I will repent of the good wherewith I said I would benefit them." So in Jonah iii, 4, the threatening was, "Yet forty days and Nineveh shall be overthrown," without condition; yet the threat-

ening was reversed by the repentance of the Ninevites. So also God promises entrance into Canaan unconditionally to the children of Israel in Exodus iii, 8, 17, and vi, 7, 8. Yet in Numbers xiv, 30, etc., he says, "Doubtless ye shall not come into the land concerning which I swore to make you dwell therein," etc. "But as for you, your carcasses shall fall in the wilderness . . . and ye shall know *my breach of promise.*"

In the above texts the conditional promises in the unconditioned form affect the destinies of those to whom they are addressed, and not *consequently* of some one else. The fulfillment of the promise is conditioned upon the faithfulness of the promisee, *nor is the securement of that faithfulness any part of the promise.*

But in 1 Samuel i, 30, the unconditional promise of the priesthood to Eli and to his house forever is declared to be revoked in regard, not to himself alone, but, **CONSEQUENTIALLY**, to his posterity, on account of the unfaithfulness of Eli in not checking the wickedness of his two sons. "I said indeed that thy house, and the house of thy fathers, should walk before me forever; but now the Lord saith, Be it far from me; for them that honor me I will honor, and they that despise me shall be lightly esteemed." The promise of the perpetual priesthood, though unconditioned in form, presupposed the faithfulness of the promisee. And the unfaithfulness of the head of the family produced the revocation of the promise, not only for himself, but for all his posterity forever.

From all this it follows that all the promises quoted by Edwards addressed to, or made in behalf of the Messiah, however unconditioned in form, implied the condition on his part faithfully to discharge his transcendent trust; nor, be it marked, *does the securement of that fulfillment, far less its necessitation, precluding the power or possibility of its non-fulfillment, form any*

Performance
of condition
not insured.

Vicarious con-
ditionality.

part of the language or the essence of the promise. So far as Christ himself is, therefore, concerned, as the type of his people he stands upon the same foundation. The promises of God conditioned upon his perseverance of character, do not pledge or secure that perseverance, but hold their own fulfillment dependent upon it.

So far as the promises made on account of Christ to the Church, or to the elect, are concerned, they stand parallel to the promises made to the posterity of Eli on account of their family head; though unconditioned in form they lose their validity, CONSEQUENTIALLY, by the failure of their representative. The promises presuppose the faithfulness of the federal head; nor do they contain in their essence any securement of the actuality of that faithfulness. Far less do they imply any necessitation of his Will precluding the power of an apostate volition or an unfaithful career.

To the divine organic arrangement of the scheme of salvation, including "the eternal purpose and decree of God," "the salvation of all the saints who were saved from the beginning of the world to the death of Christ," and "the enlargement of his Church, the salvation of the Gentiles through him," etc., the principle God's entire gracious plans measurably contingent. elsewhere stated in regard to the theodocic predeterminations of God apply.* God, in view of the future course which free agents will with full power otherwise take, predetermines his own plans and procedures; which procedures are so far contingent in their actual accomplishment as they are conditioned upon the real actuality of the free-agent's course in time; yet inasmuch as the divine foresight is clear and omniscient, the divine plans and procedures will never fail of accomplishment.

To many it seems a matter in which the fearful blends too much with the sublime, that interests so immense should be suspended upon a fiber so slight as the free

* See p. 294.

human Will of the single man, Jesus. They seek a firmer security by changing the nature of that Will from freedom to necessity, and thus underlay a mechanical prop to the organic arrangement of God's kingdom. If they can only transform all the struggles and temptations and trials of Jesus to a showy automatic machinery, in which his nature is an unyielding substance, which could no more give way under the hostile forces than a cube of solid steel could be annihilated by a hydrostatic pressure, then all seems safe. But that is to change conceptually the nature of things and beings. It is the foolish result of a faithless and timid fancy. The view we have given admits no uncertainty to the divine mind as to the accomplishment of the entire plan of salvation. For divine omniscience, according to its ordinary statement, embraces knowledge of not only all actual, but of all possible objects, events, and beings, including all possible objects, events, and beings under all possible conditions and suppositions. And in full view of all the possibilities of the case, the infinite wisdom and foreknowledge of God had selected for Messiah that Being of all others who, he foresaw, would, with perfect free Will, prefer God to Satan, and in spite of all temptation, prove true to his redemptional office, and through every difficulty attain the summit of divine success and glory. Hence, while there was an intrinsic possibility in the thing, and an intrinsic alternative power of choice in the being, there was a full and perfect *certainty* upon which the Divine mind could rest with an infinite reliance, that the possible catastrophe of his failure *would not* take place.

No uncertainty.

Christ foreseen freely holy.

That there was in the structure of Christ's Will no organic non-existence of power of alternative choice between good and evil, is proved by all those passages that specify the evil which, with effort, he avoided, and the motives for evil which

Scripture proof of his free-agency.

he meritoriously rejected. "Thou hast loved righteousness and hated iniquity; therefore God, even thy God, hath anointed thee with the oil of gladness above thy fellows." "The Lord hath opened mine ear; so that *I was not rebellious, neither turned away my back. I gave my back to the smiters, and my cheeks to them that plucked off the hair; I hid not my face from shame and spitting.*"* If, indeed, there was an organic impossibility in the constituted nature of Jesus to yield to these terrible assaults and pressures, what merit in his resistance? It was simply a statical balance of opposite forces, in which it was impossible that the major force should be outweighed.

But let the words of Christ himself settle the question. "Thinkest thou that I *CANNOT now pray* to my Father, and he shall presently give me more than twelve legions of angels? But how, then, shall the Scriptures be fulfilled, that thus it must be?" Matt. xxvi, 53, 54. Note here that it is in full view of the morally obligatory "*must*" that the Scriptures be fulfilled, in full view of the entire argument drawn from the mass of prophecy, decree, and divine plans, that our Saviour here avers *his own complete intrinsic power as a free agent to avoid the* endurance of the stupendous sufferings before him, and he completely negatives the notion that he *CANNOT* do it. That is, neither prophecy, nor promise, nor foreknowledge, nor any supposed decree or predestination, neutralizes or negatives his full power to will and to take a reverse course. The reverse course indeed, in the present case, presupposes the consent of his heavenly Father, and so presupposes no sin. But that fact no way affects the complete disproof from the passage of the notion that prophecy or promise do in any degree limit the freedom of the agent, or detract in the least

* If by probation is meant a state of endurance of trial upon which approbation and reward are dependent, then assuredly Jesus was in that state.

from his intrinsic power for a reverse volitional course. If prophecy that he should endure certain sufferings does not disprove his power to choose the avoidance of those sufferings, then prophecy that he shall pursue a straight path of rectitude does not disprove his power to choose the path of wrong. But this power to wrong is clearly implied in the text above quoted, which announces the reward of Jesus for rejecting the wrong—a reward, forsooth, for what he could not help! Surely every sensible Arminian must by this time see that all the positions, arguments, and evasions by which the free agency of Jesus is denied are necessitarian and Calvinistic; while all our arguments and replies are precisely the same, (and encounter the same logic,) touching the specific case of Jesus, as Arminianism uses in regard to all other beings. That is, such an Arminian is a *pro tempore* Calvinist.

We may finally remark that, according to Edwards's own account of the matter, it is not correct "in strict propriety of speech" to say that there was any real impossibility in the failure of the plan of Edwards's inconsistency. salvation, and the defeat and overthrow of God's decree. It is all a matter of mere moral necessity. Men say that a thing is in a man's power when a thing is at his election; and it was at the election of the man Jesus to sin, and defeat the Almighty. He had, according to Edwards's own theory, *the same power that any man has to sin in those cases where they do not sin.* Every man who does not sin, fails to sin by reason of the strongest motive, just as did Jesus; so that he, in this respect, was according to Necessitarianism just like any other man.

CHAPTER VI.

NON-NECESSITATION OF THE DIVINE WILL.

THERE is no conception from which the best elements of our nature so shrink as from the necessitarian conception of God. Motive, in the finite, is cause, and volition effect; the effectuation being as absolute as the existence of deity. The idea of self-determining power, that is, of Will's power to will other than fixed effect, is expelled the universe. All movement is but a being moved, all activity is but a passivity. All this finite metaphysical machinery, then being transferred to God, is simply rendered infinite. God is thus an infinite substance, with no power but to be passively moved as external causation acts upon him. Necessity takes her stand-point outside, and presses her causative forces upon his being. Deity is a clay moulded in the matrice of external causation, and hardened to solidity—an infinite adamantinized fossil inclosed in a tight casement of eternal fatalism.

Exterior circumscribing Causation is thus the God of God. It limits his power to one sole volition, and to one sole stereotyped set of volitions; and his volitions limit his power of actions. Omnipotence, then, is not power to do all things; it is only power for doing what *is done*; power for fulfilling the programme of prescribing causation. Do you ask what God can do? Just what he does do, and nothing else. Do you ask why God does thus? There is in him no causal fountain of power for anything else. Do you ask why God does no more, no less? The actual is the exact measure and complete exhaustive of his power. The whole process of things is the solely possible projectile from the divine nature as it is. All the causality there is in God goes forth into pre-

cisely all the effect to which it is equal. God and not-God are fixed correlatives; absolute counterparts of each other. Neither can exist without the other; neither can exist, in substance, form, act, or position, other than it actually is.

Edwards bases his argument for the existence of necessitated meritoriousness in man upon its existence in God; and its existence in God he first bases upon Arminian concessions. "Arminian writers in general hold," says Edwards, "that there is no virtue or vice, reward or punishment, nothing to be commended or blamed, without this freedom. And yet Dr. Whitby allows that God is without this freedom; and Arminians generally acknowledge that God is necessarily holy, and his will necessarily determined to that which is good. So that putting these things together, the infinitely holy God, who always used to be esteemed by God's people not only virtuous, but a being in whom is all possible virtue, etc., this being, according to this notion of Dr. Whitby and other Arminians, etc., is deserving of no commendation or praise."

Arminian concessions.

If the premises here be admitted, the consequences irresistibly follow. If from his physical substance, or from his necessary attributes or dispositions, surrounding motives necessitatively cause the divine volitions to be right; if by dynamics as fixing as physical dynamics, the divine choice and action are absolutely limited to a certain unit, then the divine being is an infinite, excellent machine, good because he cannot help it; and because he cannot help it, without moral desert.

Their consequences.

It is not, however, so clear that Arminian writers really intend to grant that necessity of the divine Will. They have unwisely dallied with the nonsensical term *moral necessity*, sometimes even admitting its nonsense. Thus, Dr. Samuel Clark says, after attributing *moral necessity* to God, "moral necessity is

Are these concessions real?

distinguished from physical necessity, just as all other *figures of speech* are from literal expressions: that is, 'tis in truth and philosophically speaking *no necessity at all*." If, we reply, moral necessity is no necessity at all, then it is *no moral necessity at all*; that is, *there is no moral necessity*; and the term is nonsense. "And yet," adds Dr. Clark, "every one easily sees that the justice and goodness of an infinitely perfect Free Agent may as firmly and reasonably *be relied on* as the necessary effect of any necessary agent is known to be physically unavoidable." Let our readers compare this with what we have said under the topics of uniformities of volition, and he will easily see that Dr. Clark here states about correctly what we consider to be the true doctrine. Rejecting the deceptive term *moral necessity*, upon which Edwards mostly builds his argument, we maintain that the rectitude of God's actions is what we may call perfectly probable and certain, *practically* reliable as any physical necessity, without admitting that the nexus is the same or equally irreversible, and strictly admitting the power of contrary choice. We may add that Fletcher, while indulging the same unwise use of the word necessity, where there confessedly is no necessity, denies that this necessity is "absolute." He hits the point very closely when he says, (vol. ii, p. 197,) "God's goodness consists in the perfect rectitude of his eternal *Will*," (his eternal *will*-ing we would say,) "and not in a want of power to do an act of injustice." In Fletcher's phraseology the words "do an act" include the volitional as well as the voluntary *act*.

Arminian positions.

"If the divine Will," Edwards next argues, (p. 331,) "was not necessarily determined to that which in every case is wisest and best, it must be subject to some degree of undesigning contingency, and so in the same degree liable to evil." Such is the inveterate necessitarian conception. The divine Will must be "nec-

Edwards's argument.

essarily determined" one way, or be "subject" and "liable" to some other way. It is a lifeless swivel, whirling under one causation or another. And this necessity, Edwards continues, is no more degrading than his "necessity" of "existence;" and so we suppose it is no more degrading, or divesting of responsible attributes, for any agent to have a necessitated Will than a necessitated existence. And so, according to Edwards, to suppose the divine volitions as necessary as the divine self-existence would no way affect their meritoriousness. And the Younger Edwards explicitly expresses what the Elder indicates, (p. 321,) Divine volitions necessary as self-existence.

"The truth is, *the divine volitions were no more caused, whether by God himself or by any other cause, than the divine existence was.* The divine volitions are the divine holiness uncreated and self-existent. And one attribute of God is not more caused or created than all his attributes, or than his existence." So that God's volitions are part of God's nature, as fixed as his self-existence!

And yet these same Edwardses every now and then have a lucid interval, in which they tell us that this *necessity* of theirs is nothing more than *certainty*! And their apologizing followers tell us that they taught "the highest kind of freedom," perfectly consistent with a power of diverse volition! It is very odious to attribute fatalism to them! We answer, their *certainty* is just the *certainty* of God's *self-existence*; their power of diverse volition is just the power of God's substance to be transmuted or substituted; and the attribution of these fixednesses to responsible human volitions is called by a soft name when termed *fatalism*. The consequent fatalism. And then deity himself is but an adamant statue of a God, run in the mould of absolute Causation; excellent because he cannot help it; automatically excellent, but incapable of attaining a particle of moral desert.

We, in opposition to all this, suppose the God of the Universe to be an infinitely free, excellent, meritorious

True doctrine, PERSON. We can as easily conceive an infinite
 God a free PERSON. omnipotent Person to be bad as to be good.
 Infinity and Goodness are not inseparable ideas as attributable to a being. To prove the goodness of God to the naturalist has been a problem for the theologian. Manes had no difficulty in conceiving a bad deity, or in communicating the conception to others. Zoroaster, as the latest
 Deity not necessarily conceived good. researches reveal, held that good and evil are opposite sides of deity. The Infinite of the Pantheist is all comprehending, of evil and of good alike. Nay, Calvinism itself has never yet been able to extricate itself from the charge of placing the intentional primordial authorship of evil in God. But we Arminians hold that God is freely good from eternity to eternity, just as a man is good freely and alternatively for one hour. Infinite knowledge does not insure infinite goodness. Infinite knowledge (which is a very different thing from infinite *wisdom*) is not an anterior cause of infinite goodness; but both Infinite Wisdom and Infinite Holiness CONSIST IN and result from God's volitions eternally, and absolutely perfectly, coinciding with, not the Wrong, but the Right. God's infinite knowledge=omniscience is an eternal fixed necessary *being*; God's wisdom and holiness are an eternal volitional BECOMING; an eternal free, alternative *putting forth* of choices for the Right. God's omniscience is self-existent; God's wisdom and holiness are self-made, or eternally and continuously *being made*. God is necessarily omnipotent and all-knowing through eternity; but God is *truly* wise and holy through all eternity, but no more *necessarily* than a man through a single hour. God is holy therefore not automatically but freely; not merely with infinite excellence, but with infinite meritoriousness.

God is holy in that he freely chooses to make his own
 God's infinite merit volitionally free. happiness in eternal Right. Whether he could not make himself equally happy in Wrong is more than we can say. And, as we have elsewhere said,

it is the agent that often makes his motive,* so between the infinite pleasure of infinite selfishness and evil and the infinite blessedness of infinite benevolence and good, God renders himself eternally holy by his eternal volition preferring good from the motive good, the same good being both motive and object, preferred for itself. As therefore to God's omniscience there belongs an eternal necessary and excellent *permanence*, so to God's holiness there belongs an eternal free meritorious *continuing*.

It hence follows that the unchanging right choices of God do not come under any Law of Invariable Sequence, nor are they to be included as under any fixed Law of sequence whatever. Dr. Hitchcock† maintains that miracles are as truly under law as ordinary events, because God would by the law of his Will choose to interfere ever and always in the same circumstances. Thus the law of causation upon natural events and upon the divine volitions is identical or equal. We reply that eternity bears to God the same relation as an hour bears to man; and it no more follows that God's volitions are bound by a fixed law from his *willing* eternally right, than it follows that man's volitions are by fixed law because he wills right through sixty times sixty seconds.

It is President Day; if we rightly recollect, who argues that it is only from the doctrine of necessity that we can be sure of the unchangeable holiness of God. Truly such a position is a very bold putting the Eternal under necessitarian bonds for good behavior. We repose in perfect security, notwithstanding our freedomism, upon the unchanging integrity of many a merely human free-agent, much more upon the unchanging holiness of the God of ages.

And how knows a finite insect, like us, that in the course of ages the motives in the Universe may not prove strongest for divine apostacy to evil? If God can be supposed by Dr. Day thus to

Divine necessity requisite to reliability?

And not reliable.

* See p. 177.

† Bibliotheca Sacra.

apostatize on the hypothesis of subjective freedom, why may I not fear on the hypothesis of external subjection to motive? I can as readily suppose that motives may so change as to change the divine Will, as to suppose that the divine free will should change in view of the motives.

Our reliance in this case depends more upon the firmness of our faith than upon the firmness of the object of our faith. Dr. Day could no more *know* that God is necessitated than I can know the certainty of his holiness. But if I can trust that the Eternal never *will* apostatize, just as firmly as he can trust that he never *can*, my ground of repose is as good as his. The goodness of the ground in both cases depends upon the reliability of the fact. Finite reliances are generally based upon probabilities. A trust in God's unchangingness is as good as a trust in God's unchangeableness.

CHAPTER VII.

FREEDOM LIMITS NOT OMNIPOTENCE.

SOUND philosophers of all sects or parties are obliged to concede that the power of performing contradictions forms no part of the true idea of omnipotence. A contradiction unsays itself and becomes nothing. The contradictory act is equally self-canceling, and so no act at all. When we say God is potential to do all things, it is unnecessary in terms even to exclude contradictions; it is unnecessary to say that "God can do all things but cannot do any act which is no act at all." The exclusion of contradictions from divine power limits not omnipotence itself, but limits our thoughts to the true idea of omnipotence.

If contradictions can be accomplished by Omnipotence,

then all reasoning is at end. The logical law of non-contradiction is no longer valid, if it be reversible by power. We can bind no reasoning around a power which can dissolve all reasoning. The syllogism is no longer a necessary argument; and geometry is a pile of contingencies. Theology lies in ruins. If Omnipotence can perform all contradictions, then the self-existent can destroy itself, and cause itself never to have existed. And after this state of self-annihilation, it may cause all events to happen without cause, being at the same time fully omnipotent and yet without existence. God can also on the same supposition govern the world with perfect wisdom and power, without any plan, purpose, decree, predestination or knowledge. And, finally, on the same supposition he can leave the creature free to choose either way in full defiance of his utmost power, without any derogation from his omnipotence or perfect sovereignty.

Such power
absurd.

That a being should be left free to choose either of several ways, yet be previously secured by necessitative causation finite or infinite, to choose a certain one of those ways so that there is no power of choosing otherwise than that one is a contradiction. It supposes that the same act is in the same sense at once possible and impossible. The power therefore to leave the Will free, and yet efficiently preordain, preform, or pre-necessitate the volition being a contradiction, is not predicable even of a true omnipotence.

Necessity and
freedom con-
tradictory.

Necessitarians ordinarily argue that the supposition of an agent able to act either way by a power implanted within him is to suppose him placed out from the control of God. But the supposition does not imply God's *non-possession* of absolute power over the agent, but simply his self-imposed *non-usance*—non-usance upon principle and by rule—of certain power.

God's non-
use of power
is not non-
possession.

Such self-limiting laws—prescribed by God to himself

—necessitarians will not deny to be necessary to the very existence of the kingdom of nature; and they do in fact give God his position as a Sovereign of nature. Such a divine law of non-usance of power is still more necessary in the kingdom of living agents, and most of all in the realm of responsible agents; it being observable that the more close the divine self-restraint, and the larger the amount of powers in the agent left untouched, the more the created system rises in dignity, and the higher God appears as a Sovereign. Even in a system of living *necessitated* agents, as necessitarians must admit, God forbids himself to disturb the agent's uniform and perpetual acting according to strongest motive. And if this self-prescribed Law of non-interference and non-usance places the being out of God's power, it is as rigidly and servilely done in God's binding himself not to touch the processes of necessitated agency as of free-agency. The volitions of a Will necessitated by a highest motive are as truly and inviolably out of the divine power as the volitions of a free Will. A necessitated Will obeys the law of highest motive; and omnipotence itself cannot prevent it, in the case, without violating that law. Unless he violates his own law, God is obliged to attain a desired volition of the agent by somehow contriving to get the proper strongest motive before the agent. If this cannot be done, it is, according to necessitarianism, wholly out of God's power. The Calvinistic Confession of Faith declares, "nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established;" which cannot be true unless God, by fundamental law, abstains from taking it away, and leaves such causes to their own unviolated action; just as freedomists suppose God to do with free agents. Necessitarianism, therefore, places the agent out of God's power, and diminishes his absolute sovereignty as much as Arminianism.

Against the Arminian doctrine, that there is an intrinsic

contradiction between the necessitation and the responsibility of a volition, and that therefore it is impossible even for God to make it responsible, Calvinists contradictorily object. For they themselves Calvinian self-contradiction. equally hold that for a being not a moral agent to be held morally responsible is a contradiction, and so impossible even to divine power. The disagreement thus is not, as they often seem to fancy, about the existence of a contradiction between responsibility and the non-existence of moral agency, and the consequent impossibility for even Omnipotence to create such a responsibility. Here they agree with freedomists. The real difference is as to what constitutes moral agency, and what are the terms of the contradiction. Freedomists hold that alternative power is one of those terms, and necessitarians deny.

We do not found the justification of God for the non-prevention of sin upon the absolute, universal Free special act sometimes attainable. impossibility, in any and every case, of God's attaining desirable free action on the part of the agent. In countless numbers of instances God foreknows that certain motives will be the motives freely and alternatively accepted by the agent. Yet it is not clear that in the best possible system Omnipotence could, consistently with *universal* unviolated free-agency, exclude *all* sin. And it is apparent, in myriads of instances, that the particular sin in the circumstances could not have been prevented without a change of circumstances, or a violation of free-agency. Not always. And this the necessitarian must also admit in his own system. In given circumstances the necessitated agent must obey the strongest motive; and God cannot prevent it but either by a change of circumstances, or a violation of the agent's laws of action.

In regard to the justification of the Divine non-prevention of sin we suppose three principles:

1. A system of free probationary agents is Sin in a divine system.

doubtless primordially better than a system of necessitated automatic agents, even though such free agency imply the possibility of sin.

2. In a probationary system the sin is not better than no sin, yet the non-prevention of sin is doubtless better than its prevention.

3. The present is doubtless the best possible system, *in spite*, not *in consequence*, of the actuality of sin.

CHAPTER VIII.

FREEDOM EXALTS MAN AND DISHONORS GOD?

It is one of the deep sayings of Whichcote, "*Liberum arbitrium*, Free Will, which men so brag of, as it includes *posse male agere*, the ability to do evil, is an

Is Freedom im-
perfection?

Imperfection: for such liberty or power is not in God. To do amiss is not Power, but Deficiency and Deformity; and infinite Power includes not in it a Possibility of evil." It is a contrary saying, not so deep, of another writer, (in a foreign Quarterly Review,) "Pelagianism, and Arminianism, and modern Morristonianism pander to the pride of human Will; and to exalt man's Will would deny Will to God, negating the decrees of God, and nullifying the Spirit's influence and special grace." Neither of these sayings, the deep one of the philosopher and the shallow one of the ranter, expresses the exact truth. It is not the power to do evil which is an imperfection; if it were, a statue would be in this respect superior to the first angels before they fell; but it is the evil exercise of that power which is the deficiency and the deformity. He who is right from incapacity is safely, but not nobly, nor meritoriously, right. It is the height of

Or a super-
human per-
fection?

virtue to be in full possession of the mastery of both good and of evil, and yet to do good alone. Such a mastery and supremacy belong in the highest degree to God. For it is *eternally* that he possesses full power for choice of right or wrong; and it is eternally that he chooses solely right.

“To exalt man’s will,” which is the charge of the above ranter, is to exalt man in that respect in which he is in “the image of God,” and in which to depreciate him below his measure is to dishonor his Original. But when we so exalt man’s Will it is not merely to assert his dignity of nature, which in its place is a just procedure, but to show him responsible for his deeds, and to justify God in his judgments. It is indeed an exalted prerogative to be a responsible subject of the Government of God; and it is but honoring that government to place in its full relief that faculty in which does mainly lie the qualification for that high citizenship. It is a foolish way, worthy the narrowness of a bigot, for the sake of humbling human pride to depreciate man’s intellect and make him a brute, or to nullify his free agency and make him a block or a clock. The freedom of the Will in the moral agent does thus furnish the true condition for the moral government of God.

As living being is superior to insensate matter, and intellectual is superior to living animal being, so of intellectual the highest is free moral being. So far as we know, the highest declarative glory of God consists in the existence of his retributive moral government. But the very existence of such a government requires of God the concession to his creature of a power which in its course of action he will neither annihilate nor violate; leaving the capability, but not the necessity, of freedom to guilt, which is judicable, or freedom to good desert, which is rewardable, and of a free holiness, worship, honor, and glorification of God, which are the highest result of a moral kingdom.

The denying the freedom of man does not honor but degrade God's sovereignty, sinking him from the position of a Ruler of free subjects to a manipulator of mechanisms. It takes from him the possibility of justice by making him propel the act he is to punish. Nor is there any ascription of meanness to God more mean than that which makes him attempt to inaugurate a glorious free probationary system, and yet *to fail*, purely from a penurious grudging of the necessary bestowment of power to constitute a true responsible agent, and from a fear that the possession of an alternative power of Will by the finite agent might disturb the stability of the throne of the Omnipotent. The former is a parsimony, and the latter a cowardice, which it is discreditable to any man to ascribe to the God of the universe.

If the maintenance of freedom of the Will "exalts man's Will," and the denial of it degrades the dignity of man's Will, the same denial must degrade the dignity of the Divine Will. The assertion, therefore, of the necessitation of the divine Will, so strenuously maintained by Edwards and other necessitarians, does bring degradation and dishonor upon the divine Will. While, on the other hand, to maintain the freedom of the divine Will from any such causative determination of volitions is to maintain its dignity and honor.

Another argument against this view of divine sovereignty maintains that it is a supposition *unworthy the divine dignity* that any of his decrees or actions should be DEPENDENT upon the action or non-action of insignificant man. The assumption, we reply, that the action of God cannot be conditioned on the *action* or *other matter* of a finite being, (for it cannot be limited to the *action*, but must extend to every finite attribute of the creature,) renders creation, preservation, government, retribution all alike impossible. In such case

God cannot create a finite being, for the act of creation must be modified by, and conditioned upon the nature of the finite to be created. If he is to be one sort of a creature, one sort of creation must be performed; if another, another. Preservation also must depend upon the actual existence, nature, and purpose of the creature to be preserved. Government requires laws which must depend upon the nature of the being or thing to be governed. No regard must be paid by God to prayer; nothing must take place in consequence of the prayers of the holiest finite being; for that would be making God's action dependent upon the action of a finite being, obliging him to wait until man performs before he can act. Nor can men be rewarded according to their works, blessed with heaven upon a life of faith and holiness, or cursed with hell on account of a life of wickedness. Such a doctrine shuts the Deity up in a dignified reserve from all the concerns of his creatures, making his sovereignty too exalted to be any sovereign at all. Nay, it deprives him of the power of producing any creatures, rendering a finite universe impossible.

Freedom is also held by necessitarians as *attributing to man* MERIT in exercising the act of *faith* and performing the conditions of salvation, so that heaven is attained *not by GRACE but by WORKS*. We reply,

1. By their own maxim of desert necessitarians are as truly obliged to attribute merit to faith and works as freedomists. By that maxim *it matters not how we come by our right volitions*; whether by necessitation, causation, predestination, or creation, they are equally deserving of reward or condemnation. No matter, then, if our faith and works be foreordained, necessitated, created by the resistless influences of the Spirit, they are still *volitions*; are *free* with the highest degree of freedom conceivable, and are to be credited with all the merit, good desert, and rewardableness that

Necessitarian
ascription of
merit to
man.

the loftiest Arminian can conceive. So that all the glory that Calvinism claims to itself for overthrowing human merit is thus by itself overthrown. *It teaches by its fundamental maxim of merit the meritoriousness of human faith and works, and the attainment of salvation by our own good desert.*

2. Faith is excellent and well-deserving. It would be derogatory to God to suppose that he would How faith meritorious. not choose a good and excellent act as an antecedent to our justification. As between good and bad, faith is good and not bad; it is ethically right and not wrong. Unbelief infidelity are wrong; faith and obedience are right. The very reason why faith is a meet condition for salvation, and a right initiation of a holy life, is that it is in itself a self-surrender and self-consecration to God and to all goodness. Performed in the use of a previous gracious aid, it is ethically meritorious; and there is a just and right sense in which we may be said to be justified for the merit of our faith and to be saved by a good work. And yet,

3. Such is not the merit of our faith that we thereby intrinsically *deserve justification*; nor such the merit of our good works as that we thereby earn eternal life.

How salvation not merited. Notwithstanding our faith, God, apart from his gracious promises, is under no obligation to forgive our past sins; nor do our works form any purchase of so great a gift as heaven and endless glory. Absolutely at the moment of an act of complete faith God needs us not, and he might justly drop us into non-existence. So that after all we are his workmanship, and all our salvation is from the free and abundant grace of God.

If man's act of accepting faith be not free and alternative, able to be withheld as to be put forth, Unfree faith makes God's government automatic. possessing the freedom *from* as well as the freedom *to*, then there is possible no divine government, but only an automatism. If man's will, in

the given case, accept divine grace, either by an intrinsic automatic spring of the Will, or by an omnipotent securative touch of the spring of the Will by the divine finger, then the very conditions of a free probationary system are destroyed. Men are the mechanically moving figures of a great panorama, and God himself is but a mechanical counterpart—both forming one stupendous reciprocal interactive automatism. Herein, Dr. Chalmers* assures us, lies the vital point of difference between Calvinism and Arminianism; and herein, we reply, lies the difference between a divine government and an automatism.

CHAPTER IX.

RESPONSIBILITY OF OBDURATES AND OF FALLEN MAN.

ARMINIANS grant, says Edwards, that both *obdurate* sinners given over to their own hardness, and the *whole race as fallen* and without the atone-
Obdurates and Fallen Man.
 ment, are unable to keep God's law, and yet are inexcusable. If so, then Arminians accept the principle that necessitation is consistent with responsibility, and that commands are consistent with inability to obey.† We take the two, the cases of the obdurates, and of the fallen race, separately.

I. In regard to OBDURATES, we are led to the discussion of these Two QUESTIONS:

1. What is the influence of the SELF-SUPERINDUCTION

* Notes on Hill's Lectures, Book iv, chap. viii.

† It should be noted by the reader that Edwards selects as instances of necessitated guilt by Arminian admission the cases of the Will of Christ, the Divine Will, the Obdurates, the Fallen Race, and the Damned in hell. The first he considers the most decisive. The argument, as well as our reply, in the last two cases being essentially the same, we add nothing further upon the last.

of obduracy and irrecoverability upon the sinner's responsibility?

2. How far does the *intensity of temptation excuse the sin?*

1. From the Arminian admission of the responsible obduracy and guilty irrecoverability of the abandoned sinner, Edwards holds them to the universal admission that necessitation to sin is perfectly consistent with responsibility for sin. To which the Arminian replies, conclusively we think, with the broad

maxim, *The superinduction by the sinner's own free act, or course of action, of necessity upon himself to sin destroys the excuse from that necessity.**

The guilty beings given over by God are first freely, fully, and irrevocably given over by themselves. They have once for all made their own selection, have rejected God, renounced conscience, made evil their good, and divested themselves of all susceptibility to moral motive. Such a result, with all its irrevocability, was not necessarily but *freely chosen*. Their very condition of necessitated guilt was not necessitated. That self-necessitation is an object of choice, and is freely chosen and so responsibly chosen; just as any other object is freely and responsibly chosen. The alternative to choose freedom to all good, or necessity to all evil, was before them, and they chose the latter. They are therefore responsible for that choice according to its nature, guilt, and magnitude.

Even the *necessitarian admits this excuse from self-superinduction*. Necessity of coercion, that is, necessity upon body against the Will, says necessitarianism, does excuse; for if a man be imprisoned he cannot be required to take a journey. But if he has locked himself in prison and flung the key from his window into the ocean beating against his prison wall, necessitarianism admits that he is not then excusa-

* See pp. 168, 400.

ble. If a parent tie his child to the bed-post he cannot require him to go to school; but if the child have tied himself even with a knot he cannot unloose, necessitarianism admits that the excuse is invalid. Edwards has set the example of reasoning from the parallelism between this his so-called *natural* necessity to the *moral*,* and we follow precedent so authoritative. As the necessitarian argues that though *natural necessity* excuses, yet *self-superinduction* invalidates the excuse; so we have a right by parity to argue, that *the volitional necessity* excuses, yet the *self-superinduction of that necessity*, where it did not before exist, *invalidates* the excuse, and leaves the agent responsible for his whole amount of self-necessitated sin and guilt.

So superinduced volitional necessity.

If a man performing a dangerous journey in a dark night extinguishes his lantern, he cannot plead darkness as his excuse for the suicide wrought by falling down a precipice. No more can he who extinguishes the lamp of knowledge which preserves him from the precipice of woe plead ignorance. No more can he who eradicates from his own nature the powers by which to avoid motive to sin and work righteousness plead impotence.

We may suppose a free being born under conditions of free moral self-development to be self-wrought to a state of high perfection. So has he trained his own nature by dropping all evil indulgences, that all evil propensities are lost; and so has he formed his taste to good that none but motives of good can reach him. His habits are so perfected thereby that temptation ceases; he does right without effort, and ultimately even can no more do wrong than I can enjoy the central heat of a fiery furnace. The merit of virtue does not cease when its power is so perfect that its contest is over. Admitting the agent to be now necessarily right, his effortless virtue is none the less meritorious because it

Self-developed virtue.

* See p. 411.

has become spontaneous. The merit of his virtue does not cease as soon as he has perfected it. It has been earned as a great good; and considering his entirety of being as a unit, it has been and is a freely chosen good, and it bears the stamp of freedom and praiseworthy goodness through eternity. It is a settled point in orthodox eschatology that *an eternity* of good or ill may be responsibly chosen. Or if a being so self-developing freely chooses

And vice. a permanent and eternal evil nature, by cherishing evil tastes and habits until his very substance has crystallized with sin, and the entire nature has so become correlative to wicked motive that it is susceptible of no motive for good, its badness is eternally guilty. A being created or born with both these alternatives accessible to his choice, with equipollent ability of will to choose either, is in full consistency with our doctrine, eternally rewardable for choosing the right, eternally responsible for choosing the wrong.

Responsibility for necessitated inclinations is one thing; responsibility for self-superinduced inclinations is another thing. Responsibility for necessitated inclinations induced by original, concreated, and permanent necessitation is one thing; and responsibility for necessitated inclinations, freely and unnecessitatedly taken upon himself by the individual, is another thing. Responsibility for inclination never in the power of the individual to change or exclude is one thing; responsibility for inclination alternatively cherished in the nature is another thing. Edwards, with a striking want of perspicacity, argues as if these two responsibilities are equal and one. The former responsibility is a nothing and an impossibility; the latter is a living reality.

Whitby, however, (perhaps to evade the irresponsibility resulting from necessity,) maintains that the reformation of the sinner abandoned of God is not truly

impossible but *very difficult*. Then, replies Edwards, if impossibility or necessity entirely excuses, difficulty proportionately excuses. From the amount of ^{Impossibility and difficulty for right.} guilt apparent, strike the equivalent of the difficulty, and you have as remainder the amount of the guilt actual. Hence the conclusion, which would be necessitated from the Arminian principle, that volitional impossibility excuses is this: *moral=volitional difficulty excuses as truly as natural=corporeal difficulty*. But this conclusion, says Edwards, is notoriously false; for in truth it is an indubitable principle that while physical difficulty excuses, volitional does not; and from that indubitable principle it is to be inferred that volitional impossibility=necessity does not excuse.

If, Edwards further argues, volitional difficulty of avoiding sin from intensity of seductive influences excuses, then exposedness, predisposition, or liability to sin increases not the danger of guilt or condemnation. For the amount of *liability=difficulty-of-avoidance* cancels just its own amount in guilt; so that the case is no worse in result than if there were no exposedness, predisposition, liability, or difficulty at all.

Strong temptation and diminished guilt.

2. We must then institute our second inquiry, *How far does the intensity of temptation or the volitional difficulty of avoidance excuse sin?*

Volitional incapacity, we maintain, excuses for a want of volition as much as bodily impotence excuses for want of performance of external act. Where the impotence is in either case *total*, and not self-superinduced, and so the necessity absolute, the excuse is complete, and the agent blameless. Where in either case the impotence is self-superinduced, and in the degree that it is self-superinduced, the self-superinduction cancels the excuse. And the volitional as well as corporeal overcoming great difficulties increases the merit of virtuous action. The overcoming of

Volitional difficulty enhances desert.

powerful motives in the way opposed to choosing right, is as true an increase of desert as the overcoming of powerful physical obstacles opposed to the path of acting externally right. Yielding to feeble motives is an act of stronger depravity than the yielding to stronger motives. To choose evil, not only for the weakest motives, but against the strongest motives, is the greatest depravity. On the other hand, to choose right for itself, and for no other motive than the rightness, is a pure virtue. So to choose in spite of strong motives is great good desert; and the stronger the counter motives the greater the desert. The highest virtue is that which is for virtue itself against the strongest motives for evil. Hence the high heroic virtue of the martyrs, and the sufferers for good in all ages. Herein lay the greatness of the piety of Enoch and Noah, who walked with God in the time of universal corruption. Hence

Instances.

the meritorious virtue of Jesus himself in the Temptation, rejecting the very highest motives for evil that time and earth can present. Hence the sublime virtue of Milton's Abdiel, "faithful among the faithless, faithful only he."

The authorities of the Bank of England one day received an anonymous note saying that the writer had access to their bullion room. Treating this as a hoax, they received, some days after, a second note, offering to meet a committee from their body, at any hour they pleased, in said room. The offer being accepted, at the hour appointed, being midnight, the committee were accordingly met by a man entering through the floor by removal of a plank. He was a laborer who had discovered the entrance while repairing the sewers beneath. How great was the temptation for so poor a man to make an unlawful fortune! The bank authorities rewarded his honesty with £800. But according to the theory of Edwards, contrary to common sense, he was no more meritorious than the millionaire who should

decline a shilling unintentionally overpaid him by a brother banker. But if the greater the motives to evil overcome the greater is the virtue, then the greater the motive-difficulty to good, the less the guilt. That is, moral or volitional difficulty does excuse according to its magnitude just as truly as natural or corporeal.

And Edwards himself, when his argument requires it, readily and amply contradicts his own theory. One entire section of ten large pages, in his work on Original Sin, (Part III, sect. 8,) argues the greatness of human depravity from the greatness of the motive-force for good against which it sins. The proposition heading that section is, "The native depravity of mankind appears in that there has been so little good effect of so manifold and great means used to promote virtue in the world." The opening sentence is, "The evidence of the native corruption of mankind Edwards's concession. appears much more glaring when it is considered that the world has been so generally, so constantly, and so exceedingly corrupt, notwithstanding the various *great and continual means* that have been used to restrain men from sin, and promote virtue and true religion among them." These *means* consist of *methods, advantages, warnings, punishments*, etc., all "to restrain men from sin and induce them to virtue;" and all properly comprehended under the name of *motives*, "motives divine and powerful," and for that reason enhancing the guilt of overcoming them. That is, the greater the resistance of motive the greater the guilt. The less the motive the less the guilt. The greater the difficulty of goodness, therefore, the less the guilt, whether that difficulty be corporeal or volitional.

And at this point we may say that this position of Edwards *overthrows all his claims of the consistency of necessity with guilt, responsibility, or desert*. If the volitional difficulty of good from counter motive-force extenuates guilt, then absolute

His position
overthrows
his Necessi-
tarianism.

impossibility destroys it. But according to necessitarianism, in all cases where the Will chooses evilly, there is no power of contrary choice; that is, *the contrary good choice was impossible, and therefore guiltless*. There is no sin in the world, and a retributive divine government is an impossibility.

We go further; we say that in strictness, *it is volitional difficulty alone* and not the corporeal *which excuses*. Corporeal difficulty excuses only as it produces volitional difficulty. Strike out from consideration those external difficulties which render part of a complex action impossible. Let the case be where there is a difficulty to the performance of the entire action, considered as one whole—not an impossibility of a part—and the external difficulty excuses only as it requires great *determination*, that is, *great exertion of volition*, to perform it. The command, as Edwards at large and justly shows, lays its contact upon the Will.* What it requires is the volition. The corporeal act is only the external effect of the real energy of true volitional obedience or disobedience behind the exterior movement. Great exterior difficulty is powerful counter motive to be volitionally overcome. If we succeed, great proportionately is our merit or good desert; if we fail, some extenuation is caused of our guilt by the greatness of the counter motive-force, and in proportion to it.

So long, however, as volition is truly free, and so long as the only necessity is self-superinduced, that freedom used for sin is basis of guilt. Motive, high or low, strong or weak, may only diminish or increase guilt; yet there will be guilt in the case, inexcusable and penal, so long as the Will is in the Conditions we have in the proper place stated of Volitional Alternativity.

The last point made by Edwards, that since guilt diminishes in proportion to power of temptation it fol-

* See p. 240.

lows that great exposure increases not the chances of guilt, has bearings worthy consideration. Our view may be stated in the following terms: 1. Temptation, not absolutely necessitative in its power, does not excuse compliance, but sin and guilt remain. 2. It is not until the extremer intensity of motive until it is doubtful whether the point of necessity is reached that the excusatory power of motive discloses itself. The ordinary motivity like the ordinary difficulty and physical right action seem unexcusing. 3. "Exposedness" is the condition in which temptations to sin, we will say of the ordinary motivity, are many and frequent. Exposure excuses sin. Its evil very much consists in the fact that the instances in which the motive might reasonably be resisted are multiplied. The guilts are therefore many and inexcusable. Yet there does in such condition arise a collective "difficulty," a cyclical necessity, (p. 132,) which possesses some excusatory power. We may thence infer, what will be often relieving, in some degree, to a benevolent spirit, contemplating some sublunary scenes, that the true depth of guilt is often less, in apparently demoralized communities, than the superficial moral phenomena would seem to an unsparing judgment to indicate. How far the exclusion in such cases of truth, knowledge, moral motive, and the permanent presence of intense temptation and absolute necessitation, may lessen guilt, and so equalize the probational conditions of men, no human eye can gauge. This point will be discussed in a subsequent chapter.

II. In regard to THE FALLEN HUMAN RACE, the charge of Edwards is, that Arminianism holds that though incapable of holiness, and so necessitated to sin, it is still responsible for sin, thereby contradicting its own doctrine of the incompatibility of necessitation with guilt. He argues,

It is vain for Whitby to urge that the "Old Law"

which requires Adamic perfection is abolished, and that a new and more merciful Law is introduced by Christ, requiring but "imperfect" obedience, and so inflicting no penalty for necessitated evil; for,

1. There being, according to Arminianism, no guilt or sin for necessitated fallen man's not keeping the old Law, Christ's death and even the new law are needless.

2. There can hereby be no responsible sin. Not by the "old law," for that is abolished; not by the new law, for that requires but imperfect obedience, and so allows sin to be irresponsible.

3. There can be no need for Christ to die to prevent unjust penalty for our not keeping a law which we had not power to keep. To all which we reply:

1. The so-called "Old Law," being the standard of absolute right, can never be abolished, but must forever stand as the standard by which all responsible sinners are condemned, and to which all ultimate perfection must be equal.

2. By the atonement, man being re-elevated to the level of responsibility, (beneath which he had sunk by the fall,) a new law, even the law of faith in Christ, is interposed, as a provisional standard of present acceptance; and man's present guilt for sin against the perfect Law being provided for by the atonement, aids and means are afforded for his final elevation to the complete standard of the perfect law.

3. By these means the absolute law is never abolished but remains, as, 1. Demanding atonement for sin responsibly committed by man after he is restored to his probationary state, when the law of faith is not by him so accepted as to afford justification; 2. Applying its own full standard of condemnation upon all sin not forgiven, through man's non-acceptance, by the law of faith; 3. Remaining as the standard of perfection to which the remedial system must finally restore man, who, by using

offered gracious aid, accepts and complies with the gracious law of faith.

4. By these means man is never responsible for a law he cannot meet; Christ's death and the new law are demanded by his case; and all sin infringes both against the new law and the old.

Edwards's final argument (which has become a staple in Calvinistic theology) is, that to furnish ability to keep the law is a matter of justice, Ability is justice, not grace? not grace. This we have elsewhere amply answered.* We will simply reply here, that an item of justice in a system of grace, which is an item requisite to the existence of the system, is itself a grace. Taken by itself alone, it may be but intrinsic justice; taken as a part of a gracious and glorious whole, to whose existence it is requisite, it is gracious. If a millionaire graciously take an orphan boy, previously involved in ruin, into his service, and endow him with capital to be his commissioned agent, for the intentional end of bestowing on him the results in form of a munificent fortune, surely Is both just and gracious. the first bestowing of the necessary capital (requisite though it be for the requiring any service or results, and so an act of justice in view of the requirement) would be an act of great grace.

Others have smartly argued that Christ's atonement, as placing us on a new foundation of responsibility, becomes the cause of all our sin, so that we are "Damned by grace?" in fact "damned by grace." No doubt, we reply, those who abuse grace are "damned by grace." If either by the grace or gift of creation, of endowment with original powers, or of the redemptive atonement, we are raised to the level of responsibility, captious reasoners may attribute all the resultant sin, evil, and damnation to the grace. And this attribution is just if they

* Methodist Quarterly Review, October, 1861, p. 661.

result by volitional or non-volitional necessity. But when the unnecessitated Will perverts the grace to evil and damnatory uses, as we have elsewhere said, it primordially originates the wrong; and the sin, wickedness, and damnability, as taking their primal start with that origination, cannot be traced back responsibly to the Grace.

CHAPTER X.

THE FREE APPROPRIATION OF OUR DEPRAVED NATURE.

OUR position is that a hereditary depravity introduced into our nature, necessitating us to sin, however demoralizing it may be, is not responsible or guilty. The question then may arise, In what manner, and how far, may our natural depravity be by us personally so appropriated as that we can be held therefor accountable? The obvious answer is, That *it is by our own free personal acceptance of it, and just so far as that acceptance extends.* As, for what a man freely chooses to *do*, so for what he chooses to *be*, he is liable to a just account. To these views difficulties are objected; by none more ably than by Dr. Julius Müller in his *Doctrine of Sin*, whose views will be taken into consideration in our following remarks.

Dr. Müller asks: Could the volition which appropriates the guilt of our depravity be withheld? If so, how comes it that guilt and sin are *absolutely universal*? And why is it that so momentous a volition, forming the crisis of our history, should be lost to our conscious memory? And how is it that, practically, in the blended impulses and volitions of our daily moral life, it is impossible to draw a clear distinction

How and how
far depravity
made own and
responsible.

Müller's ob-
jections.

between our responsible and irresponsible sins, so that our conscience unhesitatingly passes a common condemnation upon the entire mass?

It is not necessary to our argument, we may respond, that we should be able to take a precise and infallible diagnosis of the moral history or moral status of our infancy and childhood, on which Scripture furnishes so little light, and of which our conscious memory retains so little trace. Assuming the *gracious* condition of childhood, we know not what amount of conscious avoidable sin is requisite to banish the *grace* of that period and finish our young apostasy. Points of our existence, recorded as *crises* of our history in Our moral crises not marked. the registry of heaven, are not testified to our consciousness by any sensible warning or shock. Not always is the moment of adult regeneration, or of the abandonment to obduracy, or perhaps even the unpardonable sin, evidenced to the soul. But of the sin which appropriates the sin of our nature, our axiomatic principles require us to affirm that *it is free and avoidable*. Yet *back of that freedom* we admit that Appropriative act free, yet necessary. there is a NECESSITY that insures that, sooner or later, *the free act of appropriation will be made*. It is in this fact that the freedom and the universality of this fall are found to be reconciled. We have elsewhere noted* that to average free agents, as probationary men are, the constant presence of a powerful temptation often insures that sooner or later the sin will be *freely* accepted. Individually, the act is free; yet upon the collective rests the pressure of a sure necessity. So it is found in the doctrine of probabilities. Of a given cycle of The necessity collective. throws of dice, each throw may or may not turn up a six; and yet such is the synthesis of causations in the great Cosmos, that within the cycle a six must turn up. These cycles of individually free volitions, continually occurring, and sometimes several simultaneously,

* See p. 132.

become so innumerable that sooner or later the free responsible sin will be committed, and so a responsible depravity becomes individually and freely universal by necessity. What bearings this necessity, in spite of this freedom, may have upon our responsibility, may appear in the sequel.

With regard to the effect of this collective necessity, in hearty accordance with our maxim, we maintain that, according to its quality and quantity, it is destructive of responsibility. The philosopher who, like Kant, shall in effect say, *I ought to do right with ideal perfectness through my whole life, therefore I can*, lays no just basis of a responsibility. It might be replied with Baader, "The consciousness that I ought to act so or so compels me to acknowledge that I could so act if I would; but no less clear is the conviction that I do not will so to act, that I will to act otherwise. Now this perverse Will I am to repress by keeping it down with opposing Will, which is just as easy as—keeping in my breath or committing suicide."

We might still more strongly add by our view that the "I can" in its requisite extension is utterly destroyed by our *collective necessity*, and the basis of a just responsibility goes with it. And this remark of Baader's illustrates the utterly fantastic nature of that theory which bases responsibility upon a "*moral ability*" in the Will to enact a volition otherwise than the strongest motive, which it expressly admits *no Will, finite or infinite, actual or possible, ever puts forth*. Such a volition is infinitely more a phantasm than either the held breath or suicide. It is more like the act of drawing a pure geometrical figure with a charcoal. But even this ideal diagram is practicable and normal to a superior nature; whereas the ideal volition is unknown to any nature.

The blessed antithesis and compensation to this col-

lective necessity to freely contract the guilt of original sin, is the free and perpetual availability of the Atonement. The aggregate necessity is hereby balanced by an aggregate freedom. The bane is primitively not removed, but the antidote is supplied. Free, individually, in sinning and self-depravation, we are free, individually, in accepting justification and regeneration. It is thus that, without losing its intrinsic character of stupendous grace, the atonement becomes a justice—a theodice. It blends in with the terrible elements of our fallen state, and forms an average proba- Equitable dispensation. tional dispensation in which the divine Administrator appears not merely absolutely just, but practically equitable, and mercifully reasonable to our human reason.

The trial of our probation thereupon becomes—not the avoiding distributively with an ideal moral power every individual sin; that is, in keeping the law with an unfallen perfection; but—the alternative of our preferring the blessed means of escaping the power of sin and attaining an ultimate perfection, or a rejection of the offered remedial aid and persistence in our sin and ever deepening depravation. And thus we see that No probation without redemption. without the Redeemer no equitable system of probation for fallen man is a possibility. The Cross is the key to the mystery of our being.

But it is affirmed by Müller that, in the progress of our daily moral history, so does a man find necessary impulses and free volitions mingling together in the mass of his sin, that no distinction can be practically drawn; and conscience does in fact pronounce *guilty of the whole*. In the practical act of repentance, we reply, it is not very necessary for a man to sort out his sins into impulse and volition, responsible and irresponsible. They are all his enemies; dangerous to his peace and safety; and he does well to get rid of them, without waiting for a ceremonious Sorting of sins not necessary in repentance. Our mingled mass of sin.

analysis by the most summary process possible. He can afford to abjure them in the gross, and let God do the discriminating. Nevertheless, it is not true that conscience cognizes no difference; nor is it proved true by the fact that it is difficult, nay, often impossible, to pronounce infallibly of the guilt of many a single act. The reality of moral distinctions does not depend upon our skill in applying the principles to the actual case. My conscience does not recognize a guilt for a primordial

Yet there is
difference in
their nature
and respons-
ibilities.

necessitation; and it does recognize guilt for a self-superinduced necessitation. It does not recognize guilt for a purely necessitated voli-

tion; and it does recognize guilt for a free alternative volition. Questions of the amount or nature of blame are every day occurring, in jurisprudence, in ethics, in our judgments of character, in which these discriminations are spontaneously made. And when we look upon the body of sin within us, we find its varying nature requires a varying remedy. For our freely contracted guilt, there must be *justification*; for our freely contracted tendencies to sin, and to different classes of sins, there must be *sanctification*; and for that primitive and necessitative in-

And difference
of needed
remedies.

graining of depravity in our nature by which occasions and impulses and necessitations to sin exist, resulting in actual free responsible sins, we need the *reorganization*, the death and resurrection, the bodily reconstruction in the image of Christ.

Thus we see how by a free act, none the less individually free because universally committed, the guilt of our depravity is contracted. We see how that single free appropriative act, though a crisis, is not so moment-

Results.

ous a transition as at first sight appears, and requires no shock to make it memorable. We see how the collective necessity of a universal depravation is balanced by the free availability of a universal atonement. God is hereby (and in no way without the atonement) justified in the equity of our probation.

The total inability of fallen man, apart from all provision, to keep the Law, arises from the fact, that its holiness, as a normal course of conduct, is outside the conditions we have stated* of possible volitional action. The knowledge of the perfect way, in its rectitude and perpetuity, is as unrevealed to his moral perception as the view of a pure geometrical figure to the human eye. The feeling of love to God he is as unable to beget in his own soul as is a sensualist to create in his heart a poetic sensibility. Even with a Saviour, a Bible, a Church, and a blessed Spirit, the natural man, without an individual self-surrender to divine aid, cannot attain a final restoration to the divine image. Without these provisions, both gracious and just in their character, the elements of a righteous probational system have no existence. Without Christ the foundations of our present moral system could not be laid.



CHAPTER XI.

EQUATION OF PROBATIONAL ADVANTAGES.

OF the three great generic difficulties of Arminianism, enumerated by Dr. Hill in his theology, the first is drawn from the fact that a large share of mankind never having heard of Christ are, even by Arminian concession, excluded from the means, and so from the possible attainment, of salvation through him. After all your efforts to maintain the freedom of the human Will, (such is in effect his argument,) and your rejection of the justice of condemnation without a previous power to attain salvation, men are, by a sort of historical reprobation, damned without ever having possessed the power of being saved. Anticalvinian writers early

Historical
reprobation.

* See p. 70.

appreciated this difficulty and furnished their answers. Perhaps the ablest and fullest discussion on the Arminian side is the treatise of Curcellæus, *De Necessitate Cognitionis Christi ad Salutem*, written in reply to Maresius, who took the high Calvinian ground of the universal damnation of all not possessing actual faith in Christ.

Other than Arminian theologians have advocated explanatory theories. One class has adopted the theory of restorationism, by which penalty is graduated to the guilt by the *length* as well as the *degree* of infliction. Others, as Müller in his *Doctrine of Sin*, conceiving that our Protestant eschatology is too stern, have preferred a theory, not of purgatory precisely, but of a means of knowledge and repentance in the intermediate state for those who are excluded therefrom during life. A third class embraces the doctrine of annihilationism, according to which, all who fail to fulfill the conditions of a real probation simply relapse into the non-existence from which they were brought by human birth. Could either one of these theories be proved it would obviate the Calvinian argument. It is our present purpose neither to refute their claims nor to adopt their method of solution.

We may in the first place remark that Dr. Hill's argument is a most dangerous weapon for Calvinism, since it involves a complete admission of the accuracy and justice of one of the strongest objections against that system. His argument clearly avows a reprobation in which there has never been in the subject any power to attain salvation. After all the Calvinian talk of the *freedom* of the human Will, *damnation is confessedly accorded without the slightest freedom in the Will to escape it*. For if men are historically reprobated by absolute exclusion from all knowledge of Christ, how is salvation ever in reach of their free-will?

Arminianism is not required to affirm an absolute and precise equality of privileges and means of salvation to

all the race. What she does affirm is, that justice is done in every individual case. We may perhaps express the true ground in the following brief statement:

Although there is not a perfect equation of the means and advantages among all mankind, yet it may be affirmed that *no man is ever condemned to everlasting death who has not enjoyed FULL MEANS and OPPORTUNITY for salvation, and has willfully rejected them by persevering in a course of conscious sin.* The inequalities of advantage for salvation are in a great degree obviated by the fact that *the amount of advantage is an important element in the graduation of penalty and reward.* Such may be the proportion of moral demand for higher excellence, and such the liability to deeper penalty for misimprovement, that classes of mankind favored with higher means are perhaps on a wise calculation at a level with the apparently less privileged. Or conversely, the parts of mankind possessed of inferior means may be so compensated by proportionate allowances that they may be on an actual level of advantage with their apparently more favored fellows.

Without the limits of the proper Christian dispensation but two others require consideration, namely, first, what we will call the *Infantile, Irresponsible, or Undeveloped* DISPENSATION, embracing all minds not developed to the conditions of a moral accountability; and second, the *Heathen* DISPENSATION, embracing all excluded from all possible knowledge of Christianity.

I. A large mass, if not a majority of mankind, are said hitherto to have *died in* INFANCY, including under that description all who do not attain a responsible age. This dispensation then is, perhaps, scarce less populous than all the others inclusive. This is a most mysterious point in the divine administration, of which it is no part of our present purpose to attempt an explanation, that in a world of probation so large a proportion should be abortive as subjects of probation.

Arminian
statement.

Infant irre-
sponsibility.

Nevertheless up to a responsible age the manifestations of sinful nature, the sinful thoughts and actions, subject not the being to penal retribution.

But, irrespective of age, is there not a large class of mankind whose moral and intellectual nature has never attained a development to the level of responsibility? The reflections of thinkers on this subject have, it may be, rested too much on the point of *mere age*. If there are millions who die before arriving at the normal responsible *age*, there are other millions who never at any age arrive at a more responsible mental development than the infant. Under this head we should not perhaps include idiots alone. But is there not within the bounds and perhaps in the center of Christendom itself a countless class, accurately gauged by the eye of Omniscience alone, whose minds are as little expanded, and as little qualified, intellectually or morally, for the responsibilities of probation, if not as the idiot, certainly as the child? As our minds are liable to be influenced by individual chronology in the matter of responsible development, so we are apt to limit the heathen dispensation by geographical limits alone. But within the bosom of Christendom there is an immense class adult in years but apparently entitled to the moral immunity of infancy; geographically Christian, but with as little access to a true Christianity as the most distant heathenism—Heathendom in Christendom. Excluded perhaps by invincible barriers from any possible knowledge of the truth as a very idiot, unwarned and unconscious that there is any truth to be sought, they seem incapable of being held to a just penal responsibility. In the dregs of our large cities, it is impossible to say what numbers there are whom we hardly can decide whether they are to be assigned to the infant and idiot dispensation or to Heathendom. To decide this in most living individual cases would require an Omniscient knowledge of their interior man and entire spiritual

Adults as irresponsible.

history. Each single living problem must stand unsolved. Each man is, in a degree, by himself a dispensation. But what is the ultimate destiny? Precisely the same, we reply, with that of the infant. The creeds which teach infant damnation should make a clean sweep of the whole; while in our view they are all on the same basis of common redemption. The infant is in the kingdom of God with a character perhaps correspondent to regeneration in the adult. The irresponsible adult, however incusted in irresponsible sins, is redeemed by an unknown Saviour. Both alike may be least in the kingdom of heaven; neither can, by the law of moral equation, be excluded from it.

II. But geographically distant from Christian lands, in a real HEATHENDOM, there are those who never heard of Christ, in regard to whom the question arises, What are their advantages for attaining eternal life? To attempt deciding this peremptorily in the individual instances as they occur in experience would be assuming the prerogative of Omniscience. But the general principles of a just responsibility may perhaps be proximately ascertained.

We assume the headship of Christ over the human race, placing on the basis of his atonement all mankind under a regimen of just and merciful probation, suited to the present nature and state of our humanity, cognizing all the shades of human life, circumstances, and character, and adjusting with absolute accuracy the retribution of reward or penalty to the case. We assume the universality of the atonement, and that millions may be saved by its means who never heard the name of the Propitiator. We assume the universality of the dispensation of the Spirit. We assume the universal possession of the faculties of reason inferring a Creator from the creation, a conscience furnishing the dictates of right and wrong. The reason may not reveal a Creator in the fullness of his attributes, nor even pre-

Universal
advantages.

vent the worship of a God through finite symbols and images, which the Scriptures, given for the very purpose of maintaining the pure idea of the Deity, prohibit as *idolatry*, under severest penalty, especially to the chosen race, whose special mission was, the preservation of the pure idea for the development of future ages. The conscience may not furnish an absolutely accurate code of ethics; but it furnishes principles which are *relatively to the individual* right, and safe in the eye of God *for him* to follow. If under the guidance of that reason he follows the dictates of that conscience, the man, though absolutely wrong on many points, will under our gracious dispensation be right so far as responsibility and future destiny are concerned. Such a man will act under many a sad delusion and commit many things intrinsically wrong; but the saving fact is that he acts with a *purpose* which *wants but the light of truth* in order to his being truly right. In such a case, though there is

Two conditions of heaven then salvation.

not the reality of Christian faith and righteousness, yet there are TWO THINGS, namely, 1. What we will call the SPIRIT OF FAITH; and, 2. The PURPOSE OF RIGHTEOUSNESS. Where *these two* exist in the man, under any dispensation, *he is justified through the atonement and accepted of God.*

The doctrine of the grades of future retribution adjusted to the varieties of probationary character is abundantly taught in Scripture. Scripture rule is, that we are rewarded *according to our works*. Of the blessed, we are taught that in the resurrection one star differeth from another in glory, (1 Cor. xv, 41;) that there is a greatest and a least in the kingdom of heaven, (Matt. v, 19;) that some attain an abundant entrance, (2 Pet. i, 11;) and some are scarce saved, (1 Pet. iv, 18.) Of the condemned we are told that he that knew his Master's will and did it not shall be beaten with many stripes; while he that knew not his Master's will, and through neglecting the law of conscience showed not the

works of the law, shall be beaten with many stripes, (Luke xii, 47.) And once for all the rule is laid down, "Unto whomsoever much is given shall be much required," (Luke xii, 48.) And this rule is illustrated by the fact that in the parable of the talents (Matt. xxv, 14-30) the rewards were adjusted to the amount of improvement, and the amount of improvement proportioned to the capital furnished was completely accepted, while the reward was proportioned to both.

Our Saviour (Matt. xi, 20-24) declares that it would be more tolerable for Sodom and Gomorrah in the day of judgment than for the cities who had witnessed his preaching and mighty works; since Sodom with such advantages would, like Nineveh, have "repented in sackcloth and ashes." From this we may infer, 1. That all people have not equal advantages for salvation; 2. That those who receive the highest advantages may nevertheless reject salvation; 3. That God may discern in the minds of those who possess inferior advantages that *spirit or will of faith* by which in the day of their visitation they would have accepted had Christ in fullness been presented; 4. That such a disposition to faith diminishes their guilt and subtracts from their penalty; 5. That the degree of advantage, when rejected, heightens the guilt and adds a proportional segment to the amount of penalty; 6. That Sodom was not the worst city conceivable, since they had at least in some part of their history *the spirit of faith*; but not possessing the concrete *object of faith*, their faith was culpably defective, not being verified by the *purpose of righteousness*. On the contrary, in the absence of a concrete and cognizable Redeemer and Judge they renounced not only all efficient faith, but all righteousness, and gave themselves over to all uncleanness.

1. Of the SPIRIT OF FAITH it may be said that though it is not a perfect faith in Christ, yet it is a faith more or less distinct, recognized by the

1. Spirit of Faith.

searcher of hearts and trier of the reins, in *that of which Christ* is the *concrete* and the *embodiment*. It may be safely assumed that if the true Redeemer were presented in proper correlation to that faith at the moment of its full existence he would be cordially accepted. Hence Christ is presented to the world as a *test* to the true ring of the moral purpose. He "is set for the fall and rising again of many, that the thoughts of many hearts may be revealed." Luke ii, 34, 35. "*For judgment came he into the world, that they which see not might see; and that they which see, corruptly and falsely, might be made blind.*" John ix, 39. The splendid catalogue of saints enumerated in the eleventh chapter of Hebrews had at best but a dim conception of the redemptive concrete object of faith; some of them, perhaps, no conception at all. Their faith was the aspiring, heroic faith of the heart and will, whose object was truly realized and embodied in Christ. To such a faith had Christ been correlatively revealed, with the earnestness of a Nathaniel its exclamation would have been, Rabbi, thou art the son of God, thou art the King of Israel. And similarly we may suppose that a Socrates, who, according to Plato, earnestly thirsted for a divine teacher, could have rejoiced at the revealed advent to himself of this Messiah. But we do not imagine that such cases are to be found solely in those strikingly historic characters. Wherever the Gospel is not preached, as well as wherever it is preached, there are those who are not necessitatedly, but by their own free act and state, predisposed or *ordained to eternal life*, and such *believe*. (Acts xiv, 48.) Of such a class God might often say to the discouraged missionary, *Be not afraid, for I have much people in this city.*

2. This *spirit of faith*, however, like the actual faith of the Gospel, must be vivified by **WORKS**; 2. Works of righteousness. that is, it must be substantiated by the purpose and actuality of righteousness, exemplified by an adherence to the laws of conscience. In spirit and pur-

pose this is to fear God and work righteousness; and in every nation such as fulfill these conditions are accepted of him. (Acts x, 35.) About this is meant by the phrase, "*living up to the light a man has.*"

It is often said, however, that we have no reason to suppose that there are any in heathen countries who *live up to the light they have.*

And in strict interpretation, such a statement is true of all men in all countries. By that strictness of interpretation, all Christendom, as well as all Heathendom, must, without exception, perish. The application of the same liberality of interpretation which would save the visible Church in Christendom, would save the invisible Church in Heathendom. The true principle doubtless is, that the heathen will be saved who attains that approximation to the perfect standard of his Proportionate living up to standard. dispensation which equals the saving approximation in the Christian dispensation. He is a saved heathen who lives as nearly up to the light he has, as does the Christian who is finally saved to the light he has.

Truly, that severity of Christian judgment, with which many judge the unfavored peoples, would leave us little hope of the Christian Church. That judgment is a sharp two-edged sword. It surveys the vices and crimes of heathen nations and communities and individuals, judges them by the moral standard of the written law, and executes summary justice without redemption. It forgets the crimes and vices of Christendom, refined indeed by civilization from some barbarian grossness, but rendered ingenious and varied by the subtle genius of an inventive age. More especially, it forgets how the Christian Church ranks not only immensely below the true ideal of a Church, but how often she is the apologist, the sanctioner, and the perpetrator of stupendous sins. What persecutions, what corruptions, what idolatries, what oppressions, has not the Christian Church not only sanctioned, but committed. And yet that Church is the

hope, the light, the conscience, and the depository of truth for the world.

For instance, we see in a certain age and section a vast body of the Christian Church engaged in the practice and defense of slaveholding; we wonder to find that in other respects they exhibit the fruits of the Spirit in rich abundance, and we ask if such men are to be peremptorily unchristianized here, and utterly damned hereafter. Certainly not. It belongs indeed to the general Christian Church, as testimony against their great sin, to place them under the ban of exclusion from Christian fellowship, and leave them to God's wise judgment. So long as their light in other respects is not darkness, so long as their religion is in its place immensely better than none at all, we admit their true Christianity, burdened indeed by a sin that dwarfs its stature, and trims it of half its reward in glory.

Surely he must read the ecclesiastical and religious history of Christendom with a sad heart, if not an infidel discouragement, who cannot understand how God, under the superincumbent burden and guise of error and wrong, can recognize the body of believers in spirit, and righteous ones in purpose, who form the true invisible Church in the visible world. And the same penetrative eye that can recognize the Church in Christendom, who dimly embrace the historic Messiah in the fullness of his ill-understood offices, ought also to recognize the Church in Heathendom, who sit indeed in the valley of the shadow of death, but whose spirit of faith would embrace that Saviour in the completeness of his revelation and advent. And thus it truly is, that the missionary who goes forth into heathen lands goes, in a great degree, on a tour of discovery. He goes to find the men who, tried by the test of a presented Saviour, shall be found freely willing to exercise the spirit of faith and righteousness. As the philosopher, applying the magnet to a heap of sand and iron filings,

Church below
its standard.

Invisible Church
of Heathendom.

Missionary a
discoverer.

finds that the metallic particles will adhere to the loadstone, while the sands lie quiet in their own inertness, so the missionary, rightly presenting the cross, shall find it to operate as a test to decide whose wills and purposes may render and prove them the true metal. He may not present the test rightly. It may not be brought into true correlation with the soul of the heathen. Hence he may not find all the genuine objects of his search. But if the true correlation be brought about, it will generally prove true that much people will be found unconsciously waiting the desire of all nations. Such a spirit of faith, like the faith of the Christian, may be for a while entertained and then renounced. Like the receptive faith of Sodom, which would have received the living personal Christ, if presented in the plenitude of his miracles and preaching, it may be overborne and renounced, and the original possessors may plunge, voluntarily and guiltily, into all the excess of lasciviousness. Like the Jews, it may rejoice in some harbinger of the Messiah for a season.

On the other hand, the presentation of the Gospel may not only discover, but *awaken* the spirit of faith and energize a spirit of righteousness. As ^{Also an awakener.} we have before remarked, though every man who is ultimately condemned has had his day of visitation, his chance to exercise the spirit of faith and of righteousness, and is therefore justly condemned; yet there are higher as well as lower states of advantage, and the higher state may, and doubtless often will, result in increased numbers of believers ultimately saved. Indeed, we are expressly told by our Saviour, that revelations might have been made to Sodom, in view of which Sodom would have repented. It would even appear that had the apostles, or missionaries equal to them in power, have gone to Sodom, Sodom would have been penitent. The right missionary, then, in the right place, may be the means of an indefinite increase of believers who shall be saved. The Church, thus in the right temper and posi-

tion, may still effectuate through the blessing of God the conversion of the world, and the universal conversion of the world, terminating all geographical inequalities, result in the salvation of the entire mass.

But terrible enough, under any view, is not only the condition, but the guilt and the responsibility of Heathendom. Heathendom is not merely a cause, but an effect; and to a large degree, in every generation, a willful and unnecessary and consequently responsible effect of men's conscious and intentional sins. If individuals sin greatly and almost necessarily because the aggregate sins, the aggregate is sinful because the individual sins freely, responsibly, and beyond the equitable and indulgent excuse from his condition. And that *makes heathenism*; and makes heathenism largely responsible and damnable. But for this, the true light would shine and heathenism would long since have been Christendom. And to this extent the heathen are under just sentence of eternal death.

And this accords with St. Paul's view in the first and second chapters of Romans. Those who have St. Paul's view of heathendom. not the written law are not judged by the written law. They have a conscience, a law written on the heart, under the dispensation of which they are judged, as the Jews are judged under the written law. And (chap. i, 17-32) it was upon men in heathendom, who *obstruct* (so the word *hold* should be rendered) *the truth by unrighteousness*, that the wrath of God is revealed. For whereas they had, from nature and conscience, a dispensation up to which they might live and so attain the truth, they turned the truth into a lie, and so were given up "*to vile affections*." Their responsibility arose from the fact that they "did not like to retain the knowledge of God," and that though knowing that they which do such things are worthy of death, not only do the same, but have pleasure in them that do them. Nor is it true that, beyond the recognition of the

facts that men out from under the written law are still under an ethical law, with a conscience to render it conscious, and a perception of a deity as its administrator, the apostle does not in these chapters furnish any cheering moral points in heathen character or destiny. For in chapter ii, verse 14, he clearly supposes that there are Gentiles that "do by nature the things contained in the law;" and in verse 15, that "they show the work of the law written in their hearts," and he accounts for the fact by averring that they are under the law and guidance of conscience.

It perfectly accords with our views of a responsible free-agency to suppose that there are localities on earth in which, through periods of time, there is so total a moral depravation, that the spirit of faith is completely repudiated, and the entire reverse Unsaved heathen masses. of works of righteousness is done. Besides the large number who, happily for themselves, are in the conditions of irresponsibility, every individual of the whole mass in such case is freely, responsibly, damnably guilty. But we must not argue too sweepingly from cases of such extremity. There may be, too, spots in Christendom even where a degree of morality prevails, where a professed Church exists, and a form And Christian. of religion is enacted, where not a responsible soul is in a state of salvation.

Nor, we may add, must we confound *temporal moral aspects* with *eternal prospects*. For we may safely conjecture that a negro hamlet in Central Africa, however inferior in its temporal moral aspects, especially when contemplated in the light of our moral and intellectual biases, may, in its *prospects for an eternal destiny*, be superior to many an American village. That crowd of semi-barbarians, giddy with folly, addicted to vices, misguided by degrading superstitions, is composed of intrinsically noble human spirits, towering immeasurably above the most human-like animal species around them,

endowed with educable reason, with illuminable conscience, and with spiritual susceptibilities, capable of being developed (as the modern religious history of Madagascar nobly shows) into a most heroic and martyr-like Christianity. Certainly, in a community like this, the Omniscient eye that could discern a predisposition to repentance in Sodom itself may recognize an ^{African and New England} village. abundance of the spirit of faith, and, tried too by the ethics of its dispensation, that community may follow its own conscience, and "live up to the light it has" more truly than many a New England village. And making the due allowance, as taught by the words of Christ, for its inferior advantages, its collective prospect for eternity may be far superior. For that New England village has placed before its mental view the pure New Testament ideal, and the solemn obligations of Christianity; and yet the large majority of numbers, wealth, and influence is impenitent, perhaps skeptical. And its Church, how poorly does it present that pure reality of Christianity which could win the world by its loveliness, purity, and power. Nay, how little heart for the work of shaping the world to the model of Christ, and winning it as a trophy to his cross.

Strictly of a piece with this want of heart is the want of a pure and flaming zeal in the prosecution of the *missionary enterprise*. And we develop this topic ^{Missionary test of saved state.} all the more fully because it at once establishes our argument, and shows that our favorable view of the heathen condition is a strong incentive rather than a damper to the missionary spirit. It is the want of that spirit, identical with the missionary spirit, which ruins the souls of that New England village. That same disposition by which that village would become purely Christian, heir of eternal life, is the spirit by which it would seek with all its heart and all its strength to win a world to Christ. And the specific spirit, too, of missionary enterprise, burning with intense power

in the heart of that Church, would react to kindle the love and zeal requisite to gain its own community for heaven. By seeking to save others, that village would save itself.

Bold assertions in missionary speeches and sermons, that all the world without the pale of Christendom is damned in mass, never quicken the pulse of missionary zeal. On the contrary, they ever roll a cold reaction upon every feeling heart and every rational mind. Our better natures revolt, and, alas! a gush of skepticism is but too apt in consequence to rise in the public mind, especially where precise ideas in regard to the question have not been formed and fixed. We had far better argue the missionary cause from the danger to our own salvation from that low standard of Christianity which does not subdue the world to the righteousness of faith from the vast *increase* of the number saved through a universal Gospel, and from the rich reward and unspeakable glory of winning every isle and continent to Christ, securing him the crown of our entire planet.

Heathendom has her standing plea in condemnation of Christendom. She avers that Christendom, having the blessing and glory of religion, does most guiltily not only misimprove the boon, but repudiate her obligation to impart it. She charges that Christendom, with all her advantages, is still but too heathen, forgetting her mission of blessing the families of the earth with the gift of the Gospel, while she riots in refined licentiousness, expends her treasures in splendid self-gratifications, and employs her powers, trained by the civilizing discipline of Christianity, in wars of ambition and national aggrandizements. Heathendom thus maintains that, before heaven and earth, her case is fairer, if not in its present superficial moral aspects, yet in the light of reason and the judgment of eternity. Nor are we sure—and the possibility is a motive

Chilling
missionary
speeches.

The monopoly
of the Gospel
is Christen-
dom's sin.

for higher zeal in diffusing the knowledge of the Gospel of Christ—that thus far in the history of the Christian ages, so have we misimproved our higher means, and so far forgotten to impart and diffuse the Gospel we monopolize, that the majority of the redeemed will not have been gathered by Christ from lands where the power of his cross has never yet been proclaimed.

A greater power of missionary enterprise would, in full accordance with our views, increase, beyond all known volume, the amount of the spirit of faith in the hamlets and territories of Heathendom. The “mighty works” of the Gospel may be so presented to the Sodoms and Gomorrah, to the Tyres and Sidons of the heathen dispensation in the present age, as that they “will repent in sackcloth and ashes.” And as the demoralization of one part of mankind sheds a demoralizing influence over all the rest of mankind, so the purification of one part may react in blessing upon all others,

“Till, like a sea of glory,
It spreads from pole to pole.”

When every part is purified a nobler spirit of rectitude is universally diffused, a loftier standard of Christian civilization arises, a more perfect model of Christian holiness is attained, and the Church, embracing the world, gradually rises to the realization of the ideal of a true, a holy, and a glorious Church. Thus our favorable view of the condition of heathenism furnishes enhanced reasons and motives for the most earnest exertions by the Church for the world’s conversion.

And yet the eternal crown of these giants of holiness under high advantages may, by the law of equalization, be no brighter than shall be worn by their predecessors, who attained a lower stature, more hardly won, amid the struggles of a depraved age. So may the saints of all ages be graded to a proportionate level. The

Universal
spread and
higher stand-
ard.

great advantages of that millennial age, worth centuries of martyrdom, warfare, and missionary toil, is that, generally speaking, ALL are saved, all through perhaps countless generations of the race; so that it may not be an unreasonable supposition that, ultimately, it is not the *few* but the *many* that shall be redeemed. And we are inclined to indorse the opinion that the finally lost will be, proportionally, as few as are the criminals executed upon the gallows at the present day in comparison with the rest of the community. They will be the malefactors of the world, perhaps of the universe.

Equation of
rewards.

Our whole view evolves the conclusion that the possession of the Gospel is not only a glorious and blessed, but a most solemn and responsible boon. The savor of life unto life may be a savor of death unto death. The Gospel *within reach*, the Gospel *heard*, the Gospel *possessed*, all involve an accountability, whose shade of guilt God alone can precisely measure. The Gospel *within reach* carries a power of warning of its claim to *attendance* and *attention*. The Gospel *heard* involves a right to *faith* and obedience. The Gospel *possessed* proclaims the obligation to *practice* and *diffuse its doctrines and power through the earth*. Higher advantages render higher holiness obligatory. The greatest sinner in the world, measured not by superficial aspects, but by compound responsibilities of sin committed and advantages enjoyed, may very probably be the Gospel-hearing sinner, who knows his duty and does it not. His woe is that of Chorazin and Bethsaida, in comparison with which the doom of Sodom was light.

Our conclusion then is, that if Arminianism explains itself aright, it leaves to Calvinism alone its inexorable, historical, and geographical reprobation, a counterpart to its theological. We survey Heathendom with melting pity indeed, but without that horror and mystery which the dark, damnatory view of reprobation affords.

The humane
view a mis-
sionary in-
centive.

We contemplate the whole without any shuddering misgivings of divine injustice. And yet, in the very humaneness of our view, we gather fresh motives, more searching and home-coming impressions of responsibility, and more cheering incitements to quicken the nerve of missionary enterprise, through all the sections of the Christian Church and for all the lands of the habitable globe.

Our review of the Necessitarian argument is now closed. Our position throughout has been that the Power of counter choice—being the indispensable condition to Responsibility—must be held to exist until an unanswerable argument has proved its non-existence. Our reader who at this point coincides with us in thinking that none such has been found, may consider our whole work now accomplished. The difficulties in the way of Responsibility are cleared by the completed defense of the reality of Freedom. Nevertheless, not only are some positive arguments worthy of statement, but there are some necessitarian replies to that argument requiring answers which can best be made after the positive statement has been presented.

Conclusion.

PART THIRD.

THE POSITIVE ARGUMENT STATED.

CHAPTER I.

THE ARGUMENT FROM CONSCIOUSNESS.

So varying are the views of psychologists in regard to the nature of consciousness, or rather in regard to the meaning of the term, that we find it convenient to adopt a nomenclature of our own, and speak of CONSCIOUSNESS, SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS, and SUB-CONSCIOUSNESS.

I. CONSCIOUSNESS. At the threshold of this argument we are told that consciousness is a faculty which can take cognizance of mental *operations* alone, and knows nothing directly of *powers*, which knowledge the mind derives by logical inference from operations; hence she can say nothing of an alternative *power* of Will. "For consciousness," says the Princeton Essayist, "is *the mind's cognizance of its own operations*; it never beholds naked, abstract faculties separate from their workings. It discerns them in and by these workings, and so becomes conscious of their existence and nature. This, and nothing else, is the office of consciousness. How, then, can it be cognizant of operations which do not exist?"

It is not claimed, we reply, that the consciousness is "cognizant of operations which do not exist," but of *power* for such non-existent operations. Consciousness
of power. And if, as the writer admits, the mind becomes conscious, even indirectly, of the existence and nature of powers,

and so is truly said to be conscious of a power at all, the mind assuredly is conscious of power for operations, namely, volitions which do not exist. For before every volition which it is about to make, and when it is as yet an "operation which does not exist," the mind is conscious of a power to operate it. Our *volitions are all put forth in the light of a conscious anterior power* to put them forth. Otherwise they would not be put forth. And a conscious power for the act before the act is a conscious power for an action which does not exist.

For non-existent operation.

Nor can it be truly said, as sometimes is said, that we can have no conscious sense of power for a volition left ultimately unperformed. That is, it cannot be shown that we have no conscious sense of power for volitions alternatively omitted. On the contrary, we naturally survey the alternatives of choice before us with a conscious sense that *either* is in our power, that we have a one power for either act. Our conscious sense is that previous to our determination the choices omitted were as truly in our power as the choice performed. Before that performance our conscious sense is that each and every choice is equally in our power, and that the choices omitted are omitted not for not possessing the power, but for not exerting it. So far, then, as consciousness decides, we possess amid choices an alternative power.

And for volitions never existing.

Let us suppose, then, several alternatives before the deliberating mind. The conscious feeling is that either object is in the power of the choice. A comparison of their relative qualities shows different recommendations in each object, appealing to different faculties of the mind. One quality appeals to the reason, a second to the moral sense, a third to the love of beauty, a fourth to the personal interest, a fifth to some one of the particular appetites. It is from the Will comes the determination between them,

The case contemplated.

and fixes the act. But suppose that on account of some one of these inducements the choice is made; the question is often put, "Could the agent have chosen otherwise?" And the reply often is, "No; not unless there was a motive otherwise." But we rejoin, There was a motive, nay, several motives otherwise, all before the attention, and co-existing in the mind.* When the choice is made, it is of course made sequentially upon some one of the motives; and hence it is sometimes inferred therefrom that the relation of necessitative cause and effect existed between that motive and that volition. But on the hypothesis of freedom as truly as upon that of necessity, there is a motive that lies in immediate antecedency to the volition; there is a reason last occurring before the choice, in sequence to which the Will, terminating the comparative survey, makes the choice. But it is not for want of other motives that choice is made. The other motives co-exist in view of the Will; and the fact is, the *Will, in and by choosing, brings the particular motive*, on account of which it acts, *into this last antecedency* to its choice.† It does so by the very act of choosing sequentially to it and on account of it. By this view we see how the full conscious power of the Will over all and each of the motives is consistently and clearly verified.

Other choice possible if motive otherwise?

There is motive otherwise.

But still further analysis perhaps will show that consciousness may take cognizance of the QUALITIES of our mental operations, and that among these *qualities* necessity is cognized in the operations of the other faculties and *non-necessity in those of the Will*. If it is by consciousness that we know a volition from a perception, it must be because the qualities of each are cognized by consciousness. We can distinguish them only by their differences of *quality*. Nor are the true and final conclusions of all consciousness in regard to such qualities derived entirely from con-

Consciousness of qualities of mental operations.

* See p. 373.

† See p. 79.

consciousness alone, or at least from consciousness unaided by experience derived from other faculties. When consciousness judges the number, intensity, or rapidity of the inward operations, she applies to those operations a measurement *derived from other faculties*. The very faculty of knowing *number* is not consciousness, and yet the application of number shapes our conscious knowledge. And it is by a similar bringing from other faculties a discipline or a conception, that consciousness may judge the *necessity* of an operation. If consciousness, trained or supplied by other powers, can judge the intensity, why not the form and the *fixedness of the form* of a given operation? So consciousness judges that a sensation is necessitated. Power to pronounce an operation necessitated is also power to pronounce it non-necessitated. Consciousness adjudges the difference, and so knows the *difference*; and knowing the *difference*, she must know the *different*s. If consciousness knows that a faculty is necessitated in its operations, she may know that another faculty is not. So, certainly, consciousness does ascertain that sensation or intellection is necessitated. When we raise the question of the necessitation of an intellection, we introspect the intellection, examine its traits in comparison with the object, and judge. So also when we raise the question of the necessitation or non-necessitation of a volition, we may introspect the volition in comparison with the motive, and pronounce upon its quality of necessary conforming with that motive. We

Of necessity
as quality. judge this quality just as we judge any other quality in an internal operation. And we may correct or confirm this conscious decision by a conscious comparison between the traits of intellection and volition, just as we consciously learn to distinguish at all those two mental operations by conscious comparison, by their traits from each other. We shall then see that a conscious

And non-ne-
cessity. sense of non-necessity is properly a consciousness of non-necessity, and that a conscious-

ness of non-necessity is a consciousness that a different volition is a perfectly supposable thing in presence of the same motive presentations.

It is sometimes argued that if a watch were conscious it would suppose itself to tick freely. If in this illustration we reply, it is meant that a conscious soul be added of which the watch frame is the body, then the tick, being bodily, would correspond to the ^{Conscious Watch.} spontaneous motions of our bodily frame, such as the beating of the heart. It would of course be felt to be unfree. If it be meant that the watch-frame itself becomes a spirit, and its ticks become volitions, then it is no longer a watch but a spirit; its volitions are no longer ticks, and they are not movable by mechanical springs; and so the illustration vanishes. It disposes of all such illustrations to note that our perception of our own freedom depends upon the perfection of our consciousness. As our consciousness is, we perceive that our sensations and perceptions are unfree, but not our Will. Were our consciousness more perfect we should doubtless perceive the difference more clearly. But by a far less perfect consciousness the perception of the difference would be obliterated. If a watch were therefore in any way conscious in sufficient perfection, it would be aware of freedom *to* the tick, but not *from*.

If the doctrine of consciousness, maintained by Sir William Hamilton, be true, then when we are conscious of a *sense of power* we are *conscious* of the *power* itself for either volition. According to that philosopher we are not only conscious of our knowing an object, but we are conscious of the object we know. If I am conscious that I cognize the planet Mars, the consciousness of the cognition of Mars is the consciousness of Mars as cognized. There can be no consciousness of ^{Consciousness and volition as object.} knowledge of an object which is not conscious-

ness of what the knowledge embraces. If so there can be no consciousness of a sense of a present power of alternative volition which is not a consciousness of the power itself. We have therefore a conscious power of free Will.

II. SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS. But besides the view of consciousness, as thus limited by the definition of Reid, there is another presented by other philosophers, by which we might properly apply to the faculty the term *Self-consciousness*, as being the direct intuition of *self and its powers* by the conscious faculty. It seems indeed a circuitous route to the ascertainment of our own existence, and of our SELF, to make it an *inference* deduced from the premises furnished by consciousness. The obvious

consequence would seem to be that the existence of the self is less certain than the existence of thought. Do I not in pronouncing *I*, and reflectively casting inward my thought, consciously know myself? Do I not consciously *know* my being and my powers? If so I may know by the same self-consciousness my Will, its attributes and efficiencies. I then understand this sense of *power for an act not yet performed*, and which is anterior and condition to the performance itself. I can then also understand that I may possess a consciousness of power for an act that I *never shall put forth*; and that I do not need first to perform the act and then discover by inference that I possess the power for its performance.

If next we look at *the very nature of choice*, it seems to be an act which intrinsically might be withheld or put forth. Necessity imparts to the very *idea of volition* a rigidity and hardness not belonging to it. The flexibility and lenitude belonging to it disappear, and it receives a petrified, cubical, and mechanical quality unrecognized by consciousness. Hence also even necessitarians are usually dissatisfied

Direct know-
ing of Self.

And of its
powers.

Choice in-
trinsically
withhold-
able.

with the unnatural character which choice receives at their hands, and struggle to find something in it which their theory will allow to be called *freedom*. Between the view taken by the necessitarian as a philosopher and as a man there is a variance amounting to contradiction. Viewing the same thing at different moments, he is obliged to feel, and often to confess, that the results of his logic are irreconcilable with the perceptions of his natural consciousness.

III. SUB-CONSCIOUSNESS. From beneath our *moral natures* there come up the utterances of perhaps a deeper and yet more articulate *intellectual consciousness* than our analysis has hitherto reached. Let us scrutinize its dictates.

The assumption that in the act of transgression I possessed full power for contrary action lies at the base of all moral self-condemnation, all true repentance, all remorse. How deep in our nature are these feelings! How terrible is remorse! No part of our intuitive nature so clearly attests its own authority as being the VOICE OF GOD speaking, with a divine authority, within us. If any part of our being is infallible it is this. And its language is, "Woe is me, for I choose death when I might have chosen life. I did wrong though in the full possession of the power of doing right. I yielded to the baser motive when I had full power to have acted from the better and higher." In these AFFIRMATIONS of the moral nature we are to note FOUR things:

1. They assume the axiom of responsibility that *power underlies obligation*; that a man cannot be morally condemned for non-performance of an act for which he has no power. In condemning himself for not doing otherwise, he grounds the whole process on *the assumption that he could have DONE*, that is, willed, *otherwise*.
2. The power to do otherwise is assumed as existing

in the *self-same circumstances*; that is, in the *identical case*. The affirmation is that the wrong volition was put forth with the full coexisting underlying power-otherwise. To affirm that he could have willed otherwise if other motives, or the same motives with different force, had reached him, is simply to affirm that he would have had power, not in the actual case, but in a case that did not exist. It would be to affirm that he had no power-otherwise at all.

3. It is assumed that *the strength of motives did not exclude the power to will otherwise in the given case*. The superior force of a given motive does not excuse therefore; it does not nullify the counter power. On the contrary, the very blame is *for not rejecting the victorious motive*. The very guilt is that the so-called strongest motive was obeyed. And so the very assumption is that there was power to reject the so-called strongest motive.

4. This power-otherwise is assumed as existing, not merely for the *external act*, but for the diverse *volition*. Edwards has clearly shown that obligation or command rests not so much upon the external muscle or limb, as upon the Will. God commands us to *choose* his service, to *will* the right alternative, and to *determine* to prosecute the path of holiness.

But the point which it is our main purpose here to make is this. It is from the *intellect*, and not from itself, that the moral sense derives its *assumption* of power of otherwise willing in the self-same circumstances. It is an affirmation of the *intellective consciousness*. The moral sense *assumes* it because the intellect *affirms* it. Here, as in all cases, the moral sense pronounces its decisions upon the case as it is made up and presented by the *intellect*. The moral sense in effect says to the intellectual consciousness: "I pronounce a responsibility or blame for this volition, because you affirm that there is power for a different volition." To authorize the sen-

tence the intellectual consciousness must respond, "The agent willed thus in full possession of the power of willing otherwise." That is, the responsibility is affirmed by the moral sense; the existence of the counter power is affirmed by the intellectual consciousness. The doctrine of the freedom of the human Will, therefore, is an axiom of the intellect affirmed by the common consciousness of all mankind. It is an in-born self-knowledge.

Counter power
affirmed by the
intellect.

CHAPTER II.

ARGUMENT FROM POSSIBILITY OF DIVINE COMMAND.

It has been objected against the doctrine of volitional freedom that being in statement and conception a contradiction, it is itself *a nothing* in the world. To attribute it to the agent therefore is to attribute nothing; to deny it is to deny nothing.

Counter power
a nothing?

This, we reply, may be legitimately affirmed when both sides are brought to agreement that the conception of freedom is a contradiction. But for the opponent of freedom to decide that it is so, and then draw the inference, is simply an assumption of the point in debate.

Not agreed.

But if the assertion and conception of the sinner's power of doing otherwise than commit his actual deed of sin is contradictory, absurd, and a *nothing*, then so must be the *obligation*, the *requirement*, and the *command*. If to attribute the power and the act be to attribute a nothing, then so must the obligation upon the power and for the act be a nothing. Then so must the requirement and the command for the exertion of the power in the act be a nothing. And all penalty for non-exertion of the power must be

Obligation
would be
a nothing

penalty for nothing. And all retributory government founded in requirement for such act, as well as all penalty for its non-performance, is founded on nothing; and such government has no status or possible rightful or real existence. From all which it follows that without a rational and real power of counter volition there can be no divine prohibition of actual sin, no just retribution for its commission, no divine government founded upon such retribution. That is, without the alternativity of the Will, its self-determining power, its power for either of several volitions in the given case, a divine government is impossible. Necessitarianism cannot frame a Theodice. The very possibility of divine command requires and demonstrates freedom.

In Part III, sect. iv, Edwards undertakes to prove directly that necessitated volitions are proper subjects of command and prohibition, and that inability and requirement are consistent. He argues,

1. Requirement rests on Will. 1. It is the Will in the exercise of volitions which is the proper object of command, rather than the external sequent act, as we have elsewhere* fully quoted. 2. When a *generic volition*, or predomi-

2. Generics necessitate subordinate. nant leading purpose, is put forth, all the volitions subordinate and conformed to that leading purpose are *necessitated to obey it*, any obligation or divine command to the contrary notwithstanding.

3. Generics also necessary. 3. The aforesaid *generic volition* or predominating bias, which so necessitates the particular subordinate volitions, is also *necessary*. For "the inclination is unable to change itself," because "it is

unable to *incline* to change itself." 4. And yet, though both the principal and the subordinate volitions are necessary, there being in the agent no volitional power to substitute or change them, most rightfully may divine command be imposed upon the Will, (which is the point to be proved,) requiring an opposite purpose,

* See p. 240.

bias, or volition instead, whether principal or subordinate, to exist. For *either* such command, so requiring an opposite, is right, *or*, 5. The alternative consequence would logically follow, (as even Arminians must admit,) that no command could be imposed but such as required the actually existing volition, or one that will exist.

But this alternative consequence would make A dilemma. command and volition always *necessarily* to coincide; the command must accord with the act; and then, consequently, obedience would be a *necessity*! And so the Arminian (who denies that "law and command are consistent with necessity") would "overthrow himself!!"

With this slender ratiocination we may perhaps make short work. Arminians reject the necessity of both the general volition and its subordinates,* and so have nothing to do with the dilemma of alternatives deduced.

Of the two horns of the dilemma we reject both; since, if the volitions are necessary, Replies. we hold that neither counter command nor coinciding command would be suitable; for a necessitation is the suitable subject of no command at all. Very ludicrous is the necessity into which Edwards makes us "overthrow" ourselves; namely, a necessity of the divine command to coincide with our volitions; a necessity which is laid indeed upon the divine command, An absurd necessity. but which imposes no limitation upon the freedom of the human Will; a necessity indeed too absurd for discussion.

We now deny that the generic volition is always necessary and unchangeable; and we deny that the subordinate is always necessitated to obey it. If we sustain this denial, the right of command against necessity is unsustained. Let us examine the argument.

It is maintained by Edwards that a volitional agent, while under the influence of a prevalent inclination, is necessitated thereto because he is unable to put forth a

* See p. 168.

volition in a contrary direction, in the following terms:
No counter power against inclination? "The Will in the time of that diverse or opposite leading act or inclination, and when actually under the influence of it, is not able to exert itself to the contrary, to make an alteration in order to a compliance. The inclination is unable to change itself; and that for this plain reason, that it is unable to incline to change itself. Present choice cannot at present choose to be otherwise; for that would be at present to choose something diverse from what is at present chosen."—P. 232.

The first question here is, What is meant by *inclinations*? As we have in the proper place defined What is inclination? it, the term in its strict meaning applies to the *feelings* antecedent to, cotemporaneous with, or sequent upon the volition. We are inclined to a thing, often, before we choose it. We choose it often in spite of a contrary inclination. After a volition has resolved the agent into a state of determination upon a course or object, inclinations one or more may be against. There may various inclinations coexist in the mind at the same moment; and during a very brief period the soul Coexistent contraries. may fluctuate through a great variety of agitations, tendencies, biases, impulses, repugnances, and inclinations. And none of these may reach the Will. There may be not a volition in the matter. The Will is not so properly said to be *inclined*, nor are its acts *inclinations*. The instantaneous act of Will is a volition; the permanent state of Will is purpose, resolution, determination, predetermination. By *inclination* as applied to *Will* nothing else can be meant than the *determination* or *purpose*.

Dismissing the criticism of terms, the argument of Edwards, if it have any meaning, must imply that while we entertain a volitional purpose we cannot change that purpose.

1. The statement may signify that the purpose is fully

present to the mind or attention; and so present to the mind as to possess it entirely, excluding all counter thought, object, feeling, or motive. In this sense, and while this entire engrossment lasts, it is true that the mind cannot change the purpose; but this is irrelevant to the discussion. Where a counter course is excluded from mental knowledge or possible attention so as not to come as alternative before the mind, the agent cannot indeed choose it. This has been fully stated under the conditions of Will.

2. For a similar reason, if a purpose or determination be, after its first formation, deposited in the mind and memory, yet dismissed from the attention, it cannot while it and its subject are thus excluded from the mental view be reversed by the Will.

3. But when the determination is before the mind it may, even while it exists, submit to a change by the Will. Does the necessitarian really mean to say that a man cannot change his purpose, or reverse his determination, or break a resolution? Such a statement would be absurd. Now this change or reversal must take place while the purpose or determination yet exists; and the cessation of the existence of the purpose must in the order of nature be consequent upon the change. It is not true then that "the Will in the time of that diverse or opposite leading act or inclination" (or volitional purpose) cannot "change" that inclination or purpose.

The volition is often counter to the inclination; nay, even to the stronger and prevalent inclinations. The Will often acts in contradiction to the most intense passion, the strongest temptation, the deepest impression.* The opposite feeling and the volition

* With a crude philosophy the Princeton Essayist, like other necessitarians, assumes that the mind must be completely occupied with one "bias" which excludes all coexistent contrarieties. "Will any one pretend that it is conscious of a power to choose contrariwise, its ruling in-

often coexist in the mind at the same instant. We do what we intensely dislike; we decline what we intensely desire. We arrest our inclinations in full current by a strong counter effort of Will. Freedom thus exerts itself against the tide of necessity. In this meaning, therefore, the statements of Edwards are psychologically false.

"The inclination," says Edwards, "cannot change itself." Very true. But the man himself can change his inclinations. He can incline himself a different way and to a different object. "Present choice cannot at present choose to be otherwise." Choice cannot indeed choose to be otherwise, for a choice cannot choose at all. But the being who at the present instant chooses one alternative, may at the next choose an opposite. An agent who is under one inclination or direction of Will, in the presence of different possibilities, is not under disability of change of choice. When the alternatives of choosing or retaining the purpose are before the attention, the purpose may be simply a motive for its own retention or prosecution, and the agent is able to decide the question by Will.

inclination or pleasure being and continuing to choose as it has chosen?" —P. 254. What is meant by a ruling inclination's choosing, or a pleasure's choosing, we pretend not to say. But that the most intense feeling

may coexist with a contrary volition, and may be overruled by it, is an ordinary fact of consciousness. What varieties of thought may coexist at the same instant in the mind, philosophers have too little realized. A man walks a narrow path, twirls his watch key, looks at a prospect, talks to a friend, and thinks of something else, all at the same moment. What volitions, perceptions, emotions, and abstractions, like so many little wheels in various simultaneous whirl, are that instant going on in his mind! Several distinct trains of volitions are going on together. Lord Brougham has a curious passage on the multitude of intellections occupying the mind of a public speaker at the moment. De Quincy gives the narrative of a lady who was drowned and recovered. At the drowning instant, "In a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, every act, every design of her past life lived again, arraying themselves, *not in succession, but as parts of a coexistence*. Her consciousness became omnipresent at one moment to every feature in the infinite review."

Will can
change in-
clination.

Wonderful
mental co-
existent con-
traries.

If, then, the generic volition and purpose is not itself necessary, and does not necessitate the volitions which subordinate themselves to it, if they in their acceptance or rejection of the generic volition are free, then the argument of Edwards, drawn from the fact that a command or obligation may be imposed requiring them to be substituted or withdrawn or not put forth, fails to prove that necessitated volitions are proper objects of counter command. Our original argument stands untouched, that freedom is necessary to the possibility of obligation, command, or divine Government. An obligatory command requiring an impossibility is itself impossible. The possibility of divine command requires freedom.

And therefore
free and re-
sponsible.

CHAPTER III.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN AUTOMATIC EXCELLENCE AND MORAL DESERT.

AN automaton is a machine, constructed sometimes in the human form, whose parts, by force of interior springs, are made to operate apparently like a human system, with self-motion. The movement of the parts is necessitatively caused to take place, in precise proportion and in the direction of the forces applied. When the whole is artistically framed, we admire the beauty, the ingenuity, and perhaps the imitation—that is, *the automatic excellence*. But we attribute not to its action or its being the slightest intrinsic quality of *moral merit or demerit*.

Automaton
and auto-
matic.

The highest order of mechanical or automatic excellence is found in a watch. So numerous and nice are its parts, so exquisitely adjusted are its forces, and so beautiful is its aspect to the eye, that we gaze upon it with

admiration. And then, in the pointing of its hand to the figure according to the true time, we behold one of the most wonderful adjustments of mechanism to the demands of mind. With but slight fancy we attribute to it the qualities of truth and reliability, or of falsehood and fickleness. We wish it gently handled according to its excellent nature. And yet, literally and coolly, we attribute only *automatic excellence*; and we are utterly unable to see in it the slightest intrinsic trace of *moral merit or demerit*. We are unable to see in it guilt or good desert; we are, by the very nature of things, compelled to deny of it the possibility of penalty or reward.

No automatic
desert.

Should the question be asked why, in a thing which is so noble and so pleasing to æsthetical sense, all moral merit must be denied, the answer might be, because it has *no consciousness*, and so cannot be made happy by reward or miserable by penalty. That this is an insufficient answer may be made evident by an additional supposition. Imagine the automaton endowed with *sensibility* in every particle of its substance; and that it is consciously impressed by every contact, and every force applied, and feels every movement it is made to undergo. Yet it is still an automaton, being moved solely in the proportion and in the direction of the forces applied. Its every operation is the exact mechanical measure of the causation. It is plain that its sensibility has not endowed it with the possibility of moral blame or merit, and for a very plain reason. It is seen not to be truly the author of its own actions. It moves only as it is moved. It acts only as its springs are touched. It has only the freedom *to*, not the freedom *from*. There exists not in its entire being any power to move otherwise than as the fixed and constant result of the force received. Its operations are the necessitated effects of necessitative causations. It is guiltless, undeserving, irresponsible, because it can act no

Why?

otherwise than it does act. Common-sense demands not only sensibility but free self-control. We thence deduce the LAW, which is (apart from self-superinduction) universal and apodictical, that *no act can be morally obligatory, responsible, or guilty—no agent can be morally obligated, rewardable, or punishable—unless there be in the agent adequate power for other act than the act in question.*

Rising from mechanical into *animal* existence, we recognize in the horse, for instance, every combination of both material and mental automatic excellence. Animal automatism. Beauty of form, color, and motion, adjustment of parts for strength and speed, balance of forces there are, so as to fit him for his place in the economy of creation. And then in his mind there is just such a proportionment of perceptive faculties and emotions as to produce that train of volitions and actions as will suit him to his intended uses. If, on the other hand, his dispositions be so badly proportioned as to produce irregular and refractory action, we apply severity or blandishment as we do the means to repair the watch, *as a regulative*. It is simply an alterative. That alterative is not a justice but an expedient. By applying the impulses of pain and fear, we alter the balance of forces and produce better modes and habits of action. We may thus so rearrange, that both mind and body may present again the model of automatic excellence. But being a simple automatic though mental organism, we have not yet found a particle of moral merit.

The beauty of appearance, the skill of the artist, the adaptation to the ends, the perfection of the working, and the value of the results—these are the qualities of automatic excellence. When we find these in body or mind, we admire, love, and desire them. We appropriate the article to ourselves, confer upon it values and preferences. We make of the whole class pets, ornaments, and enjoyments. On the contrary, where the

automatism of thing or animal is defective, ugly, or offensive, we render it our disgust or hatred. We repel it from use, and are ready to abandon it to misery or destruction. But if we examine our feelings we shall find them purely non-ethical; we shall find our
Excellent but
not merito-
rious. selves absolutely unable to attribute to it the least element of *moral merit or demerit*. Its ugliness and its beauty, its precise action or mal-action, is not its own fault; it is entirely automatic.

But is the animal Will or action automatic? Yes, as truly as the machine, if it be necessitated. Just as automatically an object strikes the retina, so automatically the perception rises. As automatically the perception, so automatically the highest desire. As automatically the highest desire, so automatically the volition. And as automatically the volition, so automatically the action. So the whole round of impulses and effects are automatic because all are necessitated, and alike necessitated. The volition is here no less necessitated, and so no less automatic, than the perception or the desire.

But suppose that, as one term in this series of automatic
Ethical Inter-
polation. mental states or operations, there should be inserted a feeling, automatically rising, of right or wrong, of blame or moral approval. Suppose that, after one automatic volition, a consequent feeling of guilt or of merit should emerge. The question then is, Would this entire automatic organism of intellect, however clear, of sensibility, however acute, of volition, however exact, and of moral feeling, however intense, constitute a moral being, truly capable of blamable and rewardable acts? Common sense can give only a negative answer. The feeling of blame or praise would be an arbitrary interpolation, false in its affirmations and absurd in its nature. It would be out of place. Should that feeling assume that the volitions of an organism which possessed, in the given instance, no power for the production of any but

that volition, were guilty or morally approvable, its assumption would be untrue.

In an automatic organism it can make no difference what the substance composing its series or system of parts, whether matter, electricity, or spirit; or whether the connection of its constituent elements or pieces be a current, or an emotion, or a ligature, or a volition; provided the whole series do but transmit from part to part a fixed force, and a necessary action, landing in a solely possible result. We are as able to imagine what may with propriety be called a *spiritual* as a *material machine*. Of a machine nothing stronger can be said than that the causative action of one part upon the other secures the solely possible result; and that can as truly be said of a mental organism as of a material organism; and as truly said of a resulting volition as of a resulting intellection or of a resulting mechanical material motion. Such a spiritual machine would be made of a conscious center and sensitive parts. Intellect, sensibility, and Will would be its constituents; just as weights, wheels, and hands are the constituents of a clock. And just as the gravitative force may pass from weights to wheels, and from wheels to hands, and may bring the hand to a particular figure, so may the motive force pass from intellect to sensibility, and from sensibility to Will, and bring the Will to a given volition. The determination of the clock pointer may be no more fixed and necessitated than the determination of a volition. The causations may, in both cases, be as inevitable. If they are not equally mechanical, the difference is essentially verbal; consisting in the fact that the *word* mechanical is normally applied only to material organisms. But all that renders a mere mechanical action of a conscious machine incapable of moral responsibility exists in the case; namely, a necessitation antecedently fixing the given volitional action. Nor is there the slightest validity in the notion of some thinkers, who

A spiritual machine.

imagine that the very fact of its being a *volition*, and not some other thing or event, secures its responsibility. Ask them why a volition is responsible, and their only reply is, Because it is a volition. A *volition*, necessarily affixed to the agent, is no more responsible than any other attribute, event, operation, or fact.

The human constitution is a compound of the *spiritual machine* and the *bodily machine*, co-operating in a sort of "pre-established harmony." The action of forces from the external world strikes through the corporeal frame inward to the spiritual organism, reaching its central power of action; and, from that central power, *action* comes forth through the corporeal frame upon the external world. If this process be simply action and fixed reaction, producing a solely possible result, then the whole process is, so far as responsibility is concerned, as non-ethical as any case of mechanical impulse and recoil.

The impulse of rays from the beautiful fruit strikes the retina of an eye, and the perception of the exact form and force by necessitation automatically rises. The impulse of perception necessitates the strongest desire automatically to arise. The moral emotion being automatically neutralized, the impulse of strongest desire strikes the Will, and automatically the volition springs forth, and from the volitional impulse the automatic action. The automatic corporeal action springs no more mechanically from the volition than the automatic volition from the automatic desire, and that from the automatic perception, and that from the ray of light, and that from the fruit. We admire or condemn the excellent or defective automatism; but the mere arbitrary interpolation of an automatic moral emotion in the series calls not for the attribution by us of any moral merit or blame to the organism, or any part of its automatic action or substance.

We thus demonstrate that if the volition be as neces-

sitated as the emotion, the emotion as the perception, the perception as the receptivity ^{Irresponsible.} of the retina, then the whole automatic chain forms a circle of automatic force as irresponsible as the streak of an electric circle. It is impossible for logic to show or common sense to see any more responsibility or moral merit or demerit in the necessitated volition than in the necessitated emotion, the necessitated perception, or the necessitated receptivity of the retina, or the necessitated visual ray, or the necessitated fruit.

Nor can the universal common-sense of mankind see that volition, and emotion, and perception, and sensorial retina, necessitatively subjected to automatic effect from automatic impulsions, are any more imputable with moral merit or demerit, praise or blame, reward or penalty, than a similar succession of material automatic parts, under exact and necessary physical forces. We can only find non-meritorious excellence. If this be true, then necessitated volition is non-responsible volition; and if none but necessitated volitions universally exist, moral responsibility has no existence in the universe. The "common-sense of mankind" recognizes morality primarily in volition alone, and not in mere perception, because it recognizes in volition alone non-necessitation.

If we consider a Washington * as a living system of mental and bodily parts and forces so balanced; if clear perceptions and sagacious intellect were so proportioned with emotions of honor, patriotism, heroism, and self-sacrifice, as necessitatively to create that train of grand volitions by which he saved his country, then in body, intellect, and Will he was a most noble specimen

* "Is Washington entitled to no credit for giving freedom to his country, unless it can be proved that he was equally inclined to betray it?" (Day on the Will, p. 116.) The question is falsely put. We do not hold that it was necessary that he should be equally "inclined to betray it;" but that he should be susceptible to the temptation and *possessed of adequate power for the volition* to betray it. Otherwise, we praise him for the non-performance of an impossible act.

of merely automatic excellence. We should admire him as a most perfect living and acting colossus. We would love him and wish him all happiness, just as we love and wish well to all noble automatism. But he is only fortunate; he is no more meritorious, morally, than Benedict Arnold. His was only a happier fate.

Washington was, as we view the matter, meritorious, because, being volitionally able to prefer to betray his country he saved it. He saved it amid temptations appealing to his apparent self-interest, his love of ease, and his fear of danger. He served his country after the Revolution by rejecting the motives that would lead him to a Napoleonic self-aggrandizement. The very magnanimity of his character consists in his choosing in accordance with right motives, in preference to powerful wrong ones, possible to him and present before him. He could have yielded to the wrong; he chose to act by the right.

With regard to the human Will of our Saviour, we concede that the automatism, if really existent, negatives the merit. Were his a mere automatic Will, he would be a great mechanical figure in the grand panorama of redemption, striking as an automatic adjustment, but destitute of essential moral character. We hold, that from the infinity of all possible human souls Omniscience selected that one which, in the great crisis of the case, it foresaw would stand, though free to fall.

Still more appalling is the degradation of the divine Will to a mechanical automatism. A god like the evil omnipotence of Manes, who, from the eternal necessity of his own nature, has no adequate power for the production of a good volition, would be a being horribly evil, but not responsibly evil. A god automatically good, mechanically good, might be held excellent. But he would not be meritoriously excellent. We should concede to him an infinite strength in only one way. He

How is a Washington meritorious?

Or a Jesus?

would be a cramped omnipotence, an almightiness not full-orbed, but mutilated and incapable—a blasphemous contradiction.

And so the moral merit of all beings, finite or infinite, arises from this, that in their proportion of power, space, and time, they, in the possession of the full and complete volitional power of doing wrong, do persistently and freely that which is right. A finite being does thus finitely, an infinite being infinitely.

If God were to create a being of perceptions, emotions, and volitions, all perfectly excellent and well adjusted, yet all necessary and automatic in their action, so that every volition, like the pointers of a perfectly true clock, should point exactly right, such a being would be innocent and lovely, and in that sense of lovely innocence it might be called *holy*. It could not be punishable. We should æsthetically admire it; we should sympathetically love it; we should wish it happy in a condition accordant to its nature. Yet we should none the less hold it incapable of moral responsibility, moral merit or demerit, moral good or evil desert, moral reward or penalty. Nor could it, even by Omnipotence itself, be invested with a morally meritorious holiness. All its *holiness* would be simply a lovely and excellent automatic innocence or purity. The sum of all this is, that *a necessitated holiness is no meritorious or morally deserving holiness*.

Necessitatedly
holy creature
not meritori-
ous.

Again, should God create an automatic fiend; a being whose perceptions were, indeed, true, but whose emotions were purely and with a perfect intensity, yet automatically, malignant; and whose volitions were, with all their strength, automatically bad; we should hate such a being and wish it out of our way. We might still admire its vicious perfection. Yet, when we had indulged our abhorrence of it, and come to remember coolly its automatism, we should see that, though bad, it was unblamably bad. Its volitions, being as necessitated, are

as irresponsible as the springs of a gun-lock.
 Necessitated fiendishness. Upon such a fiend, if the infliction of *pain* would set his volitions right, and make all his movements safe and beneficial, we should, for the common good, think expedient to inflict it, simply as an alterative; just as we would insert a key and turn it round to set any other machinery right—simply as an alterative. Such infliction of pain could not be a punishment, in the sense of justice, or execution for a responsible crime. It would simply be an expedient, like a medicine or a mechanical adjustment, in which there can be no moral element. We might, for the good of the world, wish such a being destroyed; not as a moral retribution to him, but for the common weal, and, if possible, painlessly. The sum of all which is, *a necessitated depravity is no responsible or justly punishable depravity*. As there is, therefore, what may be called a *holiness* without any meritoriousness or moral good desert, so there is what may be called a *depravity*, or a *sin*, without any responsibility or morally penal desert.

From all the above representations we derive the answer to the question concerning the possibility of a created holiness or a created unholiness. A created holiness would be necessitated and automatic. It might therefore be excellent, innocent, pure, lovely; but it never could be meritorious, responsible, probationary, rewardable, punishable. A created unholiness would be also automatic. It might be automatically excellent, innocent, yet unlovely, hateful, repulsive, perhaps destructive. Yet it is below the conditions of responsibility, desert, probation, judgment, retribution. The being is evil, perhaps we may say morally evil; but not responsibly or guiltily evil.

If by *morally* evil we mean evil as compared with the standard of the moral law, the phrase would be correct. If by *morally* evil we mean evil so as that the penalty of the law is justly applicable, the phrase would be in-

correct. There would be necessitated disconformity to the moral law; but the conditions of amenability to its penalty would not exist.

Thus man, as born after the fall, possesses, even before any volitional act of his own, a fallen nature. As compared with what, by the perfect law of God, he ought to be, he is wrong, evil, morally evil. Yet, as not being the author of his own condition, he is not responsible for his necessitatively received nature and moral state. His nature is no fault of his own until fully appropriated by the act of his own free-will. That nature and state may doubtless be called *sin*, but only under a certain definition of the word. If all sin be ^{Irresponsible sin.} *anomia*,* a disconformity to the law, then there may be a sinful nature or state, as well as a sinful act. But where that nature or state is necessitatively received by the being, without his Will, or received only by the act of a necessitated Will, if sinful, it is not *responsibly* sinful. It thence would follow that there may be disconformity to the law, unrighteousness, evil, moral evil, sin, sinfulness, all without responsibility, guilt, ill desert, just moral condemnality, or punishment.

The whole human race, viewed as fallen in Adam, and apart from redemption through Christ, is thus necessitatedly unholy. It is in disconformity with the ideal prescribed by the divine law. Judged by the standard of the moral law, it is evil; and, in the sense above defined, it is morally evil. But it is not *responsibly* evil. It cannot be retributively, and in the strict sense of the word, *punished*. Incapable it is, indeed, of the holiness and so of the happiness of heaven. It rests under the displacency of Heaven as not being holy in the sense of conformed to his law, which is but the ^{Fallen race.} transcript of his own character and the expression of his own divine feelings. What is to be done with it? is a question for Divine Wisdom to solve. It can come from

* 1 John iii, 4.

a potential and seminal existence into actual existence only under the universal law of hereditary natural likeness to the lineal parent. The whole race is thus and then conceptually a generic unit, including the primordial parent and all his posterity. What would have been done with them without a saviour? is a question to

Grace and nature. which revelation furnishes no explicit answer. And yet there are grounds both from Scripture and reason for an obvious reply. The human race would never have been actually brought into existence under conditions of such misery. In other words, the redemption was the condition of the actual continuity of the race. Redemption underlies probationary existence. Grace is the basis of nature. And the reply is both a satisfactory and a beautiful theoretical solution of a theoretical difficulty.

If a being be, like Adam, created pure and disposed to right, yet as an agent freely able to choose right or wrong, his holiness, as created and *before his free act*, is pure and excellent. Yet it is not meritorious. It can claim no moral approbation or moral reward. His first meritorious and morally deserving personal holiness is derived from action. And that action must be volition put forth with full and adequate power of contrary action instead.

Again, if God should create or allow to be born a being of mixed character, (suppose it to be man,) the automatic spring of whose volitions, under the touch of automatic motive forces, should be necessitatively sometimes in an injurious direction, and sometimes in a beneficial direction, such a being might be automatically excellent and perfect, but he would be below the conditions of probationary existence. His good or bad volitions being automatic, would be equally irresponsible and unmeriting of reward or penalty. Any ideas or notions implanted in his own nature of retributive approval or condemnation would be arbitrary and false.

Various conditions of responsibility.

Let us now suppose a being, such as man truly is, of a mixed character in another respect. Suppose him automatic in his perceptions, emotions, and desires, yet free and alternative in his volitions; capable of choosing either of diverse ways in a right direction or in a wrong instead. He is now no longer in a pure automatic nature. He has mounted into the grade of a morally responsible being. He is henceforth capable of probation, responsibility, judgment, and retribution.

Again, let us suppose that this last being is able, by his free volitions, to modify his automatic propensions; namely, his intellections, emotions, and desires, so as to make them better or worse than they naturally were. Either he neglects to restrain them from excess or wrong direction; or he directs, impels, develops, trains, and enlarges them for wrong; or he restrains and confines them to their proper degree and to a right direction. Even his automatic faculties would thence derive a sort of secondary responsible character; at least for much, if not for all their so formed character, he would be volitionally and morally responsible. It is thus that a man's *sensibilities, intellections, emotions, and beliefs become secondarily and consequentially responsible*. Again, a man may so train up into magnitude and force of will his automatic faculties as to render suppressed his freedom of volition for any good; and thus he is automatically evil. Such volitional automatism for evil being self-superinduced, is responsible; since where a man has freely annihilated his own power for good, he is responsible for the evil. *Self-superinduced necessity is a responsible necessity*. And from this view we can clearly understand how the *sinner who is given up of God*, or *the sinner finally damned*, who sins and only sins, and that by a perpetual necessity, is responsible for his sins none the less. The *holiness of the saints in heaven* is none the less rewardable because it has become necessary; they are rewardable, not only for their works during proba-

tion, but for their works of holiness, obedience, love, and praise before God in heaven.

Finally from all this we educe three corollaries :

1. The necessitated volitional agent is with truth pronounced by freedomists to be an automatism, a *machine*. And the replies of Edwards and Day, that he is not a machine because he is a living, intellectual, volitional being, are without validity.

2. The imputation that necessitarianism is *Fatalism* is true and just. If all volitional agents are machines, still more confessedly so are all physical organisms and substances. All physical and all volitional machines thereby combine into one great interlocking machine. And this frames the Universe, including God himself, into one great clock-work. The limitless Whole thereby becomes an infinite eternal machine; than which there is no conceivably completer fatalism.

3. Just penalty can never be held as a mere preventive of future wrongs. Thus the Younger Edwards says: "It is inquired, Where is the consistence between God's laying a man under a moral necessity of sinning, and then punishing for that sin? I answer, How can God consistently make a man sick and then apply medicines or any remedy toward his restoration? Punishment is inflicted to prevent either the subject of the punishment or others from falling into the same practice."—P. 444.

This explains punishment as method, not as a pure justice. So the English judge says to the condemned culprit: "You are not hung for stealing a sheep; but you are hung that sheep may not be stolen." The first clause of this piece of information excludes the consideration of intrinsic justice; the last states the ground of pure expediency. By intrinsic justice, as cognized by the moral intuition, there is a moral relation between responsible crime and desert of penalty as essential, as eternal, as absolute as the relation between the circularity of a figure and the equality of its radii.

But expediency is simply a contrivance in social mechanics. It is the mere principle of turning a peg to regulate the machine. Or, as Edwards here puts it, it is the physical remedy for a physical disease. If God manages his system upon this bleak principle, as the argument of Edwards obliges him to maintain, justice and true retribution have no existence in it. There is, then, under his hand an organism of great physical clock-work, but strictly speaking no moral government at all. Suffering inflicted to produce right action is expediency; suffering inflicted to meet the demands of intuitive *right* is *justice*. Both these may well meet in the same case; but they are not the same in essence.

CHAPTER IV.

CREATED MORAL DESERT IMPOSSIBLE.

THE maxim laid down by Mr. Bledsoe in his *Theodice* and used by him with great argumentative effect, that *there can be no created virtue or viciousness*, ought, according to the doctrine of our last chapter, to read, *there can be no created moral desert, good or evil*, and so corrected it would lose none of the True maxim of responsibility. argumentative efficiency with which his handling invests it. There can be a created conformity or disconformity to the divine law; but no created merit or demerit therein or therefor, or desert of reward or penalty.

The righteous law, let us say, has a twofold office, namely, the judicatory or *critical*, and the retributive or *penal*. In its former character Double office of Law. it is an ethical ideal by which is tested the active real; it is the rule by which the ethical character of its subjects is admeasured. That subject, if automatic, if created

and having moral status anterior to free volitional action, is still tested by the law's ideal, is commensured by the perfect rule; but there the office of the law stops. The instant it should proceed to use its retributive function and inflict penalty, it would be by its own rectitude condemned. But the moment free volitional moral action commences, the result is accountability; and retributive righteousness or unrighteousness inheres to his personality and being.

It might be said, then, that if the agent is not free, the law has nothing to do with him, inasmuch as he lacks the qualification of a subject of the law. And we might grant that the law scarcely is his judge; but only an instrument, as an ethical critique, to estimate the quality of the agent necessitated as good or bad without responsibility. Yet when the agent is placed, like Adam, at the historical commencement of a legal governmental system, the law is installed already over him, and it is its office to pronounce, even if it pronounce that it has no jurisdiction, and that he cannot come into court. In such case the agent is necessarily placed in some relation to the law, and the law pronouncing must, as we conceive, pronounce him ethically but not retributively holy.

First we may suppose a being created in a world of chrysolite, where no external object afforded temptation or possibility of wrong or sin; with a body of Freedom to good alone. flexible chrysolite affording no propensity or power of corporeal sin; with a set of sensibilities so measured that there could be neither excess, deficiency, or irregularity of action; with an intellect from which all thought of wrong should be absolutely excluded. His world might offer to his free choice a thousand varying avenues of right and equally right action. He would be free to good alone. That good would properly be moral good. And as a being of precisely the opposite nature and condition might be conceived, free only to varieties of evil, so there would be the true contrast of a perfect *moral*

goodness or badness. And as these beings are so *created*, there is a created goodness or badness anterior to action; and both may be complete and perfect in their kind, yet neither retributively so.

Second, we may suppose a being, like Adam, created with soul perfectly right. His preferential feelings anterior to action accord with the divine ^{Created rectitude.} law. His sensibilities are so under easy volitional control, his mind is so clear and pure, that all in its primitive undisturbed state is right. His Will is able to hold his whole being in subordination to the Moral Imperative. He is, in his grade of being, perfectly excellent; and his excellence is not mechanical merely or æsthetical, but ethical. It is moral excellence; it is a created moral excellence, and perfect in its kind, yet wholly unmeritorious.

That the former of these two supposed holy beings by creation could not sin is doubtless clear; that the latter could sin may, by a little consideration, ^{How able to sin.} seem equally clear. Though the prevolitional preferential feelings are accordant with the Law, yet the various desires and appetites have their specific objects; and those objects may be so presented as to excite the appetencies above measure unless the Will either firmly exclude the influence of the object, or hold in check at the right measure the degree of desire. If, however, the Will allow the influence to enter by want of care, or allow the undue degree of desire to rise by consent, sin has begun. Thereby the feelings veer from their preference for the moral law, and another object is preferred. If after allowing the undue action of the prevolitional feeling, the Will proceed to execute its dictates, then the sin appears in overt act.

We will now notice the logic of Edwards upon this subject. The Socinian, Dr. John Taylor, ^{Taylor on necessary holiness.} denies the possibility of a created or necessary holiness. "A necessary holiness (says he) is no

holiness." [Is *no moral desert*, he should have said.] "Adam could not be originally created in righteousness and true holiness, because he must choose to be righteous before he could be righteous."

To this statement of Taylor, Edwards replies thus: "If these things are so it will certainly follow, that the first choosing to be righteous is no righteous choice; there is no righteousness or holiness in it, because no choosing to be righteous goes before it.

Edwards's
reply. For he plainly speaks of *choosing to be righteous*, as what *must go before righteousness*; and that which follows the choice, being the effect of the choice, cannot be righteousness or holiness: for an effect is a thing necessary, and cannot prevent the influence or efficacy of its cause, and therefore is unavoidably dependent upon the cause, and he says *a necessary holiness is no holiness*."—P. 278.

Here are two perfectly distinct arguments strung together, the first closing at the semicolon of the second sentence.

1. Taylor says that righteous character is *consequent* upon free choice.* Then, replies Edwards, The choice itself cannot be righteous; for you say that the righteousness is *consequent*, and so cannot exist until *after* the choice; the choice, being *previous* to, must be *outside* the righteousness. Grant it, we answer; but how does that show but that the free choice may produce—the thing that Taylor means—righteousness of *character* in the *man*, whether the *choice* be righteous or not? But we do not grant it. That righteousness of the man should be consequent upon the choice does not decide that the *choice* itself is not *righteous*. A man standing upon a straight line does not walk in the straight line until and just so far forth as he takes or has taken his first step in it; but that does not

* For, of course, it is personal righteousness which Taylor affirms that "Adam could not originally be created in."

prove but that the first step is truly in the straight line. Consistently, according to Taylor, man was created right, and his first right act freely accorded with God's law, and was therefore righteous; and his righteousness of personal character was the consequence of his right act.

2. Taylor also says that holiness cannot be created or necessitated, but must be the product of a free Will. But, replies Edwards, in his second argument above, if holiness be a product or *effect* of free Will, it must be *necessary*; for *all effect is necessary*. One of the most unmitigated quibbles on record! Taylor never thought of denying that holiness was intrinsically and so necessarily a quality of the free right act freely performed, as all essential quality is necessary to its subject; he only denied that the right act of which this holiness was the inherent essential and necessary quality is itself necessary to the agent; and, not being so, then [meritorious] holiness is not a necessary quality to the agent. It was not created in him; he was not necessitated to acquire it. It was to Adam an unnecessitated righteousness, because a freely chosen righteousness.

Volitional holiness not necessary.

But it is in his work on Original Sin (Part II, chap. i, sect. i) that Edwards endeavors to demonstrate at greatest length the reality of a created righteousness, meaning thereby a created moral desert. These arguments we will consider.

Edwards's four arguments.

1. *Argument*. It accords with universal common sense that actions, in order to be good and right, must proceed from antecedent right principles or dispositions already existing in the soul. The truth is "not that principles derive their goodness from actions, but that actions derive their goodness from the principles whence they proceed." Hence there must be principles, dispositions which are good and right and virtuous before action; and therefore choice, volition,

1. Good principles precede good acts.

doing, is not necessary to the existence of virtue. There may therefore be a created righteousness, a necessitated virtue anterior to action.

Answer. That there may be a created and necessitated righteousness before choice we admit; but the question is, Can there be a created meritoriousness, good desert, or retributive righteousness before free choice? If that created righteousness or virtuous constitution anterior to choice be such as to exclude all choice for wrong, but necessitates choosing according to the good principle, inclination, etc., previously existing, is there any imputable ethical merit? Or, if there be a created agent so

1. But not
necessitative
principles.

totally evil, and so destitute of all possibility of good inclination, motive, or principle whatever, that choice according to them is out of the reach of the agent, then, though we admit that the agent would in such case be evil, and his actions evil, would he be ethically responsible for the evil? To all these questions common sense must reply in the negative. It may, then, be true that the choice must be for the good object, and from, or sequent upon a good motive or principle, or interior correlation for a good principle, and yet no accountable righteousness precede the choice, but all accountability must follow choice. If there were no anterior bad principle within reach, from which or sequently upon which Adam could act, Adam would not be meritoriously righteous. If there had been no anterior good principle, motive, or reason within Adam's reach, from which or sequently upon which he could act, Adam would not be imputably wicked. We grant all that Edwards claims, then; that there must be some anterior good or bad motivity within reach, in accordance with which the action, in order to be good or bad, must be put forth; but that stands in no contradiction to the further truth that no merit or demerit accrues to the agent until the free volition has accorded with the anterior motivity, good or bad.

2. *Argument.* Passages are quoted from Hutcheson, sanctioned by Taylor, affirming that all actions morally good or evil flow from some good or evil affection, and that virtue or vice is either "some such affection or action consequent upon it." But righteous affection, previous to all action, must be necessary righteousness, antecedent to choice. Moreover Taylor admits that love is the fulfilling of the law, and that this is that "goodness," or "principle of benevolence," which includes "all moral rectitude;" which, in fact, is resolvable into this principle. Consequently no volition anterior to this principle can have any moral rectitude. An involuntary, non-volitional, and therefore necessary holiness, therefore, precedes all choice.

Answer. Love is, indeed, the fulfilling of the law, and all virtue is but a modification of love, as all material things are modifications of the same essential substance. But this love is not a mere inactive necessitated sentiment. So long as it is such it is "moral rectitude," indeed; but it is not moral desert. It is excellence, virtue; but it is neither imputable nor rewardable. Imputable love, fulfilling the law, is not merely love experienced, but love voluntarily lived and exemplified in action. It is not merely love passive, but love active. It is love volitionally sanctioned, appropriated, and adopted as the controlling law of the energetic life, accepted as suffusing the active being. It requires therefore free volitional action before that love can attain the meritorious character requisite to a retributive probation. If that action is necessarily accordant, the imputability is still unattained. Or, on the other hand, if that action is necessarily discordant; if love in any of its forms of virtue cannot be in reach as a possible motive or antecedent principle of volition, there will be solely necessitated *vicious* action, but not *responsible*

2. Good acts flow from good affections.

2. The good acts must freely accord with the good affections.

action. Necessitated love or hate, and, therefore, necessitated virtue or vice, may precede free action, but not accountable virtue or vice.

3. *Argument.* It is affirmed by Dr. Taylor that it is the cause which is chargeable with the effect. But the same Dr. T. maintains that choice is the cause of righteousness as an effect. But the doctrine that choice effects righteousness stands in contradiction to Dr. T.'s doctrine that all moral rectitude is in the single principle of love, benevolence, or goodness.

Answer. The cause *is* chargeable with its effect; and the free causal agent is responsible for his act. The free choice is the antecedent of the chooser's accountable righteousness. The antecedent principle of benevolence, of right, or of reason, all being modifications of the principle of love, are simply motives of volition, not single securatives of it to any one choice. The free choice according to the righteous motivity produces an imputable righteousness in the agent.



CHAPTER V.

THE MAXIM OF RESPONSIBILITY.

It is sometimes said that our doctrine of Will fundamentally decides our theology, or rather our theodice. But in truth there is an underlying principle by which our doctrine of the Will itself is likely to be shaped and decided, namely, our fundamental Maxim of Obligation or Responsibility. If *power to act must underlie and be commensurate with obligation to act*, then there must be exemption from necessity to obey motive, however *strongest*, counter to obligation. But if our maxim be that *no matter how we come by voli-*

Opposite maxims
of Responsibility.

tion, disposition, state, nature, or what its cause, we are in any case responsible for its intrinsic good or evil, then freedom or non-freedom is morally an unimportant question. This maxim we now consider.

"*A man is not to blame for what he cannot help*," is the universal language of the moral sense and the common sense. If an act be positively done, without the power of not-doing, or not done for want of power of doing, there can be no guilt. For ^{True Maxim.} neither performance of what could not be avoided, nor for non-performance of what could not be done, can there be obligation, responsibility, guilt, blame, or just punishment. The wrong would be in the requirement, not in the non-compliance.

A command requiring an act, requires the exertion of an existing power; and if the power does not exist, then there is the requirement for ^{No power no requirement.} the exertion of a non-existence or nothing. To require the exertion of a nothing, is to require nothing; that is, the requirement is no requirement.

An act without power adequate to perform it is an event without a cause. To require such an act is to require *a causeless effect*. No matter what ^{Causeless effect unrequirable.} may be the agent or object of whom or which the requirement is made, whether he or it be mind or matter, intelligent or unintelligent, living or lifeless, to require of it a result for which there exists in it no adequate causality is to require a causeless effect. But to require a causeless effect is to require a nothing, and is therefore no requirement at all.

For the non-performance of this non-requirement just penalty is impossible. *Pain* can indeed be inflicted for nothing. A being of infinite power may inflict all the suffering which a finite being is capable of enduring. He may inflict this pain in consequence of the imposition of a form of requirement which is not a requirement, and in consequence of the non-performance of an action which

is no action. But such pain would be no just penalty, nor could the omnipotence of the author make it such. Such action or non-action is no basis for responsibility, for judicial sentence, or for a just retributive divine government.

The axiom that *adequate power must underlie obligation* is equally valid whether the required act be external or *corporeal*, or *whether intellectual or VOLITIONAL*. It is equally true that an act for which there exists in the agent no adequate power is not morally requirable; whether it be an unconscious effect of a lifeless cause, as the production of lightning from a solid cube of iron; or an external voluntary corporeal act, as to turn a planet out of its course with my hand; or an intellectual act, as to know the nature and number of the inhabitants of Saturn; or *volitional act*, as to put forth the volitions necessary to call all those inhabitants by their true names. And for just this reason, namely, that all these requirements are alike requirement of a causeless effect, and therefore no requirement at all.

We inaugurate, then, this, what we will call the AXIOM OF FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY, and hold it as valid as any axiom of geometry. POWER MUST UNDERLIE OBLIGATION. *There can be no full moral obligation to an act, volitional or non-volitional, for which there is not in the required agent full and adequate power. Or otherwise, there can be no guilt or responsibility for act or volition, for avoidance of which there is not complete and adequate power; that is, for which there is not a power adequate to counter act or volition.* If guilt, or responsibility, or obligation be a reality, then the power of counter choice is a reality. *Responsibility, therefore, demonstrates free-will.*

The axiomatic character of these propositions is verified by the established TESTS of axioms. These tests are *self-evidence, necessity, and universality.*

These propositions are *self-evident*; asserting their own truth to the mind that truly understands them; needing no proof, but merely sufficient elucidation to render them perfectly understood. They are characterized by *necessity*; not being able to be otherwise than true, not able to be conceived to be untrue, not possible but to be pronounced true. They are *universal*; ever and everywhere true; and everywhere, and by all minds, assumed and acted upon as true.

It is not, however, claimed that all minds conceive them as formal and general propositions. Axioms are mentally and unconsciously *subsumed* by all minds, when the objects and occasions to which they belong arise; while few uncultivated minds form Axioms subsumed, though unexpressed. them into verbal propositions, and embrace them in that form. Dr. M'Cosh, in his able work on the Intuitions, has illustrated, with great clearness and conclusiveness, the point, that while axiomatic propositions in their general and abstract form are educes late in the history of thought by the philosopher, they are occultly assumed and acted upon, whenever the particular occasion arises, by the rudest mind.

The law of the *uniformity of nature's laws* is still under philosophic discussion by the philosopher; but from time immemorial every boy has unhesitatingly assumed that *the sun will rise to-morrow*. The law that *every event and finite object must have a cause* is susceptible of still further elucidation by the schools; but every savage, though he never heard it enounced, and is unable to *think* it separately, assumes it in every case demanding it. That *the whole is the sum total of all its parts* is assumed as a regulative principle of both judgment and action by those who have never isolated it in thought. That *a straight line is the shortest distance between two points* will strike a peasant as a new idea, although he has acted upon it ever since he could act intelligently. Nay, even the ass, who walks straight to the haystack,

assumes its truth as a regulative principle, though he is utterly unable to think it as a distinct proposition. It requires the highest metaphysics to analyze the latent and elementary, yet sure and valid, assumptions upon which the simplest intellects act. Without ascending into the principles of its own action, the common mind will instinctively observe the regulative laws for its own legitimate process. And thus the uneducated man may Subsumed by the unlearned. scarce understand the proposition *power must underlie responsibility*, and yet rare indeed will be the man who does not understand the proposition, or feel any hesitation, in the suitable case, in using it, "I am not to blame for what I cannot and never could help." Few intelligent though unschooled men would fail to indorse the proposition, "Neither any body nor any thing can be under obligation to produce an effect without a cause." And whether it were an external act or an internal choice, we doubt if any man, not preoccupied with a theory or prepossessed by education, would hesitate to affirm, "No body can be under obligation to perform an act, or feel an inclination, or put forth a volition, for which he has not and never had the adequate power." This, therefore, is an axiomatic principle. It appears true by its own clear *self-evidence*; it insures assent by its own *necessity*; it is assumed in the proper individual instances by every man, and is, therefore, authenticated with the seal of infallible *catholicity*.

Our axiom above laid down needs but one elucidation. *Where a free-agent willfully deprives himself of power to a given volition or act he does not thereby absolve himself from all obligation to that act.** In this case, however, the wrong of all his actions arising from that self-deprivation may, perhaps, be viewed as so much aggravation of the guilt of his self-depriving act. Thereby the complete universality of our axiom remains, nor is it necessary formally to make the exception of self-superinduction.

* See p. 328.

A debtor may not willfully fling his money into the sea and then claim exemption from guilt for non-payment. A servant may not cut off his hands ^{Self-superinduction.} and then hold himself innocent for not laboring. A man may not destroy his own moral faculties by disuse, by abuse, by willful forfeiture, and then make their non-existence a bar to responsibility. Or if a man rejects or forfeits means and aids by which he might possess full power and capacity for doing right, or attaining to the perfect standard of the moral law, he can never claim exemption from responsibility. If a probationary being, who owes a measure of service to God, so abdicates his powers as to be unable to fulfill his task, then, as his alternative, he must do what he can do; meet the just penalty of his voluntary omission—voluntary because secured and chosen by his own free act.

When it is said that the divine Law of obligation cannot require an impossible act, it is assumed ^{Law implies not absurdities.} that the Law presupposes the essential and eternal natures of things to be as they are. Should a pure angel once sin, the guilt of that sin, like the historical fact of its commission, must intrinsically inhere to its being as long as its personality lasts. It might then be said, in a very metaphysical way, that the law nevertheless forever constantly requires that angel to be innocent, however impossible it be. Yet it could not, if the law presupposes the essential nature of things, be said that it requires such angel to cause that the past fact be never done, which is absurd and out of the question. No more can it be said that the Law requires the angel to make itself innocent, for that includes the same absurdity. Both would be requirements of nothing, and so no requirements at all. What should be said is, that the angel having once sinned, the law, prescribing no impossibilities, holds the being permanently and unchangeably guilty. So if an angel, primordially endowed with the power of drawing a line of perfect rectitude through

eternity, abdicates that power and diverges far below the straight line, the law holds it a settled point that the entire divergency is a fixed guilt, imputable on account of the original power of eternal rectitude. There is, then, an obligation to eternal rectitude because the power for eternal rectitude is imparted, and there is responsibility for the eternal deflection because of the primordial power of avoiding it. The Law, then, does not hold itself as requiring the impossible or as condemning for the inevitable. Power still underlies obligation. The eternal rectitude is held as a *unit* for which there was
 Eternal unit. power. So that under this explanation we affirm that there is no proper exception to the maxim that power for right underlies obligation for right and responsibility for wrong.

CHAPTER VI.

NECESSITARIAN COUNTER MAXIM OF RESPONSIBILITY CONSIDERED.

To the claim that *free causation is necessary to RESPONSIBILITY for an evil volitional act*, Edwards opposes a broad proposition which he esteems as thereto a contradictory position. *The viciousness of an act of Will lies not in its cause but in its own intrinsic nature.* We are not to look at the volitional cause, so as to ask whether or not it is free, but to concentrate our view upon the act alone; and that, whatever be the nature of the cause, free or not,* is *by its own nature* good

Opposing maxim of responsibility. * "How the disposition got there is not the question which the moral sense of man when he is unvitiated by a taste for speculation, takes any concern in. It is enough for the moral sense that the disposition is there. . . . Give to its view a wrong act originating in a wrong intention, and it asks no more to make up its estimate of the criminality of what has been offered to its notice."—*Chalmers on Romans*, sect. 24.

or bad. To Arminians, on the contrary, he attributes the doctrine that the viciousness of "the dispositions or acts of the Will consists not in the nature of these dispositions or acts, but wholly in the origin or cause of them."

In disproof of this so-called Arminian maxim, Edwards tries his hand at a second logical infinite series.

If, argues he, the badness be not in the act, but Second Infinite series. in its cause, then, for the same reason, it is not in its cause but in the cause of its cause, and for the same reason in the next anterior cause; and so back in endless retrogression, it is ever to be chased but never overtaken.* Whence he infers that the causation, whether alternative or inalternative, has nothing to do with the ethic of the act. To this we reply,

I. Edwards wholly mistakes the issue between himself and the freedomist. The question is not, Edwards mistakes the issue. In what consists "the essence of the virtue and vice" of dispositions of the heart and acts of the Will?" Nor has any Arminian ever said that the "vice of a vicious act of Will lies not in the nature of the act, but in the cause." The viciousness of the act of Will does lie in itself and nowhere else. The moral quality of the act does lie in its nature. A bad act is intrinsically bad. Wickedness is in itself wicked. Herein both sides agree. The question in fact concerns not the *viciousness* OF the act, but the *responsibility* FOR the act.

To ask in what consists the evil of an act is one question; to ask what is the ground of *responsibility* in the agent *for the evil* is another Evil and Responsibility two questions. question. It does not certainly follow that because an act is intrinsically *evil* or *wrong*, the author of the act is responsible or blameworthy. That evil is the nature or

* But why cannot the evil lie in its cause and stop there? The enlightenment of the moon lies not in itself, but in the sun; is the sun therefore not self-luminous, but enlightened by some previous source? A minor's wealth lies not in himself but in his father; does it then run up through his whole pedigree?

quality of the act itself; although the nature of every act is modified by the nature of the agent. But when it is the *responsibility* of the agent for his act which is concerned, to say that the nature or causal character of the agent does not come under view is a contradiction. Wherever the evil lies, the merit or demerit, the *responsibility*, self-evidently does *lie in the CAUSE*, that is, the intentional agent.

II. Edwards fabricates for Arminians a very absurd maxim, giving it a very absurd form, and that apparently for a purpose; namely, in order to make it a basis for his *reductio ad absurdum* in the form of his infinite series. That "the vice of a vicious act lies not in the nature of the act," is to say (so far as it has any sense or meaning) that the *essential quality of a thing* does not inhere to the thing. What freedomists say is this: that an act cannot be *morally vicious* unless the actor be a *free moral agent*. In order that a certain property should be in the effect, certain property or properties must be in the cause. Which is but saying that the quality of the effect is modified by the causality; that is, that the effect is produced by the cause.

Certainly no Edwardean can reject our maxim, or rather axiom, that *a responsible viciousness in the act requires a moral agency in the actor*. Then Edwards himself held or rejected just as truly as we the maxim that "the vice of a vicious act of Will lies not in the nature of the act, but in the cause." Edwards believed just as truly as we, that none but a moral agent could commit a moral offense. Where, then, lies our variance? Simply in this, that we *hold an element of freedom in that moral agent*, as requisite to his moral agency, *which he denies*. He believed that none but an *inalternative or necessitated* moral agent could commit a guilty deed; we believe that none but a *non-necessitated or free* moral agent can incur such guilt.

III. It being settled that the guilt for the act lies in

the cause, we affirm that the evil or wickedness of *the act lies in the act*. The moral evil of an act consists in this: that it is a disconformity to or transgression of the Law of God. As this disconformity or transgressoriness lies in the act, so the evil, the viciousness, lies in the act. That viciousness does not, as Edwards says, arise from its "odiousness," but its odiousness arises from its viciousness; that is, from its variance from right and law, whereby it is most justly dreaded, avoided, and abhorred by all that is right and holy.

Statements.

And now the question comes, What are the conditions by which the agent becomes responsible for the evil act? Edwards would say that he must be a rational moral being; that he must have been voluntary in the act, and have been free from external coercion; in all which answers, contradicting his own maxim, *he admits that the grounds of the responsibility lie in the nature of the cause, namely, the agent*. So far we agree, and now comes the difference. The responsibility accrues, we say, to the agent from, 1, the fact that the act is formally evil; 2, the fact that his intention was accordantly evil; 3, the fact that the act is performed with full volitional power of non-performance.

The true question.

The Replies.

IV. But the real import of Edwards's unshapely propositions is this: *No matter what the causation that puts the volition in the mind, not only its intrinsic badness, but the consequent guilt of the agent, is all the same*. No matter how it got there, whether by freedom or necessity, by chance, by fate, by birth, by creation, or by divine implantation, the responsibility is unaffected. Now besides his infinite series, which we trust we have properly demolished, he adduces no argument, and his proposition stands unsustained.

Edwards's real maxim.

If this necessitarian maxim be true, we submit to the reader whether the following inferences do not logically result:

Consequences.

1. It would be perfectly just for God to create an individual perfectly and necessarily bad, hold him responsible for that badness, and consign him therefor to an endless hell.

2. It would be perfectly just for God to create a race or a universe perfectly bad, and the next moment consign that race or universe to an endless hell for being what he created.

3. The doctrine of absolute reprobation is right. God may justly bring into existence a depraved race, pre-damned before it is born and ready for hell. And should he from that number arbitrarily and hap-hazard select a few from the whole and omnipotently transform them into heirs of glory, it would be great mercy to them and no injustice to the rest.

4. The doctrine of infant damnation is just and right. God may bring a race into existence totally depraved and necessitated to evil, may give them a longer or shorter existence in evil, and as justly send them to hell three days old as thirty years.

5. All arguments in proof of divine rectitude or benevolence would be nugatory. Theists have studied the works and ways of God's providence to answer the cavil of skeptics, drawn from the sin and misery in the world, and demonstrate the righteousness of God. Why

No moral attributes of God. so? Were God to create a universe of as depraved beings as Omnipotence itself could furnish, and fill the universal space with the intensest hell to punish their wickedness, it would be all just and right. Nothing unjust, unrighteous, or inconsistent with benevolence would be done. It would still be a perfectly just, divine government. And for it the brief theodice would be, "No matter how these beings, this universe, became possessed of their wickedness, it is responsible and guilty; and it is right that the immensity should be a hell to punish them."

The man into whose moral sense the above maxim

and its logical consequences easily fit is welcome to believe in the doctrines of necessity. Our calm and firm belief is, that as the universal common sense of mankind comes to a clear perception of the nature of these propositions and their connections, the whole will be repudiated and consigned to a perdition as final as that to which with such facility they can consign the creatures of God.

V. Finally, Edwards flatly contradicts his own sense of his own maxim, that the viciousness of an act "consists not in the origin or cause." He ^{Contradicted by himself.} does himself affirm, in words as clear as can be articulated, that the viciousness does depend upon the origin, the cause, and the causation. It consists in this: "*A person's being or doing wrong, with his own will and pleasure; containing these two things: 1. His doing wrong when he does as he pleases. 2. His pleasures being wrong. Or, in other words, perhaps more intelligibly expressing their notion, a person having his heart wrong, and doing wrong from his heart.*"—P. 299.

Here are origins, causes, and causations plentifully marshaled as the things in which the viciousness consists. There must be "a person," and surely a "person" is a *cause*. There must be the "doing wrong;" and that is a mode of causation. There must be "will and pleasure;" "pleasure being wrong," "heart wrong," and these are so many *origins*. There must be "doing as he pleases," "doing wrong from his heart;" and these again are modes of causation. And the requirement of the least of them all incurs the full force of Edwards's infinite series. If in any one or all these origins, causations, and modes of causation, the viciousness lies, then it lies not in these causes, etc., but in the causes of these causes; and so on *ad infinitum*.

CHAPTER VII.

EDWARDS'S DIRECT INTUITIONAL PROOF OF NECESSITATED RESPONSIBILITY.

EDWARDS next (sect. 4, part iv) adduces his direct argument that responsibility for necessitated volition "is agreeable to common sense and the natural notions of mankind."

He first states, in words already quoted, (p. 407,) "what the vulgar notion of blameworthiness is." It is "a person's having his heart wrong and doing wrong from the heart;" a notion, by the way, which, 1. Contradicts his assertion that the origin or source of the volition has nothing to do with blameworthiness; and, 2. Would render very difficult any explanation of the sin of the first angels and of our first parents. But the "vulgar notion" being thus, men act upon it without mounting into speculations as to the freedom or non-freedom of the Will. "And that is the end of the matter."

I. Not quite the "end of the matter." We indeed grant that in these conditions common sense does concede the responsibility of acts of WILL—but NOT OF WILL—but not necessitated Will. NECESSITATED WILL!* Edwards here first professedly proves necessitation upon Will, and then takes the intuitive human assumption that Will is responsible, (an assumption made under tacit subsumption that Will is what it intrinsically is—*free*,) in proof that Will, loaded with necessity, is responsible. Herein the intuition subsuming that Will is free is Arminian; and Edwards *dexterously claps this Arminian subsumption under his necessitarian overlay*; so that we have it, a *necessitated volition* is responsible because intuitively a *non-necessitated volition* is.

* See p. 418.

II. A lurking consciousness of his sophism seems to have disturbed Edwards's mind; and he thus forecloses the common sense of mankind from any voice upon the subject:

Edwards's
foreclosure
of common
sense.

"The common people do not ascend up in their reflections and abstractions to the metaphysical sources, relations, and dependencies of things, in order to form their notions of faultiness or blameworthiness. They do not wait till they have decided by their refinings what first determines the Will; whether it be determined by something extrinsic or intrinsic; whether volition determines volition, or whether the understanding determines the Will; whether there be any such thing as metaphysicians mean by contingency, (if they have any meaning;) whether there be a sort of a strange, unaccountable sovereignty in the Will, in the exercise of which, by its own sovereign acts, it brings to pass all its own sovereign acts. They do not take any part of their notion of fault or blame from the resolution of any such questions."—P. 300.

We reply, first, this is a fair surrender of any claim that the common sense affirms necessitation of Will. The common sense, according to Edwards, does not go up so far as that question. *Necessity of Will is then no doctrine of common sense.* But we claim that common sense does assume, as elsewhere explained, the freedom of the Will. The common mind is perpetually assuming axioms in the particular instances,* of which it never separately thinks. It cannot isolate them in thought, nor frame them into language; but it instinctively and rightly assumes them as latent regulatives of its spontaneous and instantaneous natural judgments. "Common people," Edwards adds, "do suppose that it is the person's own act and deed." And, we add, they do subsume in their morally blaming that there was power

Surrender of
its testimony.

Popular views
of free choice.

* See p. 399.

of choice to do otherwise; not because they distinctly state that thought to themselves, but because it is naturally seen a constituent of the notion of a free blameable act. When a proposition comes announcing that the choice was overlaid with a causative necessitation, securing its putting forth, and excluding from the agent in the case all adequate power for any other choice instead, a new, an unexpected, a foreign, and a very doubtful notion is introduced. It is felt that the judgment attributing blame was pronounced without inclusion of any such notion. It requires no profounder met-

The common
mind does
perceive as
difficult dis-
tinctions.

aphysics for a man of common sense to perceive that necessitation destroys the responsibility of the volitional act than it does to perceive that compulsion destroys the responsibility of corporeal motion. Men decide the last without instruction from moral philosophers, and without any abstruse train of reasoning, by immediate moral intuition. Just as easily can they see with a glance of the moral instinct, that to fasten a man's volitions by necessitative causation, and then require a contrary volition from him, makes not a sinner of the man, but of the requirer.

III. Edwards adds, "The common people, in their notion of a faulty or praiseworthy deed or work done by any one, do suppose that he does it in the exercise of *liberty*. But then their notion of liberty is only a person's having opportunity of doing as he pleases. They have no notion of liberty consisting in the Will's first acting, and so causing its own acts," etc. Undoubtedly "the common people" have no such "notion" of "liberty" as Edwards's rigmarole attributes to "Arminians;" but we apprehend that they would require the liberty or power to be located precisely in

Judges that
the respons-
ible part
should be
the free.

the faculty, organ, or part of the agent by which the required act is to be performed, and that the power be for just the act required.

If the act required is in the foot, "the common people" will require both liberty (that is, exemption from restriction) and power in the foot. If by the body, the liberty and the power will be required by "the common people" to exist in the body, and not in something else. If by the intellect, then in the intellect. If by the Will, then in the Will. If something is to be externally done, then the external must be at full liberty to perform. But when an obligation not to *do*, but to *will*, is laid upon the Will, common people will require something different from merely "the liberty" or "opportunity of *doing*;" even "of *doing* as he pleases." It will call for liberty and power *in the Will*; and for just the power, and just the amount and direction of the power and freedom *adequate for the volition required*. Even "common people" can see that obligation to act is an obligation to exert an existing power; and that the obligation to exert a power that does not exist, whether upon the body, intellect, or Will, is an obligation to nothing, and is no obligation at all.

IV. Edwards's next argument is this: If "moral necessity"—that is, necessitation of Will to particular volition—excuses, then approximation to such perfect necessitation *proportionately* excuses. His proof is this: For in "natural," that is, corporeal, necessitation such proportion exists; namely, the nearer a perfect corporeal necessitation, the nearer a perfect excuse; and the same rule must, by logical consequence, hold of force upon the Will. But, says Edwards, "the reverse of this is true;" that is, the degree of excuse for volitional or motive force is, in fact, not proportioned to the nearness to necessitation. And then he proceeds to prove this *non-existence of volitional excuse proportioned to the necessitation* Does "moral necessity" excuse, even proportionately? Edwards twice changes question. in a decidedly adroit way; namely, by two successive changes of the question.

1. In place of *necessitation upon the Will* he substi-

Substitutes: 1. "Inclination" for necessitation on Will. tutes "propensity" and "inclination" in the volitional agent; and the question then would become this: Would the excusableness of the volition be in proportion to the strength of the evil "inclination?" which is quite a new question. 2. In place of the Will or volition, whose excusableness is the matter of question, he substitutes the moral character of the man or *agent* himself; and then the question, under the double slide, is this: Is a *man* excusable or commendable in proportion to the strength of his bad "inclinations?" And so finally it resolves into about this: Is a man the better the worse his propensities are? And of course to such a question Edwards obtains the ready negative. But unluckily it is not the question under discussion.

2. Character of the man for responsibility of volition.

The question is not as to the view we take of the general moral character of *the man* as possessed of "inclinations;" nor as to the effect of his "inclinations" upon his volitions; but the question is, What effect should the different increases of motive force and of approaches to necessitation produce *upon the degree of responsibility for a volition?* To which we reply, as we elsewhere more fully show,* that the power of temptation does often excuse proportionately to its strength, as much as the force of coercion on the external act. When an agent proves that there never existed in his created nature a ground of possibility that the tempting motive should be volitionally resisted, he is blameless. Approximations to this, not self-superinduced, do proportionately excuse. So that Edwards's "reverse" must be absolutely reversed. The same law of excusableness, graduated by the degree of force, applies equally to motive force on Will, and coercive force on body.

V. Finally, Edwards brings the trueness of his distinction between "natural and moral ability" to the test of a full example. Suppose a prince

Example of two cases.

* See p. 331.

has two rebels in separate prisons, to each of whom he offers pardon and restoration to favor, upon condition that he will come forward and make a full and voluntary submission. The FORMER would accept the pardon, but bars and chains, alas! preclude; and this is a case of physical necessitation or "*natural inability*." The LATTER has the same offer; but so powerfully do pride and hatred bar his heart, and his heart bind his Will, that by *moral necessity* he refuses. Now, Edwards argues, every one can see that the two cases are very different; that the *former* case excuses, while the *latter* does not; that this *latter* necessitation, though producing what is called a "*moral inability*," creates no real "*inability*;" since the latter rebel can submit "if he pleases," "though the vile temper of his heart is so fixed and rooted that *it is impossible that it should please him*."

We can indeed readily see the difference. The *former* of the two is a case of material, physical, or corporeal inability; but no more *natural* than a *natural* causative force upon the *natural* faculty of the Will would be. As being a force, precluding all adequate power for the required action, there is no responsibility. Were we allowed to conceive, however, that the free Will of the rebel was as opposed to the submission as the bars and chains were, those material obstacles would no longer be an excuse; his soul would be as responsible as if the body were free. This would be, indeed, a third case, combining the other two into one, but quite as illustrative as either.

In the *latter* case we will make two suppositions:

It may have been a case of self-superinduced necessity; or

It may have been a case of created, born, or objective and changeless necessity.

1. Supposing the man by nature volitionally free, he may have voluntarily and freely indulged, cultivated, and enlarged his malevolent feelings, and so have reduced,

enfeebled, and destroyed his better feelings, that when the offer of pardon came he was at the moment so filled with excitement that all favorable motive was driven from his attention or thought; the alternative conditions of freedom did not exist, and he was volitionally unfree. Yet as he has freely superinduced this one-sided bondage and true *inability* upon himself, he cannot excuse this crime by previous crime. Nay, the man is responsible and guilty for his self-superinduced bad passions, with all their enormity and overwhelming power and consequences.

2. Suppose, however, this slave of passion to have been enslaved from the first moment of his existence. Suppose, as necessitarianism always claims, that he received at the first instant a completely necessitated being, and state, and nature; suppose that, through every instant of his existence, his being, and state, and nature, and action have all been necessitated, so that his whole historic being, and state, and action, volitional and consequently corporeal, have been run in the absolute mould of fixing causation down to the present instant; then we say that he can be no more responsible or guilty than a solid cube of granite, centrally imbedded in a primary stratum, can be responsible for there lying in its adamantine hardness and fixedness through untold millions of geologic ages.

To Kant's formula, "I ought, therefore I can," (by which he asserted that power ever underlies obligation,)

Müller's reply to Kant. Müller furnishes this supposed complete answer: "If to such an one it be said in the name of the practical reason, 'thou oughtest to be holy in each moment of thy life; therefore henceforth, from this very moment, thou canst be so,' he would say, 'Truly I ought to be able, but I cannot.'"

Ought be now
holy, but *can-*
not.

In the solution of this problem, perhaps we may, from the principles we have laid down, find satisfaction under

the three following suppositions: 1. The agent may have, by his own free adoption of his inability, superinduced it upon his own being. The case, then, is clear; by our expositions, made in the proper place, his responsibility is rationally unquestionable. 2. He may have been overlaid with superimposed necessitation without fault of his own. His *ought*, then, is ideal; it involves neither obligation nor responsibility. 3. Nevertheless he may be placed probationarily under the law of that lofty ideal *ought* with a view to his restoration to its level, or a penalty for free, willful non-restoration. The ideal *ought* would then possess a *critical*, but not a *retributive* power. There may then be interposed by the divine Rector an intermediate law within the power of the agent; this intermediate law may serve as a standard of present acceptance, and as an upward sliding scale to the perfect law; the perfect law stands as the gauge of the present irresponsible defectus, and as the standard of final elevation or measure of final condemnation. Herein it will appear, in opposition to Müller's argument, that there is no retributive *ought* for which there is not the correspondent *can*.

1. Superinduction of the "cannot."

2. True necessitation; the "ought" the ideal.

3. The "ought" a critical standard of ultimate perfection.

No ought without the *can*.

CHAPTER VIII.

RESPONSIBILITY OF BELIEF DEMONSTRATES FREEDOM OF WILL.

IN his Bridgewater Treatise Dr. Chalmers, one of the most stringent necessitarians of our times, professedly solves the problem of the responsibility of a man for his belief. The denial of that responsibility confessedly derives "all its plausibility from the

Responsibility of belief.

imagination, that the *belief is in no way dependent upon the Will*. It is not morally incumbent upon man to see an object which is placed beyond the sphere of his vision, nor can either a rightful condemnation or a rightful vengeance be laid upon him because he has not perceived it. It must be within range of his seeing, and then the only question which needs to be resolved is, what the Will has to do with the seeing of it. Now to ^{Resolved by} ^{"Will."} see is not properly an action of the Will, but to look is altogether so; and it is the dependence of this looking faculty on the Will which makes man responsible for what he sees or what he does not see, in reference to all those objects of sight that are placed within the territory of sensible vision."—P. 253.

To relieve us from the irresponsibility of belief arising from the intrinsic necessity of belief apart from all volition, Dr. Chalmers here calls in the aid of Will.

^{If necessity} ^{excuse be-} ^{lief, why not} ^{excuse voli-} ^{tion?} We institute then the grave inquiry, If a necessitated intellect cannot be guilty for its necessitated beliefs, how is it that a necessitated Will is guilty for its necessitated volitions? As the evidence seals the belief, so the motive seals the choice. As the emotive nature has no power of counter emotion, so the volitive nature has no power of counter volition. If, then, one common necessity closes up all alike, why does not one common irresponsibility excuse all alike?

A disbeliever in the responsibility of belief, aware of his necessitarianism, might thus have refuted ^{Reply of dis-} ^{believer.} Dr. C. upon his own ground. "The ground for my rejection of responsibility for belief is the acknowledged necessitated nature of belief. Show me that it is not necessitated and I am answered. But to show me that it is controlled by a Will equally necessitated, is no answer. If a necessitated faculty or operation can be responsible, then no solution of the responsibility of belief can be needed; if a necessitated faculty or operation

cannot be responsible, then neither Will nor volition can be responsible. You must revolve through the whole circle of mental faculties and find necessity everywhere and responsibility nowhere."

According to Dr. Chalmers, belief without evidence is not a possible object of requirement, just because it is not in nature a possible performance. Divine Justice could not require a belief for which there was no power in the soul, any more than it could require a long and lofty strain of celestial music from the solid heart of the insensate rock. But then comes the question, If Justice cannot demand a belief for which there is, in the instance, no adequate power in the intellect, how can it demand a volition for which there is, in the instance, no power in the Will? If the counter evidence presented or the want of affirmative evidence renders it impossible and takes away the power to believe, certainly the presence of a counter motive or the absence of an affirmative renders impossible, and takes away the power to Will. Both may with equal propriety be called *a moral inability*. Of both may it be said with equal sense, or equal sophism, they are "not in strict propriety of speech," after all, to be called an "inability." But whatever the vocable by which they are designated, they are equally a non-existence of power to the thing required; they are in both cases a no-power, and both alike exclude the possibility of obligation or command under a righteous divine government.

If non-belief without evidence irresponsible, why not non-volition without motive?

To this whole argument Chalmers would have replied, with Edwards, that nevertheless it is an ultimate and axiomatic intuition of the moral sense, that *obligation is affixed to Will and not to belief*. The primary belief of the whole race finds blame in the wrong volition, however the volition be acquired, and finds it nowhere else. To this we again* furnish the reply, and

Volition axiomatically responsible?

* See p. 408.

Yes, but not necessitated volitions? we call attention to it as perfectly conclusive, that *the ultimate intuitions of the universal human soul do find blame and obligation primarily in the volition alone*, but NEVER IN A NECESSITATED WILL or volition. A Will, as the intuitions of men behold it, unnecessitated to one way but free to alterities, they do hold to be responsible; a Will, as necessitarianism overlays it with inevitable limitation to the forbidden act, they hold to be irresponsible. Men naturally hold Will responsible because they naturally see it free. They see its freedom as they see the other qualities which go to make the idea of Will, not with a power of analytically isolating this or any other one quality from the rest, but as blended and fused into the total unit. Nor will the assumption that the "vulgar" mind does not enter so deeply into the matter as to be competent to take cognizance of necessitation laid upon Will, for one moment avail. *The "vul-*

So to the
common
mind.

gar" mind—certainly the mind with which Dr. C. is reasoning—*does cognize necessity when superimposed upon belief*, and demands of the philosopher to explain how it can be responsible. If, then, the common sense can see that a necessitation estops the responsibility of belief, it can also see that the same necessitation estops the responsibility of volition.

The necessitarian adherents of Edwards and Chalmers express a permanent inability to understand what we mean by freedom of the Will. We may at this point reply, it is just *that basis of responsibility, whatever it is, which exists in Will, but not in intellect.*

In the matter of *Regeneration* we are told by necessitarian divines that the agent is the Holy Spirit, and that his operation therein in securing the consent of the Will is always effectual and irresistible. Yet we are told by their great standard divine, John Owen, that the Holy Spirit herein works upon our minds "according to their

natures and natural operations." That is, the Holy Spirit secures the consent of the Will, in the natural and normal way, by presenting the necessitative strongest motive. This is the old mechanical freedom *to*, without freedom *from*. So Dr. Hodge (Essays and Reviews, p. 11) quotes Stapfer as saying that the Holy Spirit "so clearly carries truth into our minds, that they are unable not to assent, and presents so great motives to our Will that it is *unable not to consent*."* On the authority of Stapfer, Dr. Hodge asserts that this is the "true Calvinistic doctrine." That is, as the clear meaning is, the intellect and the Will are sealed up with an equal necessitation; the former by the evidence, the latter by the motive. Dr. Hodge, quoting another passage from Stapfer, interprets him as meaning that the Holy Spirit, "though producing conviction, offers no more violence to the mind than a demonstration of a proposition in Geometry." It is thereby free not only *in*, but *because of*, its uninfringed, unqualified necessitation. He quotes Owen as saying of God's work upon our minds, wills, and affections, that "as it is certainly effectual, so it carries no more repugnancy to our faculties than a prevalent persuasion doth." That is, the Will is free, *because* unimpededly necessitated. So also he quotes Bates as saying of God's effectual operations, "we feel them in all our faculties congruously to their nature, enlightening their minds, exciting the conscience, turning the Will." From all which it follows that the intellect is as free in accepting a demonstration as the Will is free in obeying the motive; the freedom in both cases consisting in the fact that there is no compulsion, coaction, or violence offered, but only securative causation resistlessly effectuating the work, excluding all power *from* the faculty of different action. Yet inasmuch as both faculties, intel-

Regeneration
necessitative-
ly wrought.

Volition secured
by motive, as
assent by dem-
onstration.

Free because
according to
nature.

* Veritatem tam clare mentibus ingerit, ut non possint non assentiri, et tanta motiva voluntati suggerit, ut non possit nolle.

lect and Will, are caused to act, and do act, in a mode "congruous to their nature," both are perfectly free in the entire operation. They are free BECAUSE necessary.

A venerable Confession of Faith contains these remarkable words: "God from all eternity did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own Will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass. Yet so as thereby neither is God the author of sin, *nor is violence offered to the Will of the creatures*, nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established."—Chap. 3. "God hath endued the Will of man with that natural liberty, that it is neither forced, nor by any absolute necessity of nature determined, to do good or evil."—Chap. 9. These terms sound so much like an assertion of the doctrine of volitional liberty as against necessity, as to deceive such men as Wesley, Dugald Stuart, and Sir William Hamilton. "The theory of Jonathan Edwards," said Hamilton, "touching the bondage of the Will, is, on the Calvinistic standard of the Westminster Confession, not only heterodox but heretical." And yet so may words conceal their ideas and express their seeming reverse, that we may assert, on the highest Scotch Presbyterian authority, that these words actually deny the contradiction of philosophical necessity.*

When in the Confession it is denied that "violence is done to the Will of the creature," the meaning is that the Will is not violently prevented from choosing according to the highest motive, as an undisturbed intellect is not violently prevented from accepting a highest evidence, a demonstration. When it is said that the Will "is neither forced, nor by an absolute necessity of nature determined to good or evil," it is merely denied that any *force* or physical violence, compulsion or *necessity*, interrupts or deflects the free Will from obeying its law of necessitatively acting according to strongest motive. There is no violence or

Freedom to be
fixed by motive
unviolated.

* British and Foreign Evangelical Review, January, 1858, Art. IX.

necessity crossing the law of necessity. And when it is denied that the “contingency of second causes” is “taken away,” the meaning is, that whereas some causes are complete and necessary in themselves, and other causes dependent on co-operation of additional conditions, and so are contingent, God’s foreordination does not change the nature of these causes so but that the necessary is still necessary and the contingent is still contingent. All of which means that the responsible Will is free to be controlled by the absolute natural necessity of motive force; free to be necessitated, free because necessitated. So John Owen, in his book entitled “Display of Arminianism; being a discovery of the old Pelagian idol Free Will, with the new goddess Contingency,” says: “Yet here observe we do not absolutely oppose free Will, as if it were *nomen inane*, a mere figment, when there is no such thing in the world, but only in that sense the Pelagians and Arminians do assert it. About words we will not contend. We grant man in the substance of his actions as much power, liberty, and freedom as a mere created nature is capable of.* We grant him to be free in his choice from all *outward coaction*, or *inward natural necessity*, to *work according to election and deliberation*, spontaneously *embracing what seemeth good to him*.” “Endued we are with such a liberty of Will as is free from all *outward compulsion* and *inward necessity*, having an elective faculty of applying itself unto that which seems good unto it, in which is a free choice, notwithstanding it is subservient to the decree of God.”—Vol. x, chap. xii, pp. 116, 119. Similar also was the doctrine of Calvin: “If liberty is opposed to coaction, (or force,) I confess, and constantly assert, that the Will is free, and I reckon him a heretic who thinks otherwise. If it is called free in this sense because it is not *forced* or *violently drawn*

Necessity un-
crossed.

Free to obey
strongest mo-
tive.

* That is, “as much freedom as a mere created nature is capable of” in his estimation. That is, he grants just as much freedom as he grants.

by an external movement, but is led on *sua sponte*. I have no objection to this. But because men in general, when they hear this epithet applied to the Will of man, understand it in a very different sense; for this reason I dislike it."—*De Libero arbitrio*, p. 215. According to these extracts freedom is an exemption from all interference with the law of unipotence or inalterative necessitation. A freedom it is to be purely necessitated.

The non-freedom of this freedom will appear from a contemplation of the nature of the necessity of intellect, as appears, for instance, in the mental reception of a geometrical demonstration by intuition of the diagram shown, say, upon the blackboard. The figure, with its relations, is necessitatively what it is. The figure upon the sensorium, with the perceived relations, is necessarily as the figure upon the blackboard.

The perception must be as the figure upon the sensorium. But the volition in a given case being as necessitated as this perception, and the perception as necessitated as the mathematical figure, the logical result is that the *volitions are as free and as necessitated as the nature and intrinsic geometric relations of a mathematical figure*. The *volition thereby* is just as limited to be what it is as a circle is to be a circle. The entire totality of all volitions in all time and eternity, through all the earth and all the universe, are just as free as the inferential steps of a great mathematical demonstration, namely, to be just what they are and no otherwise. No individual volition can be otherwise than it is, any more than any step of a conclusive demonstration can be otherwise than it is. No agent can will otherwise than he does will, any more than a triangle can be a circle. No step of a demonstration can help being what it is, so no agent can help willing as he wills; and as the action is necessarily the result of the volition, so no

Freedom is exemption from interference with inalterativity.

Geometrical freedom.

The totality of events as necessary as the steps of a geometrical process.

agent can help doing what he does. Whether, therefore, he wills or does, if he be responsible at all, *he is responsible for what he cannot help.*

All this demonstrates our point. The freedom of the Will in volition and of the intellect in intellection is equal and the same. In spite of Dr. Chalmers, as the intellect cannot otherwise *see*, so the Will cannot otherwise *look*; for the *object* fixes the one and the *motive* fixes the other. The troubled inquirer about the responsibility of necessitated bad beliefs should be peremptorily told that a bad belief, however necessitated, is in itself responsible; for necessity is no bar to responsibility.

But in very truth we are responsible for our beliefs, because we can help our bad beliefs by our Wills; and we are under obligation to help our bad beliefs by our Wills because our *Wills are not necessitated* to leave our bad beliefs unchanged. Responsibility for belief therefore demonstrates the freedom of the Will.

Point demonstrated.

CHAPTER IX.

COACTION AND NECESSITATION.

COACTION or compulsion is a forceful causation acting upon the body, securing a given act, though *against the Will*; necessitation is a forceful causation acting upon the Will securing a given volitional act; accordant with the Will because it makes the Will accord with itself. In the former case the power of the body is nullified to perform any other than the given corporeal act; in the latter the power of the soul is nullified to the putting forth any other than the given volitional act. In both cases the adequate power is ex-

Coaction and necessitation.

cluded from the agent; in the former case from the body to effectuate the act of the soul; in the latter case from the soul to effectuate the act of the body. In order to the final act in any case required, the conjoint power of both soul and body, of both Will and muscle, is necessary. The want of either excludes, and equally excludes, the act from the reach of the agent. If the power is, on ac-

They equally
exclude
power. count of strongest material obstacle, wanting in the muscle, no capacity of Will amounts to

the adequate power for the required act; if the power is, on account of strongest motive obstacle, wanting in the Will, no capability of muscle amounts to the adequate power for that demanded deed. Whatever the required deed be, coaction by physical force or necessitation by motive influence places, and equally places, the act out of the power of the agent. The power of the agent, therefore, is equally at an end whether the obstacle be coaction or necessitation; whether it be by force of strongest material or of strongest motive. And if the required act be out of the agent's power, whether from coaction or necessitation, it is to him *impossible*. For this is the meaning of the word *impossible*; that for which there is no adequate power. And it is Terms impos-
sible and can-
not equally
applicable to
both. true that he *cannot* perform the required act; for that is the meaning of *cannot*; that for which an agent has not the requisite power.

Now *power must underlie obligation*. An act for which the agent has not the adequate power both volitional and physical, cannot be the subject of just obligation nor just command. Whether Moral respons-
ibility equally
destroyed by
both. there be a want of power to act, through material obstacle, or a want of power to will, through motive obstacle, from that want of power arises the exclusion of all possible obligation to the act, and all divine requirement.

The necessitarian will put this case. Here is a man who ought to support his family by honest labor;

but he is imprisoned and in chains. Does not that excuse him? Yes. Then "*natural*," that is, corporeal, *inability discharges obligation*. But suppose he is fully at liberty, but has no will, disposition, or inclination; does that excuse him? No. Then *moral*, that is, volitional, *inability does not excuse*. But, we reply, that "*no*" is given under assumption that the Will is non-necessitated and that necessitarianism is false. The true answer, then, to be substituted is this: "If necessitarianism is false, *no*; if necessitarianism is true, *yes*." No necessitarian has a right to utter that Arminian "*no*."

Fallacious instance.

Dr. Chalmers, in his Commentary on Romans v, 12-21, puts the case that "one may see a dagger projected from behind a curtain in the firm grasp of a human hand and directed with sure and deadly aim against the bosom of an unconscious sleeper, and seeing no more he would infer of the individual who held this mortal weapon that he was an assassin and that he deserved the death of an assassin." All this undoubtedly the spectator would assume without analysis and in the gross. It would be no moment to institute a grave philosophical inquiry in what that moral agency consisted, but all the elements included in responsible agency would instantly and intuitively be assumed. And one of these assumptions of the intuition would be, underlying the judgment of moral responsibility and desert of divine penalty, that *the volition for the act was performed in full power of willing or not willing the performance*, and all attribution of moral responsibility would be at an end.

Chalmers's case.

Dr. Chalmers next supposes that a lifting of the curtain discloses a person behind the supposed assassin grasping his hand and compelling him to infix the dagger into the bosom of the sleeper, who is in fact his bosom friend. Common sense of course affirms that the supposed assassin is no assassin, and is morally guiltless of the death of his friend. And

Chalmers's supposition of a physical compulsion.

upon what principle? Plainly upon the principle that where there is no adequate power of avoidance there can be no obligation to avoidance and no guilt for non-avoidance. For instead of the material curtain suppose that the *psychological curtain* which covers the movements of mind were lifted up and it were seen that a controlling *causation* behind the man's Will propelled its springs and, excluding all contrary power, enforced the volition which, through the hand, drove the dagger into the sleeper's heart, what then would the moral judgment be? Why should physical chains, binding the arm, any more excuse an act than a ligature, stronger than the iron chain, fastening the Will, excuse the volition?

Our further
supposition
in the case.

A bound Will
and a bound
arm equally
excusable.

"An act *against* the Will," says Dr. Chalmers, "indicates no demerit on the part of him who performed it. But an act *with* the Will gives us the full impression of demerit. The philosopher may amuse himself with that ulterior query: What was it that originated the Will? But the peasant has no metaphysics and no speculation for entertaining such a topic. And yet he has just as fresh and just as enlightened sense of a bad action, coming from a bad intention, as the most curious and contemplative inquirer."

If, we reply, the "peasant" has just as fresh and enlightened a sense of the *demerit of a bad action coming from a bad intention* as the philosopher himself, so he may have just as clear and quick a sense of the *irresponsibility of a volition coming from a necessitated Will*. He may be no more able to discuss one than the other. But he may have just as clear an intuition of one as of the other. While he will fully admit that "an act against the Will indicates no demerit," he will also assume that a volition which there was no power of avoiding has no demerit, and affirm conversely that there ever is a power of avoiding the volition of which demerit can be affirmed.

The peasant
as easily can
understand
what Dr. C.
denies as
what he ad-
mits.

CHAPTER X.

ARGUMENT FROM GOD'S NON-AUTHORSHIP OF SIN.

THE entire issue as to God's relation to sin between the freedomist and the necessitarian is this:

The former maintains that while God foreknows that in a given course of the most wise divine conduct a free agent will, with full power to do Freedomistic view. otherwise, bring sin into existence, he, nevertheless, neither destroys the agent *nor prevents* his sin, but prosecutes his own course of most perfect wisdom to the best result. This may be called the theory of NON-PREVENTION.

The latter maintains that God, in view of the best possible results, to which the sin of the agent is an inseparable incident, *necessitates* the Necessitarian. agent to sin, intentionally setting into efficient operation the train of causes by which his sinning is necessitatively secured. This is the theory of NECESSITATION.

The charge against the latter view is that by maintaining that God—not merely non-prevents, but—necessitates sin, necessitarianism makes God to be “the author of sin.” For to *necessitate* is not merely to permit, or not hinder or not prevent; it is *to be the inalterative securer and the intentional causer of sin*. And to be the intentional causer of sin is to be the responsible author of sin.

I. In regard to Edwards, we may here note the very remarkable fact that, although his whole work aggressively *maintains* necessitation, yet when he comes to this point he *defends* only the theory of *non-prevention*! He seems to forget to which side he belongs, and quietly exculpates his opponents, the non-preventionists, from charging God with the authorship of sin. He makes two suppositions, as follows:

1. "If," says he, "by the author of sin be meant the sinner, the agent, the actor of sin, or the doer of a wicked thing, then—" No matter what "then." For that is an imaginary "if." The real question is, Suppose by "author" is meant *necessitator* of sin, the necessitator of all sin, the necessitator of the sinner to be the "sinner," "the actor," "the doer;" what then is the answer of Edwards? Nothing.

2. "If," says he, "by the author of sin is meant the permitter, or not hinderer of sin, and at the same time a disposer of the state of events in such a manner . . . that sin, if it be permitted or not hindered, will most certainly follow," then God is no author of sin. That is, the non-prevention theory—the theory of his opponents—does not make God the author of sin. This is a generous exculpation of us Arminians! But what does Edwards say in defense of his own theory, namely, of Necessitation? Nothing. He simply defends the position of his opponents, and leaves his own system defenseless and naked to its enemies. He has demonstrated Calvinism; he now defends only Arminianism.

It is not merely permission, not-hindering, non-annihilation, non-prevention, privative non-interference, nor the so arranging that sin, if not prevented, will take place, that Necessitarianism teaches. It teaches that God is the necessitative first cause, through a straight inevitable line of necessitating second causes, of the man's existence, and of his every act, and of his final damnation for that being and act. Necessitated to be what he is, to do what he does, of that necessitation God is the original necessitator, the necessitator who not only negatively precludes any different results from any possible existence, but positively necessitates that sole result to come into existence. That is, God necessitates his existence, his nature, his sin, and his damnation for that necessitated nature and sin. Man has no adequate ability for different existence, choice, act, or destiny.

In the question of responsibility for an intended effect, be it here noted, it makes no difference through how many intermediate necessary No matter how long the series. causes the causation has to pass from the first cause to the last effect. No matter how long the series of mediate necessitative causes, or how many the terms in the series, the first intentional causer is the responsible author of the final intended effect. If the necessary mediate causes are billions of billions, the intentional causer is as truly the responsible author of the effect at the far end as if it were an immediate voluntary act or a simple volition. The whole series is responsibly ONE ACT; the final effect is *the* one act. The right First cause cause of last effect. line of causation shoots through the whole series, and binds the first cause to a responsibility for the last effect.

Suppose a boy upon a high scaffold intentionally so arranges a number of standing bricks in a row, that when he pushes down the first, that shall push down the second, and the second the third, and so on, so that the last brick, according to his purpose, shall fall upon the head of a sleeping man, and fulfill his intention of murdering him. Would the act be less guilty or the boy less responsible than if he had crushed the man with a single brick, or assassinated him with a dagger, or *willed* him to an actual death by a volition? Or if the bricks were a small number, would the increase of them by a score, a hundred, or a thousand, diminish the responsibility?

It would be no moral exculpation of this boy to say that he merely "so disposed" the bricks that the murder, "if it be permitted or not hindered, will most certainly and infallibly follow." The statement would be false, for he did more than this. He *necessitated*, inalternatively *caused* the brick to fall; and so he was author of the murder—the murderer. The causative force from his finger ran in Serial causation is not mere permission.

a right line through all the bricks and murdered the man. The intention of the act ran through all the bricks and achieved the crime. He had excluded from each and every brick the adequate power or possibility for any other effect. Mere *permission* and *necessitation* are thus very different things in the question of responsible authorship.

Should the superintendent of an Atlantic telegraphic cable intentionally so manipulate as to transmit to another continent a malignant falsehood, the wickedness of the deed would not be diminished by the length of the cable. No matter through how many inches or particles of matter the lie has to pass, its guilt is as if the whole were done by nothing but a lying volition and a lying tongue. Every human act of overt sin passes through countless particles of matter. If a man be murderously shot, the action starting from the volition passes through the material particles of the brain, the nerves, the fingers, the gun, the trigger, the explosion, the bullet, and the victim's body. Yet through all the necessitative series, the intentional causer of the first movement is responsible author of the last effect.

It would be no excuse for the telegraph operator to say that he was only "the permitter, or not the hinderer of sin," (Edwards on the Will, p. 356,) that is, of the lie; "and at the same time a disposer of the state of events, in such a manner, for wise, holy, and most excellent ends and purposes, that sin, if it be permitted and not hindered, will most certainly and infallibly follow." To send the lie for "wise and holy ends," would be the true Jesuitical morality of "doing evil that good may come," of lying for the glory of God. To say that he was merely "the permitter or not hinderer" of the lie is itself a lie.

The first cause is the responsible cause of the last effect. If the first cause is a living being, he is not only the cause but he is the causer; and if he intended that

Causer is not
mere per-
mitter, or
not hinderer.

the last effect should exist, then he is the intentional causer that the last effect should exist. And if this first intentional causer be a supposed God, and the last effect be sin, the supposed God is the intentional causer of that sin. But surely the intentional causer of a thing is author of that thing. God then, according to necessitarianism, we charge, is the responsible author of sin.

And by the same doctrine it is further true that God is as truly the author of sin as if the sin were his own immediate intentional act. God is hereby the responsible author of the final effect as truly as if it were his own act, or his own simple volition. From the Will of God to the act of the sinner the line of causation through all the intermediates is a straight line. And to all the purposes of just responsibility it is a short line—a point.

As truly its author as if by immediate act.

II. Edwards next proceeds to the Scripture Argument. He adduces the cases of Pharaoh, of Joseph's brethren, of the king of Assyria, of Nebuchadnezzar, and of the crucifiers of Christ to prove—it is not very clear what. These passages, it is at present sufficient to say, have terms of causation that seem to ascribe the authorship of sin to God. These passages either prove God's necessitation of sin, or his mere permission or non-prevention. By Edwards's own argument they cannot mean the former; for he asserts there is nothing but mere permission. If there be nothing but mere permission, then they make nothing against Arminianism. He quotes but does not analyze them on this point; very much as if he meant, non-committally, to have a causation, and a necessitation of sin, by the reader *inferred*, which he thought not best explicitly himself to *express*.

His Scripture argument.

Proves too much or too little.

III. Edwards next defends a necessitating God from the responsibility for sin by the distinction between *positive* and *PRIVATIVE* causations. The sun by his direct ray is the *POSITIVE* cause, and, so to speak, the responsible

author of day. But he is the author of night with her darkness, damps, and monsters by privation; that is, simply by the withdrawment of his light, and so not the responsible author. So God is not the direct and positive, but only the privative and so the irresponsible cause of sin.

But, we reply, necessity makes God the *positive* and not merely the *negative* cause of sin. God according to necessity positively sets all the first causes and materials in existence and action; just as the boy arranges the bricks and throws down the first, which throws down all to the last. The first start given secures the whole, excluding all but the given result. The line of causation from God's finger streaks through all second causes and secures the result. Sin is an act directly necessitated, and so not by privative but positive causation.

We reply, second, that necessity makes God positively cause the privative *defectus*, which demands the supply of remedy. The sun does not create the antecedents, causes, or circumstances which positively produce the *defectus*, night. God necessitatively creates all the anterior positivities, all the conditions which necessitate the existence of the resultant *privation*. The very *privative* thereby becomes *positive*. Thereby a strict truth is found in Whitby's maxim, "*Causa deficiens in rebus necessariis, ad causam per se efficientem reducenda est*—In things necessary the deficient cause must be reduced to the efficient." Where the *defectus* is the result of necessary causes, the withdrawment or withholding the reparative of the *defectus*, especially by the author of all the anterior causalities, is equivalent to positive causation of the *defectus* and of all its necessary consequences. Privation is as positive a cause as impulsion: a caused darkness blinds as truly and as responsibly as light gives vision.

IV. But it is said further by Edwards, "*Men do will*

sin AS SIN, and so are the authors and actors of it ;” “ God does NOT will SIN AS SIN, or for the sake of anything evil.” To this we reply,

1. None but the most depraved among men and the devils do will “sin as sin,” that is, for the sake of sinning. Men have no specific appetite for sin as such. The great majority of sins are committed not because they are sin, but for the sake of some “apparent greatest good” seen in the act or object, and in spite or disregard of their being sin. Sin is *anomia*, lawlessness, that is, disregard of law. That is, sin, as an act, is an act performed to gratify some particular propensity in spite or in disregard of the forbidding moral rule. Hence it is a *transgression* or *overpassing* of the boundary line of law and right. A deeper depravity may indeed develop itself in the form of sin as sin, and for the sake of sin. This would seem to be the element of the devils, who hate God’s law because it is his law, and trample upon it for their direct hatred of it. This direct and conscious sin *against* God stands liable to Edwards’s famous argument to prove the infinite demerit of sin from its measurement as an offense against an Infinite Being.

2. But by Edwards’s argument, God does will and necessitate “sin as sin.” God necessitates sin as being what it is. Its sinfulness, its malignity, its blackness, its depravity of source in the dispositions, its atrocity of external act, all are necessitated by him. As the sinner wills it, so the necessitarian deity wills it. As the finite sins it so this Infinite sins it. God necessitates, wills, decrees, foreordains whatsoever comes to pass; the sinfulness of sin, sin as sin, comes to pass; God, therefore, necessitates, wills, decrees, foreordains the sinfulness of sin, sin as sin.

3. It is relevant to our argument, as will soon appear, to add, that for the sin thus willed by God and necessitated upon the sinner, eternal death is

Men will sin
not as sin.

Except by
deeper depravity.

Divine willing
of sin as sin.

Unjust penalty.

affixed as a penalty by the same divine Ruler. But just penalty for an unavoidable act is impossible. It is as impossible even to omnipotence as a contradiction. It is a non-compliance with absolute conditions of justice.* The double wrong is hereby ascribed to the Deity by necessity of securing the sinfulness of the sin and securing infliction that can never be just penalty.

V. But God "wills sin," Edwards adds, and necessitates it in the sinner, not for its own sake, "but for the sake of the great good that by his disposal Sin for sake of consequent good. shall be the consequence." To this Edwards very justly anticipates the reply that, "All that these things amount to is that *God may do evil that good may come.*" If God may truly necessitate sin in the sinner, necessitate the sinfulness and guilt of that sin, and then necessitate an endless hell for the necessitated sin, all for some good and glorious end, then the maxim of the sons of Loyola, that the *end sanctifies the means*, is a fundamental maxim of the divine administration. God is then admitted to be the Author of Sin, and he is justified in being the Author of Sin. The fact is granted and excused. In order to make a beneficial crime holy, the method is, (as is well quoted by Professor Bledsoe from Pascal,) "simply *taking off their intention from the sin itself* and fixing it on the advantage to be gained." Edwards makes the supposed divine necessitation of sin, guilt, and damnation all right and holy, by Transfer of intention. simply taking the divine intention from them and placing it on the good result to be obtained. If this be the divine morality why not the human?

4. But is it possible that good can be imagined to result from such a course? Can any glorious result possibly be supposed to result from a divine necessitation of sin, a necessitation of guilt, an unjust necessitation of hell? Can the holiness of the universe be attained through such an unholiness? Can

* See p. 388.

the blessedness of heaven be genuine at such a price? Can a holy being generously, wisely, holily accept heaven on such a condition? Can there be a heaven? But the thought is too awful to be traced to its ultimate bearings.

VI. But Edwards has his reply: "For God to dispose and permit evil, [he should say *cause, necessitate, predestinate, and will* sin,] in the manner that has been spoken of, is not to do evil that good may come, for it is not to do evil at all." Certainly it is "to do evil;" unless the goodness of the result changes the "*do evil*" and makes it good. But the doctrine that the "*do evil*" is made good by what "good may come," is Good result cannot make evil good. the very pith and infamy of the Jesuit maxim. That maxim stands in opposition to the true doctrine that *intrinsic evil cannot by any result be transmuted into good.*

In his defense, Edwards finally argues, that for God's supposed conduct herein to be evil "there must be one of three things belonging to it: Trilemma. either it must be a thing unfit and unsuitable in its own nature; or it must have a bad tendency; or it must proceed from an evil disposition, and be done for an evil end." He denies all three of the conduct he ascribes to God.

We affirm all three. We affirm them for the following reasons: *First.* The necessitating and willing wickedness, and causing it to be willed and done, is "unfit and unsuitable in its own nature." 1. Unfit in its own nature. To so necessitate it that it cannot but be done, annihilating all adequate power to do right instead, is very "unfit and unsuitable in its own nature." To necessitate an eternal misery in hell, as the necessary consequence of necessitated sin, is horribly "unfit and unsuitable in its own nature." To do all this under the pretense of holiness, justice, and righteousness, is, finally, "unfit and unsuitable in its own nature." And being thus *intrinsically* and *essentially* evil, "evil in its own nature," it is unchangeably "evil," and no ulterior ends can justify or

transmute it into holiness and right. *Second. It must have a bad tendency.* For what were the intrinsic tendency, imagine, of an unholy God over the universe? If a deity is guilty of falsehood and cruel wrong, who can rely on his pretenses, especially upon his pretenses that all this, forsooth, will be made to result for the best? But we turn from the horrible phantasm presented by this necessitarian theory to our view.

3. From evil intention. Third. It must proceed from an evil disposition. For surely the very intention to commit intrinsic wickedness, that good may come, is "an evil disposition." But let us close our view of these most wretched arguments. Where in all standard Protestant theology shall we find a chapter more replete with the logic of a sophist and the ethics of a Jesuit?

If God be holy, he cannot consistently with that character necessitate sin; but God is holy; sin is therefore unnecessitated. Holiness in God demonstrates freedom in man. If God is holy, man is free.

CHAPTER XI.

FREEDOM THE CONDITION OF A POSSIBLE THEODICE.

OF our various argument as a whole, the summary conclusion is that necessitarianism attains but an Automatism, and not a just divine retributive Government. It is incapable of framing a Theodice. The *necessary* CONDITION to the *possible existence of a true Divine Government is the Volitional FREEDOM, both of the infinite and the finite Person.*

1. Necessity furnishes, as has been shown, but an *automatic Deity*. Of nothing is he capable but just what he does, volitionally and there-

Automatic
Creator.

fore extravolitionally. His effects are the intrinsic measure of the causation in his nature and being.

2. Man, being an AUTOMATIC CREATURE, is, as we have shown, no possible subject of command, of de-
Automatic creature.
 sert, of blame or praise, of reward or penalty, and so not of Government. As God is an infinite and man a finite, so both combined are a composite single automatism.

3. A universal created SYSTEM OF VOLITIONS, automatically resultant from inalterative particular causations, can constitute no just retributive *system*. Or
Automatic volitional system.
 if this organic system of volitions is not an intrinsically caused system; if without the impact of cause the action of all Wills, actual or possible, move by an intrinsic spontaneity, by a law precisely coinciding with the Law of Causality, the Universe is still an Automatism. The one is an orrery that
Whether causal or spontaneous.
 moves by a force from without; the other is an orrery that moves in the same orbit by an intrinsic force, both by an equally necessitative Law. One is an automatism performing its actions from an external, the other from an internal impulse; but both with an equal fixedness by the same anterior and formulable programme, and to the same result. Of no such constituents can even a Deity construct a Divine Government. For how can the Deity impose laws upon a system of beings whose actions are already fixed by the Law either of causation or of a spontaneity coinciding with causation? Either his law must coincide with those laws; and then those Laws are the law of his law, so that his law is no law at all, and he is rather ruled than Ruler; or his Law must cross those laws, and thus most unjustly sub-
Clash of Laws.
 ject its subjects to conflicting jurisdictions, one of which they must obey, and yet be punished for disobedience to the other.

In order that God may be a just Sovereign, his law must be the expression of Rectitude; and his subjects

must, uncircumscribed by laws of causation or invariability, be able to coincide with it. In order for him to be a just *retributive* Sovereign, prepared to administer reward or penalty, they must possess power to coincide or the reverse—a power uncontradicted alike by a universal Causation or an equally universal Spontaneity.

4. Retribution and automatism are incompatible in a moral system. Pain may be affixed as a sequent of bad action, and happiness as the sequent of good action. But if by necessitative law the action be as truly affixed to the agent as these sequents to the act, pain and happiness are consequences, but they are not ethically *deserved* reward and penalty. As expedients they may by motivity prevent evil action, as cause produces effect. But the whole operation and the whole system is then mechanical, not retributive.

5. The moral intuition of justice is either unsatisfied, or false and meaningless. Of all the above regulative expedients, by which pain is applied to the prevention of crime, the retributive sentiment knows nothing. What the moral sense demands and identifies is pure absolute justice; and if the system of the universe be automatic in distinction from alternative, such pure justice has no existence.

From all this, there results the Conclusion that without free volition there can be no justice, no satisfying the moral sense, no retributive system, no moral Government, of which the creature can be the rightful subject, or God the righteous Administrator. The existence of a system, and the existence in the soul of man of a demand for a system combining these elements, demonstrate the reality of Volitional Freedom. Either there is no Divine Government, or man is a non-necessitated moral Agent.

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